This paper focuses on the philosophical analysis of interculturality. Globalization involves the problem of the universal and its relation to the particular in cultures. In some interpretations, universality is sharply opposed to particularity (Arjun Appadurai's theory of "break" in culture). In contrast to this, there are authors who allow for both particular and universal, focusing on their interrelation. Roland Robertson shows that diversity and multiculturality do not exclude forms of cultural unity. The analysis involves the current debate regarding the term "intercultural philosophy" (Ram Adhar Mall, Franz Wimmer). Intercultural philosophy raises questions about philosophy itself, and involves the revision of the whole concept of philosophy. It brings to the forefront the problem of the interrelations between the cultural-specific and the universal in philosophy. For some philosophers, the notion intercultural seems to be incompatible with philosophy as universal knowledge. However, the adherents of interculturality develop a broader and more pluralistic concept of philosophy, viewed as embedded in certain cultural and philosophical traditions while dealing with perennial questions and aiming to give universally valid answers. Two main paradigms of interculturality are distinguished: one is Raimundo Panikkar's "intercultural-interreligious paradigm"; the other is the "intercultural-liberation paradigm" developed by Raul Fornet-Betancourt. At the heart of this analysis is Fornet- Betancourt's concept of the intercultural transformation of philosophy. It is related to interculturality, or the dialogue of cultures. It challenges the Eurocentric philosophical historiography and claims the necessity of the reconstruction of the history of ideas in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, thus creating a new view of the history of philosophy. The concept of intercultural dialogue is also considered as a "regulative idea" in creating an alternative to current globalization.

Muhammad Iqbal propounds a much wider view of knowledge and the universe than does Immanuel Kant. According to him, the fundamental pattern of knowledge remains the same whether we are dealing with the perceptual type of knowledge of everyday life or with a special type of knowledge called mystic or religious knowledge. This insight was not within the purview of Kant, who was working his way through specific limitations imposed by his Western legacy. Iqbal, no doubt, drew inspiration from his Muslim legacy as bequeathed by thinkers like al-Farabi, according to whom higher thought (or 'intellect' as he called it) "rises to the level of communion, ecstasy, and inspiration". It was under the inspiration of Muslim Sufis and thinkers that he could enlarge his vision regarding the knowledge of man. In fairness to Kant, however, it may be said that Iqbal accepted his epistemic model in toto and extended its application beyond the pale of sensible and empirical knowledge into the non-sensible realm of entities with which religion deals - a venture which, if accepted, will extend human knowledge beyond its present limits into various directions and dimensions.

The term 'culture' has more than one meaning in different contexts. The paper attempts to show certain consequences, resulting from the ambiguous use of the term 'culture', for the protection of human rights, by comparing the use of the term in the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation (UNESCO 1966), with its use in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It examines the meanings of the term 'culture' used in the UNESCO Declaration and the impact of this understanding on the protection of the relevant right or rights.

According to philosophical naturalism, the main anti-naturalism in philosophy derives from Kant and depends on transcendental arguments, which are invalid or polemically toothless. Many of naturalism's characteristic features follow from this repudiation of Kantian method. Anti-naturalists should be aware that the rationale for naturalism depends on this attack on their own position. There remains for philosophy a distinctively philosophical role that depends on the indexical element in our thought, the role of elaborating a scientific worldview.

Far from having overcome the human, all too human essence of knowledge the West has replaced its modern objectifying subjectivity by what may be called a postmodern subjectifying subjectivity. The modern will to power and its drive for controlling the Other has given way to a postmodern form of 'unavailability', a key concept in the ethical reflections of the Christian Socratic philosopher Gabriel Marcel. This paper attempts to highlight the degree to which fundamental features of Postmodernity, from instrumental technology to fragmented temporality and decentered subjectivity are infiltrating our existential condition. It is argued that one of the most striking symptoms of such a phenomenon is unavailability, especially in the artistic sphere.

