The theory of mental models considers sentential connectives to refer to semantic possibilities. The theory also proposes that the possibilities can be amended by virtue of modulation processes, that is, processes in which semantics or pragmatics can have an influence. The definition of modulation the theory of mental models gives has been deemed as a scientific definition within Carnap’s framework. This is because it is easy to find reduction sentences corresponding to it. What seems to be harder is to think about bilateral reduction sentences for that definition. This paper addresses this issue. It shows that at least a bilateral reduction sentence is possible for modulation.

I contrast two construals of the thesis that truth is independent of verifiability in principle: a modal one and a non modal one. I argue in favor of the modal construal and then, on that basis, that independence holds across the board, i.e., even for statements that are verifiable by us relative to familiar, customary, non-skeptical standards.

This paper investigates, from a philosophical perspective, whether high functioning autists are legally responsible for the crimes they may commit. We do this from the perspective of the Croatian legal system. According to Croatian Criminal Law, but also criminal laws adopted in many other countries, the legal responsibility of the person is undermined due to insanity when two conditions are satisfied. The first may be called the incapacity requirement. It states that a person, when committing the crime, suffers cognitive or volitional incapacities or limited capacities that are relevant for exculpation. The second, we may call the mental disorder requirement, which states that these exculpatory incapacities are due to the presence of a mental disorder. In this paper we focus on the incapacity requirement. The review of the studies on executive functions deficits associated with high-functioning autism suggests that many autists should not be held categorically responsible for the crimes they may commit. Nonetheless, we argue that these impairments in executive functions generally do not provide an unqualified excuse.

After the Second World War Albania was left under the Eastern Bloc. In 1967 Enver Hoxha, the leader of Albania from 1944 until his death in 1985, decided to implement the Chinese Cultural Revolutionary model. This article analyzes his speech, on February 6, 1967, before his comrades, who were supposed to be his eyes, ears, and mouth. It was in this way that his face, his thoughts and his words became ubiquitous throughout the country. In a highly authoritarian society political discourse has a direct and pervasive impact on peoples’ lives and all aspects of the society. This article is organized by analytical themes based on aspects of discourse analysis, but we have also applied the cognitive approach and imagology as auxiliary theories in order to achieve a better understanding of mental representations, especially the ones used to reinforce stereotypes about rural people. Given that these mental representations are still fostered by current politicians in order to establish power, we note how important it still is to analyze them. Considering that political discourse is a product of individual and collective mental processes it is important to show, especially to younger generations, where these mental schemas come from.

This article examines the epistemological views of key quantum physicists of the Copenhagen circle (Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and Léon Rosenfeld). The discussion begins with a presentation of their conception of measurement, indeterminacy and complementarity, and goes on to focus on their views regarding the nature of being and knowledge. The author identifies the basic areas of consensus in the Copenhagen circle as well as the disagreements and disputes that arose between its members. Three main points are argued: (1) The fundamental epistemological consensus in the group was that subject and object are inseparable; that the subject participates in the formation of images of reality, which are multiple and depend on how the subject is concretely constituted historically; the disagreements within the group did not arise with logical inevitability from the principles of quantum mechanics but largely stemmed from ideological clash in the Cold War context. (2) Being linked to specific configurations of the subjects, knowledge is always relative; but it does not follow that knowledge is illusory or inadequate; on the contrary, it is the pretension of attaining the ultimate nature of things “in themselves” that leads to devaluation of any concrete knowledge. (3) The world is something external, generally independent of our desires and will, but at the same time is constructed as concrete objects through the specific configuration of each concrete subject.

The paper examines the meaning of a Hegelian expression: “the ascension of the human spirit to God”, which was formulated in the philosopher’s 1829 summer course dedicated to the proofs of God’s existence. We argue that the Hegelian formula describes a double movement: the first one refers to the departure of thinking from the Phenomenon and its arrival to the Ideal, and the second one describes the opposite movement, in which thinking crosses the barrier between the Ideal and the Phenomenon.

