Traditionally, the picture has been the archetype of all signs, even the word. Contemporary philosophy is beginning to doubt the traditional understanding of the sign as present existence which represents absent existence. The sign ceases to be limited to reference and retreats in favour of inference -that which surrounds the sign; that is to say, other signs. This trend is most apparent in the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida and is also implicit in Gombrich's Art and Illusion. The aim of the present study is to present a comparison of the views of Derrida and Gombrich

The paper offers a new model of genre. The model employs Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of plane of immanence, chaos, and, in particular, concepts and approaches of cognitive science. Genre in general and the film genre in particular are modelled as a multidimensional space with a network of vector sequences, as a plane of immanence with individual works in the role of concepts, as a cluster category without a centre. That genre model provides more explanatory power than the recent semantic-syntactical one.

The paper analyses the model as an artefact sui generis establishing the role of semiosis, as a homomorphic representation, as an artefact securing the function of an interface between the author and the receiver. The receiver's ability of accepting the model and its interpretation possibility and/or quality depends on the receiver's competence including the linquistic competence, his knowledge of the represented sphere and the knowledge of the applied sign system and its rules.

The essay investigates the possibility of a closer connection of Husserlian phenomenology and that tradition in semiotics of art which originates mainly withSchelling and Goethe. The affinity between semiotically approached tropology and phenomenology is supported if a symbol is conceived not only as an analogy of the designated, but also as its direct grasping. This grasping shows some features of rational contemplation as understood by phenomenology. Modelling symbol as a synthetic trope enables us to proceed to the model of an "artistic situation" as a square generated by a decomposition of the triangle of reference. The complexity of the processes within the "square" results from a fusion of the effects of the linear, natural circuit and the feedback, culturally historical circuit.

We prove the following preservation theorem for the Horn fragment of Equality-free Logic:Theorem 0.1. For any sentence σ ϵ L, the following are equivalent:i ) σ is preserved under Hs , Hs -1 and PR .i i ) σ is logically equivalent to an equality-free Horn sentence.

RESUMEN: La Pragmática es el estudio de los procesos mentales que subyacen a las actividades lingüísticas. Las actividades lingüísticas son comportamientos que incluyen tanto la emisión como la recepción lingüística; tanto la actividad lingüística cuya intención es comunicar como la realizada con otras intenciones o incluso sin intenciones. Las actividades lingüísticas son un 'género próximo' de las emociones. El modelo de realización de actividades lingüísticas se basa, por ello, en modelos cognoscitivos sobre emociones. Integraremos también parámetros pragmáticos procedentes de la comparación entre la actividad lingüística y el juego simbólico. La Pragmática adquiere entonces una base psicológica e incrementa la contrastabilidad empírica.ABSTRACT: Pragmatics is the study of mental processes that underlie linguistic activities. Linguistic activities are taken as behaviour that includes linguistic emission as well as linguistic reception; linguistic activities performed with an informative intention, as well as linguistic activities performed with other intentions, and non-intentional ones. Linguistic activities pertain to the 'close gender' of emotions. A model for the elicitation of linguistic activities based on cognitive models of emotion is proposed. In this model, pragmatic parameters that come from the comparison between linguistic activities and pretence play are integrated. Pragmatics acquires then a psychological ground and the empirical contrastability is increased.

RESUMEN: Una tendencia importante en la filosofía de la educación contemporánea toma de la sociología del conocimiento la manera de entender la naturaleza del conocimiento científico. Esta tendencia parte de una crítica al "cognitivismo" individualista, asociado con una concepción tradicional del conocimiento y defiende una posición consensualista según la cual el conocimiento es la búsqueda de consenso. El objetivo del trabajo es mostrar que los consensualistas asumen una falsa dicotomía. Contrario a lo que los consensualistas asumen la cognición puede entenderse a la vez como un logro social y como el resultado del ejercicio de capacidades individuals. Concluyo haciendo ver algunas consecuencias del abandono de esa dicotomía para entenderel papel de la autoridad en la educación.ABSTRACT: An important trend in contemporary philosophy of education follows a view of knowledge promoted by sociologists of knowledge. According to this view a critique of the cognitive individualism implicit in the traditional account of knowledge leads to "consensualism ", the view that knowledge is the search for consensus. The aim of this paper is to show that the consensualists assume a false dichotomy. Cognition can be understood both as a social achievement and as the display of individual capacities. I conclude by exploring some consequences of the abandoning of this dichotomy for our understanding of the role of authority in education.

Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views: Nonreductive Physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of serious difficulties. In this paper, I propose a metaphysical account of functional properties and show how this proposal is able to overcome some of these difficulties, in particular, some recent arguments against the causal efficacy of multiply realized properties. However, in the second part of the paper an objection against this proposal is raised and, after a detailed discussion of it, the conclusion reached is that the prospects for a functionalist nonreductive metaphysics of the mind which affords causal powers to the mental seem certainly dim.

Mental causes are threatened from two directions: from below, since they would appear to be screened off by lower-order, e.g., neural states; and from within, since they would also appear to be screened off by intrinsic, e.g., syntactical states. A principle needed to parry the first threat -causes should be proportional to their effects- appears to leave us open to the second; for why should unneeded extrinsic detail be any less offensive to proportionality than excess microstructure? I say that the second threat relies on a perversion of proportionality that would lay waste to all causal relations.

The by now famous exclusion problem for mental causation admits only one possible solution, as far as I can see, namely: that mental and physical properties are linked by a vertical relation. In this paper, starting from what I take to be sensible premises about properties, I will be visiting some general relations between them, in order to see whether, first, it is true that some vertical relationship, other than identity, makes different sorts of causation compatible and second, whether physical and mental properties can be pairs of such relationship.

Causal compatibilism claims that even though physics is causally closed, and even though mental properties are multiply realizable and are not identical to physical causal properties, mental properties are causal properties nonetheless. This position asserts that there is genuine causation at multiple descriptive/ontological levels; physics-level causal claims are not really incompatible with mentalistic causal claims. I articulate and defend a version of causal compatibilism that incorporates three key contentions. First, causation crucially involves robust patterns of counterfactual dependence among properties.Second, often several distinct such patterns, all subsuming a single phenomenon, exist at different descriptive/ontological levels (e.g., microphysical, neurobiological, macrobiological, and psychological). Third, the concept of causation is governed by an implicit contextual parameter that normally determines a specific descriptive/ontological level as the contextually relevant level, for the context-sensitive semantic evaluation of causal statements.

The problem of exclusion threatens non-reductive physicalist theories of the mind by implying that they cannot account for mental causation. This paper attempts to clarify what exactly the exclusion problem is, and, given the problem, to survey the theoretical options open. First I reconstruct the problem from its most influential sources (Malcolm and Kim), showing that it should be understood as an ontological rather than an explanatory problem. I then distinguish the problem from some consequences that seem to follow from it. Finally I sketch a map of possible answers to exclusion.

In this expository paper, we examine some philosophical and technical issues brought by paraconsistency (such as, motivations for developing a paraconsistent logic, the nature of this logic, and its application to set theory). We also suggest a way of accommodating these issues by considering some problems in the philosophy of logic from a new perspective.

The article studies two especific forms of social interaction, linguistically mediated: promises and threats. Two pregnant theoretical accounts are to be considered here. Firstly, the analysis propounded within the framework of Game Theory, assuming an intentionalist account of human agency and an instrumentalist concept of rationality; and secondly, the attempt carried out by Speech Acts theorists. In the first case, it can be shown that the theoretical premisses are insufficient to offer a proper account of such basic forms of social interchange. This result gives indirect support, so it is argued, to the second theoretical framework considered. Yet some of the solutions offered seem to be also unsatisfactory. Reasons are given of why it is so, and an attempt of solution, within the same theoretical framework, is suggested.