I first examine Origen’s notion of nature as personal, and secondly a modern presentation of the same theme by Erazim Kohak. I then consider possible scientific support given to both these authors’ accounts by Lovejoy. I conclude that there are many strengths in viewing nature as a whole as both divine and personal.

This paper examines the notion of cultural universals and then seeks to identify what the author wishes to idenlify as “cultural fundamentals” in philosophy and philosophical debate. The paper then asses the extent to which such fundamentals are obstacles to the “birth” of potential philosophers. Lastly I suggest a solution to this problem.

This paper investigates the meaning of needs claims to determine conditions under which they can be falsified. Interpreting needs as necessary requirements, I consider two distinct versions of the statement “A needs X.” One is hypothetical: “If A is to do or obtain Y, then A needs X.” The other is categorical - “A needs X at hand” - and is derived from the hypothetical statement when A is in some manner to do Y. I argue that, despite some cases in which needs claims cannot be falsified, formal criteria can be adduced to falsify or, at least, challenge both versions of needs claims.

The world-wide struggle for justice and peace between the developed and the undeveloped nations is also a struggle between different conceptions of humanity. This article outlines and defends two African concepts that could provide a deeper, more humane, conception of humanity than those currently dominant in American, European or Russian thinking. The notion of umuntu ngumuntu ngbantu stresses the peculiarly intersubjective character of personal life, while the notion of seriti presents us with an idea of power or energy that overcomes the dualism of mind and matter without being materialistic. The article finally indicates the relevance of such a conception of humanity for the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

I argue that, despite their extensive disagreements at the level of first-order ethics, there are equally extensive agreements between Sartre and Kant at the metaethical level. Following a brief exposition of the principal metaethical similarities, I offer a defense of Sartre’s general moral theory against the more rigid first-order consequences which Kant claims to be able to assert.

In the 17th Discussion of his Tahafut al-Falasifah (“Incoherence of the Philosophers”), Ghazali presents two theories of causation which, he claims, accommodate belief in the possibility of miracles. The first of these, which is usually taken to represent Ghazali’s own position, is a form of occasionalism. In this paper I argue that Ghazali fails to prove that this theory is compatible with belief in the possibility of miracles.

Spinoza’s ideas on the eternity of the human mind have sparked much controversy. As opposed to most commentators, I argue that since substance is eternal, and the human mind can only be conceived in substance, the human mind must also be eternal. Only from a finite and partial view can the human mind be conceived of as having duration.

One argument that there cannot exist a being who creates all laws of nature was first outlined by J. L. Mackie, and further developed by Gilbert Fulmer. Fulmer’s version of the argument is examined, together with a recent neoCartesian counter-argument. The Menzel-Morris thesis holds that God’s power extends to creating his own nature. I argue that Fulmer’s argument is false, but that it can sustain counter-arguments of the type formulated by Menzel-Morris.

Bernard Lonergan contrasts his account of judgment with that of the relativist. This paper points out how Lonergan’s characterization of the relativist account of judgment closely resembles the account of judgment that F. H. Bradley had given. Furthermore, the paper points to areas of commonality between Lonergan and Bradley with regard to human knowing. Despite their similarities, however, Lonergan’s account of judgment clearly distinguishes his theory of knowing from anything Iike Bradley’s idealism.

In this paper I explore Jacques Ellul’s sociology of religion in terms of Weber’s disenchantment thesis. In contrast to Mircea Eliade’s depiction of modern persons as nonreligious, owing to scientific and technological development, Ellul argues that traditional religions have merely been replaced by new ones. This has occurred, according to Ellul, because the desacralization of one realm of experience results in the resacralization of another realm of experience.

For perspicuous comparison and evaluation of moral positions on life-and-death issues, it is necessary to take into account the different meanings that killing and getting killed can bear in the two dimensions of dealing with persons (intention meeting intention) and handling them. A homicidal scenario in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight shows the possibility of courteous dealing coinciding with lethal handling. The extreme possibility of lovingly affirming persons while killing them, suggested by the Augustinian “kindly severity” ideal for state-sponsored punitive killing, requires the killers’ affirmation of a fleshliness and fallibility shared with their victims; but love can accept killing only provisionally, since it postulates freedom from the constraints that are felt to require killing.

Despite the efforts of such notable thinkers as Sartre, Camus, and Ricoeur to affirm philosophically the being of evil, a systematic critique of the traditional metaphysical understanding of evil as privation of being has not yet been fully worked out. The task of this paper is to sketch out just such a critique and to suggest a more adequate philosophical reflection on the being of evil by turning to the thought of Heidegger. Part 1 examines Heidegger’s commentary on Aristotle’s remarks on steresis. Aristotle is our teacher, Heidegger argues, in learning “to hold on to the wonder” of the steresis-dimension of Being (physis), and, thus, to hold on to the wonder that “lack,” “loss,” “absence” - is. Part II considers Heidegger’s recognition that the k-not at the very heart of our existence is yet much more complex. He turns to the fragments of Parmenides and Heraclitus to bring to light a dissembling-dimension of Being.

I argue that the late twentieth century relies more upon the symbolic than upon the causal power of events acknowledged as sacraments. Since this is the case with the Eucharist no less than with other sacraments, the symbolic meaning of the Eucharist must be refocused. This may be accomplished through the concept of the numinous dimension of the Lord’s Supper.

There are good historical reasons for emphasis on separation of church and state in a democracy, but the separation can be carried too far. Concerning the relationship of church and state, various Chrístian denominations divide up into separatists and unificationists, and each tendency can lead into extremes which could under certain conditions be inimical to democracy. Going beyond questions of constitutional separation, one may argue for a mutual utility and complementarity of church and democratic polity. Whether a strictly necessary relationship is entailed is a more complex problem.

I first outline the arguments by which Hegel upholds the validity of his ‘rationalistic’ ideal of an ‘absolute knowing’, and then attempt to state precisely the sense in which such a Hegelian conception can be rightfully styled ‘idealistic’, and the reasons why it turns out to be preferable to the opposite empirical-realistic outlook. Thirdly, I examine his critique of ‘finite knowing’. Finally, I enumerate the fundamental features of that ‘speculative (i.e., strictly philosophical) knowing’ which, as the Absolute Idea, Hegel sets against ‘finite knowing’ as the higher category in which the peculiar deficiencies and contradictions of the latter are integrated and reconciled.

The Protestant Church in East Germany played a decisive role in the peaceful overthrow of communism in the German Democratic Republic. As a shelter for action groups, as a champion of reformers, and as a voice for nonviolence, the church gave the people some where to meet, pray, talk, and eventually to unite in such numbers as to be a force of faith and justice which could no be resised.

Perhaps the most common criticism of Kant’s ethical theory is that of formalism. In this paper, I propose to deal with that charge as it is applied to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Specifically, this essay clarifies the nature of the charge of formalism, as well as the issue of whether Kant develops an ethical theory in the Groundwork, and whether formalism is a valid criticism of the Groundwork.