The value and importance accorded to personal autonomy within liberalism would seem to suggest that cultural practices that severely constrain the choices of individuals through heavyhanded role socialization and restriction ought to be strongly discouraged in liberal societies. In this paper, I explore this claim in connection with the custom of arranged marriage, which has recently come under fire in some liberal democratic states, notably Britain. My aim is to try to complicate the liberal understanding of the relationship between cultural traditions and personal autonomy. In the course of this discussion, I analyze and offer some criticisms of autonomy as a substantive ideal and requirement for flourishing. In revisiting and evaluating arguments in favor of a thick or substantive ideal of autonomy criticisms, I hope to show that a substantive ideal of autonomy as independence is culturally bounded in ways that are often overlooked by liberal philosophers.

In this paper, I would like to explore Nietzsche's philosophy of value, its influence on contemporary thought and culture and what it means for us today, that is, what we can appropriate from it in order to shed light on some of the problems of our age and to overcome them. These problems are in the areas of conflict, globalization and chronic injustices. I will approach the question of value in three parts: 1) Nietzsche's explicit writings on value starting with the second half of his works (The Gay Science and after). Here I will explore his value-related thoughts such as transvaluation, value-positing as legislation or law-giving, language and value, the locus of value-creation and the unconscious -psychic and somatic, for instance- aspects of valuation. What search and research has been done in these areas in the 2 0 t n century will also be surveyed here. 2) The value of individuality and 'unity' or belonging in Nietzsche's thought, that is, the individual and his or her 'environment.' In this part, I will reexamine his notion of individuality within the context of culture. 3) What Nietzsche sees as value in culture or "interpretation of existence". In this part, I will examine "forces of culture" such as ecstasy, creativity, language, body, soul, wisdom, knowledge, character-formation and education and how these different values form a meaningful constellation. In conclusion, I will try to bring these three parts together as I, at the same time, discuss philosophers who have been influenced by Nietzsche's ideas.

Philosophy should not be understood as a Eurocentric project of Greco-Judaic origin, but as a critical and fundamentally reflective intellectual practice which occurs worldwide, in many different forms. If this is so, anthropology has a crucial role to play in the project of reshaping philosophy's self-conception, to include the multiplicity of regional intellectual histories that have been neglected, and thus acknowledge and take seriously philosophical reflections from around the world. Through empirical observation, documentation, and comparative analysis, an anthropology of philosophy can help philosophy reach a better self-understanding, particularly in times of rising awareness of globally operating interdependencies and suspicions that philosophy is a smoke-screen for Eurocentric power interests. Anthropological investigation, if performed carefully and in combination with philosophical expertise, can provide concrete details, accounts and assessments of philosophical practice around the world, different from those that a sociology of philosophies (Collins 1998) or a history of philosophy can offer. It can integrate understanding of local languages and sensitivity for relevant social contexts, and need not be philosophically naive. Philosophy is linked to knowledge, the quest for knowledge, the critique of knowledge, and to the various perspectives from which forms of knowledge can be described and conceptualised. An anthropology of philosophy can be developed in relation to an anthropology of knowledge (Lambek 1993), where various locally relevant forms of knowledge are identified, observed, described and discussed, in relation to social practice. Making the case for an anthropology of philosophy, my paper refers to arguments of African philosophers, and the debate on African philosophy, while also drawing from my own fieldwork experience on philosophical discourse in a Swahili context.

Globalisation seems to be especially the Westernisation of the World. One of the crucial elements of (Western) European cultural identity is the reference to its scientific and philosophical inheritance. European culture is held to be rooted in ancient Greece, where a unique, historically inevitable and irreversible transition from myth to reason is thought to have taken place. I shall try to re-examine this still predominant view to clarify the elements of Western thought by comparing it with its historical predecessors in ancient Greek mythology in order to discuss its Euro-centric elements. For this purpose, two questions have to be asked: What is so special about ancient Greek philosophy? And how and why did it come into being? The arguments given to solve the first question are hardly convincing. If we might not be able to give a satisfying answer, the search for the reasons to come up with something like Western philosophy are becoming more important.

Among the fragments published in Zettel, one finds one of Wittgenstein's most enigmatic comments. In entry 455, he states that "the philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher". The apparent incongruity between this entry and the thrust of Wittgenstein's later works initially draws one's attention, but the passage sustains interest because it is situated at the nexus of issues addressed in current philosophical debate regarding cultural pluralism. This paper attempts to make sense of the Zettel fragment in the contexts of both Wittgenstein's own analysis and such debate. It argues that the post-Enlightenment philosopher's role entails a cosmopolitan point of view with promotes both the recognition of citizens' embeddedness in a cultural tradition and the need for a critical distancing from that tradition, occasioned by an awareness of cultural pluralism.

In this paper I outline some ways in which philosophy can contribute to the study of culture and pluralism, and how such a study may lead to a better understanding of philosophical enquiry. Building on earlier work (Sweet, 2002), I focus on four areas in which these contributions might be made. The first concerns the methodological, ideological, and historical presuppositions of culture and multiculturalism. The second area considers how philosophical discourse affects a culture's "self-understanding". The third area focuses on how (and how far) philosophy may enable a culture to allow diversity and pluralism within the larger community. The fourth area deals with philosophy's dialectical relation with culture -how far philosophy is a product of culture, and whether that affects philosophy's participation in culture. An exploration of these areas will show both what role philosophy has to play in the analysis of culture, and why it is important for philosophers -especially in the English-speaking world- to engage in the "philosophy of culture".

