The author tries to prove that Plato’s theory of thecreation of kosmos by Demiourgos as conforming to a pre-existing model – namely “ho LÍgos” – by way of thepossession of a peculiar art, i.e. “to-know-how”, has a contemporary correspondent in the image built by science of the universe. Even the emergence of evil in such a rational and ordered universe has a replication in the religious myth of Lucifer’s rebellion.The paper is intended to show that, in the history of post-modern culture, three periods of global life are known as characterized through the connection betweenscience, philosophy and religion.The first is described in the dialogue Timaeus, where Plato imagined the creation of the world by Demiourgos, according to the Logos: “Cosmos was forged by a model – Logos – which can be designed with reason – Nous”; “Once he saw that the universe is moving and living, born as holy habitation of the immortal gods, begotten of the Father who was seized by delight and rejoicing. He had thought about how to make it even more like the model – Logos. And how this model – Logos – is an eternal creature, Demiourgos tried to perfect the universe, in this regard also”; “He has made a smooth body, uniform and equal everywhere from centre, whole and absolutely right-down, composed of perfect bodies”. Ptolemy, drawing on an Aristotelian conception of time and eternity, developed, in his Almagest, a vision of the cosmos founded on the ideas of Aristotle’s Physics describing a geocentric universe full of symbols. But this universe could not be brought to the eye as improved, as a universal astronomical system limited by the firmament of the fixed stars beyond which Christian theology has placed Paradise and Hell.The second period can be described through what Max Weber says about modernity, a process of “Entzauberung der Welt”, dramatically accelerated sincethe scientific revolution of Galileo, accomplished by the globalization of the mechanistic empire, by replacing Aristotelian and Thomist space, which is closed, limited and heterogeneous, by a homogeneous infinite space. Meta-science that favoured the emergence of modern scientific revolution is related to the logos problem of evolution and its solutions, where the core terminology means equally reason, rationality, science, and at the same time speech, word, verb, having religious or transcendent connotations but secularised in an historical horizon.The contemporary period – the third, the end of the second and the beginning of the third millennium – is placed under the heresy of the solidarity between science and technology, characterized by the technefication of science designating a process whereby techniques are predominant in traditional research methods, opening an age of cybernetic heresy.

This article presents theories of group belief with a problem. It is conceptually and psychologically impossible for there to be a believer with just one belief. Forconceptual reasons, a single belief could not have any content without the background of other beliefs. Or even if it could, it would for psychological reasons be impossible for the believer to know or understand the content of its sole belief. With certain plausible assumptions, however, groups would at some point of time have to have only one belief. (The assumption of discontinuity between the group’s and its members’ commitments leads to this.) If it is conceptually or psychologically impossible for the group to acquire its first belief, it can never come to acquire any beliefs at all. The article ends by discussingvarious ways out of this dilemma.

This paper outlines a relational variety of the theory of emergence and claims that it can be applied more fruitfully to sociology than the functional variety advocated by Keith Sawyer. Sawyer argues that the wildly disjunctive multiple realizability of social properties justifies a nonreductive approach to causal explanation in the social sciences (but also ontological individualism). In response, this paper argues, first, that the social properties he discusses are not wildly disjunctive, and secondly, that we can explain their causal significance more effectively with a relational emergence theory linked to the critical realist account of causal powers. Although these properties are multiply realizable, they are not emergent because they are multiply realizable, but despite being so.

This article comparatively explores Searle’s conception of society, which prioritizes language and intentionality in producing social things and Max Weber’s conception of social action as human behavior, in which the acting individual attributes subjective meaning to his or her behavior by orientation to the behavior of others. My aim is to show that the “nonlinguistic institutional facts” which in Searle’s terms seem to emerge in the absence of any constitutive rule linguistically expressed can be described in Weber’s terms of attaching a subjective meaning to individual behavior. In this way, we may add a minimal sociology to Searle’s conceptual apparatus in order to grasp contingent and historical dimensions of the functioning of institutions.

John Searle's Making the Social World addresses a question that is as central to philosophy in general as it is to Social Ontology. It concerns the involvement of human beings in the creation of seemingly objective facts. The facts in which Searle is interested are ‘institutional’ facts. Such facts are objective; they are also, Searle argues, ‘created by human subjective attitudes’. It is my contention that this apparent paradox arises from a misconception of 'subjective' and 'objective'. For Searle, these terms are synonymous with 'mind-dependent' and 'mindindependent'. Following the scientist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, I argue that 'objectivity' is better understood as 'theoretical' and therefore worthy of universal recognition by rational agents. Being a matter of reason, objectivity contrasts, not with mind-dependence, but immediate experience. It follows that Searle's paradox is a function of the contradictory terms in which it is stated.

