This essay examines how Michael Walzer and Dietrich Bonhoeffer understand practical moral dilemmas—what Walzer calls the problem of dirty hands—and how both conceive of the solution to the problem in terms of the concept of judgment. Walzer’s judgment is strictly political, and tragic; Bonhoeffer’s retains this political account but grounds it theologically, so as to overcome its finally tragic element.

This article examines the stigma surrounding mental health, drawing out implications for Christian theological anthropology and ethics. As I argue, the stigma surrounding maternal madness engenders the sociocultural and religious veiling of affective and sexual difference within Western Christian milieu reflecting a heteropatriarchal framework for articulating the value of bodies, emotions, and control. In practice and theory, this framework places mothers with affective mood disorders outside of economies (structures and practices) of care and goodness. Such logic veils the ways in which maternal madness calls us to embrace the transformative power of grace as dis-ease through (a) welcoming unpredictability within God, self, and others; (b) resisting easy fixes; and (c) actively discerning the politics of emotion.

This essay constructs a moral theology of reading scripture by retrieving habits and virtues of early evangelical readers that have potential to help evangelicals reengage one another on divisive topics such as marriage equality. I use this moral theology of reading scripture to diagnose power dynamics operative in commonsense assumptions around gender and plain-sense interpretive frameworks that privilege literal interpretations. I interact with the historical trajectory of evangelicalism that values conversion as the telos of reading scripture. Continental Pietists also read in a spirit of faithful dissent, allowing them to cast the interpretive net widely, to welcome new readers, and to challenge social barriers that excluded marginalized voices. Faithful dissent is a necessary habit that generates courage to be open to the Spirit’s work of blessing and renewal in the world.

Recent immigrants and refugees are the growing edge both of religious diversity and of working poverty in the United States. In light of this phenomenon and the rise of the “religion of neoliberalism,” it is time for intentionally interfaith programs to include class analysis and theological reflection on class in their work. Drawing on examples from fieldwork, this article contends that interfaith dialogue and interfaith organizing models should learn from each other to (a) prioritize the leadership and issues of religiously diverse low-wage workers and (b) develop theologically rich foundations for this work. The article closes by offering one such Christian resource: an empire-critical read of Galatians 2 that calls us to unite across abiding doctrinal difference by “remembering the poor.”

This essay frames the question of responsibility as a problem of agency in relation to the systems and structures of globalization. Responsibility is a “shattered concept” (Paul Ricoeur) when considered too narrowly as a problem of act, agency, and individual freedom. Constructively, the essay introduces Dietrich Bonhoeffer as the most promising theological dialogue partner for rethinking the meaning of responsibility today. His challenge is to find a way of talking about responsibility that does not collapse into individualism or become ensconced within a univocal logic that subsumes socioeconomic, cultural, and religious differences within itself. The claim is that Bonhoeffer’s reflections on the center, boundaries, and limits of responsibility are helpful today to Christian people struggling with an increasingly exhausted concept of responsibility, when linear agent-act-consequence connections to distant others and far away harms are increasingly difficult to trace.

This essay explores small “ordinary” experiences of moral harm as problems of social injustice. Starting with two stories, we first argue against a dominant framework of personal responsibility that assigns responsibility to particular blameworthy agents. Instead we sketch an account of why structural responsibility for social harm must be considered, drawing on the work of Iris Marion Young and Pierre Bourdieu. Finally, drawing on Margaret Walker’s notion of moral repair and Christopher Marshall’s interpretation of the parable of the Good Samaritan, we sketch an account of Christian moral responsibility grounded in restorative justice that seeks to address daily experiences of moral harm through the moral repair work of neighbor-love.

Many of the most pressing moral problems that face our world are structural problems. Problems of this nature present difficulties for Christian ethicists because structural features tend to undermine conditions for the attribution of individual moral responsibility. This essay proposes an approach to this problem that reconciles a social account of sin with individual moral responsibility. Two key moves drive this proposal. First, I argue for a sharper distinction between sin and moral wrongdoing than is common. Second, I argue that both sin and individual moral responsibility ought to be understood socially. This proposal addresses deep conceptual problems and points practical efforts in a new direction.

This essay considers whether the model of conscience operative in Christian ethics, what I call the “reflexive conscience,” is adequate to meet the global moral challenges we face today, problems such as gun violence, climate change, and the Zika virus. Drawing primarily on the work of Willis Jenkins, I argue that conscience has not yet caught up to the scale and interconnectedness of our global moral challenges. A truly “engaged conscience” must be focused not primarily on the self but on the other, and must be active. I conclude by turning to Elisabeth Vasko’s criticisms of the victim/perpetrator binary to suggest that conscience must call us to greater responsibility for the systemic injustices in which particular moral challenges are embedded.

The 2016 American presidential campaign raised awareness of structural evil among segments of the population whose privilege has protected this knowledge, both making them self-conscious of their vulnerability as persons and revealing the role that the liberal narrative of progress has played in establishing and perpetuating structural evil. This moment of opportunity to shift both the political and the theological narrative demands liberal conversion: overcoming the temptations of anger, denial, and paralysis to embrace solidarity in vulnerability and power. An early liberationist narrative that embraces utopian praxis rather than utopian ideology is both more theologically honest and more effective than the liberal narrative of progress.

Philosopher Harry Frankfurt has famously coined “bullshit” as a technical term—it refers not to outright lying but rather to a casual indifference to truth. Disregard for truth is accepted and even expected in many contexts, yet it creates conditions for gross injustice and dehumanization. I offer an account of widespread cultural indifference to truth as structural sin, a condition I call “truth indifference.” Drawing on Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of the virtue of truth (veracitas), I map out the conceptual framework that must be in place before Christian ethicists can provide an adequate moral analysis of structural truth indifference.

