The present study asks the question whether Karl Rahner’s treatment of biological evolution holds merit for the dialogue between Catholic theology on the one hand and evolutionary biology on the other. Central to this evaluation will be an emphasis on two core tenets of modern evolutionary biology, namely emergence and the continuity of the evolutionary process. While the former bears relevance for our understanding of how life and anthropologically important phenomena such as “mind” and “consciousness” came to be, the latter plays a crucial role in how we view our existence within the earth’s fluid and changing biosphere. It comes to the conclusion that Rahner’s concept of active self-transcendence recovers the notion of biological evolution as an on-going process where indeed something new emerges, and therefore offers an extremely helpful tool in the interdisciplinary conversation. However, this essay challenges Rahner’s understanding of the directedness of the evolutionary process toward the human being as well as his view that in us nature comes to self-consciousness for the first time and suggests alternatives.

This paper highlights certain features of the metamorphosis that the concept “the end of the world” has undergone from its origin in early Christian thought to the present day. This concept has, in recent decades, become increasingly prominent within Western European Lutheran and Roman Catholic theology. This paperdemonstrates that the notion of the end of the world popularized by Jürgen Moltmann and Karl Rahner, despite the traditional, biblical language in which it is couched, has more affinity with the philosophical concept “the end of history” developed by Hegel than it has with the ideas common in early Christianity.

The criterion of 1 John for preferring John’s community over the secessionists is that the former love one another: John’s heart does not accuse him. Expressions in 1 John and Brown’s commentary suggest that knowledge by affective connaturality and recent neuroscience furnish exegetical access to this text. John’s appeal to the accusing heart is to social praxis as access to doxa. John’s community can know they love and are God’s children only intersubjectively, in the social. John’s heart should accuse him. Were his heart changed, love for the secessionists would not be burdensome. John’s community became a sect because their love never became love for their enemies.

“Faith” is a central theme in Karl Rahner’s theology. While Rahner dealt at length with what classical theology names fides qua and fides quae, discussion of the context in which people came to faith was also crucial to his exposition of the Christian life. This paper has three aims: to examine Rahner’s understanding of the relationship between context and the possibility of faith; to outline and evaluate Rahner’s assessment of the ways in which people might appropriate and articulate Christian faith in the modern world; and to explore whether Rahner’s approach to faith still offers a resource that the contemporary church might receive in a context that raises questions beyond those that confronted Rahner.

The ‘middle knowledge’ doctrine salvages free will and divine omniscience by contending that God knows what agents will freely choose under any possible circumstances. I argue, however, that the Leibnizian problem of divine knowledge of human evil is best resolved by applying a Theodicy II distinction between determined, foreseen, and resolved action. This move eliminates deference to middle knowledge. Contingent action is indeed free, but not all action is contingent, and so not all action is free. For Leibniz, then, God’s knowledge extends to the sum pattern of determinates for an act, rather than to contingent events.

This paper attempts to read Bonhoeffer’s work as a whole. I maintain that Bonhoeffer’s attempt to develop a distinctly Christian version of the Hegelian concept of objective spirit is the central concern of his Sanctorum Communio. I note the ways he continues to refine and clarify that concept in later works, even as it remainsunnamed. I then argue that by the time of the Letters and Papers from Prison, developing this concept has become Bonhoeffer’s overriding project. I conclude by suggesting ways that the earlier works already provide resources for answering the probing questions of the Letters and Papers.

This essay responds to Richard Lennan, “Faith in Context: Rahner on the Possibility of Belief ” (Philosophy & Theology 17 [2005]: 233–58). It suggests that some of the ills of religious belief in the United States were not those for which Rahner had prescriptions. The essay utilizes the fiction of Graham Greene, born in the same year as Rahner, and who had read much of Rahner’s work, to mobilize a critique of Lennan’s (and Rahner’s) views.

Descartes’s Cogito, “I am thinking, therefore I exist,” is perhaps the most famous assertion in the history of philosophy. Thirteen hundred years earlier, St. Augustine formulated a similar claim, arguing “if I am mistaken, I am.” Did St. Augustine anticipate Descartes? We show that Descartes’s dictum is a novel insight and less vulnerable to criticism than the claim of St. Augustine. Whereas Descartes searched for one true proposition on which he could base scientificknowledge, St. Augustine sought to refute the skeptics who had denied the possibility of knowledge. By a twist of irony, the skeptics and St. Augustine reached contradictory (ethical) conclusions based, however, on similar reasoning.

