The author presents a brief appreciation of the merits of the Radical Orthodoxy movement. That appreciation centers on four themes: (1) theology as sacra doctrina, (2) countering secular reason in its latest avatar of “post-modernism,” (3) Radical Orthodoxy’s offering a theology of culture, and (4) the Thomism of Radical Orthodoxy. The author concludes with some remarks concerning the reception of Radical Orthodoxy in the United States.

In what was originally a lecture, the well-known German fundamental theologian Heinrich Fries looks at similarities between the general theological characteristics of Karl Rahner (a friend of Fries) and John Henry Newman (the object of Fries’s early books and lasting research). He offers first some contrasts but then notes similarities: theology as an investigation rather than a system, being a theologian concerned with the most basic aspects of faith, faith as a dynamic of subectivity rather than as a collection of beliefs, a primacy of praxis over theory, theological efforts done at the time of an Ecumenical Council. To conclude there are questions addressed to Fries and Rahner (who was present at the original lecture).

The author argues taht the most important source of Schelling’s ‘later thought’ is undoubtably the Bible. Schelling not only referred to it more than to any other work, he also systematically endeavored to harmonize his philosophical and theological ideas with the content of the Holy Scriptures. This was by no means evident in the post-Enlightenment context, which was characterized by its vehement critique of the Bible. The author thus investigates whether Schelling’s scripturally based forays into exegesis, dogmatic theology, and philosophy are convincing. Two Bible passages to which Schelling himself attached great weight are discussed: the prologue of St John’s gospel and the Christological hymn in St Paul’s Epistle to the Philippians. The conclusion is that Schelling’s philosophy of revelation is worth studying as an original contribution to contemporary systematic theological reflection, even if not all problems concerning the relation between biblical heritage, its possible interpretations and contemporary theological concerns are resolved.

In the context of acknowledging the contrast between Marian devotional life and eucharistic theology, this response to Díaz’s book makes several connections between the two, including a glimpse into Rahner’s own devotional piety. While affirming and approving the overall content of this study by Díaz, the respondent uses a more recent article by Rahner to suggest four topics that might have enhanced the book: 1) how Marian devotion is founded on the doctrine of the communion of the saints; 2) how Mary’s unimportance and marginalized position enhanced her unique acceptance of grace for the sake of all humanity; 3) how Rahner’s emphasis on women’s equality can figure in the present theological conversation about the relevance of Jesus’ maleness; and 4) how there is room inthe church for a variety of individual and cultural approaches to the theology of grace and to the devotional life of the faithful.

Radical Orthodoxy offers insight into the relationship between Christianity and culture. But it errs in its one-sided reading of modernity, its attempt to reduce philosophy to theology, and its prescription of a pre-modern metaphysics as the only authentic theological foundation. These suggest a fear of contingency and a desire for the immediate grasp of the divine which might circumvent history’s messiness. The result is a construal of reality that is in general inimical to an authentic Catholic reading of reality. Catholic theology must be more faithful to the incarnational and eschatological structure of revelation—and thus to contingency—than either it or Radical Orthodoxy has been in the past. Aquinas’ defense of philosophy and Metz’s principle of “dangerous memory” offer ways to overcome this fear and to enjoy created contingency, secure in hope for the eschatological transformation which God in Christ has promised to all persons and all epochs.

This essay represents a critical reading, appreciation and assessment of responses written by Susan Abraham, Conrad T. Gromada, and Michael Barnes to my book On Being Human: U.S Hispanic and Rahnerian Perspectives (Orbis Books, 2001). The essay addresses the following three themes: 1) Rahner’s Ignatian heritage and its relation to the U.S. Hispanic appropriation of the preferential option for the poor and marginalized, 2) Rahner’s understanding of one mediator and many human mediations, and 3) Rahner’s transcendental theological approach in relation to the experience of contemporary manifestations of atheism in the U.S. These themes highlight aspects of my book that Abraham, Gromada, and Barnes found fertile ground for engaging in theological conversation. First, with respect to Rahner’s Ignatian spirituality, I argue that the Ignatian understanding of indiferencia can be correlated with the preferential option for the poor and marginalized. Second, with respect to Rahner’s understanding of one mediator and many mediations, I explore other ways in which my book could contextualize Rahner’s approach. Finally, I underscore the historical moment in Rahner’s transcendental theological approach (the mystery of God encountered in, with, and under historical realities) and point to a contemporary implication of this understanding (e.g., practical atheism).

The aim of this paper is to show that for Aristotle god is, and is not, virtuous. I consider first the arguments of the EN to show that the gods do not have virtue---beginning with an account of the divisions of the faculties of soul, and of the virtues that belong to those divisions. These arguments suggest that nous is a divine virtue, and so in the second section I consider nous, as a faculty of soul and as a virtue, and examine the differences between nous as a human virtue, and nous as a virtue which is also a substance, and with which the first divine principle is identified. In the third and final section I ask what kind of difference Aristotle takes the difference between human and divine nous to be---and in particular whether this is a difference in kind or in degree.

