601.
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30 >
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Alan L. T. Paterson
The Successor Function and Induction Principle in a Hegelian Philosophy of Mathematics
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602.
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Idealistic Studies:
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Issue: 1
Eric M. Rubenstein
Experiencing the Future:
Kantian Thoughts on Husserl
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603.
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Idealistic Studies:
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30 >
Issue: 2
Jeffrey Bernstein
The Irreducibility of the Ontic
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604.
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Idealistic Studies:
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30 >
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G. Steven Neeley
Schopenhauer and the Platonic Ideas:
A Reconsideration
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605.
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Idealistic Studies:
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Issue: 2
Allegra De Laurentiis
Aristotle in the Nineteenth Century:
The Case of Goethe’s Study of Life
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606.
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30 >
Issue: 2
Gary Overvold
Husserl’s European Reason and the Phenomenology of Nature
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607.
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31 >
Issue: 1
Stephen H. Daniel
Edwards, Berkeley, and Ramist Logic
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I will suggest that we can begin to see why Edwards and Berkeley sound so much alike by considering how both think of minds or spiritual substances notas things modeled on material bodies but as the acts by which things are identified. Those acts cannot be described using the Aristotelian subject-predicatelogic on which the metaphysics of substance, properties, attributes, or modes is based because subjects, substances, etc. are themselves initially distinguishedthrough such acts. To think of mind as opposed to matter, or of acts of mind as opposed to mind itself, is already to assume the differentiation enacted by thoseacts. I argue that even though Edwards and Berkeley refer to distinctions such as mind vs. matter, they think that it is important to avoid treating mind, its acts, and its objects in terms of subject-predicate logic or substance metaphysics.
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608.
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Lawrence Pasternack
Internal Realism and Twin Earth
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This paper is structured as follows. First, it offers a brief presentation of the Twin Earth thought experiment. Second, it offers an interpretation of Putnam'santi-realism. Third, it argues for the incompatibility of anti-realism and the semantic role of extension that Twin Earth is supposed to establish.
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609.
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Matthew C. Altman
Idealism is the Only Possible Philosophy:
Systematicity and the Fichtean Fact of Reason
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Fichte develops his idealism through a higher-level critique: only through the Fichtean fact of reason can one justify a systematic transcendental idealism, thereby making possible the self-sufficiency of theoretical reason. By examining the metaphilosophical implications of our immediate consciousness of the moral law, Fichte is able to assert the necessary metaphilosophical primacy of practical reason for any possible wissenschaftlich philosophy as well as the philosophical unity of theory and practice within such a system.
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610.
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David E. Cartwright
Two Senses of "Thing-in-Itself" in Schopenhauer's Philosophy
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I present an interpretation of Schopenhauer's metaphysics that moderates between the positions of the advocates and critics of the standard view andthe standard objection. I contend that there are two senses of "thing-initself' in Schopenhauer's philosophy. I agree with the advocates of the standard view that the will is thing-in-itself, but only in a relative sense, i.e., the will is the thing-in-itself relative to other appearances. But I agree with the critics of the standard objection and deny that Schopenhauer's metaphysics is open to the standard objection
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611.
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Issue: 1
Joseph Margolis
On the Robust Possibilities of a Constructive Realism:
A Reply to Scharff and Cahoone
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612.
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Frederick Sontag
Where Does American Philosophy Stand Today?
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613.
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Idealistic Studies:
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32 >
Issue: 1
Lawrence Cahoone
Margoline Relativism
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614.
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32 >
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George Seidel
The Last Heidegger
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615.
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Robert C. Scharff
Margolis on Making the Phrase “Human Science” Redundant
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616.
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Idealistic Studies:
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Issue: 1
Joseph Margolis
Recovering the Human Sciences
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617.
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Idealistic Studies:
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Alan L. T. Paterson
Does Hegel Have Anything to Say to Modern Mathematical Philosophy?
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This paper argues that Hegel has much to say to modern mathematical philosophy, although the Hegelian perspective needs to be substantially developed to incorporate within it the extensive advances in post-Hegelian mathematics and its logic. Key to that perspective is the self-referential character of the fundamental concepts of philosophy. The Hegelian approach provides a framework for answering the philosophical problems, discussed by Kurt Gödel in his paper on Bertrand Russell, which arise out of the existence in mathematics of self-referential, non-constructive concepts (such as class).
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618.
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Frederick Rauscher
The Regulative and the Constitutive In Kant’s and Hegel’s Theories of History
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I show one reason why Hegel’s theory of history is an improvement over Kant’s. There is an ambiguity in Kant’s theory of history. He wants, on the one hand, to distinguish empirical history (and, by extension, other empirical sciences which constitute experience) from reason’s a priori regulative role in theory. On the other hand, his view of the nature of sciences and the role of reason precludes such a separation. I trace this problem to different roles assigned the faculties of understanding and reason in our experience. In Hegel’s theory of history, both reason and understanding together constitute the sciences, and thus experience. Hegel argues that history is a unified field employing both understanding and reason. I conclude that the more consistent theory of history for idealists is Hegel’s, and that this consistency partially explains the movement in German Idealism from Kantian to Hegelian thought.
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619.
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F. Scott Scribner
Affectivity, Transparency, Rapport:
Circumscribing the Fichtean Unconscious
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At last scholars are recognizing that the great generative architectonics of idealism’s account of self-consciousness would demand or imply, from a genealogical perspective, an unconscious. Yet, between Foucaultian inspired analyses of madness in Hegel, and Slavoj Zizek’s Lacanian readings of the unconscious in the work of F. W. J. Schelling, there has been essentially no mention of J. G. Fichte. As an attempt to redress this failure, I will begin to sketch Fichte’s own unique articulation of an unconscious (Unbewusst) by highlighting three unique aspects or perspectives: (a) the idea of a pre-conscious, self-affective self; (b) the notion of the self-seeing eye; and (c) his own first hand involvement with dynamic psychiatry’s phenomena of magnetic rapport. This exposition of the unconscious in Fichte has two distinct ends. First, it stands as one of the first sustained expositions of the unconscious in the work of Fichte. This analysis which places Fichte’s work in the broader genealogy of dynamic psychiatry, however, also stands as a critique of the Freudian psychoanalytic model of the unconscious.
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620.
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Wendy Lynn Clark, J. M. Fritzman
Reducing Spirit to Substance:
Dove on Hegel’s Method
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In “Hegel’s Phenomenological Method,” Kenley R. Dove maintains that the method of the Phenomenology of Spirit is not dialectical but instead wholly phenomenological. That is, Dove claims that Hegel’s method is purely descriptive. Dove’s interpretation has been highly influential and widely accepted. This article argues that, although there is a phenomenological aspect to Hegel’s method, that aspect itself presupposes a prior dialectical moment. Failure to account for that dialectical moment results in spirit being reduced to substance.
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