In his recent paper, “Understanding David Hume’s Argument against Miracles,” Gregory Bock takes the increasingly popular position that Hume’s intent in “Of Miracles” was not to argue that testimony is in principle incapable of grounding a rational belief in miracles, but rather that it is in principle incapable of grounding a rational belief in miracles that could act as the foundation for a religion. I argue that this interpretation of the text does not withstand critical scrutiny.

In a recent article Steven Cowan defended the claim that female subordination and male authority are merely functional differences. Drawing upon insights from Natural Law, I argue that complementarianism typically speaks of these functions as proper functions of male and female designs, thus making men and women metaphysically unequal in being. Furthermore, I maintain that the function serving as a means to an end is less valuable than the function having authority to direct the end. Hence, Cowan fails to defeat the objection that the claim that women are equal to men in being, but subordinate in role, is incoherent.

Adam Omelianchuk argues that my defense of the distinction between woman’s equality in being and subordinate role fails. I respond that his case misses the point of certain aspects of my argument, that it begs the main question, and that it depends upon an unclear notion of metaphysical equality/inferiority.

David Reiter has recently argued that presuppositionalist apologists who champion the transcendental argument for God’s existence (TAG) face a dilemma: depending on what conclusion the argument is supposed to establish, either TAG is inadequate to deliver that conclusion or else TAG is superfluous (thus bringing into question claims about its importance and distinctiveness as a theistic argument). By way of reply, I contend that several plausible lines of response are available to the proponent of TAG in the face of this purported dilemma. I hope thereby to advance scholarly discussion of TAG by clarifying its structure, content, and goal.

My original dilemma claimed that the transcendental argument for God’s existence is either superfluous (if the goal is to establish the actual existence of God) or inadequate (if the goal is to establish the necessary existence of God). In this rejoinder to James Anderson, I begin by noting some important points of agreement. I then clarify the differences between pattern-I, pattern-II, and pattern-III theistic arguments. I comment on each of Anderson’s three proposed lines of response and defend my original dilemma, on the assumption that TAG is formulated as a pattern-II argument.

The late I. J. (“Jack”) Good, a British mathematician, played a significant role at Bletchley Park in breaking the German Enigma code and therefore contributed mightily to the allied victory in World War II. Though not a Christian believer, Good’s approach to epistemological issues and his understanding of probability offer valuable insights to those engaged in a serious Christian apologetic. Moreover, Good’s relationship with Marcello Truzzi, critic of naïve thinking in parapsychology and the occult and who directly influenced skeptic Carl Sagan, makes Good of more than passing philosophical interest.

The constant threats to scientific progress are complacency and the diminished capacity for self-criticism. There have been great advances in our understanding of the functional anatomy of the nervous system, advances that stand in vivid contrast to our understanding of the moral, aesthetic and political dimensions of human life. The contrast is so great as to encourage the belief that these dimensions are found beyond the ambit of scientific explanation. How pathetic, then, to witness strident and smug attacks on those who have reached this plausible and profound conclusion.

It seems reasonable to seek a definition of naturalism, yet an accurate general definition proves to be elusive. After considering proposals from Quine, Nagel, and Chalmers, I propose that naturalism as understood by the majority of contemporary naturalists is best defined by the conjunction of mind-body supervenience, an understanding of the physical as mechanistic (nonteleological), and the causal closure of the physical domain. I then argue that naturalism so defined is in principle unable to account for the existence of rationality; it follows that naturalism must be rejected.

This article attempts to clarify an “argument from reason” set forth by C. S. Lewis in his Miracles. While there are various contemporary interpretations of the argument, Lewis intended to expose the “cardinal difficulty of naturalism.” First, this article seeks to clarify both Lewis’s argument and the understanding of naturalism that it presupposes. Second, philosophers of religion—especially, William Hasker and Alvin Plantinga—have significantly contributed to the argument’s contemporary discussion, and so their views are addressed with the intent to show how they differ from Lewis’s contribution. C. S. Lewis’s argument from reason was and is remains to this day philosophically timely and deserving of serious consideration.

It is argued that the dispute between philosophical naturalism and theism can, ultimately, only be rationally resolved in favor of theism, owing to certain internal inadequacies of philosophical naturalism that are commonly overlooked by both its friends and its foes. The criticisms of philosophical naturalism focus on certain questions concerning the ontological status of the objects of human reason and probe into the nature of human rationality and the conditions of its possibility. There is an implicit challenge to mainstream philosophical opinion concerning the relationship between human thought and reasoning and the sorts of facts about human brains that can be revealed by empirical neuroscience.

From a moral-philosophical standpoint, the convergence and strengthening of two interlocking ideological developments since the mapping of the human genome in 2001 would seem significant and thus call for vigilance. One of these stems from advances in biogenetic technology and brain research; the other posits evolutionary biology as the comprehensive explanation and origin of the human moral impulse as well as the universe. Both conceptual frameworks are rooted in the assumptions of metaphysical materialism. Whether human morality can be plausibly ascribed to biology—regardless of its support from neuroscience, genomic technology or evolutionary psychology—and whether physical science per se is adequate to make metaphysical pronouncements will require a reasoned response in the second decade of the twenty-first century. At stake is no less than “civil society” itself and whether human beings in fact can be held responsible for their actions.