The powerful images of the events^ of 9/11 have made an indelible impression on the world psyche. It has given rise to a pervasive rhetoric in practically all fields attempting to explain, interpret and understand the underlying causes and world changing consequences of the events. In a post-modern and secular world it has led to a refocusing on the religious fervour and ideals at work in established religions and in movements that are ostensibly devoid of all religious motivation, such as expansive globalization and American free enterprise capitalism. I argue that similar ideological and "religious" notions are at work in the conflict of worldviews represented by this historical event. In order to substantiate this claim and an identification of the ideological sources of the malaise at work in the world requires a clear distinction between religion, myth and ideology and the legitimate role played by constitutive root metaphors in culture, science and society. Root metaphor analysis reveals the underlying 'war of worlds' at work in the foundational symbolizations of the world (Gibson Winter, 1981) which function as fundamental building blocks of the "cultural cosmologies" of society (Harrington, 1995, 360). It is not only religious convictions that shape the world but the choices of metaphors by scientists, educators and politicians are not random and innocent but fraught with root metaphorical notions as religious as those of their ostensibly secular counterparts and thus laden with frameworks that dramatically alter the perception of phenomena and the behaviour and actions of groups. Harrington's (1995) analysis of the role of holism in the shadow of the Third Reich shows this very clearly. Recognition of the presence and influence of root metaphors of an ideological nature will contribute to the dies-enchantment with their allure. This paper attempts to develop a methodology on the basis of which it is possible to distinguish between the legitimate function of root metaphors in science and society and their hypostatization.

L'article cherche ä demontrer que le relativisme ne constitue pas une base viable pour les reflexions sur les relations interculturelles. Contrairement ä ce que beaucoup d'intellectuels croient actuellement, le relativisme ne s'avere pas plus difficile ä defaire qu'une pensee recherchant une assise universelle pour penser les relations entre cultures. Trois points de vue importants sont abordes pour etayer la these de l'article. II y a d'abord le concept de matrice interculturelle developpee par le sociologue quebecois Jean-Jacques Simard. Selon cet auteur, les valeurs de la modernite, comme la liberte et l'egalite des personnes, sont des valeurs universelles et non propres ä la culture occidentals La modernite est en effet une matrice culturelle qui ne se cantonne pas ä une culture particuliere. Ensuite, une analyse du relativisme present chez Levi-Strauss est faite afm de montrer l'incoherence de cette approche. Pour terminer, on aborde quelques points interessants sur le relativisme apportes par Raymond Boudon, dont le concept d'axiologie est rationaliste et non consequentialiste, et qui affaiblissent le relativisme des valeurs.

Hajime Tanabe (1885-1962), the Kyoto- School philosopher of modern Japan, attempts to interpret Aristotle's ontology as being involved in the logic of self-identical being without self-negative conversion in action from his own dialectical perspective. For Tanabe, the eternal essence or Form is to be mediated by the dynamic character of matter, i.e., the temporality pertinent to the changing movement. For Aristotle, however, the essence or pure activity as the principle of being is devoid of such a dynamic mediation, but is rather regarded as the past being, i.e., what it should be originally and eternally. In other words, for Aristotle, evil and matter are the lacks of goodness and the eternal Form that are identical with the essence of the individual substance. Evil is to be self-negatively mediated to goodness in free action through conversion in Tanabe's perspective. Movement pertaining to matter is not simply an incompletion of pure activity, but is rather self-negatively converted into the activity as the transcendent principle of the dialectical unification of time and eternity, matter and Form, evil and Goodness. The individual existence has freedom to unify the self-contradistinctive opposed moments, i.e., subjective action and objective being in a way of mutually negating conversion. The difference between Tanabe and Aristotle lies in that for Tanabe practice is relevant to the future, whereas for Aristotle contemplation is concerned with eternity as invariable and imperishable being since the past. While Aristotle's logic is confined to the self-identity of being in contemplation, Tanabe's logic is structured by the triadic elements of individuality, species as the relative universal, and genus as the absolute universal in terms of the negative conversion in action.

