This essay examines how being-historical thinking is enacted through specific motifs, which prompts an Auseinandersetzung with the modem age of machination. The earth is one such motif that arises in Contributions to Philosophy, calling for a nuanced language to enact being-historical thinking, on the one hand, and, on the other, marking a sharp divergence from the objectifying discourse of modern science and technicity. It is shown that Heidegger’s appeal to the earth not only yields a deeper meaning of what it means to dwell in harmony with nature, but also that the proprietorship of dwelling provides a hint to reestablish the place of the political outside the rule of technicity.

Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and science is expressed in his claim that they are not hostile towards each other, i.e., that philosophy is neither for nor against science, though they differ in ambition, strength, and methodology. Their interaction, as this essay suggests, may contribute to the range and diversification of philosophical thinking and to a deeper grasp of the strength and boundary (potential and limitation) of scientific inquiry and knowing. Heidegger’s rethinking of science, especially in his twenty-four “propositions about science”, includes a critical assessment of the status of science in the epoch of modernity; it discerns (discovers, discloses) the truth of science in its relation to the measure of truth in beings, and to the truth of be-ing. The entire inquiry at hand is grounded in be-ing-historical thinking and mindfulness.

This essay tries to retrace Heidegger’s interpretation of the Aristotelian concepts of συμβεβηκὸζ, τύχη and abróparov and their role within daseinanalytic ontology. We will try to show how Heidegger manages to unify the three terms (which in Aristotelian philosophy remain distinct although related) into a single ontological concept, capable of exercising a negative function with respect to the conception of being as Anwesenheit. However, one will come to notice the lack of an effective Heideggerian thematization of the concept of τύχη, whose ontological importance for the Dasein will instead be prepared and enhanced by his student Helene Weiss.

There must be a forward trajectory to history, and not merely a connection to the chronology to past events, if history is to provide the stage for the disclosure of being. Conversely, if history does not merely reflect shifts in the course of human events, then the freedom to decide must originate from the reciprocity between being and Da-sein. In this essay, I outline the narrow passageway by which Heidegger shows how decision can unlock the transformative power of history, and, reciprocally, how history grounds decision as a compliance or measured response to the claim (Anspruch) of being. I will center my inquiry on sections 45–48 of Contributions to Philosophy (Enowning), not only to provide a sharper focus, but also to bring into play the enactment of being-historical thinking as the key to coalescing the key motifs of history, decision, and freedom.