In this paper I attempt to construct an African philosophy of education, focusing particularly on how notions of ubuntu and community guide educational practices.

Placing the analyses in an interdisciplinary manner, the present paper fallows to catch and value, form a moral-formative perspective, the interpretations of the ethical theories regarding the evolutions in a moral plan, in order to build a structural model of the morality development levels, with all the complex and dynamiccomponents that this one transmits. We have proposed that this should have as final purpose the transfer and focalization of this data over the significant space of forming the human being as a moral, autonomous and responsible personality, by offering, we hope, in the terms in of efficiency, a rich space, a more complete and operational form about the levels of morality and moral education. The education in mostly very responsible for the step that defines the educated morality, of the community, of the society and a re-thinking, a restructuring and direction of the moral education on different levels is, we think, a way of responding to the challenges of today and tomorrow’s world.

The issues that we raised go beyond the framework of just pedagogical research, since they cover an area of research in the juncture of the sciences about the human being. We are talking about the interdisciplinary analysis and integration of the fundamental foundations of the solution of the problems of both theoretical and constructive-designing character. At that, the philosophy of education carries out its regulatory function determining directions and boundaries of the research. The philosophy of education inscribes itself in the cultural dominant of the time, in such way fostering the choice of the development strategy of the educational systems, which will be adequate to the positive tendencies of social development, the modern spiritual search of humanity. The research in the area of education philosophy is connected with the integration of sociological, culturological, philosophical, economical, political, biological, psychological and other knowledge. The interdisciplinary character is a necessary condition of overcoming certain isolation of the modern theory of pedagogics from general processes of cultural, scientific, and social development; a condition of significant growth of its conceptual and theoretical level, serious strengthening of its role and importance in determining the prospects of education, in the development of educational programs, projects of various levels.

The exponential growth of digital and communication technologies coupled with the rising need for continuing education have resulted in a proliferation of distance learning opportunities on a global scale. The most common and preferred option for the delivery of flexible education is online learning which relies oncomputers and the Internet to enable collaboration, participation and instruction. This new modality of learning requires novel pedagogical approaches and the seamless and transparent integration of technology. This paper proposes to discuss the emerging pedagogical underpinnings and their connection to thetechnologies that enable anytime, anywhere educational participation.

In the article is examined a problem of system and complex approach to management of modern education. The authors emphasize that development of education technology is accompanied by formation of informational, telecommunicational and communicative systems. The development of informationaltechnologies entails the formation of in principle new educational system. This system can ensure millions of people accordance to new educational services. The use of modern computer, telecommunicational and communicative technologies in education intends re-engineering of educational activities, considerablechanges in all its systems. The effectiveness of education is based on the modern technologies. It often depends on quality of use of these technologies for solution of one or another educational task. Innovations in technical system influence the development of educational process.

Based on the well known change of values during the last 30 years and the alleged necessity of values education the concept of value will be distinguished from the concepts of norm and virtue. Then a list of values, norms and virtues is presented - tabulated according several spheres of life - an overview which, in return,provokes one to think about what is the most fundamental and essential in this order.

By the end of the 20th century educational issues had become of global character due to the fact, that it is education that makes the basis for the social dimensions of the 21st century. The importance of educational issues can be explained by the post-industrial society being oriented at rising the significance of information and knowledge as being the main resources for the society development, at the priority of intellectual activities, resulting in changing the roleand place of education in the society, at turning education into the strategically important sphere of our lives.

