The article is dedicated to re-conceptualization of ideas, implied by the theories of technoscience. In particular, they imply our understanding of technologies as material artifacts and technics, which is not the only possible one. In the same time, the presence of social technologies and innovations, practices of social planning and engineering, humanitarian labs and applied socio-humanitarian knowledge can provide reasonable ground for changes in our ways of speaking about social and human sciences in techno-scientific discourse. The first part of the article presents an updated approach to the key ideas of technoscience theory. In the second part of the article the author develops the historical argumentation for this approach. The practical functions of social sciences are described as follows: professional training for specialists; social critics and applied research; production of ideological concepts; intellectual support for social engineering; enlightenment and formation of humanitarian culture. The author argues that there are close ties between social sciences and practices, and the impact of social knowledge on developing of modern technoculture is being specifically revealed in this context.

Since the 1980-s the number of immune system's depictions has increased dramatically. Often in classroom or in hospital immunologists or doctors could show you how our immune system works. Most popular hand-drawn schema is a model of self-other distinction with clear and rigid border between body and environment. But there is a tension between different models of immune system and their visualizations. For example, it's difficult to explain autoimmune diseases in terms and pictures of classical model self-other distinction because immunity means a war of self against self. Niels Jerne's network model of immune system does not react on other or non-self. It deals only with its own components and prepares immune response before any possible invasion. In another model that's called “symbiotic model" we cant tell about self and non-self, because some nonself entities are friends of organism. Besides some of bacteria in our body are responsible for our immune response. So there is no unity and consensus in immunity system's visualization. But how do we know that immune systems exist? What if schemata are just a product of immunological imagination? Microphotographs made by electronic microscope are evidence of truth. They stabilize all arguments and controversies in visualization of immune systems. First Donna Haraway and later Emily Martin demonstrated microphotographs and asked people about their feeling and impression. Lay people couldn't associate biological of microphotographs and their limited body. Microphotographs are out of context of human bodily experience and in this sense there is no stabilization of arguments. Immune system's microphotographs depend on hand-drawn pictures. Micrographs as fragments of immune system are not linked with immunological patterns. In this sense schematic images are “golden standard" for electron micrographs. There is no self and other in this picture but we define self and other in microphotographs by schemata.

The article investigates the problem of the correlation between sense and communicative situation which characterizes philosophical and scientific texts. The analysis of ancient genre of “table-talk", which goes back to Plato's dialogue “Banquet", shows that the dialogue as a text construction form defines the philosophical sense of the text in coordination with communication features of a real table-talk (symposion). This communicative mechanism coordinates text (dialogue) and reality (symposion), and its action can be clarified by “format of text" concept. It is determined by three essential characteristics of the text: the circumstances of his generation, communicative situation between the author and the reader, and the form of the text. The variety of formats in every cultural and historical situation is determined, in its turn, by the actual text culture.dentification and analysis of symposion format allows to trace the transformation of its textual expression of “Table Talk" through “aphorisms" of modern times to modern “abstract" and “round table materials". It is noted that the process of cultural transformation of the text reflects the changes in the social reality of the transition from the ancient symposion to the French salon in the seventeenth century and further to modern symposium. It is revealed the basic feature of the modern version of symposion format that is convergence, and sometimes interference of communicative and public dimensions of the text.

The author considers that the basic principles and concepts of natural history that distinguish it from biology, namely, the law of continuity, interpretation of a living being as a natural body, focus on the description of the surface of the living body, recognition of equivalence of properties, use of procedures of 'identy and differences' for the designation of place of living being in the universe, the denial of naturalness of classification hierarchy, the interpretation of the taxon as a place in the universe, the dependence of taxon name from its location. He claims that the law of continuity of natural history should be considered as the basis of modern concepts in the taxonomy and theory of evolution. He notes that the geometric approach that was typical for natural history is now widely used to describe the living beings. The author argues that in the context of modern phylogenetics biodiversity is interpreted as only spacely structured.

The author claims that recent publications on the theory of music and literature show some new trends in constructivist philosophy of culture. One of them is the idea of subconscious roots of cultural artifacts that has been applied in music studies. It was at this point it becomes clear that in order to identify variants of constructivism as indicators you can use some very simple assumptions, for example, the assumption of the possibility of the ontological significance of the “artistry" of the text. Such an assumption implicitly contains epistemological realism. So it becomes clear that realism is not something completely dead, including those for constructivism. Where constructivism allows the existence of good (“classic") texts, that is, of “high culture", he is tolerant to realism. On the other side, rejection of the classics is a sign of the radical versions of constructivism. There is possibility of fixing the difference between ontologies, which differ among themselves as a state of loss and forgetting the reality.

