This essay offers an assessment of some of the fundamental features and contributions of John Russon’s scholarship on the dialogues of Plato. It focusses on the interpretive method he refers to as “reading as agents of nemesis” and on Russon’s unique emphasis on experience as the ground of philosophical activity in the Platonic corpus. I close by raising two issues that I see as fundamental questions that Russon’s work on Plato leaves unanswered—the difference in ontology, and thus method, between ancient and modern philosophers and the frequently relied upon chronological ordering of Plato’s dialogues.

This article applies Russon's principles of reading Plato's dialogues to solve a problem arising from both the dramatic and philosophical aspects of Plato's Republic: persuasive speech seems effective only when its audience is already willing to listen and be convinced. Yet if so, then either persuasive speech is powerless to persuade anybody truly, or it is unclear how it differs from simple manipulation or brainwashing. This article resolves this dilemma by using Russon’s insights about the kind of rationality Plato invites us to assume, namely a “concrete rationality,” and by analyzing the 􀏔irst three interlocutors of Socrates in the Republic: Polemarchus, Cephalus, and, of course, Thrasymachus. This approach enables us to differentiate these three interlocutors, explain Thrasymachus’s persistence in listening to the conversation until the end despite his unwillingness to listen, as well as the therapeutic function of theōria for providing him some momentary relief from his “hatred of speech” (misologia).

In this article, I present John Russon’s phenomenological method of authorless description. I trace this method to Russon’s engagement with Aristotle, Hegel, and Heidegger. Speci􀏔ically, I claim that he is informed by Aristotle’s practice of accounting for appearances, Hegel’s method of presuppositionless science, and Heidegger’s project of preparation to “let being be.” I apply this to Russon’s book, Sites of Exposure, and his account of both the human need to transcend the home towards an open-ended realm of indifference and the concrete development of the conditions in which that is made possible in what we call the modern world. I present his account of the emergence of representative democracy, modern science, and glob-al capitalism. I argue that Russon’s method provides essential tools for understanding the promises and failures of what we call the modern world and the imperative of openness that ought to guide us in striving to address those failures.

Based on a creative use of the phenomenological method, we argue that a close examination of the temporality of objects reveals the future as genuinely open. Without aiming to decide the matter of phenomenological realism, we suggest that this method can be used to investigate the mode of being of objects in their own temporality. By bracketing the anticipatory structure of experience, one can get a sense of objects’ temporality as independent of consciousness. This contributes to the current Realism versus Idealism debates, but it does so without taking sides. The starting point is neither an analysis of pure consciousness, nor attempts to describe objects in-themselves, but the idea that things can be phenomenologically grasped through the difference between their temporality and our own. By being methodically “open to the future,” one can become aware of the sui generis temporality of objects as different from the temporality shaped by our anticipation.

In The Society of the Spectacle, Debord describes the spectacle as a capitalist social formation that is at the same time reflective of the privileging of vision in the history of Western philosophy. This article highlights Debord’s appeal to the Hegelian-Marxist notion of reciprocal alienation in his discussion of how the spectacle invents the visual form. Reciprocal alienation produces a dialectical relation between concrete social activity and the spectacle, which I argue is key for understanding how the political subject is represented in the hyper-spectacularized societies of the 21st century.

Phenomenology’s reversal of naturalism hinges on the central claim that the worldly objects that we experience acquire their ontological solidity throughout series of intentional acts that are accomplished over the course of our subjective and intersubjective lives. This posture has historically given rise to realist critiques stating that such a “correlational” ontology undermines our capacity to formulate a coherent discourse on generative natural events that predate humans, such as the Big Bang, the Earth’s accretion, the formation of the oceans, etc. In this paper, I articulate a Merleau-Pontian response to this problem. I establish a continuity between the temporality that is at play in the genesis of empirical bodies and the pre-objective tension that precedes perceptual givenness. I therefore suggest treating the past of nature as a transcendental past, always at work within our present experience, instead of an objective moment that would have determined in advance a causal chain of events.

In their shared works, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari repeatedly advise that ethical practices of experimentation must be imbued with a large dose of prudence. Among commentators, this concept of prudence has primarily been read in cautionary terms, as that which merely enables ethical subjects to avoid the “many dangers” of experimentation. By contrast, this article develops a wider, more positive reading of Deleuzo-Guattarian prudence. Focussing specifically on A Thousand Plateaus, I show that, for Deleuze and Guattari, we must always exercise prudence in ethics because prudence constitutes one positive means of maximizing the success of experimental ethical praxes.

This article argues that philosophical hermeneutics, despite its onto-logical character, can inform higher education teaching in a meaningful way. After discussing theoretical aspects of philosophical her-meneutics, focus will turn to pre-understandings and historically effected consciousness. These concepts will lead to hermeneutics’s transformative nature, with the notion of openness serving as a com-mon thread. The review of three further concepts of philosophical hermeneutics—hermeneutical experience, authentic dialogue, and Bildung—will provide insight into openness as a vanishing point without being a culmination. Parallels to Mezirow’s method of trans-formative learning will be drawn and the concept of Bildung, central to philosophical hermeneutics, will be considered through the Hum-boldtian lens to better extract its practical implications, which lay beyond Gadamer’s theoretical focus. Finally, the last section will cement the applicative intent of the article by presenting concrete teaching practices that 􀏔low from philosophical hermeneutics.

