Written in the days immediately following the death of Jacques Derrida on 9 October 2004, this essay attempts to bear witness tothe memory of Jacques Derrida as a writer and thinker and, even more personally, a mentor and friend. Written out of gratitude and affection, but also out of an almost overwhelming emotion, the essay is offered here, not without trepidation, in the hope that, in some small measure, the author’s emotion, affection, and genuine gratitude for the life and work of Jacques Derrida may be shared.

This paper takes a feminist look back at Derrida’s work roughly from “Plato’s Pharmacy” to Politics of Friendship, setting it in the context of three other sets of writings: Plato’s Lysis and Phaedrus; French philosophy in the mid-twentieth century, especially the ethical and political thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir; and contemporary re-visions of two Greek tragedies, Oedipus and Orestes/Electra. What brings these disparate themes together are Derrida’s thought, the work of Martin Heidegger, and my life in the wake of Derrida’s death.

Heideggerian existential phenomenology remains largely ignored by Latin American feminists due to their preference for more Marxist and Sartrean philosophies. But its influence on Latin American feminism can be felt through the work of thinkers such as Beauvoir and Irigaray, who have had a great impact on Latin American feminists’ involvement in political movements and developmentof theories. The aim of this essay is to discuss ways in which Latin American and U.S. Latina feminists have been influenced by phenomenology’s commitment to lived experience, but have yet to embrace existential phenomenology in an explicit manner.

What does race add to class, as both are secular social categories? The difficulties of invidious nationalism and the conservation of races that would not foment holy wars of terror persist for both secular or postsecular theorists. Postsecular thinkers are in a stronger position than a secular theorist to challenge religiously inflected social integrations, invidious nationalism, and fundamentalism.Unmasking them as social formation proffers an external criticism, to speak of them as sacralizations of identity exposes them at the root. Secular theorists ignore postsecular sensibility at the peril of failing to challenge the invidious claim to roots that secular nationalism and religious fundamentalism profess.

In this translation of Chapter 5 of Memoria de Auschwitz (2003), Reyes Mate argues that only memory can appropriately respond to the singular event of Auschwitz, as demanded by the new categorical imperative of Adorno. Traditional philosophical rationality, by contrast, overlooks or even justifies the suffering of individuals. Mate acknowledges significant contributions to knowledge about Auschwitz, both in anticipation of its occurence and in retrospect, without losing sight of how this event nevertheless escapes comprehension. He proposes that a memory adequate to Auschwitz cannot simply be aimed at avoiding similar barbarism in the future, but must be dedicated to the failed aspirations of the victims themselves.

In the United States today, much interpersonal racism is driven by corrupt forms of self-preservation. Drawing from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, I refer to this as self-love racism. The byproduct of socially-induced racial anxieties and perceived threats to one’s physical or social wellbeing, self-love racism is the protective attachment to the racialized dimensions of one’s social status, wealth, privilege, and/or identity. Examples include police officer related shootings of unarmed Black Americans, anti-immigrant sentiment, and the resurgence of unabashed white supremacy. This form of racism is defined less by the introduction of racism into the world and more on the perpetuation of racially unjust socioeconomic and political structures. My theory, therefore, works at the intersection of the interpersonal and structural by offering an account of moral complacency in racist social structures. My goal is to reorient the directionality of philosophical work on racism by questioning the sense of innocence at the core of white ways-of-being.

The Correctional Service of Canada is currently re-instituting animal-based agribusiness programs in two federal penitentiaries. To situate the contemporary function of such programs, I provide a historical overview of prison agriculture in relation to Canadian nation-making. I argue that penitentiary farms have functioned as a means of prison expansion and settler territorialisation. While support for agricultural programming is rooted in its perceived facilitation of rehabilitation and vocational training, I show that these justifications are untenable. Rather the prison farm ought to be viewed as an institution made possible by and that reproduces, settler colonial power relations to animals, labour, and territory. Prison agribusiness is then an expression of colonial, agricultural, and carceral powers.