The paper reconstructs the evolution process of scientific knowledge. The evolution theory has been applied hitherto exclusively to the famous reference problem. It the eye would be incapable seeing something really available it could not establish itself it the reality as such evolutional achievement. Contrary to this view the author states that the cognitive apparatus could survive not due to their achievements in the representations of the external world but rather due to their selfreproductive capabilities. By extrapolation of this view on the level of the epistemology it means that the knowledge itself selects that it can know on the base of that it already knows. The author suggests the principles of such cognitive evolution - the mechanisms of variety, selection and restabilization. The mechanism of variety concerns exclusively some particular operations (i.e. the communicative occurrences). Something innovative (unexpected, out of the ordinary) which has been recently created would occasionally be uttered, suggested, described, and probably printed under sole condition that it is apprehensible and writable. The selection is always based on some structures i.e. on the expectations of some reproductive use of some meaning affitudes. Only the structures can be marked out symbolically: applied to the science it means that they are marked as the true or the false ones. Finely, the stabilization level consists in the continuality of the autopoesis of the scientific communication.

The author considers the evolutionary approach to the development of the scientific knowledge in framework of the Niklas Luhmann's system-communicative theory and presents a thesis that in respect to the final evolutional state (state of stabilization of new form of knowledge) the organization of the Russian science has not yet achieved the world-level of sufficient autonomy because there was not yet been established the self-substitutive order of the knowledge accumulation which is inherent to the autopoiesis of the contemporary science i.e. the process of continued change of some ones truths by some others. The factors impeding to establish such a self-substitutive order are to be connected by the author with the impact on the scientific discourse from some external communicative forms (the theological, financial, economical, political ones) and with the continuous change of some selective criterions that have to define what has to be accumulated as a memory of the science as a communicative system.

The article presents the main trends in the analytical epistemology of religious belief. Their interrelations and mutual influences are shown. The author argues that epistemology of religious belief has risen as one of the possible answers to the Gettier- problems. Therefore different trends in religious epistemology are bounded not only with each other, but also with trends in general epistemology. As a result of the analysis of all major trends in epistemology of religious belief (reformed epistemology, social epistemology, virtue epistemology, problem of the epistemic authority) the author concludes that the core of each trend is an attempt of defining the phenomenon of religion itself. Hence it is possible to consider epistemology of religious belief as the next step in the history of such attempts. Since finding appropriate definition of the phenomenon of religion is a special task of philosophy of religion (both in analytic and continental traditions), the author argues that epistemology of religious belief is the essential part of philosophy of religion as a scholar discipline.

This paper advocates for a “social turn" in religious epistemology. Part One reviews some familiar skeptical arguments targeting religious belief (the argument from luck, the argument from peer disagreement, Hume's argument). All these skeptical arguments say that testimonial evidence cannot give religious belief adequate support or grounding, especially in the context of conflicting evidence. Part Two considers some recent work in social epistemology and the epistemology of testimony. Several issues regarding the nature of testimonial evidence are considered, and an account of testimonial evidence as a means of distribution of information through the system is defended. Part Three uses the results of Part Two to reconsider the skeptical arguments in Part One.

The author discusses the mode of introduction of religious testimonial knowledge as a response to skepticism. It is argued that Professor Greco's Answer to The Argumentfrom Peer Disagreement (Part Three; Application to the three skeptical arguments) requires accepting the thesis that has the same conceptual grounding as the skeptical statements about the impossibility to share any belief. Taking into account this common grounding, it is desirable to explain the statement “A major motivation for anti-skepticism about testimony is anti-skepticism in general" (Part Two). The theory of religious testimonial knowledge uses the statement, which can be grounded by accepting the Mental Holism. However, the Mental Holism is also a possible grounding for some skeptical theses. Thus, a philosopher who assumes religious testimonial knowledge takes not only an anti-skeptical position, but also can take a “proto-skeptical" position.

The author discusses a number of questions about the theory of John Greco, who distinguishes two types of testimonial knowledge: testimony as transmission of knowledge and as distributing of information. The author expresses doubts that this difference is consistent and, therefore, useful for epistemology. He argues that John Greco's theory needs some refinements without which it will be either trivial or erroneous.

The article considers John Greco's conception of testimonial knowledge that aims to overthrow three sceptical arguments against religious knowledge. Prof. Greco presupposes that a religious community already possesses a true religious belief and its reliability is justified exclusively by means of the reliability of transmission. The author puts this conception into question and presents some sceptical arguments regarding the initial origination of a religious belief and verifying the truth-ness of a religious belief in front of epistemic disagreement problem. In particular, he draws an attention on three moments: 1) difference between inside and outside position as to any religious community, 2) lack of inductive verifying evidence in support of religious knowledge, and 3) difference between origination a belief in a community for the first time and transmission of beliefs already given in a community. The author takes a perspective of an outsider who doesn't belong to any religious community (on the assumption that there are secular communities different from religious ones). Firstly, he suggests another from Greco's version of the “luck argument", which concerns the luck in origination of a belief, not the accidence in spreading it. John Greco solves a problem that arises from argument of luck as far as it regards transmission of beliefs inside a community. The author argues that the genuine problem is to establish an originating source of a religious belief, and taking that into consideration, testimonial evidence cannot eliminate this kind of luck. Secondly, he observes the problem of disagreement among different religious communities. He shows that an outsider doesn't have any epistemic reason to prefer one of the conflicting religious beliefs of different communities, for he doesn't belong to any of them. Thus, the problem of “epistemic peers" still remains unsolved.