Die globalisierende Vermarktung der Welt bedroht auch die kulturelle Selbstbestimmung der Völker. Daher haben wir uns erneut und verstärkt dem Problem des Miteinanders verschiedener Kulturen zu stellen. Die Auseinandersetzung mit fremden Kulturen hat sich zunächst um das Problem des VerStehens bemüht, wie es methodologisch von der Ethnologie oder Cultural Anthropology entwickelt worden ist. Aber diesem Verstehen haftet grundsätzlich eine Einseitigkeit an. Daher wurde von politikwissenschaftlicher Seite eine Disziplin der Xenologie eingeklagt, die von einer mehrpoligen Verständigung der Kulturen untereinander ausgeht. Darüber hinaus versteht sich die neu etablierte Fragestellung der Interkulturellen Philosophie von vornherein sowohl der Doppelaufgabe von Verstehen und Verständigung verpflichtet als auch in die Schnittstelle von theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie gestellt. Die Interkulturelle Philosophie ist nicht nur ein neues Arbeitsfeld der Philosophie, sondern sie fordert vom Philosophieren insgesamt auch ein neues, sich verschiedenen kulturellen Sinnfragen öffnendes Selbstverständnis. Der Vernunftbegriff, den sie dabei zugrundelegt, ist keine vorausbestimmte Gegebenheit, sondern eine menschheitliche Aufgabe, die sie in inter kultureller Kommunikation bezogen auf ein sittliches Menschsein in der Welt zu vollbringen hat.

The golden mean metaphor is suggested as a key to understanding the universal and the particular in moral philosophy since finding metaphorical links provides a way of seeing different traditions in a manner that does not erect absolute boundaries. The choice of the golden mean is made keeping in mind that all cultures recognize the worth of moderation. The prime reason for that lies in human nature which sets human beings apart from all the other living creatures by a goal-oriented activity. As a rational being endowed with will, a human person cannot move toward a goal without adopting a certain strategy of actions. An instinct for self-preservation and astute prudence, personal experience and that of one's own ancestors are all prompting a human being to moderate and commensurate in dispositions and actions for an optimal attainment of the goals. Yet, the same principle is concretized in a particular cultural context (Ancient Greek, Indian, Chinese, Muslim and Russian cases are considered). Along with cultural distinctions, situational, temporal factors are of importance: much depends on whether it is the human person guided by own free will or a certain driving force, public, government, etc., outside and above defines the content of the golden mean.

The paper is an attempt to understand the nature of political religion using Russian Orthodoxy as an example. Political religion is different from the use of religion for political purposes: from "public religions" seeking to be a part of a pluralistic society; from "civic religion" (sacralization of political processes and institutions) and from fundamentalism. Contrary to fundamentalism, political religions aim not at revitalizing the past, but at addressing the most vital issues of modernity. Politicization of Orthodoxy in Russia may seem unlikely due to obvious political passivity of the Russian Orthodox Church and to the fact that people in Russia are rather religiously indifferent and theologically ignorant. But the paper demonstrates that political activity is typical not for the leaders of an institutionalized religion but for a religiously minded intelligentsia. Global experience also shows that politicization is most likely to occur in an area where people have just returned to their semi-forgotten religious beliefs and where the majority of population does not observe the rituals and does not know the fundamentals of religion. Growing number of people who identify themselves as Russian Orthodox, having, at the same time, no sufficient knowledge of this religion provokes the emergence of mediatory ideologies, which are Pan-Slavism (the idea of a union of all Orthodox Slavic nations) and Eurasianism (the idea of a union between the Orthodox and the Islamic world). From the fundamentalist viewpoint both ideologies should be defined as heretic. Pan- Slavism is heretic because it views Orthodoxy as a kind of Slavic tribal religion and strips Orthodoxy from its universalism. Eurasianist vision of Orthodoxy is so broad that any difference between "Orthodoxy" and "non-Orthodoxy" disappears.

