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201. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Jonathan Short The Philosophy of Agamben
202. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Ugo Perone Public Space and Its Metaphors
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The political does not exist. What exists is individual and collective life; there is nature, with its inexhaustible cycles; there is the world, the (blind and astute) interlacement of the actions, conflicts and visions that will become history. The political exists only as an invention: the invention of a specific space of the relation that intercepts life, modifies nature, and is a curvature of the world. I would like to dwell on this invention, not without warning that the political of which one speaks precedes and constitutes specific kinds of politics, since it is the condition of their possibility.
203. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Antonio Calcagno Thine Own Self: Individuality in Edith Stein’s Later Writings
204. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Linda Martín Alcoff, Alireza Shomali Adorno’s Dialectical Realism
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The idea that Adorno should be read as a “realist” of any sort may indeed sound odd. And unpacking from Adorno’s elusive prose a credible and useful normative reconstruction of epistemology and metaphysics will take some work. But we argue that he should be added to the growing group of epistemologists and metaphysicians who have been developing post-positivist versions of realism such as contextual, internal, pragmatic and critical realisms. These latter realisms, however, while helpfully showing how realism can coexist with ontological pluralism, for example, as well as a highly contextualised account of knowledge, have not developed a political reflexivity about how the object of knowledge—the real—is constructed. As a field, then, post-positivist realisms have been politically naïve, which is perhaps why they have not enjoyed more influence among Continental philosophers.
205. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Babette Babich Adorno on Nihilism and Modern Science, Animals, and Jews
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Adorno, no less than Heidegger or Nietzsche, had his own critical notions of truth/untruth. But Adorno’s readers are unsettled by the barest hint of anything that might be taken to be antiscience. To protest scientism, yes and to be sure, but to protest “scientific thought,” decidedly not, and the distinction is to be maintained even if Adorno himself challenged it. For Adorno, so-called “scientistic” tendencies are the very “conditions of society and of scientific thought.” And again, Adorno’s readers tend to refuse criticism of this kind. Scientific rationality cannot itself be problematic and E. B. Ashton, Adorno’s translator in the mid-1960s, sought to underscore this with the word “scientivistic.” Rather than science, it is scientism that is to be avoided. So we ask: is Adorno speaking here of scientific rationality or scientistic rationality? How, in general, are we to read Adorno?
206. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Daniel Colucciello Barber The Power of Nothingness: Negative Thought in Agamben
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This paper addresses the nature and value of Giorgio Agamben’s negative thought, which revolves around the theme of nothingness. I begin by observing the validity of negative thinking, and thus oppose those affirmative philosophies that reject Agamben’s thought simply on the basis of its negativity. Indeed, the importance of negative thought is set forth by Agamben’s attention to the specific biopolitical logic that governs the present. If we are to understand the present, then we must begin by understanding the nothingness inherent in the logic of biopolitics. At the same time, I argue, it is important to distinguish two kinds of negative thought. The first, ultimately limited manner of negative thought follows a strictly Heideggerian path of contemplation. While Agamben shows a certain affinity with this style of thinking, I call for increased focus on a different manner of negative thought, one that turns on the power to think nothingness. I develop this second manner of negative thought by advancing the concepts of love and exile, which provide the means by which the potentiality of nothingness may inhabited in novel ways.
207. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Patrizia Manganaro, Antonio Calcagno Edith Stein o dell’armonia. Esistenza, Pensiero, Fede
208. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Jordan Glass Starting with Nietzsche
209. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
David Tkach French Interpretations of Heidegger: An Exceptional Reception
210. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Constantin V. Boundas Deleuze. La pratique du droit
211. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Peter Gratton The Truth of Democracy
212. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Robert W.M. Kennedy Anatheism: Returning to God after God
213. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Bronwyn Singleton Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be Human
214. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Aaron James Landry Plato and the Question of Beauty
215. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Santiago Zabala Unquiet Understanding: Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics
216. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Marie-Eve Morin Towards a Divine Atheism: Jean-Luc Nancy’s Deconstruction of Monotheism and the Passage of the Last God
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In Briefings on Existence, Alain Badiou calls for a radical atheism that would refuse the Heideggerian pathos of a “last god” and deny the affliction of finitude. I will argue that Jean-Luc Nancy’s deconstruction of monotheism, as well as his thinking of the world, remains resolutely atheistic, or better a-theological, precisely because of Nancy’s insistence on finitude and his appeal to the Heideggerian motif of the last god. At the same time, I want to underline, by considering it as a Derridean paleonymy, the danger of Nancy’s maintenance of the word “god” to name the infinite opening of the world right at (à meme) the world.
217. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Jérôme Melançon Personne, communauté et monade chez Husserl. Contribution à l’étude des fondements de la phénoménologie politique
218. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Ian Angus A Conversation with Leslie Armour
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Leslie Armour is the author of numerous books and essays on epistemology, metaphysics, logic, Canadian philosophy and Blaise Pascal, as well as on ethics, social and political philosophy, the history of philosophy (especially seventeenth-century philosophy) and social economics. A fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, he has worked as a reporter for The Vancouver Province, briefly as a sub-editor at Reuters News Agency, and for several years as a columnist and feature writer for London Express News and Feature Services. He has taught at universities in Montana, California, Ohio and Ontario. Now a researchprofessor of philosophy at the Dominican University College, Ottawa, an emeritus professor at the University of Ottawa, and editor of the International Journal of Social Economics, he and his wife, Diana, divide their time between Ottawa and London, U.K.
219. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
David Appelbaum Natality and Finitude
220. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Deborah Achtenberg Plato and Levinas on Violence and the Other
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In this essay, I shall describe both Plato and Levinas as philosophers of the other, and delineate their similarities and differences on violence. In doing so, I will open up for broader reflection two importantly contrasting ways in which the self is essentially responsive to—as well as vulnerable to violence from—the other. I will also suggest a new way of situating Levinas in the history of philosophy, not, as he himself suggests, as one of the few in the history of philosophy who has aphilosophy of the other but, instead, as one of a number of 20th century philosophers who turn to pre-modern thinkers for aid in critiquing early modern thought on a variety of topics, including whether the self is essentially closed or, instead, vulnerable, open and responsive to what is outside it.