What Ludwik Fleck has really written about is the cognitive life of communities which constitute their worlds of specific entities. Fleck’s subject is intellectualhistory, but history seen as changing horizons of cognition projected by certain practices. His ideas have proliferated, so that some of them are attributable to the reception of his work in constructivist programs of cognitive sociology, historical epistemology, comparative historiography of science, and cultural studies of scientific research. Fleck’s philosophical assumptions cover a broad range. Some are responses to debates in which he was involved; others derive from his penchant to examine theories of knowledge in the interwar period through a historical and sociological lens; still others arose from his critical attitude toward those who interpreted science through their own narrow ideology, as well as the violence toward the academic ethos in National Socialism and Soviet Communism. The present paper tries to do justice to the major interpretations of Fleck’s work. It puts special emphasis on the kind of “trans-subjective hermeneutics” that is inherent in this work.

This paper approaches the phenomenon of art from a contemporary perspective. It discusses art as spiritual modality of expression which testifies to man’s specific being-in-the-world. It also analyzes the idea of artwork in reference to its aesthetic, social, and historical determinations, while keeping in mind the problematization of the essence, content, and finality of art. In this context, the paper examines two significant aesthetic guidelines: aestheticism or the movement “l’art pour l’art,” founded on the cult of beauty as a supreme value, and the deaestheticization of art, a negativist contemporary movement that contests the aesthetic and artistic tradition. Finally, the paper holds that, contrary to Hegel’s prophecy on the “death” of art, the aesthetic experience shows that contemporary art continues to assert itself and to diversify itself with an impressive energy. Based on this background, the phenomenon of de-aestheticization is a challengewhich gives new impulses to the evolution of authentic art, spurring man’s ability to perceive affectively and to understand reality in new ways, adding to it, asNietzsche said, a metaphysical factor in order to transcend it.

The aim of our paper is to present the ways in which cognitive linguistics has contributed to various developments in the domain of comics studies. After providing introductory remarks, the paper describes the main views found within the works of authors considered to be the precursors of contemporary comics studies, Will Eisner and Scott McCloud, with the intention of providing the basics that will facilitate the reader’s understanding of the present issues. The main section of the paper contains the basic tenets of cognitive semantics, including the ideas traced in the works of the authors who have observed various types of comics from the cognitivist viewpoint. This section of the paper presents the research conducted thus far by a number of scientists who have engaged indrawing parallels between cognitivist theories and comics studies, including work on visual and multimodal metaphor and metonymy and the visual language of comics. This is followed by concluding remarks that end the paper.

The purpose of this article is to identify how modern Russia can build good relationships between multiple Russian religions and the state. At present there are many obstacles standing in the way of achieving this goal. The article includes a great many statistics, and discusses political, social, and religious views of the issue.The working Russian Constitution provides major legal provisions for democratic relationships between religions and the state. The law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” (1997) clarified constitutional provisions. It should not forgotten that Russia is a secular state claiming to respect all religions. No doubt the supremacy of Orthodoxy in Russia after 1721 and the extreme atheism that arose in the Soviet Union after 1917 influenced people’s minds greatly. While the countries in Western Europe were moving from religiosity to secularism, Russia was developing the other way around. But while respecting all religions, Russia should not forget to be mindful of extremism. Religious associations themselves are likewise uneasy about the danger presented by certain mystic, neo-pagan, and destructive sects. The author argues that the best compromise between religions and the modern Russian state canonly be achieved on the basis of equality and freedom.

This paper examines and defends von Wright's view of moral value, put forward in his book The Varieties of Goodness (1963). He holds that moral value is not a primary value like instrumental, technical, utilitarian, medical, or hedonic value, but a secondary or second-level one which is based on a combination of primary values. Human actions and intentions are the only bearers of moral value, and they are morally valuable because they protect and promote some set of primary values. It is argued that the same account (i) applies also to juridical value, and (ii) can be used to throw some light on the problem of defining the three competing schools of legal philosophy, viz. legal positivism, natural law theory, and legal constructivism.

This article aims at clarifying one critical function of the public sphere, namely the conditions which enable a public to distinguish the difference between trustworthy and manipulative public legitimization. It also seeks to answer the question of whether such conditions can be realized in pre-modern or alternatively modern social settings. The tendency in some recent historical and anthropological publications to regard all historical patterns of public legitimization as public spheres is criticized for ignoring the latter’s critical function. A broader understanding of this function is offered which can be applied also to “non-Western” cultural environments.

