The structure of the Euthydemus, together with other more subtle hints, shows that Plato's purpose in the dialogue is to contrast two educational methods: eristic, as represented by the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and dialectic, as represented by Socrates. Plato has made the educational failure of eristic so evident in the dialogue that the question arises why he should have thought it worth attacking at such length. The reply is suggested that it was the sophists' claim to teach virtue that was particularly galling to Plato. He wishes to show further, that the character of their eristic tricks is to deny the possibility of teaching at all, since the either/or basis of their arguments amounts to a denial of becoming. Plato brings these matters to a head less than half-way through the dialogue, at 286E, when he has Socrates ask his 'stupid question' as to what the sophists teach, if they really believe that there is no false speaking, no refutation, and no ignorance. The paper concludes by agreeing with Holger Thesleff that the Euthydemus is 'pedimental' in construction, although disagreeing with him as to where the central peripateia occurs. To place the turning point, as I would do, at 286E, is to show that the theme of the dialogue is paideia.

I show that Aristotle’s ethics is determined by his notion of communities which are in turn determined by hundreds of themes in his Topics-sameness and difference, part and whole, better than, etc. These are tools for all dialectical investigations into being and action (viz. Top. I.11 104b2) for they secure definitions and get at essences of things or their aspects. Reflecting structures of being and good, they allow Aristotle to arrive at objective reality and good. Being tools for all investigations into being and values, we are not free to reject them, nor can we have any discourse or claim to reality or good. I show how permutating the combination of these topics allows for subsequent ‘sub-communities’ which are common to some. I offer an Aristotelian explanation for the origin of these topics and conclude that ethics is determined by communities, which in turn are determined by education.

This paper argues that the assertion of Nicomachean Ethics I.ii that the art that treats of ethics is politics is to be understood properly not in the sense of politics qua nomothetike but just as politike, i.e., direct, participatory politics as was enjoyed in the Athenian polis and as the formed background to Aristotle’s philosophizing on the nature of ethics. The ethical import of politics can be retrieved from Aristotle’s Ethics (in both versions) and Politics by dwelling on the connection of eudaimonia and humanity’s function as such. Aristotle does not construe this function as contemplation but rather as the practical application of reason-reason leading to action. This, however, is the subject of politics. This specific human function, the function that makes us homo sapiens, can not be displayed in rule-be-ruled institutions such as the oikos (household) since such institutions and their collateral behaviors are predetermined based on rank or role. But achieving the distinctively human telos requires that such rule-be-ruled relations and behaviors be transcended since those relations and behaviors exclude the free exercise of deliberative intelligence.

One vigorous line of thought in contemporary moral philosophy, which I shall call ‘Neo-Aristotelianism,’ centers on three things: (1) a rejection of traditional enlightenment moral theories like Kantianism and utilitarianism; (2) a claim that another look at the ethical concerns and projects of ancient Greek thought might help us past the impasse into which enlightenment moral theories have left us; (3) more particularly, an attempt to reinterpret Aristotle’s ethical work for the late twentieth-century so as to transcend this impasse.

This article shows that Aristotle created the first notion of a zero in the history of human thought. Since this notion stood in evident contradiction to the basic principles of his metaphysics and logic, he rejected it.

Whenever we meet an unknown person, our first judgment, even unwillingly and often subconsciously, starts from his or her external appearance. Since character can be properly recognized only from words and deeds observed over some time, at first sight we have to rely on what we immediately can see. This physiognomical first approach to each other is as old as humankind, and, though it has never been able to be proved a proper science, in everyday life we all believe in and use physioculture. The earliest extant written work on the subject is the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise Physiognomonica. The author of its first part, in discussing the methodology of the art, refers to Aristotle, who develops the logical foundation of physiognomical inference: as an enthymeme, a syllogism from signs. Yet, concentrating solely on the formal logical analysis, Aristotle does not touch the central point of physiognomics; it C. S. Peirce’s discovery of the triadic relation of the sign that was able to shed new light on this central problem and to see physiognomics as a process of semiosis. Thus, Aristotle founded the formal logical basis, from which modern semiotics developed new approaches to physiognomics, taking them in account in several strands of their research.

I argue that Plato's psychological theories are motivated by concerns he had about moral theory. In particular, Plato rejects the modern account of rationality as the maximization of subjectively evaluated self-interest because, had he adopted such an account, his theory of justice would be subject to criticisms which he holds are fatal to the contractarian theory of justice. While formulating a theory to remain within ethical constraints sometimes violates the canons of scientific theorizing, Plato avoids this mistake.

This paper deals with Walter Benjamin’s text largely known as "Theses on the Philosophy of History," and disputes its classification under that rubric. The circumstances of the elaboration and, more important, the explicit destination assigned to the reflections of the "Theses," require a consideration of its content and its relation to the historical studies the author was engaged in concerning the "prehistory" of modernity, especially of the remnants of the Parisian nineteenth century: the commonly known work "The Arcades Project." The relevance of a sameness in the language used in the two writings, particularly the resort to images, metaphors and the technique of montage, is stressed. It is argued that Benjamin’s philosophical style was always imagistic and that this fact is particularly relevant to the reflections on the concept of history. Philosophers and historians are both concerned by the historical research and concept construction of a thinker like the late Walter Benjamin. It is therefore desirable to compare and contrast their views.