The appearance of mass media and a versatile medium of videos can serve the convenience and instructive information for children; on the other hand, it could abet them in implicit image consumption. Now is the time for kids' to be in need of thinking power which enables them to make a choice, applications andcriticism of information within such visual cultures. In spite of these social changes, the realities are that our curriculum still doesn't meet a learner's demand properly. This research, in this context, is aimed at looking out on the currently implemented art appreciation learning process in a critical fashion, and also aimed at suggesting a plan for visual culture learning by applying the philosophy program for kids as a new alternative. The purpose of such education is toenhance the capability to solve a variety of problems they are facing in the course of daily life by reflecting their matter of concern in a curriculum. What we have to pay attention to in visual culture learning is 'visual literacy.' Such an interpretative faculty of a critical reading of images is a must especially when kids should make a judgment of value hidden in images in their daily events, make an analysis of an ideological message and make an information-oriented decision. Therefore, learners have to enrich their higher-order thinking power as well as critical thinking faculty in modern society. If there is no objection to these social surroundings, it is quite natural that philosophy education, which forms a base of a higher-order thinking for children should be handled significantly at school.

The paper starts by stating that the concept of progress, which is a key factor in the Enlightenment programme on the philosophy of history, has vanished from our society of risk, and posits whether it is possible today to rethink the philosophy of history. The second part refers to the negation of this philosophy by Badiou and Lyotard, due to the disappearance of the “modern subject”, which lay at its heart. There are many “histories”, but there is no single “History”. The third part of the paper seeks to counteract that negation through the Sartrean concept of “alienation”, which involves a change in human relationships (“reification”), resulting from the “subject matter worked by praxis”. This is a concept that allows us to speak today of a universal history, whose “no-subject” would be that “worked subject matter”. The paper concludes by affirming that the aim of philosophy today is not to “contemplate the world” or “change the world” but rather to “take care of the world”.

This article seeks to explain the transformation of culture using the mechanism of evolutionary theory. Social biologists have been dealing with this issue for many years now. However, these scholars have not sufficiently allowed for the importance of factors independent of genes. They have primarily thought of culture as nothing more than the expansion of genes, as an increase in the rate of genetic adaptation. Namely, they have focused less on culture itself and more on its natural origins. Even while accepting the dual inheritance model that the structure of biological genes and cultural transmission is different, this article seeksto take a step further. My aim is to show how culture that takes shape on the group level is explainable on the cultural genetic level. Seen from the point of view of culture genetics, the transformation of culture signifies the transformation in the frequency of a cultural gene. At this point, we are thus faced with the following questions: 1) Is it possible to concretize the units of culture genes? 2) What is the fundamental characteristic of a culture gene? and 3) What relationship is there between biological genes and cultural genes? This article will prove that it is indeed possible to concretize the units of culture genes, that the most substantialfundamental characteristic of a cultural gene is, as would be expected, to clone itself, and that cultural genes and biological genes exist within multiple relationships of cooperation, conflict, and reciprocity. Finally, this article will further concretize the dual inheritance model with a careful examination of its two patterns of evolutionary explanation, the reductionist on the one hand, and the non-reductionist on the other. This examination will conclude that, in terms of culture, the non-reductionist model is the most suitable.

This paper deals with two different meanings of the concepts of representation related to historiography. Both of them have different consequences when they attempt to give account of recent pasts in conflict. The first of them is representation as it is understood in cultural or social history –a sort of belief that people have about the world, especially with recent pasts that affect them. The other one is historical language or historiography understood -after the linguistic turn- as a representation of the past. The main objective of this paper is to show how these two meanings of representation collapse in a “history of the present” or in a“history of the recent past”.

The purpose in this text is to focus on one of the possible use of broadly psychoanalytic concepts in history: the analysis and treatment of historical testimonies by witnesses of “traumatic events”. A number of historians have proposed that some witness accounts could be understood as “elaborations of the past”, in the technical psychoanalytic sense. My interest is in the question whether the discourse of the psychoanalytic patient and the historical testimony by the traumatized witness possess the same epistemological status, as claimed by the historians alluded to. My view is that the claims of similarity should be resisted.Is philosophyrelevant to everyday life? Is it not too abstract and general? The knowledge of priests, psychologists or physicians is as abstract and general, yet its relevance is not contested. Is not its relevance limited to the case of the rare sage which is both able to discuss complex philosophical matters and ready to adopt “the philosophical attitude” to life? Such popular notions ignore controversies with regard to the existence of such sages, the content of their alleged wisdom, or the nature or impact of their “philosophical attitude”. Modern philosophy is generally much more skeptical, realistic, pluralistic and therefore “democratic” thanthe elitist classics. It does not trust myths about the “good life” of the wise, nor ignore their preoccupation with death.