Searle’s social ontology is criticized on two grounds: (1) that Searle’s arguments do not adequately support his commitment to logically and conceptually irreducible collective-to-individual intentionality, and (2) his formulation of the constitutive rule of collective intentionality conferring symbolic social status on intended objects does not express the required concept as clearly, unequivocally, or economically as available alternatives. Two corresponding positive recommendations are offered in response to both criticisms for developing a conservatively improved neo-Searlean philosophy of social phenomena,practices and institutions.

The Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and Metohija has a long history that is rich in detail, so it is difficult to grasp it in its entirety. Therefore, only a few key points are presented in this paper, points which will hopefully lend insight into current events and future prospects. In this paper, the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and Metohija is observed through discussion about Orthodox belief, the priesthood and monasticism, and places of worship. The research was conducted in 2012, when we visited Kosovo and Metohija and interviewed bishops, monks, priests, lay believers, and pilgrims. Places mentioned in the paper are: Gazimestan, Gracanica, Prizren, Decani, Patriarchate of Pec, and Kosovska Mitrovica.

Was Frege firstly a philosopher of language or a philosopher of mathematics? I try to give an answer to this question in this paper. I argue that Frege’s definition of natural number is the right way to reach the answer. Frege had simultaneously two theoretical commitments: one regarding the logicist programme in the foundations of mathematics, the other regarding the conception of logic as a language. Therefore, Frege developed a formal language and tried to define arithmetical concepts in pure logical terms. He did this based on semantical suppositions, because he could not do it any other way as long as he regarded logic as a language. I will argue that Frege used semantic tools in order to solve problems related to philosophy of mathematics.

What Ludwik Fleck has really written about is the cognitive life of communities which constitute their worlds of specific entities. Fleck’s subject is intellectualhistory, but history seen as changing horizons of cognition projected by certain practices. His ideas have proliferated, so that some of them are attributable to the reception of his work in constructivist programs of cognitive sociology, historical epistemology, comparative historiography of science, and cultural studies of scientific research. Fleck’s philosophical assumptions cover a broad range. Some are responses to debates in which he was involved; others derive from his penchant to examine theories of knowledge in the interwar period through a historical and sociological lens; still others arose from his critical attitude toward those who interpreted science through their own narrow ideology, as well as the violence toward the academic ethos in National Socialism and Soviet Communism. The present paper tries to do justice to the major interpretations of Fleck’s work. It puts special emphasis on the kind of “trans-subjective hermeneutics” that is inherent in this work.

This paper approaches the phenomenon of art from a contemporary perspective. It discusses art as spiritual modality of expression which testifies to man’s specific being-in-the-world. It also analyzes the idea of artwork in reference to its aesthetic, social, and historical determinations, while keeping in mind the problematization of the essence, content, and finality of art. In this context, the paper examines two significant aesthetic guidelines: aestheticism or the movement “l’art pour l’art,” founded on the cult of beauty as a supreme value, and the deaestheticization of art, a negativist contemporary movement that contests the aesthetic and artistic tradition. Finally, the paper holds that, contrary to Hegel’s prophecy on the “death” of art, the aesthetic experience shows that contemporary art continues to assert itself and to diversify itself with an impressive energy. Based on this background, the phenomenon of de-aestheticization is a challengewhich gives new impulses to the evolution of authentic art, spurring man’s ability to perceive affectively and to understand reality in new ways, adding to it, asNietzsche said, a metaphysical factor in order to transcend it.

The aim of our paper is to present the ways in which cognitive linguistics has contributed to various developments in the domain of comics studies. After providing introductory remarks, the paper describes the main views found within the works of authors considered to be the precursors of contemporary comics studies, Will Eisner and Scott McCloud, with the intention of providing the basics that will facilitate the reader’s understanding of the present issues. The main section of the paper contains the basic tenets of cognitive semantics, including the ideas traced in the works of the authors who have observed various types of comics from the cognitivist viewpoint. This section of the paper presents the research conducted thus far by a number of scientists who have engaged indrawing parallels between cognitivist theories and comics studies, including work on visual and multimodal metaphor and metonymy and the visual language of comics. This is followed by concluding remarks that end the paper.

The purpose of this article is to identify how modern Russia can build good relationships between multiple Russian religions and the state. At present there are many obstacles standing in the way of achieving this goal. The article includes a great many statistics, and discusses political, social, and religious views of the issue.The working Russian Constitution provides major legal provisions for democratic relationships between religions and the state. The law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” (1997) clarified constitutional provisions. It should not forgotten that Russia is a secular state claiming to respect all religions. No doubt the supremacy of Orthodoxy in Russia after 1721 and the extreme atheism that arose in the Soviet Union after 1917 influenced people’s minds greatly. While the countries in Western Europe were moving from religiosity to secularism, Russia was developing the other way around. But while respecting all religions, Russia should not forget to be mindful of extremism. Religious associations themselves are likewise uneasy about the danger presented by certain mystic, neo-pagan, and destructive sects. The author argues that the best compromise between religions and the modern Russian state canonly be achieved on the basis of equality and freedom.

