Ageing has become a central topic of medical ethical debates, e.g. regarding autonomy and care in geriatric practice, the just distribution of healthcare or the implications of anti-ageing medicine. In all these debates, however, particular conceptions of ageing are tacitly presupposed. The aim of my research is to develop an explicit understanding of the relevance of ageing for ethical reasoning, providing a conceptual framework for discussing concrete medical ethical problems in a more comprehensive and reflected manner. I proceed from the life course approach, assuming that our life is shaped by a time regime defined and implemented by social institutions and structures, reflected in cultural images, and internalized as an “inner clock” directing individual decisions. From the ethical viewpoint, two concepts appear particularly significant: In a deontological perspective, the idea of “age norms”, social standards of age-appropriate behavior, becomes relevant. In a teleological perspective focusing on individual flourishing and good life, the concept of life plans, comprising age-related self-images and expectations, is important. I will briefly sketch the current medical ethical debates around ageing, then delineate the life course perspective and its implications for ethical reasoning, and finally exemplify its theoretical potential regarding medical ethical controversies about long time care, resource allocation and life extension.

This article rejects the traditional division of “active/passive euthanasia”. Such concept usage carries the potential for adding significant confusion and unnecessary complexity to the already extraordinarily complex issues surrounding euthanasia, assisted suicide and various related end-of-life acts such as withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatments. Whatever their normative view of euthanasia, discussants are well advised to use one particular and uniform understanding of euthanasia; namely, what it is taken to mean in the Netherlands. In this conception, there is no such thing as “passive euthanasia”.

“Cultivating yang in spring and summer, while protecting Yin in autumn and winter” is one of the most important principles of health preservation, which was put forward in the Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine. However, ancient scholar-physicians held different views on the principle at their own levels of understanding, as well as with its application, mainly represented by the restriction doctrine, the growth and storage doctrine, and the root doctrine. The three doctrines were related with the opposition of yin and yang, waxing and waning of yin and yang, and mutual rooting of yin and yang, respectively. In light of the evolution of the yin-yang theory during Qin and Han dynasties and its influence on the theory of Chinese Medicine, this principle was developed on the basis of conforming to the cycle of four seasons and understanding of yin-yang circulation theory. The ideas in the doctrine of growth and storage were consistent with the principle, whereas the two other doctrines were developed by the influence of the theories on opposition and balance of yin and yang.

The nature of health is one of the central topics in the philosophy of medicine. The concept of health is complex because it comprises multiple features and there is no consensus on which feature is most basic or even whether some particular feature has any importance at all. This paper focuses on how several basic elements play a role in the formation of the concept of health. My central claim is that the theory of emergence offers a way to construct a theory of health that is sympathetic to both analytic and holistic perspectives. In one way, this emergent theory of health looks very much like a holistic theory in that it considers not only biological factors as fundamental to understanding health, but also psychological, and social factors. In another way, this theory looks very much like an analytic theory because it sees health as a phenomenon that emerges from more basic elements: biology, psychology, and sociology. This may seem ambiguous, but this kind of ambiguity might just be the biggest virtue of the theory.

In medicine, the gap between discovery and innovation is shortening. This is highlighted in the field of pathogen diagnosis and discovery where molecular techniques are allowing detection and identification of microbes that previously was not possible. It is common practice in medicine to store patient specimens for purposes of future study. Specifically, if patient specimens exist for which a negative diagnosis was made, applying new technology may yield a positive diagnosis. Retrospective analysis on patient specimens is scientifically appealing. It does however raise bioethical questions, especially in the context when a patient is alive. Specific questions include:1.Did patients agree to future tests, not known at the time of obtaining the sample?2. Should individual patients be asked if they want to know their new test results?3. Or do we even need their consent to do any of this, from testing to communicating results on previously diagnosed ‘negatives’- actually false negatives now?We faced this with frozen brain fluid specimens. Forty neurologists and neurosurgeons were surveyed asking whether novel results on archived specimens should be reported, along with soliciting input for additional comments. In addition, a review of the literature was performed.

Within the following paper I attempt to offer a preliminary analysis and a sketch of the foundations of the scholastic notion of the convertibility of Being and the good from the perspective of its roots within Aristotle and, in particular, in relation to the view expressed within the first book of the Nichomachean Ethics (see, i.1), that the good is that of which all things desire. The paper thus initiates with a brief examination of the scholastic notion of the relation of convertibility, and in particular, that expressed by Aquinas. There the relation is clearly recognized to find its roots within Aristotle’s notion of the good as above stated. Following analysis of this statement, I turn to consideration of the structure of desire. There three senses are identified, the third of which is found to correspond to Aristotle’s expression. From this, being and the good are shown to be reciprocally expressed.