The analytical and self-critical bias of modern philosophy lets ideology expand to most significant world-view and value areas. Hence, philosophy of history escapes such problems as meaning of history, course of history, and self-identification in history. Ideology aggressively grasps these ideas and transforms them into its own primitive dogmas that usually serve as symbolical tools for political struggle or for legitimating ruling elites. This paper shows how it is possible for philosophy, in cooperation with the social sciences (especially historical macrosociology), to retrieve these problems of crucial world-view significance. A universal model of historical dynamics and the concept of values of general significance are described and integrated within a general frame for historical meanings: permanent self-test of human communities.

Contemporary caution of anachronism in intellectual history on the one hand, and currently momentous theoretical emphasis on subjectivity on the other, are two prevailing circumstances that set puzzling constraints for studies in the history of philosophical psychology. Together these circumstances call for heightened awareness of our own interpretive presuppositions as historians: the former urges against assuming ideas, motives, and concepts that may be alien in the historical intellectual setting under study and the latter suggests caution in relying on our intuitions regarding subjectivity due to the specific and historicallycontingent characterisations subjectivity has attained in the contemporary philosophy of mind. In face of these enticements our paper explores subjectivity as a non-textual standard of interpretation. Taking into account recent methodological discussion and examples of denials of the relevance of subjectivity for historical theories, we argue that historical work should be conceived as a reflective investigation into what is and what is not genuinely historical. In particular, we show how subjectivity can function as a pre-conceptualized feature of the world that has an effect on our concept formation.

1. In this paper have done what Niklas Luhmann always recommended us to do: I have drawn a distinction – or to be more precise, I have some distinctions. I have done so because I think, and you all know, that in the ongoing debates on so-called “globalization” there is not enough of distinction, and no distinction at all very often. And that is particularly unsatisfactory if the critique, or even the rejection, of globalization is at stake. 2. The first of my distinctions is between Europeanization (in Heidegger’s sense) and Americanization, as this term is meant usually today. These two concepts, and the processes they refer to, seem to be quite similar in so far as what is meant that a particular part of mankind at a given period of history has succeeded in becoming a hegemonic power on a global scale – economically, politically (and militarily) and/or culturally. One could think, and Heidegger himself really does, that those two processes have also in common that they are historically contingent: Nothing of this sort could have happened as well; other powers could have, and have indeed, played a similar role at other times; it could have come out completely different etc. etc. In my view, though, there should be made a distinction here because the world-wide success-story of modern science and technology has to be accounted for by causes and dynamics which are not only gradually, but qualitatively different from what we need to explain the globalization of, let’s say, American blue jeans, or T‐Shirts etc. 3. This brings me to the distinction between globalization and Americanization, which are identified nowadays very often, and that particularly so in order to attack and reject globalization as being nothing but Americanization. At this point, then, it seems to me necessary to draw distinction between (a) globalization as such – regarded to be a factual, complex and heterogeneous process that has to be analyzed in all its aspects by econonomists, sociologists etc and (b) universalization.

