This paper concerns the question whether the rational reconstruction of science provided by the philosophy of science is partly descriptive and partly normative task. To this respect we offer a general characterization of the concept of science and observe then briefly the relations between the history and the philosophy of science. The widely extended view that there cannot be a history of science without an underIying philosophy suggests the problem whether it can exist a rational reconstruction of science independently from any theory about the science. On the answer to this question depends that we could conceive the philosophy of science as a discipline which combines descriptive (or empirical) with normative eIements.

The starting point of the paper is the explicit recognition that the prevalent methodology among economists -namely popperian falsacionism- does not reconstruct as rational the central part of the work of the majority of them. The main thrust of the paper is doublefold. First, a new methodology -abstracted from the analysis of the core of Economic Theory- is proposed which enlarges the scope of rationality in Economics. Second, this new methodology -dubbed the Fix Point Methodology- is posited as a general scientific one. As such it opens new vistas on Truth, specially the conjecture that Reality is a changing entity and the consequent call for professional honesty.

There are five basic types of ontology of law identified in relation with the singling out simpIe ontological objects in a strong or weak sense, dualist ontological objects, and complex ontalogical objects in a strong or weak sense. The conceptians of law far mulated in the theories/philosophies/ of law are ascribed to these five types.

The main aims of this paper are two: first, to show that the current situation of History of Logic is far from being satisfactory, and second, to put forward a programme for its improvement. To this end it is as well, I think, to take into account a new conceptual and historiographical approach to growth of Iogic as a discipline, some basic notions in this regard -e.g., the notion of being a contribution to develop ment of Iogic-, and some others compIementary aspects, commonly neglected by the History of Logic scholars.

In this paper everyday reasoning is examined fromm the standpoint of natural logic. In natural logic there is the supposition of the concept of schematisation, i.e. the discursive representation of a situation that a speaker A constructs for a listener B and that B must reconstruct for himself.Under these circumstances, in order to prove that a statement s is true A must present it in such a way that B does not call it into question, that he considers it a fact. For this it is necessary to have proofs. Moreover, a fact is never isolated and it may therefore appear inconsistent with other facts. A is thus led to provide reasons in order to substantiate his statements.Some mechanisms of proofs and of reasons are investigated.

The aim of this paper is to highlight the main features of the philosophy of science that are present in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. At the same time I attempt to point out some obscure proposals within his metascientific theory and (hypothetically) to distinguish certain aspects in which the Aristotelian Model of science has become inapplicable nowadays.