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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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Raoni Padui
From the Facticity of Dasein to the Facticity of Nature:
Naturalism, Animality, and the Ontological Difference
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Hans Pedersen
Heidegger’s Critique of a Causal Understanding of Human Action
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Jesús Adrián Escudero
Heidegger on Discourse and Idle Talk:
The Role of Aristotelian Rhetoric
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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Catherine Homan
Preserving Play in “The Origin of the Work of Art”
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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Adam Knowles
I, Who Am Still not Dead:
Heidegger, Death and Survivance in Derrida’s The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. 2
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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James Risser
Another Look at Heidegger’s Hermeneutics
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Christopher Ruth
Dwelling and the Ontological Difference
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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François Raffoul
Heidegger and Derrida:
The Ex-Appropriation of Responsibility
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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Julia A. Ireland
Heidegger and the “Inner Truth of National Socialism”:
A New Archival Discovery
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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Peter Trawny
Why Hegel? Heidegger and the Political
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Christophe Perrin
Heidegger’s Philosophy of Right?
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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Thomas Sheehan
Making Sense of Heidegger:
A Paradigm Shift
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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Krzysztof Ziarek
Event/Language
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Richard Capobianco
The Matter of Being in “Time and Being”
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David Nowell-Smith
Sounding/Silence
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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Sophie-Jan Arrien
Knowledge and Faith:
On Heidegger’s Reading of Saint Paul
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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Julie Kuhlken
Work as Vocation:
The Pauline Roots of Earthly Dwelling
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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48
Mathias Warnes
Heidegger on Hölderlin’s Festival:
The Wedding Dance as Inceptual Event
abstract |
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After accounting for the holiday festival as a philosophical theme across Heidegger’s early to later writings, this paper summarizes the 1943 “Andenken” essay on Hölderlin’s “wedding festival” and 1959 “Hölderlin’s Earth and Heaven” essay on the “round dance.” It then explores how these motifs of the wedding and its round dance are in play in the 1936/7 Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event manuscript, especially in its philosophy of attunement, and notion of the “celebration of the last god.”
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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Bradley Warfield
Play as Polemos:
Gadamer and Heidegger on the Truth-Disclosing Event
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Much has been written about Heidegger's various influences on Gadamer's thinking, especially as the latter culminates in Truth and Method. Scholars often point to the way Heidegger's notions of “thrownness” and “historicity” in Being and Time (BT) influence Gadamer's insistence on the centrality of tradition for hermeneutical understanding, and his notions of the “fusion of horizons” (horizontverschmelzung) and the “hermeneutic circle.”1 But scholars have appeared to overlook, or at least underestimate, the influence some of Heidegger's other notions have exerted on Gadamer's thought. In this paper I want to address crucial aspects of this neglect; I shall explore the relation between Heidegger's notion, as he explains it in Introduction to Metaphysics (IM), of truth as unconcealment (aletheia), and compare it to Gadamer's notion, as he describes it in Truth and Method, of truth as emergent, in play (Spiel), from the event (Ereignis) of conversation and of the work of art.
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Heidegger Circle Proceedings:
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Nate Zuckerman
Heidegger on Dasein’s Ways of Being
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Heidegger claims we are defined, not by what we are, but by the way we are what we are. But his concept of our ‘way’ of being is ambiguous and has given rise to four distinct readings of what he means. I draw upon recent work on kinds of genus-species relationships in order to disambiguate this concept and explain the unity and dependence-relations among the four extant readings of it. I argue that Heidegger’s main concern in the published portion of Being and Time is to explain what it takes for Dasein to be the entity that can understand its own way of being, not in this or that specific way, but rather, in general—that is, at all, as opposed to not at all.
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