Historical research was one of Jean-Paul Sartre's major concerns. Sartre's biographical studies and thought indicate that history is not only a field in which you gather facts, events, and processes, but it is a worthy challenge which includes a grave personal responsibility: my responsibility to the dead lives that preceded me. Sartre's writings suggest that accepting this responsibility can be a source of wisdom. Few historians, however, view history as transcending the orderly presenting and elucidating of facts, events, and processes. I contend that Sartre's writings suggest a personally enhancing commitment. A lucid and honest response to the challenges and demands of history and the dead lives that preceded my own existence is an engagement that requires courage, wisdom, and thought. The consequences of this commitment for teaching history is discussed.

In Vico’s New Science wisdom is understood in a double sense. On the one hand, wisdom means the poetic wisdom that provides intelligibility for the peoples of the nations during their early stages of development. On the other hand, wisdom means the noetic knowledge gained by the Vichian scientist who contemplates concrete historicity in the light of the New Science. By means of an examination of three principle aspects of Vico’s science, and by looking to his conception of the origin of the most rudimentary institutions of humanity, primordial piety— fear of the mythic other— is shown to be the origin of poetic wisdom. And, by focusing on the necessity of surmounting the conceit of scholars and the conceit of nations for a science of universal history, philosophical piety— openness to the wholly Other— is revealed as the ground of philosophical wisdom. This paper sets out to show how Vico’s science of the principles of humanity is, at the same time, a science of the unity of piety and wisdom.

El presente trabajo expone y problematiza las categorías de la filosofía de la interpretación, que Gianni Váttimo* reconoce como herencia del mensaje cristiano; por entender que el autor esclarece el fenómeno del ‘retorno del cristianismo,’ su sentido y alcance en la filosofía tardo-moderna. Se explicita la relación de continuidad entre la historia de la revelación cristiana y la historia del nihilismo, a partir del análisis especulativo del fenómeno religioso de la encarnación de Jesús. En consonancia con la interpretación del pensiero debole, el resurgimiento de la religión en los albores del tercer milenio, no puede ser comprendido desde un cuerpo doctrinal dogmático. Muy por el contrario, el Dios qu retorna en la época posmetafísica requiere ser pensado desde la categoría de debilitamiento, inscripta en la ontología de corte heideggeriano. La tarea del pensar que propone la hermeneútica desde una instancia ética se define en un doble proceso: a) el alejamiento del pensar violento de la metafísica, correspondiente en el plano religioso con el abandono de concepciones naturalistas, y b) La asunción de la Verwindung bajo la luz y el límite de la caritas. En este contexto, la conjunción nihilismo y encarnación, se transforma en la clave de interpretación del decurso de la filosofía occidental.

Múltiples son los puntos de contacto entre Nietzsche y Musil en lo referente al modo en que piensan la configuración de lo real, y a sus respectivos diagnósticos de la sociedad finisecular. Desarrollaré en este trabajo el tema de la forma del ejercicio del pensamiento como modo de constitución de lo real, aquello que en Nietzsche se puede caracterizar desde el término 'perspectivismo,' y en Musil alcanza su veradadero sentido desde la consideración del 'ensayismo,' en las consideraciones que realiza en El hombre sin atributos. Tanto en uno como en otro autor, esta noción ensayístico-perspectivista se halla en estrecha relación con la pérdida del centro ordenador último de la realidad, con las posibilidades del decir desde un yo sin atributos, y con el carácter erótico del ensayo mismo, como forma de tensión. Interpretando la Wille zur Macht nitzscheana como 'razón imaginativa,' como fuerza tensionante entre la unidad y la disgregación, es posible entender el carácter múltiple de las perspectivas que, de la misma forma que el amor, no se agotan en ninguna figura última del pensar.

In his essay "The Politics of Interpretation: Spinoza's Modernist Turn," Berel Lang attributes to Spinoza the view that interpretation presupposes or implies a political framework-in effect, that interpretation is itself a politics. The thrust of Spinoza's argument is against "interpretation from authority," i.e., against the view that the meaning of a text can be determined by an external authority. Understanding cannot be coerced, according to Spinoza. In my paper I attempt to make the relationship between reader and text even more direct and "free" than it is in Spinoza. I argue that any approach (such as Derrida's) which posits an interpretation between reader and text places constraints on the notion of a democracy of free readers. I argue that in a truly literate democracy readers have the right to claim that they have understood or grasped their texts without having any kind of intermediary placed between themselves and their texts, regardless of whether this intermediary takes the form of an external authority (in Spinoza's sense) or an interpretation (in Derrida's sense). In the course of the paper I draw upon Michael Dummett's philosophy of language in order to critique the "humpty-dymptyism" of the interpretationist school. I place myself firmly on the side of Alice in Through the Looking Glass, and spend some time discussing the significance of the difficulties which she experiences with the nonsense poem, "Jabberwocky."

