The realist belief in the primacy of the world and its underlying structure answers the question ‘why is there something rather than nothing.’ The world, and all things contained in it exists because of God’s creative act. Personal death in Christian philosophy continues the gift of human existence by shifting that temporal existence into eternal life. The death and resurrection of Christ lays the foundation for the possibility of eternal life, while the will of God provides an answer to the why of human existence. The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of the death and resurrection of Christ on the metaphysical strings of human existence. The phenomenon of human death takes place on the arms of consciousness and being’s unconcealment. The subjective correlate of human death is the irreversible loss of consciousness, while the objective correlate of human death presents as the infolding of the gift of existence, namely, of being’s unconcealment from consciousness. These correlates function as a dynamic unit to explain human death and resurrection. The attempt to justify a belief in the existence of life after death from the point of view of consciousness alone is dualistic and leads to several absurdities and confusions about the nature of the afterlife state. The explanation of the resurrection of Christ as a continuation of the dialogue between being and consciousness begun on earth avoids those absurdities while maintaining personal identity.

This article examines and seeks to define Karl Rahner’s distinctive view of human dignity. Despite the relative infrequency of the words “dignity” or “image of God” in Rahner’s work, the inherent and realized worth of the individual holds a central place in his overall moral theology, especially as it appears in Foundations of Christian Faith. In particular, the article seeks to demonstrate that Rahner’s view of the (in)vulnerability of human dignity serves as a synthetic moral principle unifying his conceptions of freedom, the supernatural existential, the categorical, and the fundamental option. This article concludes by suggesting how Rahner’s conception of dignity may be helpful for the development of a comprehensive definition of dignity within the Catholic Social Thought Tradition.

The close proximity and topical confluence of two early fourteenth-century quodlibetal disputations, those of John Duns Scotus and Jacques de Thérines, has drawn the attention of several scholars. Antonie Vos argues that Thérines’s quodlibet exhibits the influence of Scotus’s, yet no solid evidence has yet been provided for the chronology of their delivery or publication. Most scholars agree that they likely delivered their quodlibets in the same year: 1306. The following article gives a full exposition of corresponding topics in the two texts, closely analyzing them for clues as to which influenced the other.

Ecumenical theology was integral to the ecclesiology of Karl Rahner. The highpoint of that theology in Rahner’s corpus was Unity of the Churches: An Actual Possibility, which he co-authored with Heinrich Fries and which was published shortly before Rahner’s death. Although the reception of Unity of the Churches was generally positive, one prominent critic of the book claimed that it promoted unity over “truth.” In identifying ten principles that underpinned Rahner’s ecumenical theology, this article explores Rahner’s interpretation of “truth.” The particular focus of the article is on Rahner’s conviction that “truth” in relation to Christian unity could not be separated from the “context” of the divided churches. The final section of the paper discusses Rahner’s proposals for the future of ecumenism.

Thirty years after the publication of Unity of the Churches: An Actual Possibility by Karl Rahner and Heinrich Fries, our panel was asked whether we consider the unity of the churches an actual possibility today. I sketch an answer to this question with the help of Michael Kinnamon, past Executive Secretary of the World Council of Churches and from 2007–2011 the General Secretary of the National Council of Churches in the USA, and Cardinal Walter Kasper, President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity from March 2001 through June 2010. In response to Cardinal Kasper’s caveats, I address three points: 1) the word of God and the Eucharist, 2) transubstantiation, and 3) the sacrifice of the Mass, The fourth point is my concluding answer to the question of Christian unity.

The work of Quilligan, Kelley, Gardner and others is alluded to in an effort to argue that Christine de Pisan’s Book of the City of Ladies is an early example of a philosophically feminist view. The importance of allegory as a literary construct is discussed, and it is concluded that Christine stands midway between the preceding medievals and the women thinkers of the seventeenth century. In addition, it is concluded that the importance of de Pisan’s work as a bridge between the two eras cannot be overlooked, and that only recently has substantive scholarship on her begun to emerge that would point a clear way to her standing.

This paper analyzes William A. Dembski’s theory of intelligent design. According to Dembski, it is possible to empirically detect signs of intelligence in the world by examining properties of observed events. In order to detect design, Dembski has developed the criterion of specified complexity, by means of which he claims to be able to distinguish events that are designed from those that are caused by necessity or chance. Five problems regarding Dembski’s theory are identified and discussed. It is revealed that Dembski’s theory is not rigorously enough defined to be deemed to be a scientific theory.

In order to make sense of Scotus’s claim that rationality is perfected only by the will, a Scotistic doctrine of truth is developed in a speculative way. It is claimed that synthetic a priori truths are truths of the will, which are existential truths. This insight holds profound theological implications and is used on the one hand to criticize Kant's conception of existence, and on the other hand, to offer another explanation of the sense according to which the existence of things is grasped.

