Οὐσία in Numenius: a notion which is progressively elaborated: Analysis of the difficulties linked to οὐσία and ἰδέα in fragments 22 F, 24 F and 28 F (fr. 14, 16 et 20 dP). In the Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ, Numenius refines his definition of οὐσία step by step. He uses the word at first as a synonym of τὸ ὄν (15 F) and as another designation of being. Then, he associates it to the ἕξις when he refers to the specific οὐσία which possesses science (22 F): in all likelihood, this οὐσία is the intellect as the essence common to God and Man in the possession of science. Finally, Numenius gives οὐσία two aspects or sides which, in our opinion, represent two manners of conceiving the intelligible it constitutes: on the one hand, οὐσία comes from Being itself (the Good) and seems to represent the eidetic predicates or what we could name the “fundamental intelligibility”, a state in which the form is not determined yet, but which gives it the status of a real being ; on the other hand, οὐσία is the product of the second god and intellect and the determined aspect of the previous one, which makes it possible to distinguish the forms one from the other. In this last case, Numenius seems to name οὐσία more specifically ἰδέα, even if both words are elsewhere synonymous and used to refer to the two aspects previously mentioned according to the context in which they are employed. The paper presents the analysis of fragments 22 F, 24 F and 28 F from which we arrive at this interpretation. The distinction between two manners of conceiving οὐσία makes it possible then to discover two levels in the Being at the origin of each of them: Being itself (αὐτοόν which is the Good itself, αὐτοάγαθον) and the ≪second≫ or ≪just≫ Being, constituted by the good demiurge which is probably the “One who is good par excellence”. From there, two ways of conceiving ἰδέα also appear: on the one hand, ἰδέα is synonymous with οὐσία, then it refers to the second aspect of οὐσία, the determined one; on the other hand, it can also refer to the level of Being which is the Good when, in fragment 28 F, it is conceived as a form and probably as the Form par excellence identified with the intellect which this Good is itself.

At the end of Treatise 38 (VI 7), Plotinus presents an original analysis of the activity of the intellect. The intellectual activity of the soul cannot produce its object and thinks what is in the Intellect from which it comes. On the contrary, the Intellect produces its object (οὐσία) and its intellection is not the act of a substrate (ὑποκείμενον), as in the preceding case. In this context, Plotinus uses, to account for this particular form of intellect, a very rare notion in his work, that of συνυπόστασις. In our opinion, its use is at the origin of a true explanatory model that Plotinus uses in particular in Treatise 39 (VI 8) to think how the One can be what he wants to be. The use of this notion can therefore help us understand the meaning of freedom and will attributed to the first principle.

In his critic of the doctrine of Bardaisan († 222), Ephrem the Syrian († 373) devotes a lot of space to reflection on the meaning of the terms ītutā and ītyā (plural ītyē) which, as he denounces, are used inaccurately by his opponent. These Syriac terms can be translated by “being” or “essence”, but also by “substance”. This observation leads us to propose the comparison with the Greek term οὐσία, taking into account many difficulties raised by its uses in theological discourse. The article is devoted to the analysis of the uses of the terms ītutā and ītyā ‑ by Ephrem and by Bardaisan ‑ in their different ways of describing the divine essence. This comparison reveals the peculiarities of the two systems of thought and also their connections with the Greek philosophical doctrines.

The rediscovery of the Hellenic philosophy, but also of the Patristic thinking is a typical feature of Thomistic thought, which consists of a new synthesis of Hellenism and Christianity that raises anew the issue of the relation between Christianity and philosophy as a focal point of medieval philosophy. Acknowledgement of Hellenic Patristic thought that focuses primarily on man as an inseparable union of body and soul, joined in a whole, has been a determining factor in the Thomistic approach of being, through the distinction between a person (or hypostasis) from essence (or nature). Through this distinction and because of the Aristotle’s hylomorphism, the notion of ‘person’ is placed in the field of individuality and the unity of the human composite. The metaphysical notion of a person as individual, complemented by the notion of “relation” is directly related to the ontological unity of human nature and is founded upon the metaphysical notion of “essence” (substance).

L’article présente et discute le livre de Michael Cameron, Christ Meets Me Everywhere. Augustine’s Early Figurative Exegesis. Dans cet ouvrage, M. Cameron expose la manière dont Augustin a élaboré sa méthode d’interprétation figurative de l’Ancien Testament, depuis ses premières œuvres jusqu’en 400 environ, c’est-à-dire jusqu’à la rédaction des Confessions, du De catechizandis rudibus et du Contra Faustum manichaeum. La force du livre est d’articuler la christologie d’Augustin à sa lecture figurative des Écritures: la manière dont Augustin a peu à peu compris la profondeur de la médiation du Christ, à la fois Dieu et homme, grâce à la lecture de Paul et des Psaumes, est à lier à l’importance qu’il donne, dans l’Écriture, aux signa translata. M. Cameron montre bien le rôle qu’a joué Ambroise en permettant à Augustin de rattacher la Bible au cadre rhétorique qui lui était familier; il serait fécond de compléter ses remarques en analysant aussi la pratique exégétique d’Ambroise sur quelques exemples et en précisant le rôle de Tyconius dans la formation de l’exégèse figurative d’Augustin. Le jugement que porte M. Cameron sur le De doctrina christiana qu’il juge “expérimental et incomplet à bien des titres” mérite sans doute d’être un peu nuancé.

