Heidegger, the founder of the hermeneutic paradigm, rejected the traditional account of cultural activity as a search for universally valid foundations for human action and knowledge. His main work, Sein und Zeit (1927), develops a holistic epistemology according to which all meaning is context-dependent and permanently anticipated from a particular horizon, perspective or background of intelligibility. The result is a powerful critique directed against the ideal of objectivity. Gadamer shares with Heidegger the hermeneutic reflections developed in Sein und Zeit and the critique of objectivity, describing the cultural activity as an endless process of "fusions of horizons." On the one hand, this is an echo of the Heideggerian holism, namely, of the thesis that all meaning depends on a particular interpretative context. On the other hand, however, this concept is an attempt to cope with the relativity of human existence and to avoid the dangers of a radical relativism. In fact, through an endless, free and unpredictable process of fusions of horizons, our personal horizon is gradually expanded and deprived of its distorting prejudices in such a way that the educative process (Bildung) consists in this multiplication of hermeneutic experiences. Gadamer succeeds therefore in presenting a non-foundationalist and non-teleological theory of culture.

El autor parte del significado griego de la Paideia. Responsabiliza al individualismo por la falta de un modelo que guíe la dinámica educativa de nuestra Cultura en un Mundo de información que se globaliza. Plantea la urgencia de poner las bases para una nueva Paideia, que forme a las generaciones del milenio que se avecina. Propone sus condiciones: carácter filosófico, aplicación de una base común universalizable, interés por la ciencia, respeto por la diversidad, apuesta por la formación integral humana. En esta línea de búsqueda, se sugiere el rescate de la categoría de 'cuerpo,' previa superación de la errónea identificación del término con nuestras propiedades fisicas visibles. Se invita a emplearia referida holisticamente a la totalidad de los aspectos humanos. Para implementar la noción de 'cuerpo,' se acuñan las categorias de 'valencias' y 'coordenadas' corporales. Las primeras son las necesidades y capacidades naturales biofisicas, sociales y personales; las últimas apuntan los aspectos sincrónicos y diacrónicos que constituyen al cuerpo total. El cuerpo podría ser la base antropológico-axiológica para la nueva Paideia. Algunos de sus lineamientos serían: conocer el cuerpo-quesomos, recorporalizar la Cultura, la alteridad corporal como principio integrador, el imperativo corporal de la hominización, la base corporal del ecodesarrollo y la democracia cultural desde el cuerpo.

Richard Wagner always represented for Nietzsche the Germany of that time. By examining Nietzsche's relationship to Wagner throughout his writings, one is also examining Nietzsche's relationship to his culture of birth. I focus on the writings from the late period in order to clarify Nietzsche's view of his own project regarding German culture. I show that Nietzsche created a portrait of Wagner in which the composer was a worthy opponent-someone with whom he disagreed but viewed as an equal. Wagner was such an opponent because he represented the disease of decadence which plagued the culture and from which Nietzsche suffered for a time, but of which he also cured himself. In other words, Nietzsche emphasized his overcoming and revaluation of Wagner because he wanted his readers to understand it as a metaphor for his larger battle with decadence in general. The goal of this portraiture is to demonstrate on an individual level what could be done on a cultural level to revitalize culture. Through an analysis of Nietzsche's portrait of Wagner in the late period, I will claim that in order to understand Nietzsche's revaluation of decadent values in nineteenth century German culture, one must understand his relationship with the composer.

This paper attempts to bring out environmental consciousness as reflected in Indian culture. What we are facing now was quite different in ancient times because our environmental problems owe a lot to contemporary styles of thinking and to our way of life. 'Differences' between nature and human beings have been misinterpreted as 'opposing forces.' This attitude is antipathetic to nature, which explains our careful but callous experimentation with nature that produces achievements as well as harmful by-products. When dealing with living beings on earth, we should not rely fully on the methods applied in laboratories. Science explains particular phenomenon in terms of universally valid laws. But abstract aspects of things do not do justice to the aspirations of living beings. Indian culture depicts the entire universe as a significant manifestation of a basic reality, namely 'The Self.' Indians believe 'macrocosm' in 'microcosm.' This vibrant common bond enlivens everything existing in the universe. To substantiate the above, a few phenomena will be cited. In the end, it will be shown that human values are not to be grafted; they require rather perseverance and cultural base. Hence scientific and cultural efforts should proceed hand in hand for the progress of humanity.