The thesis of this paper encapsulates the deep suspicion postcolonial theory has of privileged identity claims while ignoring the manner in which identity is negotiated in a postcolonial context. The limits of identity claims with regard to theology and ethics is analyzed through Rahner’s presentation of “Indifferent Freedom” and its impact on gendered subalterns. A feminist postcolonial theological anthropology rejects the dehumanizing consequences of Rahner’s move to condone violence in the face of force in the world. What is needed rather, is a non-violent and embodied response in the face of violence, initiated by the gendered subaltern, which simultaneously captures Rahner’s original intention of linking spirituality to ethics. Gayatri C. Spivak’s notion of the caress to interrupt the dehumanized discourses of exploitation and unequal power is forwarded as the way to being human in the postcolonial context, in order to make Rahner’s theology and spirituality more concrete for postcolonial societies.

This paper shows that Thomas Aquinas has a compatibilist position on the freedom of the will, where compatibilism is understood as the doctrine that determinism does not preclude freedom. Thomas’s position concerning free will is compatibilist regarding both the divine and human wills. Thomas pioneers the idea that human freedom is an image of divine freedom. It is on account of the notion that god is the exemplar toward which human beings proceed that it is much easier to understand why, if the freedom of god’s will is compatible with the determinism of omnibenevolence, it is acceptable that the freedom of the human will is compatible with the determinism that ensues from what Thomas calls the “natural necessity” of the human will. The evidence for his compatibilist stance on divine freedom emerges from Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) I.74–91, whereas the strongest evidence for Thomas’s compatibilist position about human freedom derives from the Summa Theologiae (ST) and Quaestiones Disputatae De Malo (QDM) 6. This paper establishes a compatibilist reading of Thomas’s account of the freedom of the divine will and shows that Thomas’s theory of human freedom is modeled upon his treatment of divine freedom. Finally, I argue that the position maintained in QDM 6 does not abandon the theory presented in ST but instead is a clarification of it. Thus, Thomas presents a theory of freedom that is uniformly compatibilist.

Miguel Díaz has succeeded quite well not only in providing support for popular Hispanic religion through an analysis of ideas from Karl Rahner, but skillfully meets several possible objections or alternatives. Nonetheless, the more sophisticated forms of Hispanic theology must also be sustained, if only to address adequately the transcendental atheism that the current and subsequent generation of Latino/a college students will encounter.

Alvin Plantinga, in Warranted Christian Belief, offers a model for the rationality of a particular version of Christian theistic belief. After briefly summarizing Plantinga’s model, I argue that there are significant moral difficulties present within it. The Christian believer who gives assent to Plantinga’s model is vulnerable tocharges of irrationality and/or immorality when one considers the role and effects of original sin in the model. Similar difficulties arise when one considers a problem posed by religious pluralism for the model. I consider some possible responses to these difficulties, and conclude that these issues merit more attention than they are given in Warranted Christian Belief.

Although the primary meaning of Max Weber’s concept of disenchantment is as a sociological condition (the retreat of magic and myth from social life through processes of secularization and rationalization), as Weber himself makes clear in his address, “Science as a Vocation,” disenchantment can also be a philosophical act: an unusual form of moral discourse that derives new ethical direction out of the very untenability of a previously robust moral tradition. The philosophical variant of disenchantment is significant both because it contradicts numerous elements of the sociological version and because it suggests there are forms of cognition unique to moral philosophy (insofar as the derivation of a moral teaching from the very absence of one is foreign to both a religious and ascientific mindset).

The aim of this study is to show that, because the single individual, to whom Kierkegaard dedicates his entire authorship, is no less secular than religious, the secular does not exist outside of the religious and the religious does not exist outside of the secular. To this end four concepts central to Kierkegaard are examined: (1) authority; (2) the either/or decision or choice and its relationship to the concepts of stages and history; (3) indirect communication and the claim that truth is subjectivity; and (4) metaphor as the language of spirit, both divine and human.

This response to Richard Lennan’s presentation of Rahner’s call for a new understanding of faith raises questions about 1) the rationale behind Rahner’s “short formulas,” 2) how feminist challenges are understood, and 3) the place of “the ecclesial” in a secular milieu.

Through reading Kierkegaard and Derrida together I argue that deconstruction has its historical origin in, and goes no further than, biblical principles. I begin with an analysis of the complexities in Kierkegaard’s exposition of the biblical command to love the neighbor: in showing the command to express the deconstructionof originary presence, Kierkegaard appears to invoke as central to it the apparent binary opposition between divine and human being. I next turn to the Derridean deconstruction of binary opposites and particularly to Derrida’s insistence that deconstruction is justice and that it never proceeds without love. In then engaging Kierkegaard’s critical distinction between ancient Greek and biblical thought, as well as Derrida’s response to issues posed by such a distinction, I show that the deconstruction of Kierkegaard can proceed only on the basis of principles whose origin is biblical and, therefore, that ideas central to Derridean deconstruction, including différance and the supplement, presuppose and express the biblical concept of neighbor.

Matthew’s account of the journey of the magi to Jesus has been employed in historical theology to articulate the relation between reason and faith in four different ways: i) reason and faith forming a unity; ii) reason cooperating with faith; iii) reason being the tool of faith; iv) reason being superseded by faith. The paper considers each of these categories in turn, and thus progressively separates the two terms. It demonstrates that “faith” and “reason” are equivocal concepts, and that their relationship is itself a key determinant of their nature. A plurality of forms of reasoning enables the journey to be completed, with each form providing a distinct contribution to a shared faith.