Hegel is sometimes regarded as a defender of the market system. Recently, Heisenberg (2018) argued that the prevailing view of Hegel is incomplete, as it overlooks a fundamental advantage of the market: its educational role. In his reading, the Hegelian defence of the market system includes seeing the market as the sphere where persons learn both to regard others as individuals with equal standing and equally relevant desires and to see the well-ordered civil society as the space where all social members can find protection and fulfil their needs. I argue that this focus, while inadequate as a sole ground for a critique of today’s market systems, can potentially bring forward new normative critiques of the market. These in turn require departing from Hegel’s baseline assumptions regarding the market sphere and applying this analysis to the locus where the educational impact of markets arguably subsists: the local or national levels.

My article does not aim at a comparison between Hegel’s and Marx’s points of view on Asia as such. The Hegelian motives are employed to understand the place and the significance of the Orient in Marx’s writings from the 1850s onwards. The more Marx learns from original and/or updated sources on the Oriental societies, the more Hegel’s authority seems inadequate to provide a reliable and comprehensive account of their history and social organization. Yet his “spirit” still holds together the different perspectives from which the subject is approached by Marx (economy, history and praxis, above all). In other words, Marx’s interest in Asia is here considered through the lens of Hegel’s legacy in order to reflect on the endless effort of the materialistic dialectic to encompass the complexity of reality and global history.

Taking its cue from the untimely paradoxes manifesting themselves in some of the most visible instances of Hegel’s and Marx’s reception in the twentieth century, this essay proceeds to explore the ground between the two thinkers with particular reference to their philosophico-historical grasp of repetition. After a number of preliminary observations on the ideological subtext involved in Marx’s reference to Hegel in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and the temporality their intertextual conjuncture stages, I focus on four major complications that attend the comparison of Hegelian and Marxian notions of repetition, as well as on their correlation to the historical events of Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Restoration. I conclude with some reflections on the “exit strategies” Marx and Hegel adopt vis-à-vis the specter of iteration as a sign of submission to the gravitational pull of the past upon the present and future.

In this article we shall try to explore the ethical aspects of the Dao De Jing and the fragments of the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus based on the symbolism of the infant that they both use. At first a very short introduction needs to be made concerning the basis of morality and the difference between China and Greece. Needless to say we must take into account the general ethical context in the civilizations of ancient China and ancient Greece and indicate (if possible) whether the DDJ is to be seen as a strictly ethical/political text as well as whether Heraclitus’ fragments work as an ethical map for the people of his time and place. I intent to structure this article in two chapters each one dedicated to each of the philosophers along with a short introduction in the beginning. As far as the main chapters are concerned the Lao-Zi’s DDJ will be analyzed at first from the perspective of ethics in connection to the symbol of the infant not rarely used by Lao-Zi. Secondly I shall deal with the ethical thought of Heraclitus and his perspective of the infant found in some of his fragments. Let us keep in mind that apart from the fragments themselves, the witnesses (i.e. stories about his life) play a not less important role in our extracting his philosophical opinions. Lastly we shall try to come to a conclusion concerning the similarities and dissimilarities between Lao-Zi and Heraclitus regarding their views on ethics and especially regarding the use of the infant as a symbol or a pattern.

In 1781, prior to any Kantian reference in favor of the epigenesis – a direct, nominal reference, published in life –, two comparative passages of the “Architectonic of Pure Reason” will have drawn no attention from his readers. But, despite omitting that “augmentation” [Vermehrung], such passages shall lead, both on its own and jointly, to the possibility of a retrospective conflict regarding that theory; a conflict of a conceptual nature which may have repercussions on Kant’s position on the epigenesis, be it directly, on a metaphorical-speculative level, be it indirectly, on an embryological level. The present, ongoing study shall deal with the collocation of the problem, the presentation of some elements in view of its analysis and, finally, a possible solution for the difficulties which the two passages of both editions of the Critique indirectly raise.

This article focuses on Kant’s central belief that an individual’s humanity, her rational personhood, ought never be treated merely as a means. I focus on two paradigmatic cases of such treatment, for Kant, namely suicide and prostitution. In the case of suicide, the individual treats his own humanity merely as a means in completely eliminating it to escape from his miserable life. The case of prostitution is more complicated. It is not obvious how the prostitute’s rational personhood is compromised. An analysis of Kant’s views on prostitution and sexuality enables us to understand Kant’s concern that the prostitute is treated merely as a means. However, his more extreme position that the prostitute is reduced to the status of a thing for use is not supported by arguments. A woman’s use (or, rather, misuse) as a mere means, I explain, is insufficient to define her status as an object.

The second part of the 20th century has been dominated by a nominalist, anti-realistic and post-metaphysical trend, focused on the performativity of languages, texts, discourses, power structures, economic relationships, etc., and involved in any kind of sociolinguistic, hermeneutical, structural and deconstructive analysis. By contrast, the first part of the 21st century seems to emerge from the exhaustion of that nominalist paradigm, and the drive of a new realistic impulse defined by the irreducibility of the real to mere cultural discourses or power’s relationships. In this new speculative context, several materialisms and realisms spread out their strands, with the certainty of grasping the real in and by the real itself. The following lines aim at looking over the main authors and ideas of the newest philosophical stream.