La tematización filosófica de la proximidad de razón y lenguaje desde el giro hermenéutico practicado por H-G. Gadamer permite repensar a la razón, núcleo de la filosofía occidental, en su posibilidad misma de universalidad y respeto de la diferencia. Razón y lenguaje están entretejidos en la idea misma de logos. El logos reside en esa disposición de las palabras para la unidad del sentido, y por ello, se ha llamado logos a la frase. Pero la frase, al igual que la palabra, es una fragmentación del lenguaje. En realidad el lenguaje es en la conversación. Cuando realmente hay conversación se llega a la elaboración de algo común y en ello consiste el entendimiento. En la praxis social y en el arte tiene lugar una conversación, un entenderse en algo con otro, una orientación hacia la unidad no supresora de la alteridad, que patentiza una universalidad no totalizadora en la misma filosofía occidental.

Two fundamental criticisms made by traditional hermeneutics against philosophical hermeneutics are that the latter deny the possibility of objectively true interpretation, as well as assert that all interpretations are possible on the basis that they cannot be measured. In my paper, I argue that the first criticism is well-founded, while the second is not. I contend that interpretations can be decided according to two relational criteria: (i) which interpretation has a more comprehensive horizon; and (ii) which one is derivable from the other.

One of the most difficult philosophical works ever written is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. In the "Introduction" to this work, Hegel attempts to aid his readers by describing the project that he carries out. But like so many things written by Hegel, the "Introduction" itself is formidable and very difficult to understand. In this paper, I attempt to "make sense" of the "Introduction" and, thus, contribute to the understanding of the Phenomenology. To achieve this end, I take the great liberty of comparing philosophers with blind men and Reality with an elephant. I take a series of claims made by Hegel in the "Introduction" and show how they make sense of his project once they are seen in the context of John Godfred Saxe’s poem, "The Blind Men and the Elephant." In doing so, I explain the similarity of problems presented in the poem and the Phenomenology. Further, I show how the nature of both problems places the same kind of restrictions on anyone trying to overcome either. While Saxe’s poem urges an acceptance of the fact that total truth is always beyond your grasp, Hegel’s goal is to achieve such a truth. What you will see is that all the characteristics that would have stopped most philosophers and Saxe, become the means by which Hegel thinks he can ultimately achieve knowledge of the Elephant.

This paper examines the nature of freedom in Hang-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. It focuses on the last section of Wahrheit und Methode advancing the hypothesis that Gadamer’s model of understanding is derived from his particular appropriation of the Platonic notion of the beautiful which poses a passive interpretative posture toward the object of understanding and deprives the activity of interpretation the essential creative quality of freedom. I argue that to the extent that the object of understanding presents itself as immediate revelation of truth, the interpreting subject is reduced to a mere acknowledger of truth as opposed to a creative producer.

This paper reexamines the central thesis of Gadamer’s theory of interpretation that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, I consider three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the secondary literature, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. I reject this argument as insufficient. I also reject a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. I then articulate a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions under which it is grasped. I appeal to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend it against two objections: (i) that it conflates meaning and significance; and (ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism.

According to Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation there are no facts of matter which could determine the choice between two or more incompatible translation schemes which are in accordance with all behavioral evidence. Donald Davidson agrees with Quine that an important degree of indeterminacy will remain after all the behavioral evidence is in, but he believes that this indeterminacy of meaning (IM) should not be seen as either mysterious or threatening. In this paper I argue that IM is not as innocuous as Davidson believes it to be and has consequences which do not sit easily with some core elements of the Davidsonian project. I argue that IM leads to the nontrivial thesis of the indeterminacy of language ascription which is not captured by the mundane examples of indeterminacy of measurement that Davidson frequently cites. Davidson makes a liberal use of the principle of charity in order to lessen the effect of IM. In recent years he has broadened the scope of the principle of charity by arguing that a radical interpreter, at least in some basic cases, should identify the object of a belief with the cause of that belief. Davidson agrees with Quine and Putnam that the concept of causality is applied to the world according to human interests. For Quine and Putnam, however, the interest-relativity of causal relations has relativistic consequences. Given Davidson. s long-standing opposition to all types of relativism this conclusion should not be welcome to him. Relativism may be avoided by imposing a great deal of social and biological homogeneity on all language-users which is an equally unwelcome view.

The article presents a proposal to use the notion of information and a model of its transmission for analysis of the structure and basic functions of a sign. This is to point to the relation between information and the basic function of a sign, that is, a 'representation.' A sign is understood, in accordance with Peirce's theory, as a triadic relation of representation. One of the consequences of this theory is limitation of representation to the area of internal objects of a sign, that is, to ideal intentional objects. The relationship between a sign and the external world remains unexplained, which allows one to perceive a sign as a barrier in comprehension of the external world. A more complete justification is also required for both the relationship between object and meaning of the sign and the very arising of representation as a unity of three elements. The article analyzes the triadic relation of representation on the basis of the notion of information close to the one proposed by C.F. von Weizsacker. It is shown that representation can be understood as a specific, complex information flow. Processes of information flow determine the structure of representation as well as the relationships between the world of signs and the world beyond signs. Such approach allows one to give a more complete justification to the ability of sign systems to represent the external world.