In this article, I discuss an interpretation of Hegel's concept of the “Inverted World” (verkehrte Welt), which is present in the final part of the chapter on Force and Understanding in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Other than my own reading of the chapter, I also summarize the three most important interpretations of the verkehrte Welt from the last century: those of Jean Hyppolite, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Joseph Flay. I have chosen these three due to the typology of interpretation within them: the first one adopts a Christian reading of Hegel, the second a Hellenistic phenomenological interpretation, and the last one, which is closest to the interpretation I also propose, a reading consistent with the thought of Immanuel Kant. The article ends with a possible interpretation of Hegel's verkehrte Welt through Kant's “Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding” from his Critique of Pure Reason, where I argue that Kant's fundamental faculty of imagination and its object, schemata, play the same role in Kant's system that Hegel's verkehrte Welt does in the development of natural consciousness.

The scientific paradigm which I rely upon in the framework of this article is quantum mechanics, whose “cognitive revolution” consisted of replacing the classical principle of separability with the principle of nonseparability or global intercorrelation. According to this intercorrelation, highlighted at the subatomic level, the part cannot be separated from the whole, because every part has a global and instantaneous connection with the whole universe. For this reason the foundation of the world cannot be the part (elementary particles), but the whole, which is therefore logically and ontologically prior to the part, i.e., self-consistent. Consequently, the principle of global intercorrelation elucidates and validates some of the oldest philosophical problems and intuitions about the unity or self-consistency of the world. An example in this sense is the bootstrap theory of American physicist Geoffrey Chew, which presents such striking similarities to the metaphysical system of Leibniz's Monadology that the two intertwine and mirror each other, like twin souls, to the extent that it could be stated that if Chew’s bootstrap theory represents the explanatory physical level of Leibniz’s metaphysics, then, analogously, Leibniz’s Monadology represents the explanatory metaphysical level of Chew’s physics.

This article addresses “Creativity after Computation” by looking into the concept of artificial imagination, namely the machine’s ability to produce images that challenge artmaking and surprise human beings with the aid of machine learning algorithms. What is at stake is not only art and creativity but also the tension between the determination of machines and the freedom of human beings. This opposition restages Kant’s third antinomy in the contemporary technological condition. By referring to the debate on the question of imagination in Kant, Heidegger, and Stiegler, the article suggests that imagination is always already artificial and that it is more productive to develop an organology of artificial imagination. It clarifies the notion of artificial imagination and offers an organological reading through a reinterpretation of Leibniz’s monadology, Kant’s sublime, and Schiller’s aesthetic education against the backdrop of recursive algorithms.

Obstructing our engagement with Computer-Generative art is an Authenticity Problem. This is where our engagement with Computer-Generative art is either seen through the prism of fantasy, such as romanticisation, or our engagement is defined by superficial inattentiveness. My aim is to show how a more fulfilling engagement is possible. This is my demonstration of the connection between Computer-Generative art and Authentic Expression. This is done by reorientating our focus away from artwork as primary and towards the artistic-process itself. I do this by conceptualising the CG-artistic-process as expressing a Cyborg Relation. My argument is that the Computer-Generative artistic-process, through the Cyborg Relation, authentically expresses our relationships with technology.

Algorithms and automated learning systems have been successfully applied to produce images, pieces of music, or texts that are appealing to humans and that are often compared to artworks. Computational technologies are able to find surprising and original solutions–new patterns that humans cannot anticipate– but does this mean we ascribe to them the kind of creativity that is expressed by human artists? Even though AI can successfully detect humans’ preferences as well as select the objects that satisfy taste, can we ascribe to them the capacity of recognizing the intrinsic value of artworks? To answer these questions, I am first going to explain the kind of creativity that is expressed by contemporary predictive systems, then, in the second part of this paper, I will try to show the difference between the creativity of algorithms and the creativity of artists by expanding on Deleuze’s reflections.

The aim of teaching philosophy to children ultimately is not to teach them the history of philosophy, but rather to teach them to think, starting from philosophical concepts. This will help to develop high-level skills in children such as questioning, research, understanding and interpreting knowledge, establishing meaningful relationships between knowledge, creating original ideas, and problem-solving. Models of philosophizing with children have been developed, and systematic application attempts have been made, producing successful results in many countries of the world. According to Matthew Lipman, these skills should be developed at a very young age with use of the model of philosophy for children (P4C). Our aim is to show and explore how to develop and sustain creative thinking, which is one of the achievements of P4C. If Lipman is right, children participating in these activities will start to gain creative thinking skills from an early age and will apply this foundation in other knowledge acquisition processes at more advanced developmental stages. This presentation aims to reveal the interrelation between P4C and creative thinking activity. First P4C will be explained, and then creative thinking and the interrelation between the two will be expanded upon in the conclusion.