The phenomenologist Gerda Walther posits the possibility of a new social act, which she terms telepathy. It is marked by an intimate in-terpersonal union in which ego and alter ego become capable of sharing in the identical lived experience, though distant from one another. Here, there is no fusion or collective identi􀏔ication; rather, in-dividuals, though they live the experience and mind of the other, never lose or transcend their own individuation. Unlike the act of empathy, there is no analogical transfer. This article defends the possibility of a restricted sense telepathy. The author argues that four conditions must be ful􀏔illed for telepathy to occur: recognition of a social drive; a partially willed act of mind that results in the assump-tion of a certain stance, but it also comes upon us as an experience; constitution of subjects as persons marked by a “fundamental es-sence”; and I-splitting.

To be Black means to have ancestors whose humanity has been de-nied by slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and segregation, as well as by many theories elaborated in order to justify and intensify these modes of domination. To be Black also means having to face the enduring legacies of these systems and theories, which predomi-nantly manifest through overexposure to violence and death. Today, premature death and habituation to loss remain constitutive fea-tures of Black experience. Dignity, often de􀏔ined as the inherent value of every single human being, has been a core concept in ethics since Kant, at least. But in both philosophy and modern politics, the claim of respect for the dignity of people has coexisted with deep antiblack-ness. However, apart from the Western understanding of dignity stands another tradition. The concept of dignity is pervasive in Black radicalism, Caribbean philosophy, and African thought since the 18th century. This article draws inspiration from the legacy of these thinkers to elaborate an ethics centred on the speci􀏔icities of racial-ized life.

This paper reconstructs Oskar Becker’s phenomenology of race, a project he called “paraontology.” For Becker, a fervent National So-cialist, paraontology provided a phenomenological account of “na-ture”—a realm of ahistorical essences encompassing both the “super-historical” truths of mathematics and metaphysics and the “sub-historical” forces of “blood and soil.” The impetus for this reconstruc-tion is the re-emergence of this term in contemporary Black studies, where it is used to problematize ontology’s usefulness for thinking black life. This paper asks what the possibility of such an iteration shows about Becker’s project and its investment in non-historical repetition, arguing it reveals a profound disavowal of the historical at the heart of Becker’s project rather than a phenomenological disclosure of the natural.

While essential work in Africana philosophy that illuminates the perils of Western constructs of race and racism has been laid out, scholarship is yet to excavate genealogies of Africana critiques of Western slavery as distinct philosophical themes that can contribute to the understanding of slavery from the vantage of the subjugated. This article is a call for more theorizations of such genealogies.

This article sketches an archaeology of the racial divide between North Africa and “Black Africa” by examining how it belongs to the emergence of modern geography during the nineteenth century. It argues that the de-Africanization of North Africa is inseparable from the racial identi􀏔ication of “Africa proper”—to quote Hegel’s word—with a dehumanizing concept of Blackness. The second part of the article tries to move beyond archaeology in order to analyze counter-geographies of decolonization. It does so by focussing on the ways in which the continental Pan-Africanism of the Algerian revolution has deployed a practical criticism of the divide between North and Black Africa through Fanon.

It is important to read afresh today the meaning of the Negritude movement without reducing it, as is often the case, to a counter-essentialism in response to the essentialism of the discourse of coloni-alism; to realize that Senghor, Césaire, and Damas were 􀏔irst and foremost global philosophers, that is, thinkers of the plural and decentred world that the Bandung conference of 1955 had promised. Thus, their different perspectives converge as the task of thinking a humanism for our times based on a non-imperial universal, a univer-sal of encounter and translation founded on equality. And, consequently, a socialism that is, in its different translations, a force of emancipation, but also of humanization and spiritualization of the earth. That task is still ours.

What does “life” mean in the protest slogan “Black Lives Matter”? This article draws on a close reading of Aimé Césaire’s Cahier d’un retour au pays natal to offer an answer to this question. In his poem, Césaire carefully examines the ways racial and colonial domination distort life. He identi􀏔ies various false accounts of life complicit in domination, and he points toward an alternative. The article com-pares Césaire’s alternative to accounts of life put forward by Gilles Deleuze and Michel Henry, suggesting that Césaire pushes his cri-tique in a similar direction, but goes further.

In this article, I analyze a concept central to the work of the Beninese philosopher Paulin Jidenu Hountondji: pluralism. Hountondji’s pluralism consists of both a theoretical pluralism, which emphasizes the importance of plurality and debate within philosophy and science, and a politico-economic pluralism, which arises in opposition to the dominative tendencies of cultural nationalism and the capitalist world-system. I contend that at the heart of both Hountondji’s theoretical and politico-economic pluralism rests a concept of negative pluralism, a political principle derived from Hountondji’s immanent critique of his own historical conjuncture. I conclude that Hountondji’s negative pluralism offers a distinct and compelling ac-count of plurality as neither innately nor instrumentally ideal. Instead, Hountondji’s negative pluralism allows us to identify, through a critique of existing political structures, forms of political compul-sion and economic exploitation which function as obstacles to universal emancipation.

What corresponds, in contemporary feminist and decolonial usage, to the demand to “return to experience,” or rather “to the lived experiences” of oppression - a distant echo of Husserl’s call to return to the things themselves? Beauvoir and Fanon appear to have laid the first foundations of a critical phenomenology of oppression - or of a phenomenologization of social critique. Later, Young and Ahmed took up a similar approach, reading history and politics in bodies, and habitus and structures in intimate experience - an approach that is now discussed in the United States under the label of “Critical Phenomenology.” But is this still, really, phenomenology in the strong sense? This article contributes to an understanding of the path taken by the field of Critical Phenomenology from Husserl to Lorde, and of the shifts that can be observed both in the field and in the method that it presupposes. Finally it undertakes to clarify the horizon of this field, which is essentially concerned with the defence of a life that is both deeply corporeal and open to a total meaning.