The topic of science was one of the most significant topics in the work of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was not primarily a science methodologist; he could be considered a significant philosopher of science. Heidegger’s philosophy of science is often labeled supertemporal. Although Heidegger was interested in reflecting several stages of science, the present article only deals with his philosophical view of modern science. The article does not analyze how Heidegger reflects on particular sciences; it analyses how he reflects on science as a whole, specifically the individual stages of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. The basic question of the research is whether his philosophy of science before the “Turn” is in any way different from his philosophy of science after the “Turn,” i.e., whether we can speak of two completely different approaches to science, or whether it is possible to find some continuity between them. Besides Heidegger’s published works, the paper also reflects on the discovery of an original, unpublished version of his text and looks critically at some interpreters of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. The study concludes that despite numerous differences in his reflection on science before and after the Turn, it can be stated that there is substantial continuity between the stages of Heidegger´s philosophy of science.

The moral debate about open borders needs to go beyond focusing on the interests of the migrant versus the interests of the hosting state and its original citizens to focusing more on the interests of the countries that migrants are leaving. I hint at the long-term insufficiency of so-called economic remittances to the development of migrant-sending states when compared to domiciled skilled labor. But most importantly, I identify the irrelevance of current empirical research on brain drain to an open borders scenario. I hint at the potential scale of brain drain in such a scenario, and I raise a moral question about the propriety of proposing open borders with a focus on the wellbeing of the individual migrant if such a focus is determined to be at the expense of the wellbeing of the migrant’s home country. I add that a preamble to opening borders would be to significantly address gross global economic disparities, world poverty, and political injustices.

The paper is a critique of Alvin Plantinga’s notion that belief in God is properly basic - evidence is not needed to justify such belief - in light of Thomas Aquinas’ religious epistemology. The latter’s epistemology proves that, while evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God based on his Summa Theologica (henceforth, ST) since such belief is evidence itself from his De Veritate (henceforth, Dv), there is sufficient evidence that justifies such belief. First, I argue that Plantinga’s total rejection of evidence as a justification for belief in God renders such belief purely subjective. To rationally ground this purely subjective belief, Plantinga introduces the notion of justification-conferring conditions. Second, following Thomas Aquinas’ thought, Plantinga’s justification negates his claim that belief in God is properly basic because the said justification-conferring conditions seem to function as an evidence for belief in God. I will conclude the work by claiming that although evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God, it is epistemically sufficient to justify the said belief.

The principle of overlap of classes holds that when two entities interface, the effect is a blurring of boundaries between conceptual territories. In this paper, this question is in order: Is Folk Catholicism an instance of overlap of classes? If Folk Catholicism is not construed as such, these fallacies – using Robin George Collingwood’s perspective in his An Essay on Philosophical Method (1933), may unfold: the fallacy of precarious margins, the fallacy of identified coincidents, and the fallacy of false disjunction. The first fallacy holds that the ‘Folk’ in Folk Catholicism has no contribution to how ‘Catholicism’ unfolds. The second fallacy maintains that the extensions of both ‘Folk’ and ‘Catholicism’ are clearly delineated. The third fallacy underscores that Folk and Catholicism are mutually exclusive terms. When such fallacies are accepted, this paper holds that Folk Catholicism as a construct may be a contradiction of terms on what it means to be Folk and Catholic. This is the illogical consequence given that the truth of what it means to be folk necessitates the falsity of what it means to be Catholic and vice-versa. However, when recognized from the lens of the overlap, Folk Catholicism is construed as a term that evolves and is historically conditioned.

