In the ontological argument and the method of Anselm, we find many phenomenological elements. The proximity of the ontological argument to phenomenology shows itself especially from a parallel between Anselm's and Husserl's deriving a necessity of thinking from a necessity of being. But, Medieval proofs for the existence of God appear to contradict the principles of phenomenological method, particularly the 'bodily self-givenness,' the epoché as bracketing the real existence as well as the transcendence of essence vis-àvis consciousness. The phenomenological method must indeed be rethought and reformulated to allow a transition from returning to 'things themselves' to a philosophical knowledge of God. It must be freed from Husserl's subjectivistic theory of 'constitution' and from any generalization of the methodological principle of epoché. In this way, Anselm's position contains the germ for a critical rethinking of the phenomenological method in the vein of realist phenomenology.

He aquí un proyecto para educación infantil como introducción al curriculum ‘Philosophy for Children’ creado por Matthew Lipman. Este proyecto ha sido desarrollado desde una perspectiva multicultural a partir de tres lenguas: catalán (TOT PENSANT), castellano (PENSANDO) y portugués (BRINCAR DE PENSAR). La finalidad de este proyecto no es convertir a los niños en pequeños o grandes filósofos sino en individuos que sepan tomar decisiones, que prevean consecuencias de sus acciones, que sean en la vida activa más reflexivos, considerados y razonables; es decir, se trata de mejorar la capacidad de juicio para mejorar la acción.

The Western onto-theological tradition has long been preoccupied with two symbolizations of childhood. One conceives of it as an original unity of being and knowing, an exemplar of completed identity. The other conceives of childhood as deficit and danger, an exemplar of the untamed appetite and the uncontrolled will. In the economy of Plato and Aristotle’s tripartite self, the child is ontogenetically out of balance. She is incapable of bringing the three parts of the self into a right hierarchal relation based on the domination of reason. In other words, attaining adulthood means eradicating the child. Freud’s reformulation of the Platonic community of self combines the two symbolizations. His model creates an opening for shifting power relations between the elements of the self. He opens the way toward what Kristeva calls the "subject-in-process," a pluralism of relationships rather than an organization constituted by exclusions and hierarchies. After Freud, the child comes to stand for the inexpugnable demands of desire. Through dialogue with this child, the postmodern adult undergoes the dismantling of the notion of subjectivity based on domination, and moves toward the continuous reconstruction of the subject-in-process.

Philosophy and Narrative’ is a program designed for five to seven-year-old children. It is intended to exercise basic intellectual skills in a dialogic way, as does the ‘Philosophy for Children’ curriculum. Using The Jolly Postman, a stimulating tale by the English authors A. and J. Ahlberg, as a basis, de Puig has prepared a manual entitled Cuentos para pensar (Tales for Thinking) which comprises a series of resources ordered and adapted to the text and the needs of the curriculum for this age range. This sequentially ordered manual includes a number of popular tales as well as exercises and activities that engage various cognitive skills such as reasoning, research, translation and conceptualization. So far, our classroom experience with these materials has been highly satisfactory. Teachers and children enjoy working with them, creating many activities and engaging in new experiences.

Percibimos órdenes dominantes y, a la vez, grietas o discontinuidades en ese mismo orden. Valores, saberes y prácticas imperan en nuestra experiencia al mismo tiempo que fisuras de ese imperio engendran asombros, dudas, moestias. De estos sentimientos se nutre el cuestionamiento y la investigación filosóficos, un intento, al fin, por superar la inmovilidad de aquellos órdenes imperantes. En efecto, la filosofía, en tanto tarea crítica, cuestiona los valores, ideas y creencias que permean las prácticas socialmente dominantes. A la vez, en tanto tarea creativa, la filosofía piensa otros órdenes, alternativos a los imperantes. Las disposiciones y métodos de la filosofía se ejercen sobre toda práctica significativa para desatar su caráter ordinario, rutinario o cotidiano. Se establecen así condiciones de posibilidad para nuevos estados de cosas. En ese doble moviento de poner en cuestión y poner en cuestión y proponer alternativas para un determinado ámbito de la realidad, la filosofía se despliega en un conjunto variado de "filosofías de . . . ": la mente, el lenguaje, la cultura, la religión, la educación, el deporte, la tecnología, entre otros.