A whirl surrounds Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed 1.2. He seems to argue, there, that good and evil are merely concerns of the imagination. In the prophetology, Guide 2.32–48, Maimonides never refers to practical intellect or prudence. Recent interpreters have inferred that the imagination takes the place of practical intellect in Maimonides’ practical teaching. This paper seeks to show that, in keeping with earlier works such as Eight Chapters, Maimonides continues to rely on practical intellect throughout the Guide as an integral part of his teaching on true prophecy and the best regime ruled by divine law.

The text is a translation of a radio address given by Karl Rahner, S.J., in 1981. In the talk Rahner claims that critical reasoning will, on its own principles, lead the mind to an encounter with Absolute Mystery. Faith is that which allows the mind to accept this mystery in love. The original German text is from the Karl Rahner Archives, which gave permission for this translation and publication.

Divine revelation as a subject matter cannot be properly considered in the framework of theology, as theology already presupposes revelation. In order to conceive revelation in a non-theological way, we need a philosophical approach. Thus we can recognize the need for a renewed understanding of revelation as God’s self-revelation. In this paper I argue for the understanding of God’s self-revelation as radical revelation, which is opposed to partial understandings ofrevelation, such as the propositional one. A given notion of divine revelation goes together with a given notion of human persons; and as soon as it becomes clear that divine revelation is properly understood as radical revelation, the need of a radical understanding of human persons can be recognized too. Human persons can be determined in terms of their ad se or ad aliud dimensions, but it is the former that leads to a proper understanding of human persons as being basically related to the radically self-revealing God.

Simone Weil wrote in her notebooks that “Friendship, like beauty, is a miracle.” This paper investigates her discussions of friendship in the larger context of her understanding of the mediation of opposites, modeled on the Pythagorean and Platonic models of mathematics. For Weil, friendship was not only miraculous, butalso a key to understanding the relationship of the divine to the human. Convinced that friendship and love create equality between parties where none exists naturally, Weil concluded that friendship “is full of marvelous meanings with regard to God, with regard to the communion of God and man, and with regard to men.”

In this paper I examine Thomas Aquinas’s attempt at theodicy (the reconciliation of evil in the world with the existence of an all-powerful, -knowing, and -loving God). Aquinas’s theodicy, utilizing the book of Job, maintains that God uses suffering and fear as a method to encourage us to form a loving relationship with Him. I argue that Aquinas’s theodicy fails because an all-loving God would not utilize suffering and fear as a method by which to encourage us to form a loving relationship with Him. As I argue through example, loving relationships between persons are not underwritten on the foundations of suffering and fear, and as such we have no good reason to think that God would use such methods to form His loving relationships.

This article is a commentary on Denis Edwards’s “Resurrection of the Body and Transformation of the Universe in the Theology of Karl Rahner” and was presented with the original at the 2005 meeting of the Karl Rahner Society.

Building on recent research exposing Hegel’s debt to esoteric Christianity (both Gnostic and Hermetic traditions), the aim of this paper is to show how Hegel and Schelling resolve an ambiguity in Boehme’s theology of evil in opposing ways. Jacob Boehme’s notion of the individuation of God through the overcoming ofopposition is the central paradigm for both Hegel’s and Schelling’s understanding of the role of evil in the life of God. Boehme remains ambiguous on the question of the modality of evil: Is it necessary to God’s self-unfolding, or is it rather an anarchic act that God permits in the interest of preserving the autonomy of finite freedom? If the former, Boehme becomes much more closely aligned to Gnosticism by identifying finitude with evil. This identification is shown to be exactly Hegel’s solution to the ambiguity, one Hegel opts for in the interest of maintaining the absolute rationality of the system. Hermeticism opposes Gnosticism on this point: for the Hermeticist, finitude / material being / nature is not evil but ‘of God,’ the means of his individuation. This conflict in interpretations of Boehmeilluminates an often overlooked but essential difference between Gnosticism and Hermeticism. Schelling remains faithful to the Hermetic tradition by sacrificing system for the sake of preserving the contingency of evil, and disidentifying finitude and evil.

The fundamental task of Filosofía de la realidad histórica (Philosophy of Historical Reality) is to put forth historical reality as the ultimate manifestation of reality, as the proper object of philosophy. Ellacuría develops the concept of historical reality as the synthesis of the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic and Xavier Zubiri’s radicalization of Scholastic realism. Historical reality is physical, not conceptual; material, not ideal; concrete, not abstract. Historical reality encompassesthe material, biological, individual, and social moments of reality. And when it is considered in its totality, as a dynamic and differentiated structure of its moments, functions, and relations, historical reality forms a transcendental system—intramundane metaphysics.