Many philosophers agree that consciousness necessarily has a subjective character, which Thomas Nagel (1974) characterizes as “something it is like for the organism” (p. 436), and which, in turn, “is essentially connected with a single point of view” (p. 437). Among these philosophers, some attempt to ground this subjective character on some kind of self, though they use different notions of self to explain what that point of view amounts to. In this paper, I analyze these different notions, categorize them into three types, and demonstrate a shared presupposition among them. I argue that, because of this presupposition, these philosophers cannot explain the dynamic nature of the subjective character of consciousness. I then propose an alternative to ground th􀀁 subjective character, and show how this alternative provides a better framework for explaining the dynamic nature of consciousness.

For a long time philosophy has understood a human’s being in the world as governed by thought, since the relation of a mind to an independent objective world is a relation of thought. And the relation of thought was often considered to be the only way to grasp true reality. Thinkers that endorse this position consider even perception to be a relation of a mind to a mind-independent world, therefore for these thinkers perception is nothing but a rather crude mode of the relation of thought. The consequence of this position is an understanding of our being in the world that is based on intellectualism, rationalism and psychologism. Both Hegel and Whitehead disagree with this position to varying degrees, since they both concede that there is a fundamental disclosure of reality through our being in the world, through a relation of being. But they disagree on whether this level of disclosure has any relevance. In this paper I want to investigate the reasons why Hegel is forced to dismiss straight away the fundamental relation of being, while Whitehead founded his philosophy on this very relation.

In this paper we are trying to assess two perennial philosophical questions with the help of conceptual tools borrowed from Whitehead and Prigogine: What constitutes the feeling of happiness? and How could happiness be related to the notion of balance?

Teaching as a process of story telling allows faculty to reach out to students’ emotions, breathing life into the ideas that are being taught and learned. Story telling among indigenous peoples emphasizes the importance of balanced relationships with the land, with all living creatures, and with the cosmos. It serves different functions in other societies that can also enhance teaching and learning. Alfred North Whitehead’s account of emotions is relevant to the learning process and to teachable moments better understood as learning opportunities that enhance the value of students’ lives. I provide an example of such a learning opportunity in which one of my students experienced an energetic connection with her colleagues as a living community. Teachable moments and story telling can strengthen students’ range of comprehension, their imaginative and aesthetic appreciation, as well as their growing capacity to learn. Emotion also has a primordial role in Whitehead’s account of life in his process philosophy. Its vectoral character enables all entities to realize their distinctive value as a process of valuation in life. An appreciation of this process requires consciousness and the refinement of human understanding through art as the achievement of finite perfection. Whitehead believes an education which would allow students to appreciate art and beauty could be implemented quite easily to transform the lives of future citizens. Process pedagogy itself could include the creative power of story telling to promote the value of life.