This paper examines and defends von Wright's view of moral value, put forward in his book The Varieties of Goodness (1963). He holds that moral value is not a primary value like instrumental, technical, utilitarian, medical, or hedonic value, but a secondary or second-level one which is based on a combination of primary values. Human actions and intentions are the only bearers of moral value, and they are morally valuable because they protect and promote some set of primary values. It is argued that the same account (i) applies also to juridical value, and (ii) can be used to throw some light on the problem of defining the three competing schools of legal philosophy, viz. legal positivism, natural law theory, and legal constructivism.

This article aims at clarifying one critical function of the public sphere, namely the conditions which enable a public to distinguish the difference between trustworthy and manipulative public legitimization. It also seeks to answer the question of whether such conditions can be realized in pre-modern or alternatively modern social settings. The tendency in some recent historical and anthropological publications to regard all historical patterns of public legitimization as public spheres is criticized for ignoring the latter’s critical function. A broader understanding of this function is offered which can be applied also to “non-Western” cultural environments.

As a non-dualistic but holistic and harmonious way of thinking, Chinese Yin-Yang Thinking can make great contributions to the contemporary dialogue between science and religion, especially in its emphasis on interdependence, mutual complementarity, and mutual transformation. It can help us understand the complex and multifaceted relationship between science and religion, and provides a middle way to move beyond the impasse between scientism and religious fundamentalism. This paper explores the following three contributions that Yin-Yang Thinking can make to the contemporary dialogue between science and religion: 1. Yin-Yang Thinking can help deconstruct the dichotomy between science and religion by showing the interpenetration between them; 2. Yin-Yang Thinking can help promote synergy between science and religion by showing how they can complement and learn from each other; 3. Yin-Yang Thinking can help establish a partnership between science and religion in order to create an ecological civilization. The paper also explores the question of why such a valuable philosophical concept has been suppressed in China for almost a century.

Rationality and consciousness are strictly correlated. If one evolves, the other necessarily changes accordingly. Of all the possible modes of inquiry, this paper adopts a process genetic perspective informed by the historical speculations of Julian Jaynes. First, we co-define consciousness and rationality. Second, we take up again Jaynes’s insight: (proto-)consciousness has a history, or consciousness has a pre-history. Third, we underline that the sharpening of operational rationality has involved a palpable impoverishment of consciousness over the ages and nefarious consequences for our future.

While supporting the anti-foundational ontological turn in science and technology studies, the author criticizes the tendency towards the radical empiricizationof empirical ontology. The article discusses two crucial arguments against this tendency. On the cognitivist argument, empirical immediacy is inevitably shaped and mediated by non-empirical assumptions. According to the hermeneutic argument—which is of great greater importance—any empirically immediate state of affairs is the upshot of actualizing possibilities projected by interrelated practices upon horizons of practical existence. Thus, what is given as empirical immediacy is ineluctably “produced” within the potentiality for practical being. Following this argument, a non-empirical extension of empirical ontology is suggested. The starting-point of this extension is the integration of radical reflexivity into ethnographic descriptions of multiple realities. A further step consists in the introduction of double hermeneutics to studies of empirical ontology. Finally, the significance of ontological difference for these studies comes under scrutiny.

The author argues that for the last 2,500 years, the science concerning the universe (o kosmoV) has been based on two metaphysical intuitions—the atomic one for more than 2,400 years, and the string intuition in the second half of the twentieth century.

It is sometimes claimed that intuitions are an indispensable part of the evidential support provided for, or against, philosophical theses concerning a wide rangeof topics. This view is ingeniously argued for by George Bealer. His approach is based on a close connection between the modal nature of philosophy and theindispensability of intuitions as sources of modally-oriented evidence. This paper is aimed at a critical assessment of this approach. It is claimed that philosophy,though being modal at bottom, need not rely on (modal) intuitions as sources of evidence. In particular, it is shown (i) that at least some of Bealer’s crucial philosophical arguments do not rest on intuitions as evidence and (ii) that one may find modal philosophical claims of considerable importance that do not require modal intuitions for support. As a result, (modal) intuitions need not be considered indispensable for gaining philosophical knowledge, even when philosophy is understood along Bealer’s lines.

Developing the ideas presented in Jacquette (2011), the paper presents an indispensability argument aimed at justification of induction. First, Hume’s problem of induction is introduced via slightly different reconstructions. Second, several traditional attempts to solve Hume’s problem are presented. Finally, Jacquette’s(2011) proposal to justify induction by an indispensability argument is developed. I conclude with presenting a kind of indispensability argument for induction.