Recent ethnographies suggest that tribal cosmologies address topics of philosophical relevance and offer valuable insights into the nature of perennial philosophical problems. For example, while postmodern and feminist thought has argued that the verification of knowledge is directly related to political interests, I argue that there are other vantage points not related to such interests that serve as valuable measures for the acceptance of knowledge. Direct empirical verification of the ontological presuppositions that govern the assessment of anthropos in the context sub species aeternitatis empowers an individual to understand his or her role within culture as well. The methodological bounty described in ethnography signals for philosophers to question the categorization of transcendence merely as 'religious experience.' This paper argues that humans may have the capacity both to recognize the divine and to give objective descriptions through symbols and language which allow for the development of methodologies in order to access that knowledge at will.

I use Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man to consider the requirements of existentialism to be relevant to racialized experience. Black existentialism is distinguished from white existentialism by its focus on anti-black racism. However, black existentialism is similar to white existentialism in its moral requirement that agents take responsibility so as to be in good faith. Ralph Ellison's invisible man displays good faith at the end of the novel by assuming responsibility for his particular situation. The idiosyncratic development of the novel can be interpreted as an example of the ways in which existentialist values ought to be instantiated through unique individual experience. However, blackness, or any racial identity, is not itself an existential structure because it is not universal. Rather, existentialist requirements for good faith can be applied to racialized situations by both whites and blacks.

1. A strong interest shown by modern society to the sphere of economic attitudes, and connected to it the growing authority of the economists. - 2. Perception about the "iron" laws of economics as highest criteria of economic activity and life in general (economic fatalism). - 3. An exploration of the most widespread motives of housekeeping: struggle for a survival, earning one's "life", earning on "the black day". - 4. Logical "circumvention" of all these motives confirmed by the daily facts. - 5. Managing for the sake of managing - professions for amateurs. - 6. Narrowing the sphere of action of the economic "laws" from "all" to "wishing". - 7. Optionality of the "iron laws" of economy, even for those wishing to be engaged in it. (with examples). Dependence of economy on ethics and psychology. - 8. The essence of the moderate fatalism, its incompleteness and discrepancy. - 9. Economics as a game, initiated and regulated by the government. Decreasing of the status of economic game with the eldering of the population. - 10. Inevitability of occurrence of "shadow" sector in economy, which considers as its basic purpose the obtaining of the profit. 11. A dilemma rising before any man without preconception: to admit economy to be a "dirty business", fun for the adults, or to search for the "third" way, which... 12. ...on my sight, consists of returning to the initial sense of the word: economics-a reasonable running of an economy, or keeping house keeping) - 13. The elementary analysis of this definition. - 14. The task of philosophy of economics in the given context. - 15. Concept of "organic economics" demanded by real life, instead of the obsolete, and diminishing influence of the exclusively mechanical approach. Universal character of this concept.

The concepts of Utility and Universality form an answer to the utilitarian topology of Utility and the General Good. Starting from the realization that utility cannot be determined materially, but only formally, the very premise of utilitarian philosophy has to be abandoned. The greatest good is not the good of the greatest number, but the universal good.

Allais' paradox provides a convenient way to demonstrate that the distribution of alternatives we face in a situation of choice may give rise to new factors. These emergent factors may need to influence a one time choice of rational decision-makers, although they should not be taken into account in long reiterative games.

According to Marx, "at any given epoch of a given society, [there is] a quantity of necessaries [recognized as] the necessaries of life habitually required by the average worker." The variations in the type and amount of goods recognized as necessary for life between different epochs and different societies is due to the different 'physical conditions' and to the different 'degrees of civilization' and 'comfort' prevalent. In advanced capitalist societies, the necessities of life include a heated dwelling, food, clothing, and access to some means of transportation, be it public or private. However, the average laborer in advanced capitalist societies has access not only to the necessaries of life but to a variety of luxury items as well. For example, the average worker has access to fine food and drink, an automobile, a television, and a stereo system. In my paper, I explain Marx's theory of the nature of capitalist exploitation. I then indicate how the phenomenon described above may be interpreted as evidence against Marx's theory, and then sketch an interpretation of this phenomenon that reconciles it with Marx's theory. My interpretation will suggest that the average worker's access to luxury items can be explained by the necessity in capitalism of reproducing the working class.