In his biography on Augustine, Possidius writes: “His table was frugal and sparing, though indeed with the herbs and lentils he also had meats at times for the sake of his guests or for some of the weaker brethren”.1 Given the importance of friendship in Augustine’s life, it is not surprising that he ate meat for the sake of others and not for his own pleasures. However, Augustine spends much time in Book X of his Confessions obsessing over his delight in everyday activities, including eating2. Indeed, Augustine examines the relationship between desire and the object of desire throughout the Confessions, his ultimate focus being on the nature of our concupiscent hearts. In this paper, I will explore Augustine’s seemingly unhealthy relationship with food by discussing the place of food in his eschatology, his account of concupiscence and will, and his theory of interiority as given in the Confessions. Ultimately, for Augustine, there is a beauty to eating that is found in its relationship to the sensual experience of God.

My paper examines the status of philosophy at the beginning of Middle Ages. I did this analysis by commenting the work of Boethius Consolation of philosophy. While his contemporaries analyze new philosophical themes (the themes of Christian philosophy), Boethius (author of some theological treatises) returns to the ancient themes of philosophy in his last work, as mentioned above. This return occurs in distinct biographical circumstances, because he was the victim of several accusations - among them the accusation of sacrilege, which was supported by the fact that Boethius was a well-known philosopher. As a result, Boethius wrote a treatise to defend philosophy. The outcome is a philosophy about good and about the supremacy of good, about evil, and suffering, which are the consequences of ignorance. The philosophical knowledge is the way to goodness and happiness of a philosopher who suffers, because of the wickedness and injustice while in prison, and waiting for the death sentence. Consolation of philosophy shows the prejudices and the suspicions of the contemporaries of Boethius, regarding philosophy, that lead to the closing of the schools of philosophy; the last one, the School from Athens, was closed five years after the writing of this treatise and the death of Boethius.

My aim in this paper is to reconstruct a certain path of problems which arise, one after another, from an important range of discussions, which unfolded from the middle of the 13th century to the middle of the 14th century among authors writing in Latin, defenders of a hylomorphic description of the constitution of material entities. I will follow in particular John Duns Scotus’ texts on the dispute. Thereby we will find out how it is that in the background of a question apparently concerned solely with the description of the physical world lies a quite deep metaphysical quarrel.

The philosophy of Johannes Scottus Eriugena is normally identified with late antique/early medieval Platonism, which has a very distinctively emanationist cosmological model. The concept of causality, on the other hand, is generally identified with Aristotelianism, which was not at all common in the early medieval West, due, amongst other things, to the lack of most of Aristotle’s texts. However, causality is an important concept for Eriugena: it is the link via “creation”, which allows the creature to know the otherwise utterly transcendent God. This particular sense of causality as a structure of creation, distinct alike from specifically Aristotelian causality and Platonic emanation is something Eriugena inherited from Maximus the Confessor, who also uses it as a structure of participation. This paper examines the background to Eriugena’s use of causality, before examining particular structures of causality, i.e., God as the First and Final cause, the primordial causes as formal and efficient cause, and how they help Eriugena balance a very strong negative theology with a very strong model of participation, and concluding.

This paper examines the influence of Platonism on the work of a twelfth-century philosopher, Achard of Saint-Victor. The development of the Plato’s doctrines, in particularly the theory of ideas, is scrutinized across the works of Latin authors that most influenced the reception of Platonic doctrine in the XIIth century (Seneca, Augustine, Erigena, and Boethius). Secondly, these are compared with the doctrine of Achard of Saint-Victor, which allows us to see the origin of some of key philosophical concepts in Achard’s writings such as eternal reasons, first form, idea and idos. The paper supplements previous research on XII century Platonism by Marie-Dominique, Chenu, John Marenbon, and Stephen Gersh.

The paper deals with issues concerning IX-XII centuries Central Asian scholars’ contribution to succession and correlation of Weltanschauung (philosophical world outlook) in the Middle Ages and Renaissance Europe in the light of the ancient Greek philosophical heritage. It is stated that each epoch had its own peculiar viewpoint, dependent on the level of knowledge and character of civilization and historical experience of the nation. The purpose of this paper is to discuss contribution ways of IX-XII centuries Central Asian philosophy to further development of Medieval and Renaissance Weltanschauung in Europe. The paper also tries to ground that both Central Asian and European philosophical complexes were inspired mostly and primarily by ancient Greek philosophy as part and parcel of the history of world philosophy. An attempt is made to show that the Middle Ages and Renaissance philosophy of Europe was inspired, first of all, greatly by rational philosophical ideas of Al-Farabi and Avicenna. In this article the author conveys his understanding on this complex phenomenon.

The distinction between active and passive mind has been discussed by recent Augustine scholars, mainly in connection to the question whether - and if so to what extent - the Augustinian mind could be said to be active given the doctrine of divine illumination. The doctrine has prompted some to emphasize the mainly passive nature of the human mind in attaining knowledge, while others have argued that the doctrine should not be so construed as to downplay the role the human mind plays in cognition. Of the latter, some have emphasized the role of the act of judgment, others the mind’s act of discovering within itself the standards of “eternal reasons”, and still others the role of the “created” as well as the “uncreated” light. While framing the discussion of the active and passive mind in this way, does help us clarify Augustine’s epistemological views, and at the same time fails to bring out the specific conception of the “active” mind that Augustine himself had and wished to emphasize. I explain what this conception is, then show that the distinction is put in use in his philosophy with a view that recent commentators have not emphasized in their interpretation of this distinction, as regards the role of the mind’s activity as a condition for non-empirical as well as empirical cognition.