One of the common targets that contemporary feminists are critical of concerning the problem of the body is Rene Descartes' mind and body relation. Feminist scholars can identify at least three lines of investigation of the body in contemporary thought that may be regarded as legacies of the Cartesian view, which treat the body as primarily an object for: 1) the natural sciences, particularly for the life sciences, biology, and medicine; 2) as an instrument or a machine at the disposal of consciousness or allocating an animating, willful subjectivity; and 3) as a vehicle of expression of private thoughts and feelings; that is, as fundamentally passive and transparent. Recently, feminist scholars are seriously thinking of a new conceptual model that can displace Cartesian dualism and that can emancipate notions of the body from Cartesian dominant mechanistic models and metaphors. In this light, this paper turns to a Confucian theory of the body for revelation and the case of Mencius is introduced, in which the mind is regarded as the major component of the body and a coherent model is adopted. Can we then conclude to ask in what ways the reclaiming of the body in the Contemporary Western discussion may learn from the Confucian ideas of the body...?

Die Einwände, die sich hinsichtlich der Weltprobleme gegen die Philosophie richten, sind vor allem, dass sie in ihrer Ausrichtung auf die eigenen Themen die Gegenwartsprobleme nicht zur Kenntnis nimmt, oder dass ihre Begrifflichkeit zu abstrakt ist, um der Komplexität der Wirklichkeit zu genügen. Aus diesen Gründen wird von der Philosophie ein Realitätsbezug und der Kontakt mit der Gegenwart gefordert, um zur Lösung der Weltprobleme beizutragen. Im Unterschied zu diesen Einwänden behandelt der Beitrag die Frage, ob die Philosophie selbst als ein Weltproblem beurteilt werden kann. Hierfür scheinen drei Grundannahmen erforderlich zu sein: 1. der "Motor" der gegenwärtigen Globalisierungsprozesse ist die westliche Kultur, die sowohl auf den modernen Naturwissenschaften als auch auf der Idee der Menschenrechte gegründet ist. Sie erzeugt zum einen durch ihre Dynamik Probleme als Weltprobleme und definiert zum anderen, was als Weltproblem zu betrachten ist. - 2. Die Philosophie ist das geistige Fundament und der ideelle Ausdruck der westlichen Kultur. Versteht man unter "Philosophie" die institutionalisierte Praxis des Reflektierens und Begründens, die ihren Maßstab an der Rationalität hat, so ist sie hinsichtlich ihrer Genese und ihrer Geltung untrennbar mit der westlichen Kultur verbunden. - 3. Die Praxis der Philosophie, ihre Standards auf Prinzipien der Rationalität zu gründen, stimmt nicht mit den Bedingungen und Strukturen des irdischen Lebens überein. Diese Annahme widerspricht sowohl einer idealistischen Ontologie, die die natürlichen Vorgänge in rationalen Strukturen gegründet sieht, als auch einer materialistischen, die Begriffe und Theorien als Abbilder natürlicher Strukturen interpretiert. Unter diesen drei Bedingungen ist die Philosophie nicht nur mit den Weltproblemen konfrontiert, sondern muss selbst als ein Weltproblem angesehen werden.

In this paper I examine the relevance of Maurice Merleau- Ponty's criticism of what he labels "objective thinking", in the light of contemporary political discussions. I compare his critique of the mutually exclusive categories of objective thinking, with Edward W. Said's analysis of Orientalism and its dichotomies between Orient and Occident as constitutive of highly material relationships of power. Especially after the 9.11 events, reasoning in terms of dichotomies between East and West, islam and civilization/freedom and so on has been prevalent in the discourse of politicians, journalists as well as intellectuals. Is there something that Merleau- Ponty's philosophy can teach us here? I claim that his view of the interdependency of language on the one hand, understanding and thinking on the other, is of highest importance here, since it shows that we have to undermine the established discourse from the inside, working out the complex differences of reality at the same time as forgin out new less rigid categories.