Published here is a critical edition of Augustine’s Sermons 293 and 299, the first edition since the Maurists. Sermon 293 was preached in Carthage on the 24th of June 413, feast of John the Baptist, at a time when infant baptism was a controversial question. Sermon 299 was delivered on the 29th of June, in honour of Peter and Paul : its manuscript transmission and thematic likeness with Sermon 293 suggest that it was preached, according to Pierre-Marie Hombert’s hypothesis, in the same year in the same city, not five years later. Both texts, numbered among the longest of the De sanctis sermons, contradict Pelagian theses about the origin of death and the notion of human impeccability.

Despite the ideal of dispossession, absolute poverty and the total absence of links with possession and human beings which shaped the myth of the monastic desert, the monastic economy and its management were very similar to the secular economic system, in that both were organised by networks based on families.This article tackles how and where material assets were produced and administered in Egyptian monasteries between the fourth and eighth centuries (the diakonia), and who was responsible for this function (the oikonomos). The history of monasticism is materially related to the institutionalisation of the society’s cultural and material systems of production. Consequently the economy was also transformed by monastic practices: history is linked to the definition and the successful affirmation of the figure of the oikonomos, the steward in charge of everyday life in monasteries.

The verbal form κατέλθῇ, which appears in the passage of Adv. Haer. 1, 13, 3, linn. 56-58, in which Irenaeus presents the Marcosian doctrine, is usually translated as to descend, following the old Latin version (cf. descendat). However, in another place in the work of Irenaeus himself, this verb receives other translations. This note shows how it may be much better to translate the verb κατέρχομαι in AH 1, 13, 3, linn. 56-58 by devenire, redere.

Three major reshuffles delineate two families (α and β) within the manuscript tradition of the Commentary on Matthew by Hilary of Poitiers. In the first two cases (3, 2; 9, 7-9), J. Doignon in his critical edition (SCh 254 and 258) favored the text of the α family, judging that the β family generally attests to numerous revisions intended to suppress difficult lectiones. In the third case, on the other hand, he adopted the short text of the β family, thus demoting two short passages in 33, 5 specific to the α family. This article shows that on the one hand the language of these passages is attributable to Hilary and on the other their content fits perfectly with his exegesis. It thus argues for their authenticity.

The main exegetical work of Jean Philopon, the De opificio mundi, which rehearses the literalist reading of Genesis found in the Basil of Caesarea’s Hexaemeron rather than an allegorical reading, uses a surprising hermeneutic given the general expectations of the era and in particular the Miaphysite milieu to which Philoponus belongs. This paper studies how Philoponus’ work stems from the demands of the Christological debate in which he took part, and offers an evaluation of its immediate aftermath.

Was Sabellius really a Libyan? Examining contemporary sources and ancient historiography on one of the most enigmatic heretics in the history of dogmas, the article shows that the Libyan origin of Sabellius is unlikely, and that it is an exaggeration to claim that Libya was a Sabellian home in the third century. Eusebius of Caesarea is probably guilty of having identified the adversaries of Dionysius of Alexandria located in Ptolemais as disciples of Sabellius, and the testimony of Origen on the theology of the identification between the Father and Christ is too abstract to deduce that this theology was as widely diffused in the East as it has previously been held.

This article further examines the literary relationship between the De Trinitate falsely attributed to Didymus the Blind and the works of Cyril of Alexandria, aside from their common philosophical citations. The highlighted similarities of these two authors cannot be explained by a common source; on the contrary, they indicate a direct dependence of one author upon the other. Their analysis shows that words, turns of phrase and ideas which are typical of Cyril and often occur in his writings are each used only once by Pseudo-Didymus. This evidence weighs heavily in favour of Cyril’s antecedence. In fact, the anonymous author of the De Trinitate has been influenced, in addition to fourth-century doctrinal treatises, by Cyril’s De sancta Trinitate dialogi, an anti-Arian work dating from the 420s. He also assimilated several other Cyrillian features, and was even inspired by Cyril’s anti-Arian Christology in his doctrine on the Holy Spirit. Cyril of Alexandria, therefore, has priority over Pseudo-Didymus, both chronologically and theologically.