In this text, my aim is to provide a reading of Mauro Carbone’s Philosophy Screens: From Cinema to the Digital Revolution in the context of his other writings. My claim is that in this most recent work, Carbone makes a decisive step from being an original interpreter of the work of Merleau-Ponty and Proust to making an original contribution to what I describe, following Merleau-Ponty and Carbone, the history of “a-philosophy”: an historical attempt to reverse the “official philosophy” that has been with us since at least Plato. This reversal is staged through a series of concepts, created by Carbone, that I take up here viz à viz Plato’s allegory of the cave: the archescreen, the sensible idea, the screen, and philosophy-cinema (a concept borrowed from Deleuze). Together, these concepts illustrate what I call, borrowing a phrase from Jean-Luc Nancy, a philosophical partance: for Carbone, the work of “philosophizing” should no longer be conceptualized in accordance with Platonic imagery of ascent, illumination, conversion, and importantly, grasping and seizing upon the είδη but as “departure”: allowing the objects of thought their transcendence, a liquidity by which they slip through our grasp.

This essay reads Graeme Nicholson’s Heidegger on Truth in conjunction with Frank Schalow’s Heidegger’s Ecological Turn. It calls for the appropriation of Heidegger’s understanding of Da-sein to elaborate a radically other, earth-based political order. Nicholson and Schalow independently draw the conclusion that the technocratic world order, founded in the metaphysics of presence, is incapable of adequate response to a hermeneutic situation defined by instrumental reason and ecological collapse. Schalow’s carefully elaborated contribution to eco-philosophy offers a creative adaption of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology and specifies how it is integrated into the project of the history of being.

The present paper is a review of Critical Studies on Heidegger: The Emerging Body of Understanding (SUNY, 2023), by David Michael Kleinberg-Levin, who argues we can find a phenomenology of perception in Heidegger ultimately no different than that of Merleau-Ponty. The concept of “the emerging body of understanding” means the growth or “perfection” of human capabilities in perception – touch, vision, and hearing – that are attentive to our interconnectedness with others and nature as presented by the Fourfold. The conclusion of the review offers some evaluations regarding questions of influence and recently available course notes by Merleau-Ponty about Heidegger’s philosophy.

Petri Berndtson’s Phenomenological Ontology of Breathing points to the largely unexplored dimension of our being breathing beings. Berndtson draws upon the ontology of the flesh, as well as several comments of Merleau-Ponty about breathing and Being. The primordial perceptual faith in the being of the world as a field of all fields (the “barbaric conviction”) is seen as a primordial sense of breathing in the world (“respiratory faith”). Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s reference to Claudel’s call to listen to the ear of Sigé, the Abyss, Berndtson relates silence in the encounter with Being to an encounter with silence of breath and its abyssal or chasmological (“yawning”) quality. He asserts that this level of breathing is a level of being-in-the-world deeper than the primacy of perception. At this point, the review questions the author’s assertion that this dimension is more primordial than perception, that Merleau-Ponty has a positivistic framing of perception, the author’s literal sense of silence and the lack of appreciation of the power of the poetic in flesh ontology, the role of reversibility and the import of the invisible of the visible. Rather than the ontological primacy of breath, the review suggests that breathing is a way of taking in the world and being open to an aerial dimension of inchoate sense that is equiprimordial with the other avenues of perceiving the world.