As a non-dualistic but holistic and harmonious way of thinking, Chinese Yin-Yang Thinking can make great contributions to the contemporary dialogue between science and religion, especially in its emphasis on interdependence, mutual complementarity, and mutual transformation. It can help us understand the complex and multifaceted relationship between science and religion, and provides a middle way to move beyond the impasse between scientism and religious fundamentalism. This paper explores the following three contributions that Yin-Yang Thinking can make to the contemporary dialogue between science and religion: 1. Yin-Yang Thinking can help deconstruct the dichotomy between science and religion by showing the interpenetration between them; 2. Yin-Yang Thinking can help promote synergy between science and religion by showing how they can complement and learn from each other; 3. Yin-Yang Thinking can help establish a partnership between science and religion in order to create an ecological civilization. The paper also explores the question of why such a valuable philosophical concept has been suppressed in China for almost a century.

Rationality and consciousness are strictly correlated. If one evolves, the other necessarily changes accordingly. Of all the possible modes of inquiry, this paper adopts a process genetic perspective informed by the historical speculations of Julian Jaynes. First, we co-define consciousness and rationality. Second, we take up again Jaynes’s insight: (proto-)consciousness has a history, or consciousness has a pre-history. Third, we underline that the sharpening of operational rationality has involved a palpable impoverishment of consciousness over the ages and nefarious consequences for our future.

While supporting the anti-foundational ontological turn in science and technology studies, the author criticizes the tendency towards the radical empiricizationof empirical ontology. The article discusses two crucial arguments against this tendency. On the cognitivist argument, empirical immediacy is inevitably shaped and mediated by non-empirical assumptions. According to the hermeneutic argument—which is of great greater importance—any empirically immediate state of affairs is the upshot of actualizing possibilities projected by interrelated practices upon horizons of practical existence. Thus, what is given as empirical immediacy is ineluctably “produced” within the potentiality for practical being. Following this argument, a non-empirical extension of empirical ontology is suggested. The starting-point of this extension is the integration of radical reflexivity into ethnographic descriptions of multiple realities. A further step consists in the introduction of double hermeneutics to studies of empirical ontology. Finally, the significance of ontological difference for these studies comes under scrutiny.

The author argues that for the last 2,500 years, the science concerning the universe (o kosmoV) has been based on two metaphysical intuitions—the atomic one for more than 2,400 years, and the string intuition in the second half of the twentieth century.

It is sometimes claimed that intuitions are an indispensable part of the evidential support provided for, or against, philosophical theses concerning a wide rangeof topics. This view is ingeniously argued for by George Bealer. His approach is based on a close connection between the modal nature of philosophy and theindispensability of intuitions as sources of modally-oriented evidence. This paper is aimed at a critical assessment of this approach. It is claimed that philosophy,though being modal at bottom, need not rely on (modal) intuitions as sources of evidence. In particular, it is shown (i) that at least some of Bealer’s crucial philosophical arguments do not rest on intuitions as evidence and (ii) that one may find modal philosophical claims of considerable importance that do not require modal intuitions for support. As a result, (modal) intuitions need not be considered indispensable for gaining philosophical knowledge, even when philosophy is understood along Bealer’s lines.

Developing the ideas presented in Jacquette (2011), the paper presents an indispensability argument aimed at justification of induction. First, Hume’s problem of induction is introduced via slightly different reconstructions. Second, several traditional attempts to solve Hume’s problem are presented. Finally, Jacquette’s(2011) proposal to justify induction by an indispensability argument is developed. I conclude with presenting a kind of indispensability argument for induction.

The term “rationality” is applied to many different things, from beliefs and preferences to decisions and choices, actions and behaviors, people, collectivities, andinstitutions. Therefore this paper will limit its considerations only to social preferences and choices in order to clarify the role of rationality in social explanation. The paper will focus on degrees of rationality, calling upon the concept of transitivity for help.

The aim of this article is to offer a contribution to our understanding of the way in which reason appropriated the idea of system at the beginning of the modernity and made from it one of its emblematical forms of expression. I will start with seminal remarks on the topic from Martin Heidegger, and will then move to the idea of the system in the works of René Descartes, the pathfinder of modern philosophy. After commenting on some Cartesian ideas, I will outline six points of support for and development of Heidegger’s conception about the system of philosophy and its roots in modern science.

This paper considers the rediscovery of Hegel currently taking place in the analytic philosophy. Going back to the Hegelian texts themselves, I will try to show how they can help to decisively solve some problems of contemporary philosophy. I will concentrate on the theme of knowledge, and especially mathematical knowledge, in relation to Hegelian dialectical logic.

In the 10th century, the Brethren of Purity conceived a henological arithmetic which they believed could explain the mathematical structure of the cosmos (as a macroanthropos), and could lead the student to the discovery of the real substance of his own soul (as a micro-cosmos), a discovery which is the first step towards knowledge of metaphysical and theological truth.