The author does not aim to argue with John Greco's theory, but to find out whether it requires any adjustment. The author claims that Greco's theory of the social transmission of knowledge requires the transmitted knowledge to be socially verifiable, that is, to be subject to those means of confirmation that pertain to the social system. Unfortunately, some kinds of religious knowledge are not socially verifiable; therefore, they cannot be transmitted via Greco's social mechanism. The author concludes that Greco's theory turns out to be applicable to the socially verifiable religious testimonies, and not applicable to the rest.

Contemporary defenders of autonomy and traditional defenders of authority generally assume that they have so little in common as to make it hopeless to attempt a dialogue on the defensibility of epistemic, moral, or religious authority. In this paper I argue that they are mistaken. Under the assumption that the ultimate authority over the self is the self, I defend authority in the realm of belief on the same grounds as Joseph Raz uses in his well-known defense of political authority in the tradition of political liberalism. The acceptance of authority over certain beliefs extends to moral and religious beliefs and is not only consistent with autonomy, but is entailed by rational self-governance.

The author addresses his replies to the issues raised in the comments by Professors Berestov, Butakov, Gaginsky and Maslov. This includes some general points about methodology for skeptical arguments, and a related point about the scope of John Greco's project. Some more specific issues raised by my commentators are then considered.

The author considers the account of epistemic authority as it was proposed by Linda Zagzebski in her book “Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief" [Zagzebski, 2012]. Zagzebski claims that the idea of epistemic authority could be reconciled with the modern idea of epistemic subject's autonomy without rejecting the principles of contemporary liberalism. The author aims to show that even if Zazgebski is right in claiming that epistemic authority and epistemic autonomy are closely connected to each other the nature of their connection is different from that which Zagzebski believes to be. In the further analysis the author shows that weakness of her account is that it cannot explain where the substantial link between a subject's following after an epistemic authority and this subject's intention of getting truth can be.

The article is devoted to the phenomenological and postphenomenological approaches in philosophy of religion. In the first part of the article the author considers the early Heidegger's philosophy of religion. Heidegger understands the philosophy of religion within his philosophy of the facticity. He considers historical dimension as a key phenomenon of religion. The author focuses on the concept of formal indication as a particular attitude overcoming the theoretical approach. The formal indication achieves the enactment-aspect of phenomenon. In the second part the author deals with methodological issues of phenomenological- hermeneutical philosophy of religion (John Caputo, Richard Kearney), demonstrating the possibility to think of God after God, non-metaphysical thinking of God. It is analyzed Caputo's critique of metaphysics and his concept of “religion without religion". She examines also the notion of micro-eschatological reduction in diacritical hermeneutics of Richard Kearney comparing this kind of reduction with transcendental (Husserl), ontological (Heidegger) and donological (Marion) reduction. The author argues that the phenomenological and post-phenomenological approaches in philosophy of religion unites the understanding of the philosophy of religion, not as one of particular section of philosophy, questioning about the specific region of human existence, rather, the phenomenon of religious experience becomes the starting point of an integrated system of philosophy. The main task here is phenomenological understanding of the original orientations of religious life in its facticity. It's argued that philosophy of religion should arise from our own historical situation and facticity.

Author discusses the problem of the relation between scientific and theological discourses. He argues both against the thesis about science and religion as complementary parts as well as against the thesis that they stay in conflict. He defends the position of the strong separation of theology and science. The author considers three fundamental philosophical problems that mark the difference in rational consideration between science and theology: emergence of the world, foundations of belief and knowledge, modes of scientific and religious discourses. The author claims that the incompatibility in the understanding of the emergence of the world in science and religion lies in the concept of the observer: the “external" observer in theology and the “internal" observer in science. “Experience" in science and “religious experience" have different sources, different criteria for reliability, different existential meaning. Religion and science have different purposes: the domination of man over himself in religions and the domination of man over the outside world in science. Therefore, religion and science use fundamentally various discourses: a descriptive discourse in science and prescriptive discourse in religion. Therefore, I think that the dialogue between religion and science doesn't make any sense neither for religion nor for science.

Scientific knowledge is not merely a matter of reconciling theories and laws with data and observations. Science presupposes a number of metatheoretic shaping principles in order to judge good methods and theories from bad. Some of these principles are metaphysical (e.g., the uniformity of nature) and some are methodological (e.g., the need for repeatable experiments). While many shaping principles have endured since the scientific revolution, others have changed in response to conceptual pressures both from within science and without. Many of them have theistic roots. For example, the notion that nature conforms to mathematical laws flows directly from the early modern presupposition that there is a divine Lawgiver. This interplay between theism and shaping principles is often unappreciated in discussions about the relation between science and religion. Today, of course, naturalists reject the influence of theism and prefer to do science on their terms. But as Robert Koons and Alvin Plantinga have argued, this is more difficult than is typically assumed. In particular, they argue, metaphysical naturalism is in conflict with several metatheoretic shaping principles, especially explanatory virtues such as simplicity and with scientific realism more broadly. These arguments will be discussed as well as possible responses. In the end, theism is able to provide justification for the philosophical foundations of science that naturalism cannot.