321.
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Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology:
Year >
2012
Denis Seron
The Fechner-Brentano Controversy on the Measurement of Sensation
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322.
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Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology:
Year >
2012
Roberto Poli
Modes and Boundaries
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323.
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Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology:
Year >
2012
Susan Krantz Gabriel
Heidegger's Question and the Fundamental Sense of Being in Brentano
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324.
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Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology:
Year >
2012
Ion Tănăsescu
Franz Brentano's Dissertation and the Problem of Intentionality
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325.
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Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology:
Year >
2012
Robin D. Rollinger
Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint: its Background and Conception
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326.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Acknowledgments for the First Edition
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327.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Chapter III: The Phenomenological Reduction: A Descriptive and Historical Introduction
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328.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Preface to the Second Edition
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329.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Abbreviations
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330.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Preface to the First Edition
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331.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Chapter II: Husserl's Logical Investigations: Whence And Whither?
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332.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Chapter I: What is Phenomenology?
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333.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Chapter IV: Lived Ego: The Ego in Husserl's Thought
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334.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Chapter VI: Lived Time
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335.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Index of Names + Index of Topics
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336.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Chapter VIII: Toward Phenomenological Practice
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337.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Chapter V: Lived Essence: “Essence” in Husserl's Thought
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338.
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The Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology:
Year >
2010
Harry P. Reeder
Chapter VII: Lived Language
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339.
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Fichte-Studien:
Volume >
45
Douglas Moggach
Contextualising Fichte:
Leibniz, Kant, and Perfectionist Ethics
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
An examination of the intellectual context in which Fichte develops his ethical program in the Jena period and its immediate aftermath (1794–1800) reveals the determining presence of Leibniz, and the complex heritage of Leibnizian perfectionist thought from which Kantian, and post-Kantian, ethics seek to extricate themselves. While Kant blocks any reversion to the older, Leibnizian perfectionism, his criticisms leave open a space for a new kind of perfectionist ethic, one whose object is the promotion not of any determinate notion of eudaimonia or thriving, but of the possibility of free agency itself. The aim of post-Kantian perfectionism is to sustain the conditions of free, spontaneous action. Fichte’s ethical system is one example of post-Kantian perfectionism.
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340.
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Fichte-Studien:
Volume >
45
Daniel Breazeale
In Defense of Conscience:
Fichte vs. Hegel
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
First in the Phenomenology and then in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel rejects Fichte’s notion of conscience on the grounds that it leads to despair (since the agent can never be sufficiently well-informed to know that he is doing the “right” thing). He also criticizes Fichtean conscience as purely “formal” and “abstract” and compatible with any content, which it can obtain only arbitrarily from the manifold of one’s natural drives and inclinations. For Hegel, there is an unresolvable tension between the claimed “universality” of a conscientious deed and the natural particularity of every moral agent, which ultimately leads to ethical egoism and hypocrisy. The aim of this paper is to show, first, that Hegel misrepresents key aspects of Fichte’s position and, second, that Fichte possesses the resources to respond successfully to most of Hegel’s criticisms. In order to grasp this one must closely examine Fichte’s subtle and often misunderstand account of moral deliberation and conscientious decision-making and the relation of the same to his larger account of I-hood.
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