Edith Stein’s early phenomenological texts describe community as a special unity that is fully lived through in consciousness. In her later works, unity is described in more theological terms as participation in the communal fullness and wholeness of God or Being. Can these two accounts of community or human belonging be reconciled? I argue that consciousness can bring to the fore the meaning of community, thereby conditioning our lived-experience of community, but it can also, through Heideggerian questioning, uncover that which remains somewhat hidden from consciousness itself: its own ground or condition of possibility, namely, being—a being that is both one and many, unified, communalised, and very diversified. If my reading of Stein is correct, the traditional understanding of the split between Stein’s strictly Husserlian/phenomenological period and her later Christian philosophical period must be renegotiated, at least when it comes to the philosophical problem of community or human togetherness.

This article argues that Karl Rahner’s theme of “eschatological ignorance” should be retrieved to facilitate and to fortify the enactment of Catholic theology’s prophetic commitments in a U.S. context. First, the article presents and defends Rahner’s famous distinction between eschatology and apocalyptic. Second, it characterizes Rahner’s distinction as representative of his conviction of a need for docta ignorantia futuri, which stems from his theology of God as Absolute Mystery, and which, though Rahner recommends it to twentieth-century Europeans, seems particularly well suited for theological application in the twenty-first-century United States. Third, it suggests how Rahner’s eschatological ignorance might make a prophetic impact on the American socio-religio-political climate.

This essay provides an analysis of Karl Rahner’s book The Shape of the Church to Come and comments briefly on the context of this book, namely, the German Synod at Würzburg, Germany in 1971. Rahner was prescient in thinking that it may only be a single occasion that may precipitate a huge crisis in which many Catholics will leave the Church, refusing to pay the church-tax, as is happening in Germany today. Although Rahner sharply criticizes the Church as institution, his passionate loyalty to the magisterium also comes through loud and clear in all his writings. Rahner, the consummate theologian, cannot be pigeonholed into neat categories like “conservative” or “liberal” because his theology knows how to do a balancing act. Finally, Rahner is such a trailblazer in theology that it may take another fifty years for the institutional Church to catch up with his thought.

Hick’s religious pluralism has been a matter of philosophical de­bate for more than two decades. Until recently, the philosophical framework of Hick’s pluralism has elicited a wide range of philosophical criticism. In this paper, I specify three core claims of Hick’s concept pertaining to the philosophical framework of his pluralism that have been under intensive discussion so far: Firstly, the epistemological claim that all exclusive religious truth claims have to be de-emphasised. Secondly, the methodological claim that Hick’s pluralism must be understood as a meta-theory and not as a first-order theory such as, for example, exclusivism. Thirdly, the metaphysical claim that no substantial properties can be ascribed to the noumenal and therefore transcategorial divine reality. I examine these three claims and reconsider Hick’s responses to philosophical objections to these claims. I argue that Hick is not successful in his defense. A reconsideration of these problems shows that all three pluralist claims remain neither compelling nor consistent.

Genesis 1:26 announces that God made us in His image and likeness. The paper examines the connection between the divine image and likeness. The love that exists between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit must be in the image. However, we cannot understand the Trinity so we make use of the divine likeness as a road to the divine image. The dual nature of Christ makes this pilgrimage possible. Christ as God is the divine image whereas Christ as man teaches us how the divine likeness leads to the Father. The love inscribed in the human heart connects the finite to the infinite. The divine Persons exist in relationships. Salvation takes place through a person-making process in the likeness of divine relations. Salvation is the output of relationships taking place at the level of a social self, an environmental self, and an inner self. These processes function as gateway to the structure of the divine image.

In his 1959–1960 seminar on the ethics of psychoanalysis the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan states that one can only fully understand the intellectual (philosophical, ethical) problems Freud addresses when one recognizes the filiation or cultural paternity that exists between him and a new direction of thought represented by Luther. In this article Lacan’s interest in Luther’s theological voluntarism, his conception of God, his articulation of what Lacan identifies as the modern crisis in ethics and his view on the law in relation to desire is presented and analysed. It is argued that Lacan is primarily interested in Luther as a religious author radically expressing the problem of the foundation of moral law and addressing the question how and where a person finds moral orientation after the break with the medieval Aristotelian-scholastic universal order and given man’s sinful desires.