When analyzed within economic methodology, the Duhem-Quine thesis has been given a particularly restrictive interpretation, with the focus on the testing of individual hypotheses. The most recent contributions however have shifted the focus from the testing of individual hypotheses to that of more extensive structure such as paradigms or schools of thought within economics. In this connection the impact of the Duhem-Quine thesis remains extremely pessimistic in prohibiting the rejection of an economic paradigm. In this paper we refute the basis for this methodological pessimism by focusing on an alternative and broader framework of analysis, which is termed "causal holism." Contrary to the standard approaches to economic methodology, causal holism does not start with the Duhem-Quine thesis at the level of testing. Rather we distinguish between the Duhem-Quine thesis at the level of meaning and at the level of testing. This distinction necessitates a reinterpretation of the role of economic theory. At the level of testing, contrary to the standard interpretation, which distinguishes between a strong and a weak thesis, we introduce a threefold distinction. Applying this distinction to economic methodology, we demonstrate how economic theory can be exposed to holistic testing while incorporating the causal holistic reinterpretation of the Duhem-Quine thesis.

This article is an attempt to sketch a philosophical view of money as a social phenomenon. I show that the way to understand the substance of money is to analyze its meaning as a medium of exchange in connection with its meaning as a purpose of exchange, thereby providing an investigation of its social value. This approach has been used by many of the great philosophers and economists of the past, but not today. Modern economics is a policy oriented theoretical discipline and concentrates its efforts on solving practical tasks. I hope to contribute a philosophical approach to economic research.

This paper begins with an explanation of the "life sequence of value," which is defined by the formula Life->Means of Life->More Life (L->MofL->L1). The analysis then contrasts this general sequence of value to the "money sequence of value," which is shown to have three autonomous forms not before distinguished: (1) Money->Means of Life->More Money ($->MofL->$1); (2) Money->Means of Life Destruction->More Money ($->MofD->$1); (3) Money->More Money->More Money ($->$1->$2->$3->$n). I explain how the first money sequence of value, analyzed by Marx in his classical formula of industrial capital (M->C->M1), has mutated so that the standard sequence of (1) assumed by economists has, in fact, been increasingly displaced by sequences (2) and (3). The argument shows that these sequences of economic "growth" increasingly dismantle environmental and civil life-fabrics, but remain unproblematic to the dominant economic paradigm whose measures of value do not register life-losses in their value accounts. It is concluded that a regrounding of economic understanding in the life sequence of value is required to avoid a cumulative breakdown in the conditions of social and planetary existence.

The thesis of this paper is that the ethics of environmental economy must search for a virtue-ethical basis. The traditional utilitarian approach has been the dominant ethical paradigm in neoclassical economics, but it is very problematic regarding environmental issues. Alternative orientations for an environmentally responsible economy can be found from (a) the history of economics, especially from the Aristotelian tradition (Aristotle, the physiocrats, Hegel, Marxism, etc.), and (b) recent discussions about values in nature. Through these, one can look for economic virtues which are ecologically sound and, at the same time, socially and culturally possible. Some such virtues do already exist (e.g., saving) which must be interpreted only ecologically. Others (e.g., ethical control over the level of demand) can be found from the economic ethics of Antiquity. Economic virtues are usually followed unconsciously and alternatives are scarce. The ethics of ecological economics must develop ecologically meaningful virtues: through that it can make a place for new environmentally sound practices and policy.

I argue that humanity is initiating a new historical era: the Technological Era. While this mutation opens to man extraordinary possibilities of spiritual and material progress, it is irreversible and threatens to destroy him. The eminent danger can be relieved only by adequately preparing the younger generation. In what follows, the principles which guide this preparation are enunciated and justified. The nuclear importance which should be given to moral education is emphasized, and the cultural and sociological obstacles opposed to it are analyzed. Finally, the means to overcome these obstacles are indicated.

The business sector increasingly subsidizes financially challenged institutions. Representative examples would include health care, major sports arenas, and penal facilities. Among the recent beneficiaries of corporate largesse are schools. Such assistance blurs social roles and raises serious moral concerns, especially those of moral agency. Education, more so than other social institutions, determines the kind of citizen and moral character a person can become. Put differently, education operates on virtue development that may override the fiscal logic of profit-maximization practiced by corporations. In this paper I argue that whatever benefit received by struggling schools is short-lived by comparison to the long range influence achieved by a corporation via advertisements that affect the psychological preferences of children. I contend that this makes the exchange unfair insofar as it violates the autonomy of the student. Education should provide a free and open atmosphere in which critical points of view are discussed. If corporations are permitted untrammeled access to schools, social views may become one-dimensional. Economic salvation would effectively trade on the moral failure of schools.