The Philosophy Program for Children initially inspired by Lipman’s work has been successfully applied in different countries. This program defends the necessity to teach children to think philosophically. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary both that teachers are philosophically educated and that philosophy is included in the curriculum of all schools. The aim of this paper is to show that phenomenology helps toward the success of this task as much as pragmatism, the tradition that inspired Lipman. The interest of Husserl and his followers in Lebenswelt and in knowledge makes pedagogical reflection and practice richer. Phenomenological applications and methodologies are so broad that they give education a critical orientation. The controversy between Merleau-Ponty and Piaget shows the validity of the Philosophy Program for Children. Hermeneutic phenomenology goes deeply into dialogue, an activity essential to the institution of an investigative community in the educational process.

This paper proposes that we should aim to refine talk about issues in soap opera as a means of developing moral reasoning skills. I begin with a report of work at schools in New Jersey over 1996-97, during which excerpts of a popular soap opera, 'Party of Five,' were used as the basis of a rigorous philosophical discussion of moral behavior. I then turn to the distinctive role of soap opera as a locus of moral discussion, with an example of a Mexicana telenovela. I suggest that children are already engaged in moral debate about soap operas and are eager to develop a more rigorous critical framework for the debate. I argue that children appreciate the opportunity to flesh out the school yard gossip about soap operas with a philosophically sophisticated discussion. My approach draws on the work of Matthew Lipman in philosophy for children, Neil Postman's critique of television, and David Buckingham's analysis of children's responses to television.

Los profesores de filosofía suelen afirmar que la filosofía debe ocupar un importante lugar en la educación de los niños y adolescentes. La filosofía les ponen en contacto con temas básicos para entender los fundamentos de la democracia y ayuda a que se desarrollen en ellos las capacidades cognitivas y afectivas exigidas en las sociedades complejas, plurales y cambiante de la actualidad. Falta de todas formas definir un poco mejor lo que entendemos por filosofía y cómo debe ser la enseñanza de la misma. La argumentación es correcta, pero no pasa de ser una argumentación filosófica más bien retórica, insuficiente para defender la presencia de la filosofía y poco clara para orientar la acción del profesorado en el aula. Hace falta en estos momentos desarrollar un amplio trabajo de investigación educativa centrado en la enseñanza de la filosofía. En esa investigación debemos confirmar la supuesta aportación de la filosofía y para ello hace falta, partiendo de un marco teórico solido y riguroso: a) definir con precisión que dimensiones desarrolla efectivamente la enseñanza de la filosofía; b) precisar cómo pueden ser observadas esas dimensiones en el aula; c) seleccionar los instrumentos que hagan posible medir el progreso en esas dimensiones; y d) diseñar las prácticas pedagógicas que ayuden a desarrollar esas dimensiones. Esto es lo que se presenta en este trabajo. Dedicado a la enseñanza de la filosofía en el bachillerato desde hace más de 25 años, me ha interesado siempre mucho la justificación de la presencia de esa asignatura, preocupación que se ha incrementado en los últimos años debido a la reforma del sistema educativo español que has supuesto, en parte, una disminución de la presencia de la filosofía, al menos tal y como era concebida anteriormente. Este interés, que comparto con la mayor parte de mis compañeros de prefesión, me ha llevado a profundizar en tres aspectos que quiero abordar en este trabajo. En primer lugar, el término de filosofía y de enseñanza de la filosofía son tan amplios, o tan vagos, que no estoy muy seguro de que, cuando defendemos la presencia de la filosofía en la educación, todos estemos hablando de lo mismo. En segundo lugar, la argumentación que los colegas ofrecen para defender la presencia de la filosofía es, con frecuencia, por no decir siempre, absolutamente retórica e insuficiente para el objetivo que persiguen. En tercer lugar, carecemos de un marco teórico de investigación que permita con cierto rigor avanzar en la verificación del papel que la filosofía puede desempeñar en la enseñanza.

Central to the explanations of justifications for Philosophy for Children is the concept of the 'community of inquiry.' This paper explores the question of the metaphysical foundations for this notion in terms of the nature of the individual versus the community and the question of truth.

This paper addresses the problem of educating for democracy in Chile and other places where human rights have been violated. Based on a research project conducted about the ethical foundations of human rights, I maintain that ethical education must be an indispensable ingredient of an education for democracy. I argue that an effective ethical education requires both an appropriate setting for the fostering of an open and tolerant discussion, and adequate guidance from the teacher for the understanding of complex ethical problems. As the ideal setting for it, I propose the creation of a ‘Community of Inquiry’ as it is understood and practised by the Philosophy for Children Program created by Matthew Lipman. As the basis both for identifying the main problems and for the training of the teachers, I build on Ernst Tugendhat’s ethical theories. The most significant consequence for ethical education derived from Tugendhat is the inclusion of a discussion of the problem of the foundation of ethics in order to avoid ethical relativism resting on the individual’s personal decision to belong to a moral community. To this the child should be invited through philosophical dialogue in a community of inquiry.