I argue in this paper that every society has its own “libidinal drives” that may or may not paralyze the capacity of individuals towards freedom. Fromm calls this the social character. Social character is the unconscious canalization of individual libidinal drives for the attainment of social objectives instituted by the dominant figures of society. I theorize that the Freirian dyadic alliance persists because of a dominant characterology permeated by the ruling authorities. The dynamics of social character structure not only eludes the oppressed conscious awareness, but it also actually strengthens the domination and control through the institutionalization of structural policies enacted and implemented by the oppressors. Hence, what Freire laments in the Pedagogy of the Oppressed is equalized and smoothen by how the marginalized and the downtrodden cling incessantly towards the oppressors. By depending upon the dominant ruling authorities, the oppressed find fulfillment and satisfaction, upon which they fortify the dyadic-symbiotic relations. This happens because of the dynamics of their character structure that caters to the instinctual drive to survive. The social character gives rise to the inner satisfaction of oppressed libidinous desires and needs, thus equalizing their own emotional needs. Furthermore, the very nature of their submissiveness is a character trait that unknowingly recanalizes their elementary needs in life. Hence, by understanding how the Frommian social character influences social behaviors the symbiotic element that cements the Freirian dyadic relation is unlocked. Through unraveling the dynamics of social characterology, the Freirian dyadic symbiosis ungrounds itself and eventually grasps why the majority of the poor and marginalized are motivated and find fulfillment therein as a matter of survival from controlling authorities.

Morality is a normative system of guidance that figures into practical reason by telling people what to do in various situations. The problem, however, is that morality has inherent gaps that often render it inefficacious. First, it may be indeterminate due to the high level of generality in which its principles are formulated. Second, moral terms such as ‘good’ and ‘right’ may be so vague that they fail to specify the requisite behavior. And third, its subjective aspect, which is a product of personal experience, generates moral disagreement and thereby creates coordination problems that frustrate society’s collective moral aims. The objective of this article is to advance the thesis that morality must sometimes depend on law as a supplementary source of practical reason, a dependence which can be explained in terms of three essential features of law: its institutional character, its claim to authority, and its status as a second-order exclusionary reason for action. It shall then be explained how these three features enable law to make difficult decisions on behalf of individuals, define objective standards of conduct, and solve coordination problems, respectively, and in doing so, manage to fill in the gaps of morality mentioned above. Hence, it will be argued that law is also a normative system that helps people achieve their moral aims, notwithstanding the fact that it guides human behavior through a different logic and mode of operation from those of morality.

The use of language in hate speech is understandably offensive. Though words do not kill, they convey an alarming message that can harm the victim. To understand how words can harm, it is necessary to understand the nature of the meaning of pejoratives or slurs that are used in hate speech. Pejoratives are undeniably offensive. However, they are puzzling as they can be used in two directions, namely, the offensive power preservation and the offensive power destruction. This paper proposes that the direct reference theory of pejoratives can solve the puzzle. A characterization of pejoratives is that it has the property of immediacy. They refer directly to the object of speech. Grounding on a shared context, any descriptions are unnecessary for understanding the offensive message of pejoratives. In this sense, pejoratives have indexical content as it is context-sensitive. The kind of indexical content that pertains to pejoratives is action-oriented. However, its object of reference is empty. In discussing pejoratives that are used in hate speech, some examples of Thai slurs are shown.

This paper aims to institute that the folk song Pamulinawen is essentially a work of art descriptive of Ilokano cultural self-understanding. Specifically, it wants to elucidate that Pamulinanen, per se, is capable of self-assertion; it can usher itself to engage in a dialogue with the Ilokano beholder, and through the mediation of a common pagsasao (language), it embodies the individual and/or Nakem, the Ilokano collective identity. More than a popular song of courtship among the Ilokanos, the song Pamulinawen then attempts to increase knowledge about Ilokano kananakem (cultural self-understanding) so that it serves not only as a piece of Ilokano cultural entertainment but as a medium to express “Ilokano-ness" (Ilokano beingness). Through the qualitative methodology, this study mainly employs maiyannatup a panagripirip, a hermeneutical approach to appropriately philosophize on the Ilokano metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. This approach consists of, among others, palpaliiw (observation) and the “Agcaoilon PAR” (“Punget-A-Ramut a balikas” or root-stem word).

