Spinoza semble adopter une position pleinement norninaliste lorsqu’il discue des notions universelles dans l’Ethique, mais on y trouve aussi plusieurs arguments où, semble-t-il, des universaux sont présupposés. La solution avancé par plusieurs commentateurs, y compris Haserot, est que Ie système spinoziste est d’inspiration platoniste, et qu’il faut réinterpréter les passages d’apparence nominaliste pour les accorder avec Ie platonisme ou l’essentialisme. J’argurnente qu’un tel procédé n’est justifié ni par Ie texte ni par la structure du système de Spinoza. L’interprétation du spinozisme que je propose Ie place dans Ie cadre logique du nominalisme contemporain, à I’instar du système de Nelson Goodman, par exemple.

Mediated by a hermeneutic/semiotic reading of symbols, searching out and finding some similitudes between mythical constructions concerning the genesisof the world and scientific hypotheses can be considered fruitful from at least two viewpoints, since: (a) it allows the validation of a truth which is difficult to prove through other means, that early humans had intuitive-cognitive resources much more profound than appearances seem to allow; (b) it enables the utilization of some of the suggestions offered by the mythic language in the scientific language context. Using such correspondences, the author proposes the integrative model of a structurally named "Cluster Universe" or the functionally named "Pulsatory expansion", able to solve some major difficulties of the cosmological thinking.

The Russian icon was always related to the soul of the Russian painter, his anxiety and his emotions. Through the icon the russian has always expressed his faith and mentained the bundle with God. The icon has been considered by the russian people a bridge between human and divinity. The Russian people belive into an russian Christ. The Russian icon embodys the russian nature, his strength of creation and of adaption, but especially the russian soul. It is been capitalized the icon painting of the greatest painters: Andrei Rubliov, Teofan Grecul Dionisie, as well as icon painting, starting from the novgorodiana school (the 11th century) till the 20th century, when big names of icon artists appared, such as Kondrafiev, Filatov, Zubov, A. Ivanov.

Reflections or Dialogicals: Ways for Making up an Ethics. This purpose of this article is to analyze the relationship between reason and ethics in the thoughts ofLéon Brunschvicg and Gaston Bachelard. It will demonstrate that although the positions of these two authors have points in common as far as the development of their philosophical trajectories, there are also profound divergences in regards to their ethical conceptions. In affirming the passage from intellectual reason to moral consciousness, the ethical humanism of Brunschvicg takes as foundation a monological conception of reason. In showing that the constitution of ethical principles is modeled after the dialogical nature of the scientific city, Bachelard opts for a conception of reason and ethics that passes thorough a reflection on the path taken by man, a path filled with contradictions, but that it is nonetheless as true as the one established by Brunschvicg.

ABSTRACT: I clarify in what sense one might want to claim that thought or language are public. I distinguish among four forms that each of these claims might take, and two general ways of establishing them that might be contemplated. The first infers the public character of thought from the public character of language, and the second infers the latter from the former. I show that neither of these stategies seems to be able to dispense with the claim that thought and language are interdependent, and that the second strategy raises more difficulties than the first. I then examine the reasoning by which Davidson means to establish that thought depends on language. I claim that this reasoning is not conclusive, and that it can be adapted in such a way as to establish aversion of the thesis that thought is public which does not presuppose that language is public, and aversion of the thesis that language is public which does not imply that thought depends on language. I conclude with the suggestion that despite appearances to the contrary Davidson’s doctrine is defensible only if it implies at least the conceivability of intentional systems that would lack language altogether.

ABSTRACT: When we reconstruct Fichte’s philosophy of nature of the Jena period, we notice striking similarities between the conception of organism in the Doctrine of Science and Schelling’s corresponding developments in his early Naturphilosophie. Even though both thinkers agree to consider organic nature within the framework of transcendental idealism, it is nevertheless possible at this stage to discover slight differences in their interpretation which announce their future disagreement on the status of a philosophy of nature. If, for instance, organism for both Fichte and Schelling can be considered as an analogon of the absolute, much depends on whether they conceive this analogy from a practical or theoretical point of view.

ABSTRACT: In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive probability. Since its publication the argument has faced many criticisms and we argue in this article that they do not reach their objectives. We will first reconstruct the demonstration made by Popper and Miller in their initial article and then try to evaluate the main arguments against it. Although it is possible to conceptualize logically the idea of induction, it is shown that it is not possible on traditional Bayesian grounds.

RÉSUMÉ: Le but de cet article est de défendre une conception inférentialiste de l’introspection des qualia contre une série d’objections apparemment décisives. Selon la theorie inférentialiste, une auto-attribution d’un état qualitatifest la conclusion d’un raisonnement, plutôt que le résultat d’une expérience d’un type spécifique. Contre cela, il a été remarqué qu'il ne semble pas exister de raisonnements déductifs formellement corrects permettant d’arriver à une conclusion introspective. Je concède que toute tentative visant à construire de tels raisonnements est à coup sûr vouée à l’échec. Mais cela ne me semble pas menacer l’approche inférentialiste. Certaines inférences sont en effet correctes non pas en vertu de leur forme logique, mais en raison du sens des concepts qu’elles mobilisent. Je soutiens que c’est précisément le cas des raisonnement introspectifs. Ceux-ci sont matériellement corrects, en raison des relations inférentielles a priori reliant le concept d’expérience consciente à certains concepts démonstratifs.ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to defend the inferentialist conception of qualia introspection against some apparently decisive objections. According to inferentialism, a self-attribution of a qualitative state is to be understood as the conclusion of an inference, rather than as issuing from an experience of a specific kind. It has been objected that formally correct inferences warranting introspective conclusions are simply not to be found. I concede this point, but maintain that inferentialism should not be abandoned. Some deductive inferences are correct because of the contents of the concepts which occur in them, rather than in virtue of their logical form. I claim that this is what happens for introspective inferences: they are materially correct because of apriori conceptual liaisons linking the concept of a conscious experience with a certain class of demonstrative concepts.