It is argued that some of Beauvoir’s short, journalistic pieces shed new light on her overall philosophical positions. Special analysis is made of “Existentialism and Popular Wisdom”, with its advertence to our standard take on human affairs. Part of the argument is that Beauvoir expands on notions taken from the common culture, and that she does so in a way that sheds new light on existentialist concepts. Taking into consideration the extent of her work with Sartre, we can assume that Beauvoir is making powerful statements with her analysis. It is also important to note that this work represents a level of publication intended for the average French reader, and that much of her writing in this vein has received very little comment.

Adam Smith is usually seen as the founding father of modern economics, interpreted as a science that explains human agency in terms of the pursuit of egoistic self-interest. But a reading of Smith’s writings on moral sentiments shows how critical he was of explanations of society which focus solely on self-interest. When engaging in a critique of those individualistic explanations, Smith refers to the criticism that Thomas Hobbes received from the Cambridge Platonists, who argued against the fatalist view of the human agent driven solely by self-interest. Here the connections between Smith’s view and the Cambridge Platonists are further explored, while also assessing its implications for the common interpretation of Adam Smith as the founding father of modern economics.

The paper deals with the problems of universals in German Enlightenment before Kant. The first part reconstructs the sources of the problem of universals, focusing in particular on Leibniz and Locke. The second part examines the early eclectic positions of Brucker, Baumgarten, Hollmann and Crusius. In the fourth part the essay investigates the relation between universals and the various combinatorial projects like those of Ploucquet and Lambert.

Under the traditional classification of medieval positions on the issue of universals, both Aquinas and Buridan would have to be deemed to be “conceptualists”: they both deny the existence of mind-independent, Platonic universals (against “realists”), and they both attribute universality primarily to the representative function of our universal concepts, and thus only secondarily to universal names of human languages (against “nominalists”). Yet, Aquinas is quite appropriately classified as a “moderate realist,” and Buridan as an “Ockhamist nominalist.” This paper will argue that what justifies these more refined classifications is the two authors’ radically different conceptions of the representative function of our universal concepts. The paper will show how this difference results in their opposing judgments concerning the demonstrability of the thesis of the immateriality of the human intellect and will reply to Buridan’s main objection to Aquinas’s argument for this thesis, by pointing out the objection’s conflation of merely indifferent, non-distinctive singular representation with genuinely universal intellectual representation. In its conclusion, the paper will briefly gesture at an important contemporary implication of Aquinas’s thesis concerning a metaphysical limitation of artificial intelligence.

In On Ideas, Aristotle presents and criticizes an argument for ideas referred to as “the One-over-Many.” On the basis of an uncontroversial fact concerning a group (for instance, the fact that each of the many men is a man), the One-over-Many infers that there is something predicated of each of the members of the group (for instance, that there is something predicated of each of the many men). It then tries to show that the thing predicated in common is an idea. Aristotle criticises this argument by claiming that if it were sound it would show that there are ideas of negations, a result which the Platonists should reject. Since Aristotle himself refuses the existence of “common things,” i.e., Aristotelian universals, of negations, he is committed to the view that the One-over-Many fails to prove the existence not only of ideas, but also of “common things.”

The Problem of Universals is one of the oldest problems of metaphysics. And still, there is no agreement, neither about its nor about its . What is the most adequate formulation of the problem? And what kind of explanation does it require? My aim in this paper is to offer an overview of these two basic questions in the contemporary debate. I will present the four most important formulations (section 1), discuss their connections (section 2) and how the three most prominent are related to these formulations (section 3). We will see that, despite the long history of the problem, in recent years new formulations and approaches have been proposed which may open up original perspectives on its solution.

The present article aims to analyze the relation between the finitude of the soul and the perception of the infinite in Malebranche’s philosophy. We will initially address the relationship that Malebranche establishes between the spirit and God through the simple vue proof of the existence of God, and the subsequent infinitesimal perception that follows from this immediate apprehension of the infinite. We will then turn specifically to the function that the idea of the infinite plays for Malebranchean theory of perception. On the basis of this analysis, it will become clear how the infinite is not only perceived by the spirit, but also how it becomes, after the introduction of the notion of intelligible extension, a structuring part of perception.

Supposing that addicts choose to act as they do, rather than being compelled to behave in particular ways, what explains the choices that they make? Hannah Pickard has recently pointed out that we can go a long way to answering this question if we can make sense of why addicts value the ends they pursue. She argues that addiction is a social identity that gives purpose and structure to life and that the choices that addicts make are valuable to them as ways of sustaining this social identity. But if addicts freely make choices towards ends that they perceive as valuable in terms of a social identity to which they contribute, and therefore if addiction involves the deployment of quite considerable agential apparatus, how are we to hold on to the natural assumption that addictions are disempowering? In this paper I present an answer to this question. Drawing on the resources of the phenomenological tradition, I argue that some social identities give purpose and structure to life in a way that inhibits, rather than enables, the exercise of a capacity that is central to our form of life. I elaborate the hypothesis that paradigmatic cases of addiction involve this sort of disempowering social identity.

Since the publication of Hume’s Treatise, scholars have been divided on how to interpret the ontology of Humean relations. In particular, is Hume’s theory of relations consistent with positivism, (skeptical) realism, or anti-realism? In this essay, I propose a novel distinction separating impressions and ideas from relations such that relations are construed as forming a distinct category equal to impressions and ideas. In so doing, I interpret Hume as fundamentally agnostic toward the ontology of relations.