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161. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Mark Alfano, Brian Robinson Bragging
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The speech act of bragging has never been subjected to conceptual analysis until now. We argue that a speaker brags just in case she makes an utterance that (1) is an assertion and (2) is intended to impress the addressee with something about the speaker via the belief produced by the speaker’s assertion. We conclude by discussing why it is especially difficult to cancel a brag by prefacing it with, ‘I’m not trying to impress you, but…’ and connect this discussion withMoore’s paradox and the recent neologism ‘humblebrag’.
162. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Thomas Mark Eden Donaldson If There Were No Numbers, What Would You Think?
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Hartry Field has argued that mathematical realism is epistemologically problematic, because the realist is unable to explain the supposed reliability of our mathematical beliefs. In some of his discussions of this point, Field backs up his argument by saying that our purely mathematical beliefs do not ‘counterfactually depend on the facts’. I argue that counterfactual dependence is irrelevant in this context; it does nothing to bolster Field’s argument.
163. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Matthew Simpson Defending Truthmaker Non-Maximalism
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Jago (2012) argues that truthmaker non-maximalism, the view that some but not all truths require truthmakers, is vulnerable to a challenge from truths which ascribe knowledge of propositions about things which don’t exist. Such truths, Jago argues, can only be dealt with using maximalist resources. I argue that Jago’s point relies on the claim that the relevant truths require truthmakers, a point that non-maximalists can coherently and plausibly deny. Moreover, I argue that by making use of a safety account of knowledge, non-maximalists can fully answer Jago’s challenge.
164. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Alexander Miller Wittgenstein, Quine and Dummett on Conventionalism about Logic
165. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Hannah Clark-Younger Imperatives and the More Generalised Tarski Thesis
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J.C. Beall and Greg Restall’s (2006) Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT) is a generalisation of the seemingly diverse conceptions of logical consequence. However, even their apparently general account of consequence makes necessary truth-preservation a necessary condition. Sentences in the imperative mood pose a problem for any truth-preservationist account of consequence, because imperatives are not truth-apt but seem to be capable of standing in the relation of logical consequence. In this paper, I show that an imperative logic can be formulated that solves the problem of imperative consequence by leading naturally to a further generalisation of the GTT.
166. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Giulia Felappi On Product-based Accounts of Propositional Attitudes
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Propositional attitude sentences, such as "John believes that snow is white," are traditionally taken to express the holding of a relation between a subject and what ‘that’-clauses like ‘that snow is white’ denote, i.e. propositions. On the traditional account, propositions are abstract, mind- and language-independent entities. Recently, some have raised some serious worries for the traditional account and thought that we were mistaken about the kind of entities propositions are. Over the last ten years there has then been a boom of accounts of propositions in terms of (types of) mental acts (Burge 2007; Hanks 2011; Soames 2010). But Friederike Moltmann (2013; 2014) has recently suggested that in accounting for attitudes we should forget about mindand language-independent entities and (types of) acts and follow Twardowski (1912) in focusing instead on attitudinal objects, which are the products of our mental life. In this paper, I will focus on some semantic problems that any product-based account seems to face. Moreover, I will show that product-based accounts may be also criticised on ontological grounds. My conclusion will be that we lack a reason to think that in accounting for propositional attitudes we should focus on the alleged products of our mental lives.
167. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Howard L. M. Nye Well-Being, Self-Regarding Reasons, and Morality
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It seems that we should want to avoid becoming intellectually disabled. It is common for philosophers to infer from this that those of us without intellectual disabilities are intrinsically better off than individuals with intellectual disabilities, and that there are consequently stronger moral reasons for others to preserve our lives than to preserve the lives of intellectually disabled individuals. In this article, I argue against this inference from what states we should prefer for ourselves to how much moral reason others have to maintain these states on our behalves. I argue that there is an important sense in which an outcome contributes to our well-being to a certain degree, namely the extent to which others should want it out of care for us, which plays a central role in determining the moral priority of ensuring the outcome for us over ensuring distinct outcomes for others. But an outcome’s contribution to our well-being in this sense can come apart from the extent to which we should prefer it for ourselves.
168. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Michael Hughes Necessary Truths are Just True: A Reply to Rossberg
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One longstanding problem for glut theorists (also known as dialetheists) is the problem of ‘just true.’ On Beall’s conservative version of glut theory advanced in Spandrels of Truth (2009), he addresses the problem in two steps. The first is a rejection of the problem: he claims that the only general notion of ‘just true’ is just truth itself. On that view, the alleged problem of ‘just true’ is reduced to the problem of truth itself, which (according to glut theorists) has a solution—glut theory.The second step is to acknowledge that there is a notion of ‘just true’ which is more limited but nonetheless meets all reasonable criteria demanded by those who advance the longstanding just-true objection. Marcus Rossberg (Thought 2013) disagrees. According to Rossberg, a just-true operator ought to iterate and be non-arbitrary in ways that Beall’s proposed just-true operator is not. My aim in this paper is to construct a new conditional in terms of which a new just-true operator may be defined, a necessity operator, and to show that it meets all of the target desiderata of the debate. I then use that new operator to address the arbitrariness worries raised by Rossberg.
169. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Per Algander Variabilism Is Not the Solution to the Asymmetry
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According to “the asymmetry”, the fact that a future person would have a life notworth living counts against bringing that person into existence but the fact that a future person would have a life worth living does not count in favour of bringing that person into existence. While this asymmetry seems intuitive, it is also puzzling: if we think that it is of moral importance to prevent people from living lives not worth living, shouldn’t we also that it is of moral importance to create people with lives worth living? Melinda Roberts has suggested a view, “Variabilism”, which she argues solves this problem. I argue that Variabilism fails as a solution to the asymmetry. First, Variabilism relies on a particular distinction between gains and losses which is at least as puzzling as the asymmetry itself. Second, in some cases Variabilism is incompatible with the asymmetry. In these cases, the fact that a person would have a life worth living does count in favour of creating her.
170. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Ben Blumson, Weng Hong Tang A Note on the Definition of Physicalism
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Physicalism is incompatible with what is known as the possibility of zombies, that is, the possibility of a world physically like ours, but in which there are no conscious experiences. But it is compatible with what is known as the possibility of ghosts, that is, the possibility of a world which is physically like ours, but in which there are additional nonphysical entities. In this paper we argue that a revision to the traditional definition of physicalism designed to accommodate the possibility of ghosts inadvertently accommodates what is known as the possibility of inverted spectra, that is, the possibility of a world which is physically like ours, but in which colour experience is inverted. This consequence is unwelcome, because it is widely agreed that the possibility of inverted spectra is incompatible with physicalism. We argue for a revised definition of physicalism which resolves this problem. We then use our definition to argue that physicalism is not compatible withwhat is known as the possibility of blockers, that is, the possibility of a world which is physically like ours, but in which additional nonphysical entities have prevented the existence of conscious experience. This undermines Stephan Leuenberger’s (2008) attempt to defend physicalism from arguments which purport to establish the possibility of zombies.
171. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Fabrice Correia, Sven Rosenkranz Presentism without Presentness
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We argue that presentism, understood as a view about time and existence, can perspicuously be defined in opposition to all other familiar contenderswithout appeal to any notion of presentness or cognate notions such as concreteness. Given recent worries about the suitability of such notions to cut much metaphysical ice, this should be welcomed by presentism’s defenders. We also show that, irrespective of its sparse ideology, the proposed formulation forestalls any deviant interpretation at odds with the view it aims to capture.
172. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Ralph DiFranco Do Racists Speak Truly? On the Truth-Conditional Content of Slurs
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Slurs denigrate individuals qua members of certain groups, such as race or sexual orientation. Most theorists hold that each slur has a neutral counterpart, i.e., a term that references the slur’s target group without denigrating them. According to a widely accepted view, which I call ‘Neutral Counterpart Theory’, the truth-conditional content of a slur is identical to the truth-conditional content of its neutral counterpart (so, e.g., ‘Jew’ and ‘kike’ are truth-conditionally the same, yet the latter is an objectionable or derogatory way of referring to a person’s ethnic background). My aim is to challenge this view. I argue that the view fails with respect to slurs that encode truth-conditional content which does more than merely classify someone as a member of the target group (such as ‘slanty-eyed’, ‘curry muncher’, ‘camel jockey’, and ‘Jewish American Princess’), as well as slurs that denigrate by virtue of their iconicity (‘ching chong’).
173. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Ulf Hlobil There Are Diachronic Norms of Rationality
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Some philosophers have recently argued that there are no diachronic norms of epistemic rationality, that is, that there are no norms regarding how you should change your attitudes over time. I argue that this is wrong on the grounds that there are norms governing reasoning.
174. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Shieva Kleinschmidt Fundamentality and Time-Travel
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The relation of being more fundamental than, as well as the Finean notion of partial grounding, are widely taken to be irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetric. However, certain time-travel cases that have been used to raise worries about the irreflexivity, transitivity, and asymmetry of proper part of can also be used to argue that more fundamental than and partially grounds do not have these formal properties. I present this worry and discuss several responses to it, with the aim of showing that the problem is harder to address when applied to fundamentality and partial grounding than it was when merely applied to proper parthood.
175. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Seth Lazar Authority, Oaths, Contracts, and Uncertainty in War
176. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Stephan Krämer, Stefan Roski A Note on the Logic of Worldly Ground
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In his 2010 paper ‘Grounding and Truth-Functions’, Fabrice Correia has developed the first and so far only proposal for a logic of ground based on a worldly conception of facts. In this paper, we show that the logic allows the derivation of implausible grounding claims. We then generalize these results and draw some conclusions concerning the structural features of ground and its associated notion of relevance, which has so far not received the attention it deserves.
177. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
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178. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Branden Fitelson The Strongest Possible Lewisian Triviality Result
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The strongest possible Lewisian triviality result for the indicative conditional is proven.
179. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Aaron Bronfman Reflection and Self-Trust
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The Reflection principle expresses a kind of epistemic deference to one’s future self. There is a plausible intuitive argument to the effect that, if one believes one will reason well and gain information over time, then one ought to satisfy Reflection. There are also associated formal arguments that show that, if one’s beliefs about one’s current and future selves meet certain criteria, then one is committed by the axioms of probability to satisfy Reflection. The formal arguments, however, rely on an assumption that has no apparent relevance to the intuitive argument: the assumption that one has perfect access to one’s beliefs. This paper explains why it is advantageous to replace the perfect access assumption with a self-trust assumption. The self-trust assumption is superior from a formal point of view, since it is formally weaker than the perfect access assumption, and from an intuitive point of view, since it leads to an improved formulation of the intuitive argument.
180. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Sara Rachel Chant Collective Responsibility in a Hollywood Standoff
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In this paper, I advance a counterexample to the collective agency thesis.