The decline of communism in Eastern Europe in years 1989-1991 was a big surprise for Western Sovietology. The sudden disappearance of the object of research would undermine the reason of existence of the whole science. For this reason, in the first half of the 90s Western scientists tried to answer following question: why Sovietology was not able to predict the demise of communism. The purpose of my paper is not to make one more analysis of factors responsible for this failure of social sciences but reconstruction of theories which accurately predicted the demise of communism. It is possible to point out two scholars whopredicted the collapse of communism at the turn of the 70s and 80s. One of them is Randall Collins, an American sociologist who elaborated in 1978 Geopolitical Theory. The second of them is Leszek Nowak, Polish philosopher, who in 1979 elaborated theory of historical process – non-Marxian historical materialism. In the last part of my paper I compare these two theories. Despite obvious differences, these theories share striking similarities: model status, antagonistic vision of society, grand scope of applicability and belonging to the periphery rather than to mainstream of social sciences. Maybe, this last feature is one of the necessary conditions of making accurate predictions in social and historical sciences.

Rethinking philosophy of history we see that the main concepts must be revised or specified especially <history> and <the world history>. It’s very important to use adequate notions. The world history is an integral process having dialectically contradictory tendencies. Humanism is an objective tendency of the world history but the alienated tendency prevails in the epoch of globalization. Collisions between civilizations are outcomes of the alienated capitalist world system. Many problems both in practice and in theory are connected with a fortune of humanism and a problem of mutual understanding between representatives of different cultures is among them. So philosophy of history must be revised in humanistic way and we must do our best to put the humanistic tendency into practice.

Many historians and philosophers emphasize the great importance of periodization for the study of history. There is no doubt that periodization is a rather effective method of data ordering and analysis, though it deals with exceptionally complex types of processual and temporal phenomena. For any periodization its basis is a very important point. One can choose different bases for periodization if he constantly uses the same criteria. According to the theory that we propose, the historical process can be subdivided more effectively into four major stages. The transition from any of these stages into another one is the change of all basic characteristics of the respective stage. As the starting point of such a change we propose the production principle that describes the major qualitative stages of the development of the world productive forces. We single out four principles of production: Hunter-Gatherer; Craft-Agrarian; Industrial; and Information-Scientific. As an additional basis of our periodization, by means of which the chronology of the beginning of each respective stage may be worked out, we propose the threeproduction revolutions: the Agrarian or Neolithic Revolution; the Industrial Revolution; and the Information-Scientific Revolution. There are many traditional discussions in philosophy of history that have dealt with issues having to do with the relevance and suitability of the use of broadly psychoanalytic concepts in history (Certeau, 1995; Mudrovcic, 2003). In these discussions some have noted a number of very abstract connections between the concepts and techniques of historiography and those of psychoanalysis. In this text, however, I want to focus on a potential, more concrete point of contact considered only relatively recently: the analysis and treatment of historical testimonies by witnesses of “traumatic events”.

This paper is about the uses of language which the Oxford philosopher of language, J.L. Austin excluded from theoretical consideration in his William James Lectures delivered in 1955 and posthumously published as How to Do Things with Words. Uses of language, such as dramatic, poetic or comedic, are said by Austin to be non-serious, deviant and parasitic upon the everyday normal ordinary language. This leaves literature out of consideration as an etiolation. Derrida, who is not merely a trained philosopher but also one of the finest literary critics of our day, fails to agree with Austin. In his “Signature, Event, Context”, and Limited Inc, he criticizes Austin of “totalization” and “idealization” of the norm or the standard; his inability to see that the parasitic is necessarily inbuilt in the standard. This paper is an attempt at seeing how far Derrida is justified in his critique as there is much that is common between his and Austin’s approaches towards language.

This paper is devoted to an examination of the topic of cognitive dynamics as introduced by David Kaplan in his essay ‘Demonstratives’. I discuss two approaches to cognitive dynamics: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in Kaplan’s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans’s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan’s account and Evans’s account are on the whole defective - even though there are features of each of those views which seem to be along the right lines. On the other hand, I claim that a broadly Fregean account is still to be preferred since by positing semantically efficacious modes of presentation it is clearly better equipped to deal with thephenomena in the area. In particular, I argue that the notion of a memory-based mode of presentation of an object turns out to be indispensable for the purpose of accounting for the persistence of intentional mental states over time.