With the aim of strengthening the deep desire and the hope to find the truth, St. Augustine writes against the Academics, based on the Ciceronian formulation of the academic doctrine. Advocate of the probabilism of Carneades, Cicero confronted the opposite arguments to reach the probable, to find the closest to the truth. The probability is the real guide of life. According to St. Augustine, academics altered the concept of classical philosophy. The wise academic is an irrational and contradictory creature. He who does not admit anything as certain, nothing does, since without certainty no action is possible. The academics dissociated theory from practice, threatening the whole moral order. Neither have sense to hide behind the verisimilitude, approach the true or establish approximations to the truth as rules of action. How can man, who does not know the face of the truth, dare to talk about of the resemblance to this truth? But, since his conversion, his skepticism had been overcome. St. Augustine did not longer believe, as Cicero, that the truth was submerged in a deep hole, and man could not find it. In discussing the academic question, St. Augustine wanted to satisfy a personal desire: reach the truth.

In this paper, I discuss an anonymous Quaestiones super librum Ethicorum in the manuscripts of Worcester Cathedral Library (Q. 13) and the notion of felicitas (happiness) in this work. The question (commentary) has characteristics similar to those once called “Averroists’ commentaries”, i.e., the commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics written by Parisian masters of arts in the late 13th century. There are, however, elements peculiar to the Worcester commentary and others that resemble to aspects of the work written by John of Tytynsale, a contemporary Oxford master of arts. Like some of those Parisian commentaries, the Worcester text describes felicitas as “a conjunction with the first cause” (coniunctio primi principii). The anonymous author claims that the knowledge of divine essence obtained through this conjunction is non-demonstrative.

In my paper I will discuss the development of Meister Eckhart’s ideas from his early work i.e. Quaestio Parisiensis I to his latest sermons in German language that are his one of the latest writings. In the Meister Eckhart research the German sermons are mostly discussed as a mystical contribution of Eckhart. In my presentation I will try to ask the question if it is possible to find a development of a general idea uniting Eckhart’s early and latest works.

This report deals with one of the most popular trends in modern scientific theoretical thinking, that of building meta-conceptions of existing theories. All these meta-conceptions follow the method of building meta-mathematics for formalized mathematical calculi. The essence and forms of various types of metatheories are discussed. The author of this report has suggested the idea of metatheoretical models – Platonic and Rhodesian models of metatheories – a completely new approach in philosophical publications on the subject. These models allow separating two different sets of metatheoretical constructions taking into account the level of formalization of object-theories. The Rhodesian model allows finding out those methods that are helpful in building certain type theories as well as suggesting and examining theories that have special metatheoretical features and revealing their common features and differences in regard of other theories. The paper discusses the complicated problem of metaphilosophy in the light of the Platonic and Rhodian models. The general conclusion is that philosophy is its own metaphilosophy.

This paper proposes to establish synthetically how the Merleau-Ponty’s proposal in Phenomenology of Perception and the Adorno’s proposal in Negative Dialectics are closely related and even complementary, specifically regarding to what would be the phenomenological foundations that stand in the Adornian negative dialectic that questions the main way of philosophy to proceed. This questioning will help us to understand a metaphilosophy with practical scopes. Themes such as corporality and the critic to the modern rationality stuck in the preeminence of subjective transcendental conscience are common and complementary aspects which will help us to understand the limits of a discursive and unilateral way of thinking. Finally, but not less important, this paper will help to set the basis on how the dialectical movement and the phenomenological approaches, considering Adorno’s and Merleau-Ponty’s proposals, could influence on the contemporary notion of moral reflection and action.

The paper examines the role of self-deception in Descartes’ Meditations. It claims that although Descartes sees self-deception as the origin of our false judgments, he consciously uses it for his searching for truth. Descartes finds that self-deception is a very productive tool in our searching for truth, since it expands our ability to free ourselves from our actual certainties; logical thinking enables us to doubt our certainties but only self-deception enables us to really suspend them. Although it might sound wrong or even absurd to employ self-deception for the purpose of searching for truth, one should examine Descartes’ strategy carefully. After all, this strategy leads him to great philosophical insights.

This paper offers a new transcendental dialectical logic within the mathematical set theory between Kant and Hegel, it is both free of culture and culturally meaningful. It has neither been derived from Kant nor Hegel, has been hypothesized from our teaching experiences. It gives a new general systematization of philosophy, and a meaningful total picture of philosophy. It is also a transition formula between natural and artificial intelligence so as to be an answer from a transcendental Cartesian point to our postmodern era that could be characterized with a double alienation.