A great amount of scholarly attention has been devoted to Karl Rahner’s early philosophical writings, but his theological work from the same time period remains only marginally known. While his dissertation in philosophy, Spirit in the World, has been published in multiple editions and in many languages, his dissertation in theology, E latere Christi, was only available in archives until it was published in the third volume (1999) of his collected works, Sämtliche Werke. Exploring the content of this third volume which contains Rahner’s early writing on the spirituality and theology of the Church Fathers, this article illuminates a neglected part of Rahner’s career: his fascination with patristic thought during his early, formative years. It also identifies themes in these early writings which reappear in his more well known mature writings on the theology of das Symbol, soteriology, mystery, and the importance of historical theology for the activity of today’s theologian.

Can the 1985 proposal for the unification of the Christian churches co-authored by Karl Rahner and Heinrich Fries in Unity of the Churches: An Actual Possibility still provide a realistic basis for the unification of the churches? This paper considers the proposal as an application of the ecumenical principle that no greater burden than necessary be imposed as a requisite for full ecclesial communion, and of the hierarchy of truths. It explores the basic presuppositions of the proposal in light of Rahner’s reflections on the role of the creed within the context of theological pluralism. Finally, it considers the changing contours of global Christianity and the potential of Rahner’s thought to hold together in creative tension the at times competing currents of those who would locate the ultimate basis of unity in a maximalist theological orthodoxy and those who would find it in an almost exclusive emphasis on orthopraxy.

In Book Four of his Confessions, Augustine recalls his grief at the death of his closest friend. Augustine believes he grieved excessively because he loved his friend as an idol, in the place of God. To illuminate the problems with Augustine’s friendship, I will draw on Jean-Luc Marion’s helpful analyses of the idol and the icon. In doing so I seek to clarify not only Augustine’s position on proper human love in the Confessions, but also suggest a way to understand his infamous uti/frui (use/enjoyment) distinction from On Christian Teaching, a nearly contemporaneous text to the Confessions.

This essays considers hope as an essential aspect of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. Comparing his pseudonymous works with Works of Love helps us to understand hope as the breath of the eternal, which is experienced in time as future possibility. True hope rests in the future eternal good and not in optimistic or calculative expectations. Hope is a necessary condition of the self on the journey to the eternal and as such is constitutive of the self. It is the belief in the in-breaking of the eternal into the temporal, which wholly surpasses earthly expectations in the form of the certain expectation of the future eternal good which is beyond all human possibility.

This article discusses whether animal rights may be defended from a natural rights or an ethical perspective. Both options fail. The same analysis applies in the case of humankind. ‘Humankind’ does not bring with it the acknowledgement of rights, nor does a focus on what is arguably characteristic of humankind, reason. Reason is decisive, though, in another respect: the fact that reasonable beings can claim and lay down rights. It does not follow from this that animals should have no rights, since human beings may be motivated to constitute such rights, while this provides the most solid basis for them.

Traditionally divine life has been conceived as an attribute that belongs to God according to his way of acting. This thesis is based on a notion of life as a purely operational perfection and on the place in which Aquinas develops his thought about divine life in the Summa theologiae. Here we contend that these arguments are not entirely conclusive and introduce the idea that life, in its most radical meaning, is an attribute that belongs to God according to his way of being. In our view, this approach is more consistent with Thomas’s doctrine and avoids some common misunderstandings.

Jean-Paul Sartre is known for his analysis of human consciousness. Surprisingly, however, he never takes seriously what it might mean to theorize God’s existence through that same understanding of consciousness. In this paper, I endeavor that analysis and outline the Sartrean conscious God, where nothingness haunts God’s own being. My argument is not to prove God’s existence through a Sartrean theology. My argument is only that a Sartrean theology centered on the conscious God is fully consistent within Sartre’s existentialism and that such a conception of God should appeal to the Christian.

This article relates the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas in order to overcome the technological attitude pervasive in society. Heidegger’s concept of technology as a way of presencing opens the door to both the danger and the saving grace of the technological attitude. Through a contemplation of art and nature recommended by Heidegger, St. Thomas’s metaphysics acts as a focus for that contemplation and de-centers the self by connecting all creation to God through esse which brings about a radiance in all things drawing the observers’ gaze away from the self to God.

The aim of this paper is to apply the metaphysics of John Duns Scotus in constructing a new conception of matter which does not stand in opposition to the mental realm, but is rather composed of both physical and mental elements. The paper is divided into four parts. Section one addresses Scotus’ claim that matter is intelligible and actual in itself. Section two aims to show that matter can be seen as a deprived thinking being. Section three analyzes Scotus’ conception of place. The final section brings together the conclusions of the three preceding parts to confront the Cartesian psycho-physical problem anew and to suggest a viable solution.

Patrick Grim and Einar Duenger Bohn have recently argued that there can be no perfectly knowing Being. In particular, they urge that the object of omniscience is logically absurd (Grim) or requires an impossible maximal point of all knowledge (Bohn). I argue that, given a more classical notion of omniscience found in Aquinas and Augustine, we can shift the focus of perfect knowledge from what that being must know to the mode of that being’s understanding. Since Grim and Bohn focus on the object rather than mode of God’s knowledge, this classical approach to omniscience undermines their objections.