I argue here that, due to the influence of Greek philosophical ideas (such as the depreciation of time and change, and the glorification of independence and unqualified omnipotence), Christianity and Islam developed in directions foreign to the religious vision of their founders, leading ultimately to the present antagonisms between them. A 'philosophy of organism' - which sees time as cumulative, relations rather than substance as basic - can, however, help to reinterpret the insights of Jesus and Mohammed, and show that humanity's primary responsibility is to care for the creatures which the Eternal One has called into being.

The logical problem of evil centers on the apparent inconsistency of the following two propositions: (1) God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good, and (2) There is evil in the world. This is the problem that Alvin Plantinga takes to task in his celebrated response to the problem of evil. Plantinga denies that (1) and (2) are inconsistent, arguing that J.L. Mackie's principle - that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do - is false. We challenge Plantinga, and defend Mackie's view.

William James and John Dewey hold the view that all knowledge and experience are experimental. Within this common pragmatic context, James's theism and Dewey's atheism offer contrasting - indeed, contradictory - interpretations of the object of religious experience. This essay explores the intertwining of their common pragmatic context and differing objects of religious belief to show the way in which this intertwining gives rise to a unique position which can appeal to theists and atheists alike.

Since the Enlightenment, a common assumption in much of Western philosophy has been that religious belief would decline. Yet this has not occurred. Religion's tenacity can be partly explained by considering it as a story. The fact that stories play a central role in human experience may help to explain why religion continues to appeal to so many in a supposedly technologically-advanced, secular age.

While many have claimed that there is a conflict between science and religion, it is not often noted that they share a number of assumptions. Here, I work toward identifying and clarifying some of these shared assumptions. I focus on some of the common commitments to metaphysical, epistemological and moral priorities which are necessary for human life in a democratic society. While this will not eliminate all conflict between science and religion, it will remind the disputants of their common goals and even common enemies.

Philosophers of religion debate what is meant by the word 'God,' in the conclusion of proofs of God's existence. If'God' is a proper name, there seems to be no good proof that a non-empirical entity has this name. If it is a common name, it seems that it must mean what classical theists mean by 'God' - and the existence of such a being is hard to prove. I defend a third possibility: that 'God' names a common name that is the least prescriptive possible, while being sufficient to signify one kind of thing different from all others.

In his posthumously published book The Confession of Augustine, J.F. Lyotard reconstructs St. Augustine's invocatio: his "move upward" towards the absolute. The paper deals with three segments of Lyotard's text that interpret St. Augustine's method of letting the voice of the invoked "speak within me"; his attempt to progress to the atemporal "at the umbilical" of temporal experience; and his reading of the caller and the called as (partially) identical. Two aspects of Lyotard's interpretation are pointed out as problematic: his thesis of the "silent" absolute "You"; and his assumption, that invocatio takes pleasure in a "radical heteronomous" subordination "under the law of an unknown master."

In this paper, I argue that, while Kierkegaard distinguishes between an event 'contrary to the order of nature' and an event 'above the order of nature,' and while he recognises a strong order of nature and a strong bond of natural laws, the idea of miracle (i.e., expressed explicitly in terms of violation of laws of nature or of the order of nature) is not important to him. The unavoidable doubtfulness of all historical knowledge and the 'non-immediate' character of personal experience are the most important reasons for what is, at best, a tangential interest in miracles.

In this paper, I reconstruct the problem of evil as an argument to the conclusion, "No one can claim to be a theist without abandoning the ethics of belief that would ordinarily be required for a civil way of life." Most theistic replies to this argument reduce theism to a "Sunday truth," i.e., a sincere belief that has no direct relevance to ordinary life. Bishop Butler's position - that this world is best understood as a probationary state - is presented and defended. Nevertheless, Butler's argument that one follow the ethics of belief is consistent with being led to doubt God's existence.

In the world today, human beings are confronted with a number of problems due ultimately to the apparent conflicts among the different religions (religious faiths). Religious attitudes, ideas, and practices differ and even seem to be incompatible with one another. I argue, however, that these faiths do not contradict. To see this, we need to engage in the comparative study of religion. This will show that the ultimate aim of all the world's religions is to establish unity among people, and will thereby provide a basis for tolerance and understanding on the part of the followers of every religion towards other religions.

Dans l'espace spirituel de la civilisation occidentale contemporaine il s'opere un croisement entre deux paradigmes mentaux selon lesquels le rapport entre le transcendant et le phenomenologique est percu d'une maniere fondamentalement differente: il est question des paradigmes de pre-renaissance et de la modernite. Dans le paradigme pre-renaissant, l'univers est percu comme etant ontologiquement divise en deux realites subordonnees, ce qui introduit le Transcendant dans le monde. Avec les progres des sciences, le paradigme mental se bätit sur l'idee principale de l'unidimensionnalite du reel. Or. le monde se retrouve ainsi depourvu de sa dimension transcendante. La solution proposee dans l'expose serait la formation d'un nouveau paradigme mental qui assurerait ä l'homme une presence spirituelle dans le monde.

Throughout the history of Christian spirituality, it has been held that it is impossible to adequately name God. The Neoplatonic readings of Plato's Parmenides, particularly by Plotinus and Proclus, decisively influenced the course of Western philosophy and theology. From a comparison of the notion of God in Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, Epistle III, and in Martin Heidegger's text "Der letzte Gott," I show that there is a common thread, based in the Pauline idea of kenösis.