This essay argues that Berkeley’s doctrine of notions is an account of concept-formation that offers a middle-way between empiricism and innatism, something which Berkeley himself asserts at Siris 308. First, the widespread assumption that Berkeley accepts Locke’s conceptual empiricism is questioned, with particular attention given to Berkeley’s views on innatism and ideas of reflection. Then, it is shown that Berkeley’s doctrine of notions comes very close to the refined form of innatism to be found in Descartes’ later writings and in Leibniz. Finally, it is argued that Berkeley denies a principle common to both empiricism and innatism, namely, that all conceptual knowledge amounts to the perception of ideas. By denying this―at least in the case of the concepts of self, causation, substance, and virtue―Berkeley is able to provide a synthesis of conceptual empiricism and innatism.

This essay provides some historical background for, and considers the philosophical importance of, the collection of Anne Berkeley’s (George Berkeley’s wife) letters to Adam Gordon. The primary philosophical significance of the letters is her arguments against the so-called “free thinkers.” She discusses the philosophical view and the behavior of five prominent free-thinkers: Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Hume. Her discussion of Shaftesbury is particularly illuminating and can be read as a commentary on Alciphron III.13-14. Because the work of the other four were published mainly after the Bishop’s death, the letters also show Anne’s independent lifelong interest in matters theological, philosophical, and moral.

Luce once declared that his and Jessop’s interpretation of Berkeley is “reflected in our edition of the Works.” The appearance of a recent article by Stephen Daniel draws attention to two examples of the implications of this interpretive model of editing. One is Luce’s and Jessop’s rejection of Alciphron as a reliable source for Berkeley’s philosophy, because (they claim) we have access to his true philosophy elsewhere (W 3: 7), and “it is idle to turn to Alciphron for Berkeleianism,” for he does not rest his case there “on his own philosophy” (W 3: 13). The other is the “correction” of Alciphron by incorporating an anonymous letter to Peter Browne “as a supplement” to Berkeley’s work—something that Daniel criticizes for circularity and lack of scholarly accuracy. The question arises as to whether Alciphron is the only example of a text in the Works that is biased in favor of the editors’ private interpretation.

In Passive Obedience Berkeley argues that we must always observe the prohibitions decreed by our sovereign rulers. He defends this thesis both by providing critiques against opposing views and, more interestingly, by presenting a moral theory that supports it. The theory contains elements of divine-command, natural-law, moral-sense, rule-based, and outcome-oriented ethics. Ultimately, however, it seems to rest on a notion of spiritual reason—a specific God-given faculty that all rational human beings have. Berkeley’s work on immaterialism, for which he is better known, could thus perhaps best be seen as an attempt to find a scientific justification for his moral doctrine.

This essay situates Berkeley’s views on common sense within the context of eighteenth-century debates about the nature of common sense. It argues that in his Notebooks, Berkeley develops a theory according to which to possess common sense is to use the faculties of the mind properly, and that Berkeley’s approach to common sense can be understood as a response to John Toland’s epistemology of religion. It concludes with a discussion of consequences of this analysis for our understanding of Berkeley’s later works, his methods, and his overarching philosophical aims.

In several essays I have argued that Berkeley maintains the same basic notion of spiritual substance throughout his life. Because that notion is not the traditional (Aristotelian, Cartesian, or Lockean) doctrine of substance, critics (e.g., John Roberts, Tom Stoneham, Talia Mae Bettcher, Margaret Atherton, Walter Ott, Marc Hight) claim that on my reading Berkeley either endorses a Humean notion of substance or has no recognizable theory of substance at all. In this essay I point out how my interpretation does not assume that Berkeley adopts a bundle theory of mind, but instead redefines what it means for a simple substance to be the principle by which ideas are perceived.

In my book Idea and Ontology I argue for a re-evaluation of how we read and engage early modern philosophy with respect to the so-called way of ideas. I contend that, despite current trends that emphasize epistemology as first philosophy, we need to retain the importance of ontology when interpreting and learning from the early moderns. In this piece, I respond to critical reviews of my book, deepening the discussion of several topics. The main topics include whether ideas are private to the finite minds that perceive them in Berkeley’s philosophy, the nature of modes in typical early modern ontologies, and issues regarding the charitable reading of other scholars.

This essay summarizes the argument of my A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley, and it provides replies to objections raised against it, particularly about my focus on Berkeley's view of the nature of spirits. Specifically, I address worries about identifying mind as will, how we can think of God, the relation of mind and ideas, and how thinking of Berkeley’s efforts as metaphysical is compatible with his commitment to common sense.

This essay replies to criticisms of my Berkeley’s Idealism: A Critical Examination made by Margaret Atherton and Samuel Rickless. These critics both focus primarily on my treatment of Berkeley’s arguments in the opening sections of Principles Part I and the first of his Three Dialogues. They mainly agree that the arguments I attribute to Berkeley are unsound for the reasons that I give, but also argue that I misrepresent his arguments and that his real arguments are better. Here I defend both my interpretations and my assessments of Berkeley’s arguments.

The contemporary view of scholars that Berkeley’s legacy stems from his philosophical work has traditionally dominated discussions of his significance, despite the prolific nature of his writings. This disjunction between his reputation and historical interests can be addressed by locating Berkeley’s career within his Irish context(s) and examining those aspects of his career that have often been disregarded as immaterial to his philosophical projects. When seen from this perspective, the trajectory of Berkeley’s intellectual pursuits mirrored those of the broader Irish Enlightenment and represents an important contribution to this emerging field.