This paper proposes a deep analysis of the latest research of digital humanities scholar Beatrice Fazi, and especially her critique of computational automation, to understand the roles of digital creative technologies, and more specifically of creative software. After a close analysis of Fazi’s main contribution to a new understanding of computational aesthetics, we will briefly outline the potential implications of her work to understand the contemporary evolution of creative software, and especially the implementation of machine learning algorithms in these kinds of software. This will lead us to contextualise the contemporary anxieties regarding how machines could replace humans in the act of artistic creation.

Recently, heated discussions about artificial intelligence, creativity, and work have re-emerged. Despite the dominant focus on the novelty of this entanglement, it is rich with history. In this paper, I will first introduce creativity as a historical and socio-culturally embedded concept, looking at how and why we have invented creativity in the guises we have. The focus will mostly be on the political and ideological backdrop of these historical processes–for instance how creativity was repeatedly cast as the positive counterimage of (industrial and bureaucratic) alienated labour, and hence stood in a complex relationship to automation, robotization, and so on. Based on this I will then discuss a series of scenarios that are related to the (perhaps) forthcoming automation of creativity, more specifically four ways in which automation might in different ways impact (the fields of) creative practices and labour.

Art creates a specific relation to time and especially to the present moment. It opens the experience of the present towards its indeterminacy and emergence. On the contrary, AI does not know the present. It recognizes only the past and future. We could even say that artificial neural networks do not “know” time at all. Instead, they know only logical functions which process patterns of information. Yet, what makes time “time” is genuine transformation, which happens outside of the abstract realm of logic. I support these observations by analysing two works of art: Bill Viola’s The Raft (2004) and Hito Steyerl’s This Is the Future (2019). While artistic creation opens up the intervals “in-between seconds” for an unpredictable and transformative event to occur (The Raft), AI closes these intervals and fastens the future into predictability calculated on the basis of past data (This Is the Future). Although this machinic operation makes the present even more unpredictable and prone to catastrophes, its potential for transformation seems to be withdrawn.

This paper questions the notion of creativity found in certain artworks produced with A.I. technologies. The artistic examples concerned are: The Giver of names by David Rokeby, Oscar by Catherine Ikam and Louis Fléri, and Emotion Vending Machine by Maurice Benayoun. These artworks were selected because they stand out for their autonomous behavior in front of the human public. In this context, creativity is revealed as a consequence of the functional autonomy, which is very typical of these pieces of art. The intention is to establish a relationship between the notion of autonomy and that of creativity, reviewing their meanings and applications in philosophy and in the field of life science.

The author discusses the problem of what AI is and how we can understand the “anthropocentrism” of AI from a philosophical point of view. Three interpretations of the relationship between humans and technology are presented: 1) AI-aided human intelligence, based on the extension theory of technology (Stiegler, 1998); 2) human-aided AI intelligence, based on ideas related to political economy (Crawford, 2021); and 3) the relativity of the anthropocentric frame of reference (AFR), based on the taxonomy of species. The purpose of the article is to provide considerations of the three different interpretations of the relationship between humans and technology and how they lead to different opportunities to answer the question of how we can understand AI’s creativity.

I contrast two construals of the thesis that truth is independent of verifiability in principle: a modal one and a non modal one. I argue in favor of the modal construal and then, on that basis, that independence holds across the board, i.e., even for statements that are verifiable by us relative to familiar, customary, non-skeptical standards.

Spinoza’s Ethics is one of the most important works in Western philosophy. Unfortunately, aside from the Vatican manuscript, which is very close to the final printed version, no drafts have been preserved. In this article I shed some new light on the composition of the early draft of Ethics. I argue that there are significant reasons to believe that propositions Ip9 and Ip10 in Spinoza’s Ethics were added to the deductive argument later than the other first propositions: Ip1-Ip8 and Ip11.