Whether all the Platonic dialogues are parts of an inconsistent or consistent body is a controversial subject of philosophy. Indeed, though in form all the texts are written dialogically, in content, one might recognize methodological alterations in Platonic thought from the 1st book of The Republic to later dialogues such as The Statesman and The Laws. However, how much this methodological alteration might affect the content of Plato’s political philosophy, the relation between the rupture in the method of contemplation on the one hand and the structure of the Platonic ideal Polis is still a subject not seriously explored yet. Exploring the characteristics of the three different methods used in Plato’s different dialogues, the present study attempts to show that in the light of the methodological alteration, one might realize how Platonic understanding of the good society has changed from The Republic to The Statesman and The Laws.

This article aims to present Cicero and Wang Chong as theorists of divination. While it has already been determined that they advanced both defenses and criticisms, I specifically intend to focus on their significant criticisms of divination, which emerged as corrective for the practice by supporting or disapproving and extending or limiting its underlying principles. I also emphasize that these thinkers have different objectives and emphases in their criticisms. Cicero’s objective is to maintain the fundamental teachings of their forefathers, prompting him to criticize anything that contradicts their teachings. Wang Chong’s objective is to make an appeal and encourage their people to be critical, and he often showed this through his criticism of the old, their classic texts, or even their tradition. In bringing them together, I show a robust and united rebuttal to the old ways of thinking about the divine and its ritualization. In conclusion, I offer an analysis that their critical attitudes, although different and may even be opposed, are complementary and both necessary.

Since Descartes, the quest for the foundation in epistemology has suffered a series of setbacks. The consequence of the opposition against an epistemic foundation is epistemic skepticism. The irony of the skeptic position is that scepticism in all its hues is self-refuting. Although the establishment of a foundation is essential for coherent epistemology, the quest for epistemic foundation has suffered some oppositions because most attempts at establishing foundational epistemology have focused on intentional signs or products – beliefs, concepts, propositions, etc. In this essay, I argue that in order to establish foundational epistemology, cognitional and intentionality analysis should take priority over conceptual analysis. Hence, instead of focusing on intentional signs or products, attention should be paid to intentional acts – experiencing, understanding and judging – of the knowing subject. In other words, I argue that paying adequate attention to human cognitional structure is vital in the defense of epistemic foundation and that the foundation is found in the structure of human knowing rather than in the products of human knowing. Focusing on cognitional analysis will help to account for both epistemic foundation and epistemic pluralism. The shift from conceptual to cognitional and intentionality analysis has implications for the articulation of the African perspective on knowledge since the human cognitional structure is the same, but contextual differences arise because of one's epistemic environment. Following the example of Bernard Lonergan, I argue that self-knowledge or self-affirmation of the knower, as he terms it, is the paradigmatic case for the establishment of epistemic foundation.

Aristotle discovered the law of contradiction more than 2000 years ago. Since then, this law has been regarded as one of the basic principles of logic. Aristotle considered this principle to be 'the most indisputable of all beliefs,' but nearly half a century ago, it began to be criticized. The voice of criticism came from a philosophical logic - paraconsistent logic. This study analyses in depth the specific properties of the positive logic plus approach, non-adjunctive approach, and relevant approach of paraconsistent logic and presents three definitions of the law of contradiction. It also shows that there are two types of the law of contradiction in C-logics and that the law of contradiction with classical negation is valid in them. Furthermore, this study proves that the law of contradiction with classical negation is also valid in a non-adjunctive approach and explains the reason this law cannot be deduced in some relevant logic systems. Based on these, we can clarify what type of the law of contradiction is questioned by paraconsistent logics and thoroughly reveal the exact meaning of 'the law of contradiction is invalid' in paraconsistent logics.

In this article, we contest the idea that evil does not exist, or that it is a mistaken grasp of reality to contend that evil exists. We analyze two versions of this argument: the 'orchestra argument' and the 'mystical argument.' In common, these arguments contend that those who affirm the existence of evil in the world have a limited view of reality. We argue that these views are either over-abstract from reality or do not offer a plausible approach to the problem of evil. We then advance a decolonial perspective on evil. According to the perspective advanced here, evil is conceptualized as a phenomenon that diminishes life. We contend this view provides a better account of how to understand evil.