Habits form a crucial part of the everyday conceptual scheme used to explain normal human activity. However, they have been neglected in debates concerning folk-psychology which have concentrated on propositional attitudes such as beliefs. But propositional attitudes are just one of the many mental states. In this paper, I seek to expand the debate by considering mental states other than propositional attitudes. I conclude that the case for the autonomy and plausibility of the folk-psychological explanation is strengthened when one considers an example from the non-propositional-attitude mental states: habits. My main target is the radical eliminativist program. As regards habits, eliminativists could argue in two distinct but related ways. They can either abandon the concept "habit" altogether or retain the folk-psychological term "habit" by reducing it to the causal chain of the observed behavior pattern, as is sometimes done in social theory. I contend that both of these strategies are defective. The correct way to talk about habits is in terms of manifestations and activating conditions, not in terms of causal chains. Hence, if eliminativists take up either of the two arguments given above, they will not succeed. Correspondingly, by the added generality gained through the consideration of habits, the case for folk-psychology is strengthened.

What is the role of mental variation in cognitive science? I will attempt to answer this question by dividing it into two separate questions: (1) what role does mental variation already (or implicitly) play in cognitive science? and (2) would cognitive science benefit by inquiring (explicitly) into the role of mental variation? I will attempt to show that mental variation already plays an important (though not always explicit) role in cognitive science. Additionally, I will suggest that explicating the role of mental variations in cognition may be seen as a vital component of maintaining the strength of certain approaches and "schools" of cognitive science.

Can a mass of networked neurons produce moral human agents? I shall argue that it can; a brain can be morally excellent. A connectionist account of how the brain works can explain how a person might be morally excellent in Aristotle's sense of the term. According to connectionism, the brain is a maze of interconnections trained to recognize and respond to patterns of stimulation. According to Aristotle, a morally excellent human is a practically wise person trained in good habits. What an Aristotelian theory of ethics and a connectionist theory of mind have in common is the assumption that the successful mind/brain has the disposition to behave appropriately in appropriate circumstances. According to Aristotle, the good person knows the right end, desires and chooses to pursue it, and recognizes the right means to it. Thus the good person's brain must be able to form certain moral concepts, develop appropriate behavioral dispositions, and learn practical reasoning skills. I shall argue that this collection of the brain's cognitive capacities is best accounted for by a connectionist theory of the mind/brain. The human condition is both material and moral; we are brain-controlled bodies with ethical values. My essay seeks to understand the relationship between our brains and our values, between how the brain works and how we make moral decisions.

There is a striking paradox in contemporary brain and cognitive science. Their purported fundamental category of information either is not defined or is used in a Shannonesque sense, which is unable to account for the processes of regulation and control when content, not the quantity of information, is concerned. I try to provide a more adequate formula which is applicable to a wide range of systems commonly counted as informational systems. Representative examples would include a single biological cell, animals, persons, and computers. In fact, I consider information-defined here as any detectable difference of physical states-to be the determining principle of all animate systems, one in which determines both their achitecture and their operation. I claim that the concept of information is a realist category and that information itself is, in ontological terms, an irreal entity unable to act on its own. Three hierarchically ordered forms of information are distinguished and a number of applications of the proposed definition are discussed.

Psychophysical dualism — the distinction between mind and body — is the counterposition between essentially irreducible elements: the mind and body. Such a dualism implies the main ontological problem of the philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem (MBP). The dualism and the referred-to problem has been insistently discussed in the philosophical tradition and several solutions have been proposed. Such solutions are properly philosophical or require a scientific approach. First, I will expound the philosophical solution to the MBP proposed by Descartes, to be followed by an exposition of Ryle's criticisms to the solution. Second, from Ryle's criticism, I will deduce a scientific solution to the MBP related to the neural framework model of mind in cognitive science by means of what I call 'the principle of the embodiment of the mind.' Finally, I shall point out the philosophical difficulties that are to be found in using such a principle.