Individualism is a popular cultural trope in the United States, often touted for its promotion of industriousness and rejection of laziness. This essay argues that, ironically, America’s brand of individualism actually promotes a more fundamental form of the very vice it purports to oppose. To make this case, the essay defines the unique form of individualism in the United States and then retrieves the classical definition of sloth as a vice against charity (not diligence), contrasting Aquinas and Barth with Weber to demonstrate that this peculiarly American individualist impulse undermines civic charity by reaping the benefits of civic relationships while denying any concomitant responsibilities. Identifying this narrative of individualism as a structural vice, the essay proposes structural remedies for reinvigorating civic charity, solidarity, and the common good in the United States.

For many in the United States, an important step in dismantling the structural evil of racism would be the total removal of Confederate monuments from the southern landscape. While the motivation behind this recommendation is laudable, such a move may also serve to assuage white guilt while leaving the structures of white privilege basically untouched. This essay uses recent work in theology and memory to assess these monuments as well as calls for their removal, and suggests that at least some should remain standing as signs of a crisis that remains with us, bent toward the goal of justice by means of remembering a devastating history under the aspect of God’s judgment. The upshot is that Christians have a strong theological warrant to support calls to add markers around certain Confederate monuments in order to contextualize and “fill out” the untruthful story they currently tell.

Social theory can help Christian ethics respond to structural evil, both by accurately naming “what is there” and by precisely specifying “what to do.” William Cavanaugh and Katie Grimes, representing distinct neo-Franciscan and Junian approaches, draw extensively on social theory to confront structural evils of nation-state violence and racism. Yet they fall short of an adequate account of how social structures and individual agency interact. Their works obscure the actual mechanisms of social change, call for overly heroic actions, and offer rival formulations of the church–world relationship. I use critical realist social theory to offer an alternative approach that better accounts for the interaction of structure and agency needed for effective Christian responses.

In environmental ethics, there has been too little attention to the question of why changes in environmental beliefs do not simply result in changes in behavior, given that this gap between belief and behavior is widespread. In this essay, I argue that two forms of inaction that exhibit this gap can be helpfully analyzed by reading them in terms of a Lutheran account of sin. To make the argument, I distinguish seven forms of and reasons for inaction, from which I pull out two “privileged” forms of inaction that characterize people who could act and yet do not. Using psychological and sociological research, I interpret these two forms of inaction as, on the one hand, people’s attempts at securing righteousness and, on the other hand, people’s terrorized consciences in response to the complexity and gravity of climate change. I end suggesting a turn to justification within Christian environmental ethics.

Structural evil impacts persons’ experiences differently, a reality that feminist philosophers Claudia Card and Lisa Tessman have termed “moral luck.” As Christian ethicists grapple with privilege and oppression, we lack a satisfactory framework to describe how particular life circumstances impact moral lives. This essay develops a Christian virtue account of moral luck, drawing on Thomas Aquinas and womanist theologians including Melanie L. Harris and Rosita deAnn Mathews. Moral luck helps Christian ethicists attend to the impact of difference on the moral life as well as to the common experience of contingency harming virtue, requiring dependence on God’s grace.

The prevalence of tainted legacies within Christian ethics, across the academy, and in contemporary public debate raises difficult questions about handling legacies implicated in traumatic pasts. This essay uses the concept of moral injury to illuminate the moral complexities of tainted religious legacies (e.g., John Howard Yoder’s) and employs feminist and womanist ethics to provide strategies for moral repair in the wake of these and other such legacies (e.g., Georgetown University’s participation in slavery). It first argues that, despite significant limitations, moral injury provides purchase on the experience of encountering tainted religious legacies by naming the type of agency involved, describing the moral harm tainted legacies cause, and highlighting the social and institutional context of that harm. It then argues that feminist and womanist responses to morally injurious forms of Christianity—particularly explorations of redemptive suffering—not only resonate with responses to Yoder’s case and other tainted legacies current in public debate but also provide criteria for assessing those responses.

In the midst of religious conflict in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a number of prominent Protestant theologians and lawyers wrote on the collective moral obligation to resist systemic injustice. My essay focuses on Johannes Althusius, who offers a theological account of the political community and its obligation to preserve the common good and resist injustice. Thinking alongside Althusius, I will consider not only the conditions that may prompt acts of resistance but also the lawful means and ends of resistance. In other words, how might resistance be carried out rightly? By whom? And to what end? Finally, I argue that we have good reasons to use Althusius’s political thought to revive an account of resistance that is internal to the Christian theological tradition—an account that relies on a broader conception of divine justice, covenantal responsibility, and mutual accountability.

Families and children are hidden victims of labor exploitation in the US economy across the economic spectrum. The Sabbath commandment, however, provides a theological basis for resisting this structural evil. In Karl Barth’s discussion of the commandment, Sabbath rest not only limits the scope of economic activity in human life but also sets the stage for reflection on the meaning and purpose of work. As a recurring reminder that human life is a gift to be lived in joyful fellowship with God and neighbor, Sabbath observance can be a crucial practice to orient work toward the flourishing of individuals, families, and communities.

The first part of this article analyzes the Black Power movement within the context of wider debates about how black nationalism conceptualized the need to form a people as a response to white supremacy. The second part examines how white supremacy conditions the nature and form of democratic citizenship in the United States and how the formation of a “nation within a nation” is a vital adjunct to dismantling white supremacy as a political system. Part three situates Black Power within a theological conception of poverty understood as powerlessness. Building on James Cone and Cheryl Kirk-Duggan, it closes by suggesting that forming a people as a response to powerlessness constitutes a double movement of healing and exorcism.