Conceptualizations of critical thinking framed in terms of mental processes have been highly influential in contemporary education. Such conceptualizations have, however, been criticized by philosophers of education both because of the problematic nature of the notion of mental processes and because of their lack of a normative dimension. I argue, however, that the reliance on the notion of skills in the accounts of some of these same philosophers renders their accounts potentially subject to some of the same criticisms which they level against process conceptualizations. This problem becomes particularly salient in the debate over the generalizability of critical thinking where the introduction of the concept of skills frames the issue in terms of the transfer of an inner process or ability. I argue that critical thinking is better conceptualized in terms of the achievement of certain understanding or intellectual resources. The problem of generalizability then becomes one of determining the range of use and application of the principles and criteria which constitute our public traditions of inquiry rather than one of determining the transference of some putative mental ability.

The present global political situation is serious and desperately invites public awareness and concern. Global problems cannot be solved locally; they must be studied locally with an eye towards a mass-movement that would raise awareness of the severity of the problems as well as the absence of viable solutions. A comprehensive view should evolve through critical discussions regarding both problems and possible solutions. The movement must seek to create minimal scientific literacy (that is, attention to factual reports plus a critical attitude toward them). The movement must be educational and democratic; it must encourage individual autonomy. It must freely confess ignorance and slowly develop ideas in a combination of broad propaganda and proper research. Philosophy can contribute by developing a comprehensive view of the situation. Academic research should attend to practical problems. Ideally, the movement will offer grassroots education that will enable graduates to compel appropriate institutions to enact legislation directed toward the alleviation of global problems.

Education, an action, is a process, a development of the imperfect human being intentionally directed at achieving the ideal of human plenitude in the best possible manner. This is a description of the educational process based on the human being who travels toward plenitude, a point of arrival; the human being who achieves his or her own perfection in the best possible manner; and a method: intentional guidance towards plenitude in the harmonious formation of humanity. It is not enough to say what education is or what it is like. It is necessary to clarify what education is for. The harmonious development of essential, integral and vocational abilities makes the student more perfect and causes his or her cosmic and social circumstance to be more perfect. In this integral philosophy of education, I offer a new "Paideia." It is necessary to seek the student's point of balance between the sciences of empirical verification and humanistic duties. Otherwise, we will march toward the disintegration of the human being, to the anti-knowledge of a very powerful technocracy. Integral personal and community education is education which promotes the person in a changing society susceptible to progress. That student perfectibility which is anxious to satisfy demands can only be fulfilled with love. The contemporary world has not rehearsed on a large scale an education for love. If we do not found education on love, the world will not be inhabited by humans.

La preocupación social y política por el comportamiento de los individuos en sus relaciones sociales ha suscitado en el ámbito educativo internacional un interés creciente. Se han desarrollado programas de formación que reciben denominaciones diferentes: educación del carácter, educación moral, educación cívica, educación en valores, educación social, y los otros. Resulta necesario para reflexionar sobre esta temática conocer qué han expuesto algunos autores del pasado que han influido más notablemente en el desarrollo del pensamiento pedagógico. Aristóteles y Rousseau son autores excelentes para este propósito comparando de paso etapas diversas como son la clásica y la moderna. Las nociones y denominaciones que utilizan para referirse a la dimensión moral de la educación son: educación del carácter en Aristóteles, y educación moral en Rousseau. Desde el punto de vista aristotélico, la educación del carácter es siempre moral porque hacer del individuo un ser humano pleno es hacerle bueno. Viendo el tema desde la perspectiva de Rousseau, la educación moral busca que el individuo conserve su carácter "natural' aun viviendo en sociedad. Rousseau dividiría la educación del carácter que promueve Aristóteles en dos etapas, la educación del individuo, que es formación de su carácter-educación negativa-para después pasar a una educación propiamente moral. En la raíz de la distinción entre educación moral y del carácter encontramos las diversas bases antropológicas que sustentan Aristóteles y Rousseau por las que establecen cuál es la relación entre sociabilidad e individualidad. El Estagirita destaca la posible armonía entre estas dimensiones humanas planteando la educación cívica como una continuación de la del carácter, en cambio, a Rousseau le resulta difícil coordinar ambos aspectos aunque lo pretende añorando el estilo de vida de las polis griegas. Tanto Aristóteles como Rousseau insisten en que uno de los procedimientos básicos de la educación moral y cívica es el ejercicio y la habituación en los comportamientos que se quieren suscitar.