Perspicuous representation, Wittgenstein offers, is not another methodology, but it consists in seeing the connections. The Wittgensteinian perspicuous representation is therapeutic. The method he suggests for philosophy is the same method he suggests for social sciences. In both of these cases, he tries to get us to see the confusions we become entangled in when philosophizing and theorizing. In both of these disciplines he warns us not to advance explanatory, metaphysical theories. In this paper, I connect Wittgenstein's this concern with his critique of Frazer. In criticizing Frazer Wittgenstein adopts the important part of Spengler's view. Nonetheless, there are differences between the views of Wittgenstein and those of Spengler; this paper aims to show similarities as well as these differences. The first part of the paper briefly summarizes Frazer's views. The second part focusses on Wittgenstein's critique of Frazer regarding science. The third part gives an account of his critique concerning method of social sciences and philosophy. The last part concentrates on Wittgenstein's critique of Frazer regarding the tolerance towards alternative forms of life.

In this paper I shall be looking at the state of science before and after the 17th century especially with regard to the question of the nature of scientific knowledge, specifically scientific paradigms. I will argue that some of the major differences between modern science and pre-modern science are due to (i) methodological changes, (ii) the rise of paradigmatic monism in modern science as opposed to paradigmatic pluralism in pre-modern science, (iii) the integration of science with technology after the 17th century. These changes, I maintain, also redefine the role of scientific knowledge in society and culture, and bring in its wake certain problems and challenges, which in turn elicit different types of responses. Pre-modern science, I argue, are admirably suited to play a cultural and religious role, partly because of a lack of a pragmatic criterion of knowledge, and the emphasis on rational coherence. This makes enchantment of nature through science, possible. However, with the further evolution of science, especially the introduction of the experimental method and the emphasis on empiricism in the 17th century, scientific knowledge now has to conform to different criteria of knowledge -pragmatic in partleading to 'paradigmatic monism' and the consequent loss of enchantment in our conception of nature. The rise of the new science beginning in the 17th century thus brings in its wake a new set of epistemological and cultural challenges which were met with in different ways. I will then comment on the different types of responses made against the rise of the new science.

En Turquie la philosophie des Lumieres est congue comme un courant de pensee qui rayonne et eclaircit le processus de la creation de la Turquie moderne. Cette philosophie a contribue par ailleurs au developpement de la Turquie dans la voie de modernisation. Tous ceux qui ont lutte pour F independance du pays, notamment Mustafa Kemal Atatürk etaient profondement influences de la philosophie des Lumieres, Le fondateur de la Republique Turque et ses amis avaient tres bien saisie la grande importance d'adopter les principes de cette philosophie pour mener ä bien les reformes republicaines. En Turquie, la plupart des specialistes de la philosophie ont fait des recherches approfondies en la matiere et ils ont mis F accent sur les rapports qui existent entre les problemes sociaux et la philosophie des Lumieres. Par consequent, il n'est point errone de parier de l'existence d'une tradition des Lumieres en Turquie.

In this paper, I will try to show Bergson's resolution of the paradox of the human condition: the tension existing between 'living in the world' and 'perceiving the world'. His resolution centers around his concept "displacement of attention." According to him, when the direction of reasoning changes from 'intellect to intuition' to 'intuition to intellect', one will be able to experience the seemingly distinct two realms as a "succession without distinction". This experience is possible only by means of intuition in duration. In order to explain this kind of experience, Bergson uses the analogy of an artist creating a work of art. The artist and the philosopher both share the act of perceiving for the sake of perceiving; they both create in duration and as such they are able to perceive the moving world of phenomena without stopping it and breaking it into pieces. It is only through carrying this experience that we live in art or when we listen to a melody or again when we experience our self from within into the realm of philosophy that one is able to do true philosophy.