The present essay focuses on the Frankfurt School’s views on relations between philosophy and science. The author specifically concentrates on Horkheimer, the School’s leader, and Habermas, its most prominent contemporary representative. In her reconstruction of the Frankfurt School’s approach to the dependencies between philosophy and science the author—similarly to the Frankfurt theoreticians—abstains from treating it abstractly, instead placing it in its social and historiosophical context. The essay’s leading thesis is that the Frankfurt School sees philosophical self-reflection as a remedy for the crisis in European culture, visible since the beginnings of the modern era in the rise of instrumental thinking. The author reminds that the assumption of philosophy’ primacy over science—or the primacy of wisdom over knowledge—has found avid support among philosophers of other eras and other schools of thought.

The following is an attempt to grasp synthetically the strategy and development of Jean Baudrillard’s intellectual standpoint. My view emphasizes late ideas by French Philosopher, while the earlier ones are treated from this perspective as preliminary. After having left Marxist and post-Marxist positions, Baudrillard developed an original and idiosyncratic way of thinking about contemporary world that—inspired by Nietzschean idea that the power of interpretation prevails over representation of truth—evolves around rejection of the traditional ideas of the social, reality and revolt, while employing categories of mass, simulation or catastrophe. This attitude took him not only beyond good and evil, but also to affirmation of death and terror, conducting to an extreme standpoint of “intellectual terrorism”.

Both nihilism and universalism are historical products of Western speculative philosophy. The failure of this philosophy to discover universally valid laws resulted in widespread despair, which at times created a suicidal atmosphere. The other worldly promises offered by dualistic world models made an escape into an alternate world attractive. This paper investigates whether Nietzsche’s proposal to rekindle the fire of life by recovering the Dionysian spirit in creative work is a feasible alternative to nihilistic despair. It goes on to investigate whether a new sense of community and collaborative ethics can be distilled from a renewed engagement with nature. Recent scientific discoveries and experiential evidence could lead to a reformulation of virtue ethics based on naturalistic sources.

Marek J. Siemek’s idea of the transcendental social philosophy seems paradoxical, because it aspires to combine the allegedly “non-historical” and “timeless” transcendental sphere with the social and historical dimension. But the uniqueness of Siemek as a philosopher consists precisely in being Fichtean as well as Hegelian. Siemek’s philosophy is an undertaking to reconstruct the field of rationality in its social and historical dimension. The leading question of this philosophy is not if history is rational, but how it is possible for the rationality to be historical. Siemek seems to maintain, that the noninstrumental rationality has it’s own history: it is a history of self-de-instrumentalization of the initial one-sided instrumental reason. Historical process can be seen as a vehicle of rationality, although not always and necessary rational itself. For Siemek, as well as for Hegel, the historical contradiction is a contradiction of the thing itself, not a development scheme imposed on the history by theoretician from his allegedly external position. On one side: there is no history without the rational interpretation of history. On the other side: the interpretation itself is a part of historical process.

I can’t say that I resent the Germans, nor that I expect or demand anything from them. I would only like them to know what they have done to me. They have destroyed my childhood and ruined my eight-year-old imagination, leaving only a pile of rubble, heap of corpses, great cesspool—gigantic hole filled with black blood. (K 53)

This paper defines a quantitative model of civilization wisdom potential in terms of its wisdom capacity potential and wisdom activity potential. Four minds such as the Basic, Whole, Global, and Universal ones are defined and their wisdom potential is assessed for eight particular civilizations, such as Western, Eastern, Japanese, Chinese, Hindu, Islamic, Buddhist, and African. In conclusion the study states that civilization wisdom should be applied in almost every facet of civilization and its future depends on civilization wisdom.

Under the influence of today’s post-modern human sciences and their relativistic, skepticism-imbued theories the universalism idea, until recently the philosophical driving-force behind efforts to build a global human community based on universal principles of rationality, has lost much of its attractiveness to pluralism. However, despite the recognition that human rationality expresses itself in many different ways, strivings towards a universal human community have by no means ceased. Some take the form of political projects, others are more spontaneous and take place beyond both politics and philosophy. The present reflections on these strivings’ success chances go out from ideas formulated by Eugeniusz Górski in his study Civil Society, Pluralism and Universalism(Washington DC, Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2007).

This article is a speculative review of psychology’s approach to the cultural and civilizational determinants of the development of human identity. It discusses the relation between human freedom and necessity as it is determined by culture and its alternative suggestions concerning normative human existence. As his point of departure the author adopted Feliks Koneczny’s quincunx philosophy of history together with its five basic categories of existence. One can try to transpose these categories into the factors which constitute human intra-psychic space and also into measures of description of the mechanics of human behavior. Attention is drawn to the fact that, in this context, the axiological shortcomings of psychology are exposed, especially the deliberate refusal to evaluate behavior in terms of good and evil or the exclusion of ethics, moral obligations, conscience and responsibility from psychological discourse.

This paper investigates the reason why humans developed a brain and mind and the latter’s mental processes employed in the search for wisdom. The Anthropological and Cognitive Approaches are applied in defining major cybernetic anatomies of a brain and mind. The INFOCO Systems are defined and applied in defining the stage-oriented development of humans’ kinds. A concept and evolution of a mind is defined too and eight minds are recognized which are grouped in four clusters: Basic, Whole, Global, and Universal Minds. Their development in particular civilizations is analyzed and a model of wisdom’s bifurcation is presented.

From the perspective of Marek J. Siemek’s theory of modernity, one of the most important problem is to include conflicts into institutional framework of the modern society. He reinterprets Hegel’s dialectics of the struggle for recognition by conceptual tools of Hobbes and Marx in order to uncover hidden assumptions and conditions of possibility of the social rationality. For Siemek, law as purely formal, autopoetic social system or social subject (intersubjective automaton), which produces individual subjects (persona in the sense of Roman law), is the first of the conditions of possibility of modernity. The second one is the convergence of formal and material presuppositions (such as recognition and labor) of law—or, speaking generally—the convergence of form and content of the social reason. Form and content, facticity and normativity, instrumentality and communicativity (or teleology) are aspects of the process of rationalization andof the only one reason, self-generating in the history. So for Siemek, the Hegelian model of the struggle for recognition gains its theoretical power only when it is interpreted from the perspective of economical, technical and legal rationalization of modernity. Only such perspective is able to construct “the transcendental social philosophy” which starts from critique of “the non-instrumental reason”.

In the paper I try to define some basic ideas and sketch a style of Marek Siemek’s epistemological reflection and its influence on the notion of do called “meaning of history”. I referee some elements of his interpretation of Kant and Hegel as a background to paradox of “meaning of the history”—the paradox of its necessary transcendence and immanence, the contradiction between a history as an eschatology, and history as a “project”, a dialectic of sense and non-sense. The conclusion is following: the “history” for Siemek is the becoming of self-sufficiency of the “modern spirit” and therefore a tragicomedy in the Hegelian sense. It excludes any transcendent point of view or any utopia.

The author of this text introduces to Kazimierz Dąbrowski’s views on the subject of national character as a category describing the structure and character traits of individual and collective identity. The Polish psychiatrist and existential psychotherapist K. Dąbrowski (1902–1980) distinguishes positive and negative traits of the „national character” of Poles, based on a typology of characters by Ernst Kretschmer and his own theory of psychical over-excitability types. My text verifies the introduced psychological arguments with the concept of “humanity”, finding that the concept of „national character” can be included into the complex or the ego defense mechanisms.