The adjective 'virtual,' practically unheard-of a few years ago, has become a primary buzzword of the 90's. Yet the word 'virtual' is nothing new, although its ubiquity is new, as is perhaps its current meaning or meanings. In 1902 the word was defined by Charles Peirce as follows: 'A virtual X (where X is a common noun) is something, not an X, which has the deficiency (virtus) of an X.' Peirce also references Scotus's concept of virtual knowledge, the concept of virtual velocity in physics, and Edmund Burke's doctrine of virtual representation, which is not representation but is supposedly as good as. The concept of virtuality is deeply embedded in Peirce's doctrine of signs and hence in his semiotic doctrine of mind. In this Peircean doctrine, which has been more recently echoed in the writings of Wittgenstein and Popper, we find the most promising philosophical framework available for the understanding and advancement of the project of augmenting human intellect through the development and use of virtual technologies.

My first goal is to question a received view about the development of Analytical Philosophy. According to this received view Analytical Philosophy is born out of a Linguistic Turn establishing the study of language as the foundation of the discipline; this primacy of language is then overthrown by the return of the study of mind as philosophia prima through a second Cognitive Turn taken in the mid-sixties. My contention is that this picture is a gross oversimplification and that the Cognitive Turn should better be seen as an extension of the Linguistic one. Indeed, if the Cognitive Turn gives explicit logical priority to the study of mind over the study of language, one of its central features is to see the mind as a representational system offering no substantial difference with a linguistic one. However, no justification is offered for the fundamental assimilation of the nature of a mental representation with that of a linguistic symbol supporting this picture of the mind, although the idea that a system of mental representations is identical in structure with a system of linguistic symbols has been argued over and over. I try to demonstrate this point through a close critical examination of Fodor's paradigmatic notion of 'double reduction.' My second claim is that the widespread contemporary assimilation of a mental representation with a symbol of a linguistic kind is no more than a prejudice. Finally I indicate that this prejudice cannot survive a rigorous critical examination.

I examine some recent controversies involving the possibility of mechanical simulation of mathematical intuition. The first part is concerned with a presentation of the Lucas-Penrose position and recapitulates some basic logical conceptual machinery (Gödel's proof, Hilbert's Tenth Problem and Turing's Halting Problem). The second part is devoted to a presentation of the main outlines of Complexity Theory as well as to the introduction of Bremermann's notion of transcomputability and fundamental limit. The third part attempts to draw a connection/relationship between Complexity Theory and undecidability focusing on a new revised version of the Lucas-Penrose position in light of physical a priori limitations of computing machines. Finally, the last part derives some epistemological/philosophical implications of the relationship between Gödel's incompleteness theorem and Complexity Theory for the mind/brain problem in Artificial Intelligence and discusses the compatibility of functionalism with a materialist theory of the mind.

Turing's analysis of the concept of computation is indisputably the foundation of computationalism, which is, in turn, the foundation of cognitive science. What is disputed is whether computationalism is explanatorily bankrupt. For Turing, all computers are digital computers and something becomes a (digital) computer just in case its 'behavior' is interpreted as implementing, executing, or satisfying some (mathematical) function 'f'. As 'computer' names a nonnatural kind, almost everyone agrees that a computational interpretation of this sort is necessary for something to be a computer. But because everything in the universe satisfies at least one (mathematical) function, it is the sufficiency of such interpretations that is the problem. If, as anticomputationalists are fond of pointing out, computationalists are wedded to the view that a computational interpretation is sufficient for something to be a computer, then everything becomes a digital computer. This not only renders computer-talk vacuous, it strips computationalism of any empirical or explanatory import. My aim is to defend computationalism against charges that it is explanatorily bankrupt. I reexamine several fundamental questions about computers. One effect of this computation-related soul-searching will be a framework within which 'Is the brain a computer?' will be meaningful. Another effect will be a fracture in the supposed link between computationalism and symbolic-digital processing.

The domain of cognitive semantics-insofar as it deals with semantic neighborhood and semantic fields-is discussed from a historical perspective. I choose four distinct stages in the evolution in philosophy of language: Raymundus Lullus and his Ars Magna (14th century); Giodano Bruno and his artificial memory system (16th century); Charles Sanders Peirce and his diagrammatic logic (19th century); and, Kurt Lewin and his topological psychology (20th century). Their proposals furnish steps toward a kind of space-oriented model of semantic neighborhood and semantic fields. Linguistic developments since 1920 (field linguistics) and more recently in cognitive semantics are compared to the evolution in the frame of philosophy as put forth above. The result is that we criticize cognitive semantics insofar as the field does not reflect the philosophical work done since Raymundus Lullus, which is highly relevant for contemporary cognitive science.