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201. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Enrico Berti Substance et essence, entre Aristote et Thomas d’Aquin
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The article shows that Thomas Aquinas in many of his works (De ente et essentia, Summa theologiae, Sententia in Aristotelis Metaphysicam) interprets the passage Aristot. Metaph. II 1, 993 19‑31, as expounding a theory of degrees of truth and of being, which is not the true Aristotelian doctrine. This is due to the fact that he interprets ≪the eternal things≫, mentioned by Aristotle in that passage, as the heavenly bodies, and their principles as the unmoved movers, while Aristotle is speaking of the eternal truths, i.e. the truths of scientific knowledge, and of their principles, which are the axioms. The origin of Thomas’ interpretation is the commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias, which Thomas knew via Averroes.
202. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Maria Protopapas·Marneli L’hexis comme privation de changement et d’alteration chez les Stoïciens
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The Stoics try to demonstrate, in a theoretical context, more than any other philosophy, the link unifying the parts with the whole, in all areas of existence; namely, from man to divine reason, from god to nature – a tautological link in some cases – from matter to logos or creative pneuma. This unifying bond – hexis or continuity – guarantees the attachment between bodies which are in a state of sympathy (or interaction) which also constitutes their existence. It remains to seek the meaning of this notion; draw on its etymology: according to Bailly’s dictionary, the term hexis in Greek means among other meanings: action of possessing, possession. And according to the dictionary of L.‑S.‑J., hexis (proper noun) derives from the future of the verb ἕξω, from the verb ἔχω, (to have, to possess); in its intransitive form refers to a permanent condition, namely to an act, which results from practice.In order to make an attempt to define this concept or to orient its function, it seems appropriate for us to do some research – we could say historical –, consulting texts prior to Stoicism, examining its place and the nuances it takes in different contexts and finally, follow its interpretation where, according to philosophical approaches, it sometimes means disposition, habit, or situation. Nevertheless, the Stoics give this term an original meaning, different from the one that was granted to it until then. It is the hectic pneuma or the tension (tonos) prevalent in the universe. In this perspective, we will try to define its function and compare it with the notion of hexis in Aristotle, where it acquires the meaning of metaxy, in his Metaphysics, Δ, 1022b12.
203. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Maddalena Bonelli Porphyre et la catégorie de la relation
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Porphyry’s Expositio per interrogationem et responsionem can help us to understand some obscure passages of chapter seven of Aristotle’s Categories, focused on the relative (πρός τι). The Porphyrian analysis of πρός τι presents indeed developments which are both useful for the understanding of the Aristotelian text and very innovative too. First, we can mention the general Porphyrian thesis according to which categories are predicates. This theory fits very well with πρός τι, which are predicates corresponding to properties that subjects only possess because of an observed reciprocal relationship. This brings us to the second novelty of Porphyry’s analysis, really important for modern developments of the notion of relation, namely the difference between σχέσις and πρός τι, which depends on it. Finally, we will mention the important Porphyry’s contribution to the understanding of a particularly obscure issue concerning the relationship between the two definitions of πρός τι that Aristotle provides. Porphyry points out the Platonic origin of the first definition, without dismissing it though: instead, he will just consider it too vast and encompassing the true πρός τι, object of the second definition.
204. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Jean‑Baptiste Brenet L’intellect agent, la lumière, l’hexis. Averroès lecteur d’Aristote et d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise
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This article examines Averroes’ interpretation, found in his Long Commentary on the De Anima, of a famous passage in Aristotle’s De An. III 5 (430a14‑15) which presents the intellect “producing all things, as a kind of positive state (hexis), like light”. Averroes, clearly heir to Alexander of Aphrodisias for whom hexis refers not to the intellect “agent” itself but to its product, defends nevertheless, via the comparison with light, the conception of the agent intellect (a substance purely in act by itself ) as an hexis, which leads us to the inevitable consequence that the agent intellect is the prime object of the material intellect, acting as a condition for all subsequent thoughts.
205. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Cristina Cerami Puissance et acte chez Averroès: entre ontologie et théologie
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The present paper aims at presenting Averroes’ doctrine of act and potency in the framework of his general conception of metaphysics as a science. By tracing the origins of his doctrine back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, it shows that Averroes conceives act and potency as concomitant attributes of being qua being and as terms πρὸς ἕν and ἀφ’ ἑνός. According to this reading, the study of these two notions, considered as such, constitutes an essential step in Averroes’ metaphysical project, whose ultimate goal is to account for the essence of the first of all forms: God.
206. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Fabienne Jourdan Οὐσία chez Numénius: une notion qui s’élabore progressivement. Analyse des difficultés relatives à l’οὐσία et à l’ἰδέα dans les fragments 22 F, 24 F et 28 F (fr. 14, 16 et 20 dP)
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Οὐσία in Numenius: a notion which is progressively elaborated: Analysis of the difficulties linked to οὐσία and ἰδέα in fragments 22 F, 24 F and 28 F (fr. 14, 16 et 20 dP). In the Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ, Numenius refines his definition of οὐσία step by step. He uses the word at first as a synonym of τὸ ὄν (15 F) and as another designation of being. Then, he associates it to the ἕξις when he refers to the specific οὐσία which possesses science (22 F): in all likelihood, this οὐσία is the intellect as the essence common to God and Man in the possession of science. Finally, Numenius gives οὐσία two aspects or sides which, in our opinion, represent two manners of conceiving the intelligible it constitutes: on the one hand, οὐσία comes from Being itself (the Good) and seems to represent the eidetic predicates or what we could name the “fundamental intelligibility”, a state in which the form is not determined yet, but which gives it the status of a real being ; on the other hand, οὐσία is the product of the second god and intellect and the determined aspect of the previous one, which makes it possible to distinguish the forms one from the other. In this last case, Numenius seems to name οὐσία more specifically ἰδέα, even if both words are elsewhere synonymous and used to refer to the two aspects previously mentioned according to the context in which they are employed. The paper presents the analysis of fragments 22 F, 24 F and 28 F from which we arrive at this interpretation. The distinction between two manners of conceiving οὐσία makes it possible then to discover two levels in the Being at the origin of each of them: Being itself (αὐτοόν which is the Good itself, αὐτοάγαθον) and the ≪second≫ or ≪just≫ Being, constituted by the good demiurge which is probably the “One who is good par excellence”. From there, two ways of conceiving ἰδέα also appear: on the one hand, ἰδέα is synonymous with οὐσία, then it refers to the second aspect of οὐσία, the determined one; on the other hand, it can also refer to the level of Being which is the Good when, in fragment 28 F, it is conceived as a form and probably as the Form par excellence identified with the intellect which this Good is itself.
207. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Sylvain Roux De l’intellect a l’un: la notion de “συνυποστασις” chez Plotin
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At the end of Treatise 38 (VI 7), Plotinus presents an original analysis of the activity of the intellect. The intellectual activity of the soul cannot produce its object and thinks what is in the Intellect from which it comes. On the contrary, the Intellect produces its object (οὐσία) and its intellection is not the act of a substrate (ὑποκείμενον), as in the preceding case. In this context, Plotinus uses, to account for this particular form of intellect, a very rare notion in his work, that of συνυπόστασις. In our opinion, its use is at the origin of a true explanatory model that Plotinus uses in particular in Treatise 39 (VI 8) to think how the One can be what he wants to be. The use of this notion can therefore help us understand the meaning of freedom and will attributed to the first principle.
208. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Riccardo Chiaradonna Essere e vita in Plotino (VI, 2 [43]; III, 7 [45]).
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This paper focuses on Plotinus’ account of life and being in treatises VI, 2 [43] On the genera of being and III, 7 [45] On eternity and time. Life and being play a key role in Plotinus’ ontology since they characterise incorporeal realities as such (life and being cannot be drawn from the analysis of bodies). Therefore, focusing on these items makes it possible to attain an account of intelligible reality according to the principles appropriate to it. Three issues are considered: (1) the cognitive process through which the soul grasps being and life when it turns its cognitive activity away from the bodies and reverts to itself (VI, 2, 4‑6); (2) the status of being and life as genera of the intelligible reality (life is equivalent to intelligible motion: VI, 2, 7); (3) Plotinus’ account of life as the way of being typical of intelligible realities (III, 7); (4) his gradualist account of the hierarchy of life (III, 8 [30], 8; VI, 3 [44], 7; I, 4 [46], 3).
209. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Izabela Jurasz Itutā ‑ ītyā / ītyē comme synonymes d’ousia dans la polémique d’Éphrem contre Bardesane
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In his critic of the doctrine of Bardaisan († 222), Ephrem the Syrian († 373) devotes a lot of space to reflection on the meaning of the terms ītutā and ītyā (plural ītyē) which, as he denounces, are used inaccurately by his opponent. These Syriac terms can be translated by “being” or “essence”, but also by “substance”. This observation leads us to propose the comparison with the Greek term οὐσία, taking into account many difficulties raised by its uses in theological discourse. The article is devoted to the analysis of the uses of the terms ītutā and ītyā ‑ by Ephrem and by Bardaisan ‑ in their different ways of describing the divine essence. This comparison reveals the peculiarities of the two systems of thought and also their connections with the Greek philosophical doctrines.
210. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Tiziano F. Ottobrini Intorno al teologhema della שכינה e all’antiallegorismo dello ἱλαστήριον presso Filone Alessandrino
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This essay analyses the use of the term/concept hilasterion (‘propitiatorium’, i.e. the cover of Ark of Covenant) in the hypomnematic corpus by Philo of Alexandria. This subject needs to be examined in relationship with the Greek translation of the Septuagint and the exegesis of the Hebrew kapporeth ; so it will be argued that here Philo deals with semitic thought more than with the categories of Greek philosophy, since the real and bodily presence of God on hilasterion differs ontologically from any allegoric interpretation : only a sound Hebrew contextualisation of the theme as šekhînâ might take away this concern. As a result it means that, speculatively, there does not exist Philo Gracus only but this coexists with a sort of often neglected Philo Hebraicus too, when Greek allegory and allegorism fail to make sense, just as in the case of the special point of view of hilasterion, due to its semitic nature not totally compressible into Greek forma mentis.
211. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Monica Brinzei New Evidence for Nicholas Aston’s Principia on the Sentences: Basel, UB, A.X.24
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Cet article propose d’identifier le fragment anonyme du manuscrit Basel, UB, A.X.24, ff. 1‑73v avec les questionnes sur les Sentences de Nicholas Aston, connu grâce aux travaux pionniers de Zenon Kaluza. Une analyse des détails techniques de ce texte permet également d’avancer l’hypothèse que les Articuli d’Aston peuvent être lus comme des traces des principia. En annexe, nous éditons la liste des questions du manuscrit Basel, UB, A.X.24, ainsi qu’une concordance entre ce manuscrit et les autres témoins manuscrits d’Aston, afin de démontrer que ce nouveau témoin contient la tradition la plus complète du texte d’Aston.
212. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Eleni Procopiou Essence, individualité et personne chez Thomas d’Aquin
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The rediscovery of the Hellenic philosophy, but also of the Patristic thinking is a typical feature of Thomistic thought, which consists of a new synthesis of Hellenism and Christianity that raises anew the issue of the relation between Christianity and philosophy as a focal point of medieval philosophy. Acknowledgement of Hellenic Patristic thought that focuses primarily on man as an inseparable union of body and soul, joined in a whole, has been a determining factor in the Thomistic approach of being, through the distinction between a person (or hypostasis) from essence (or nature). Through this distinction and because of the Aristotle’s hylomorphism, the notion of ‘person’ is placed in the field of individuality and the unity of the human composite. The metaphysical notion of a person as individual, complemented by the notion of “relation” is directly related to the ontological unity of human nature and is founded upon the metaphysical notion of “essence” (substance).
213. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
David Hamidović Les dualismes dans les manuscrits de Qumrân
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Very early after the discovery of the first manuscripts of Qumran in Cave 1, the scholars were agree to describe the Essene world‑view as dualistic. The close study of each document reveals today a more complicated literary situation. The manuscripts of Qumran attest to three kinds of dualism : cosmic dualism, relative dualism, and human dualism. This taxonomy is not to take too strictly because the dualisms can be combined inside a text to reinforce and justify the Essene world‑view, especially the sectarian perspective. The combination is also a proof of the multiple state of dualism in Ancient Judaism. Moreover, we note the relationship between dualism and apocalypticism. The apocalyptical literature may be a source of diffusion of different types of dualism.
214. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Fabienne Jourdan Plutarque développe‑t‑il réellement une pensée dualiste ?
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Plutarch is often seen as a dualist philosopher. Yet, when one studies the texts which are most often quoted to back such an opinion, the so‑called dualist doxographies in De Iside et Osiride and in De animae procreatione, one is actually lead to think otherwise. When they are replaced in their context, it so happens that these texts describe the conditions to obtain harmony and the mixing of the contraries which are both necessary to the birth and to the very existence of the universe. However, harmony and mixing cannot be obtained without the receptacle of the contraries that constitute them. Far from being a simple intermediary, this receptacle, which takes different aspects in the different treatises, is indeed a constituent principle according to Plutarch. Without it, there can be neither encounter nor opposition of the contraries, and so, paradoxically, precisely because it is a guarantee of dualism, it makes dualism disappear. Dualism then turns out to be a mere preparatory step in the elaboration of a really triadic philosophy.
215. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Lucia Saudelli, Adrien Lecerf Matiere «issue du Pere» ou matiere «primordiale» ?: (réponse a H. Seng)
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In this response, we discuss Professor Seng’s proposal according to which the Chaldaean Oracles call the matter πατρογενής («derived from the Father») and not πρωτογενής («primordial»). We first explain the philosophical problem raised by this philological reading and we formulate an objection to it ; secondly, we take into consideration the Late Neo‑Platonic tradition as an eventual confirmation of the πατρογενής hypothesis.
216. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Jean‑Daniel Dubois Remarques sur «La monarchia dans les Homélies clémentines et l’origine du Mauvais»: (réponse a A. Le Boulluec)
217. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Anca Vasiliu Platon et l’invention aristotélicienne du dualisme platonicien
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Aristotle’s main grievances against his forebears, in the first instance Plato, but also Empedocles and Anaxagoras, rely on three theoretical standpoints : the status of the whole and the one, the separation or the immanence of the principle and its ability to act as a cause or not, and finally the possibility of engendering or producing from contraries. An analysis of the criticisms developed in Metaphysics Lambda 10 brings to light both the purpose and the flaws of the Aristotelian indictment. Arguably, Plato has brought things to existence from a secondary dualism, not from an immutable and separate principle, since, according to the Stagirite’s critical reading, the status of that principle remains ambiguous on the grounds that it is used both as an efficient cause and a universal predicate. From the encounter between the theory of causes and of being advocated by Aristotle against Plato and what Aristotle introduces as the Platonic theory of the principle, Ideas and Numbers, emerges a “dualistic” vision of Plato’s thought. However when one endeavours to locate and contextualize in the Dialogues the theses attributed to Plato by his rebellious disciple, that “dualistic” vision not only does not appear to be founded, but one can even find a criticism of the aptness of such interpretation. The example given is that of the fight of the Gods and the Giants in The Sophist ; in that fight between philosophers around the status of the being can be found a great many of the themes and positions mentioned in what is called in Lambda 10 a criticism of the forebears. Isn’t the “dualistic” interpretation of ancient philosophies ultimately the projection of a modern type of reading, sensitive to the mythologizing interpretation fashioned owing to the late popularity of Platonism ?
218. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Nathalie Frogneux Les enjeux du dualisme chez Hans Jonas
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This paper summarises the issues of dualism in the philosophy of Hans Jonas. Dualism was a central topic for him to understand gnosticism in late antiquity, and it became also a key concept to understand moral nihilism of the XXth century. Jonas demonstrates that Heidegger’s thought in Sein und Zeit ‑ which enables him to elaborate the heuristic method to shed light on gnostic dualism ‑ was in fact itself based on a dualistic anthropology. On the one hand, Jonas attempted to reply to it with a philosophical biology ; on the other hand, his reply to the cosmological dualism thanks to his speculative and mythical concept of the weak God.
219. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Isabelle Koch Augustin : d’un dualisme a un autre ?
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Augustine is a particularly interesting author for anyone who wishes to question the topic of dualism, because of the diverse and complex way this topic is adressed in his writings. After having been listening to the Manichean as an “auditor” for almost ten years, he raised many critics against the manichean thesis ; but in spite of this critical position, several of his later opponents, from the Donatist and mostly from the Pelagian heresy, often reproached him to have remained a crypto‑Manichean. This paper focuses on working out the original image Augustine had about the manicheism, as providing a coherent answer to some ethical and metaphysical problems, then as being nothing more than a false response he had to break with. This task will then lead us to question his potential residual manicheism, considering his controversy with Julian of Eclanum, in order to identify the arguments by which Julian supports the accusation of augustinian Manicheism, and to assess the extent to which this accusation is or is not admissible.
220. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Nele Ziegler Enuma elish, le récit babylonien de la création
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The Babylonian Poem of Creation Enuma Elish tells the story of Apsu and Tiamat begetting the first generations of gods, of Marduk vanquishing Tiamat and creating from its corps the whole universe. Can the story of this fight be a hint to a dualistic vision of the universe in Mesopotamia ? The author stresses some arguments against this conclusion even if some of the main elements of dualistic cosmologies are present : combatting forces, non‑existence – creation of the universe, male – female opposition.