This article provides a detailed examination of Bernard Lonergan’s nuanced understanding of experience and proposes his philosophical stance of critical realism as a foundation for interreligious dialogue. The article begins by acknowledging the existent tension between philosophers and theologians and suggests the problematic of interreligious dialogue as one field of possible collaboration. Critical realism is discussed in comparison to other, and indeed contrasting, positions, and is ultimately defended as the stance that provides correct answers to the so-called ‘three basic questions’ of cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics. The notions of patterns of experience and bias are particularly emphasized in order to highlight the complexity of experience. By way of conclusion, suggestions are made as to how philosophers and theologians might enhance their collaboration by furthering their understanding of religiousexperience and employing it as a category in interreligious dialogue.

In the letters written to the Thessalonians, Paul’s teaching appears to be irreconcilably divided between a still influential Judaic apocalyptic eschatology and (due to Timothy’s considerable influence in the development of the gospel), an emphasis on Hellenistic self-transformation and, in particular, how the philosophy of Epicurus contributed to the psychological health of recent converts. By interpreting the rhetoric of wrath, quiet, sleep, and childbirth, Paul’s teaching as it emerges in 1 and 2 Thessalonians reveals how the gospel must necessarily encounter, agonistically, two foundations of thought. During the early composition of the letters to his churches, Paul struggles ambivalently between the persistence of a Judaic past and its metaphysical promise of a parousia and eschaton, and the realization that Hellenistic philosophy, and Timothy’s Epicurean pastoral care, provides immediate comfort to the well-being of others.

This paper strengthens an argument from Alvin Plantinga against versions of the doctrine of divine simplicity which identify God with each of his properties. Plantinga shows that if properties are causally inefficacious abstracta, then God cannot be one of them—since God is surely causally efficacious. Here I argue thatGod cannot be even a causally efficacious property. The argument is an important complement to Plantinga’s work, since in the years following the publication of his essay many metaphysicians began to think of properties as causally efficacious entities for reasons quite independent of the doctrine of simplicity.

This essay examines Lévinas and Ricoeur’s criticisms of the project of theodicy and analyzes their attempts to figure an approach to God that survives the end of theodicy in terms of ethics (Lévinas) or hope (Ricoeur). In conclusion, it is argued that while both thinkers engage in the important task of disassociating God from the justificatory practices of theodicy, Ricoeur’s hope in the God of the future offers more ample resources for theological appropriation than Lévinas’s approach to God within the limits of ethics alone.

This interview with John Cottingham explores some major themes in his recent work in moral philosophy and the philosophy of religion. It begins by discussing his views on the task of philosophy and focuses particularly on philosophy’s role in achieving an overall view of the world and for understanding and achieving the good life. It also discusses some ‘limits of philosophy’ with respect to understanding and achieving the good life; i.e., some ways in which philosophical reflection on the good life needs to draw on insights found in other domains such as psychoanalysis and religious faith and spiritual practice. The role of philosophy and spiritual practice in coming to religious faith and supporting it is also discussed.

This article has a historiographical and a philosophical aim. The historiographical and most difficult objective is to provide a comprehensive presentation of F. W. J. Schelling’s doctrine of the potencies (Potenzlehre) for the English-speaking philosophical community as found in his, for the most part yet to be translated, late lectures on the positive philosophy of mythology and revelation. The philosophical objective is to show how this same doctrine provides a modern response to the assertion that thinking and Being are the same, sometimes rendered as “Thinking and Being belong together” or “Where there is Being, there is thinking.”

The Preface to Part 4 of Spinoza’s Ethics claims that we all desire to formulate a model of human nature. I show how that model serves the same function in ethics as the creed or articles of faith do in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, the function of allowing the imagination to provide a simularcrrum of rationality for finite, practical human beings.

This article addresses the issue of why God would sanction, via the Old Testament Law, less than ideal practices such as slavery, polygamy, and excessively harsh punishments for certain crimes. I appeal to two concepts (the idea of a supererogatory good, and the idea of Molinism) to explain why God sanctioned these practices. I explain that God’s sanctioning these practices may have been necessary in order to create the world with the most possible good.

This interview with Charles Taylor explores a central concern throughout his work, viz., his concern to confront the challenges presented by the process of ‘disenchantment’ in the modern world. It focuses especially on what is involved in seeking a kind of ‘re-enchantment.’ A key issue that is discussed is the relationship of Taylor’s theism to his effort of seeking re-enchantment. Some other related issues that are explored pertain to questions surrounding Taylor’s argument against the standard secularization thesis that views secularization as a process involving the ineluctable fading away of religion. Additionally, the relationship between Taylor’s religious views and his philosophical work is discussed.