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201. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Casey Hart, Michael G. Titelbaum Intuitive Dilation?
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Roger White objects to interval-valued credence theories because they produce a counterintuitive “dilation” effect in a story he calls the Coin Game. We respond that results in the Coin Game were bound to be counterintuitive anyway, because the story involves an agent who learns a biconditional. Biconditional updates produce surprising results whether the credences involved are ranged or precise, so White’s story is no counterexample to ranged credence theories.
202. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Bjørn Jespersen Should Propositions Proliferate?
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Soames’s cognitive propositions are strings of acts to be performed by an agent, such as predicating a property of an individual. King takes these structured propositions to task for proliferating too easily. King’s objection is based on an example that purports to show that three of Soames’s propositions are really just one proposition. I translate the informally stated propositions King attributes to Soames into the intensional λ-calculus. It turns out that they are all β-equivalent to the proposition King claims Soames’s three propositions are identical to. I argue on philosophical grounds against identifying β-equivalent propositions. The reason is that β-conversion obliterates too many of the procedural distinctions that are central to an act-based theory such as Soames’s and which are worth preserving. In fact, β-expansion allows the addition of a fifth proposition that highlights additional procedural distinctions and propositional structure. The welcome conclusion is that we have five procedurally distinct, if equivalent, propositions.
203. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Sean C. Ebels-Duggan The Nuisance Principle in Infinite Settings
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Neo-Fregeans have been troubled by the Nuisance Principle (NP), an abstraction principle that is consistent but not jointly (second-order) satisfiable with the favored abstraction principle HP. We show that logically this situation persists if one looks at joint (second-order) consistency rather than satisfiability: under a modest assumption about infinite concepts, NP is also inconsistent with HP.
204. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Gareth Young Shrieking, Just False and Exclusion
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In a recent paper (2013), Jc Beall has employed what he calls ‘shriek rules’ in a putative solution to the long-standing ‘just false’ problem for glut theory.The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, I distinguish the ‘just false’ problem from another problem, with which it is often conflated, which I will call the ‘exclusion problem’. Secondly, I argue that shriek rules do not help glut theorists with either problem.
205. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
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206. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Toby Handfield Essentially Comparative Value Does Not Threaten Transitivity
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The essentially comparative conception of value entails that the value of a state of affairs does not depend solely upon features intrinsic to the state of affairs, but also upon extrinsic features, such as the set of feasible alternatives. It has been argued that this conception of value gives us reason to abandon the transitivity of the better than relation. This paper shows that the support for intransitivity derived from this conception of value is very limited. On its most plausible interpretations, it merely provides a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for intransitivity. It is further argued that the essentially comparative conception of value appears to support a disjunctive conclusion: there is incommensurability of value or betterness is not transitive. Of these two alternatives, incommensurability is preferable, because it is far less threatening to our other axiological commitments.
207. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Andrew Alwood Should Expressivism Be a Theory at the Level of Metasemantics?
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Michael Ridge argues that metaethical expressivism can avoid its most worrisome problems by going ‘Ecumenical’. Ridge emphasizes that he aims to develop expressivism at the level of metasemantics rather than at the level of (first-order) semantics. This is supposed to allow him to avoid a mentalist semantics of attitudes and instead offer an orthodox, truth-conditional or propositional semantics. However, I argue that Ridge’s theory remains committed to mentalist semantics, and that his move to go metasemantic doesn’t bring any clear advantages to the debate between expressivism and its opponents.
208. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Max Siegel Priority Monism Is Contingent
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This paper raises a challenge to Jonathan Schaffer’s priority monism. I contend that monism may be true at the actual world but fail to hold as a matter of metaphysical necessity, contrary to Schaffer’s view that monism, if true, is necessarily true. My argument challenges Schaffer for his reliance on contingent physical truths in an argument for a metaphysically necessary conclusion. A counterexample in which the actual laws of physics hold but the physical history of the universe is different shows that priority monism is contingently true at best. I suggest some general lessons for discussion of metaphysical dependence.
209. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Wesley H. Holliday On Being in an Undiscoverable Position
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The Paradox of the Surprise Examination has been a testing ground for a variety of frameworks in formal epistemology, from epistemic logic to probability theory to game theory and more. In this paper, I treat a related paradox, the Paradox of the Undiscoverable Position (from Sorensen 1982, 1988), as a test case for the possible-worlds style representation of epistemic states. I argue that the paradox can be solved in this framework, further illustrating the power of possible-worlds style modeling. The solution also illustrates an important distinction between anti-performatory and unassimilable announcements of information.
210. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Roberto Loss Grounds, Roots and Abysses
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The aim of this study is to address the “Grounding Grounding Problem,” that is, the question as to what, if anything, grounds facts about grounding. I aim to show that, if a seemingly plausible principle of modal recombination between fundamental facts and the principle customarily called “Entailment” are assumed, it is possible to prove not only that grounding facts featuring fundamental, contingent grounds are derivative but also that either they are (at least) partially grounded in the grounds they feature or they are “abysses” (i.e., derivative facts without fundamental grounds and lying at the top of an infinitely descending chain of ground).
211. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Christopher Howard In Defense of the Wrong Kind of Reason
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Skepticism about the ‘wrong kind’ of reasons—the view that wrong-kind reasons are reasons to want and bring about certain attitudes, but not reasons for those attitudes—is more often assumed than argued for. Jonathan Way (2012) sets out to remedy this: he argues that skeptics about, but not defenders of, wrong-kind reasons can explain a distinctive pattern of transmission among such reasons and claims that this fact lends significant support to the skeptical view. I argue that Way’s positive case for wrong-kind reason skepticism fails. I conclude with an account of what’s needed to resolve the debate between wrong-kind reason skeptics and defenders.
212. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Jan Heylen Being in a Position to Know and Closure
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The focus of this article is the question whether the notion of being in a position to know is closed under modus ponens. The question is answered negatively.
213. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Sven Rosenkranz Being in a Position to Know and Closure: Reply to Heylen
214. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Kenneth L. Pearce Counteressential Conditionals
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Making sense of our reasoning in disputes about necessary truths requires admitting nonvacuous counterpossibles. One class of these is the counteressentials, which ask us to make contrary to fact (and therefore contrary to possibility) suppositions about essences. A popular strategy in accounting for nonvacuous counterpossibles is to extend the standard possible worlds semantics for subjunctive conditionals by the addition of impossible worlds. A conditional A □→ C is then taken to be true if all of the nearest A worlds (whether possible or impossible) are C worlds. I argue that a straightforward extension of the standard possible worlds semantics to impossible worlds does not result in a viable account of counteressentials and propose an alternative covering law semantics for counteressentials.
215. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Tom Dougherty The Burdens of Morality: Why Act-Consequentialism Demands Too Little
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A classic objection to act-consequentialism is that it is overdemanding: it requires agents to bear too many costs for the sake of promoting the impersonal good. I develop the complementary objection that act-consequentialism is underdemanding: it fails to acknowledge that agents have moral reasons to bear certain costs themselves, evenwhen itwould be impersonally better for others to bear these costs.
216. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
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217. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Yishai Cohen Leeway Compatibilism and Frankfurt-Style Cases
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The new dispositionalists defend the position that an agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case (FSC) has the ability to do otherwise, where that ability is the one at issue in the principle of alternative possibilities. Focusing specifically on Kadri Vihvelin’s proposal, I argue against this position by showing that it is incompatible with the existence of structurally similar cases to FSCs in which a preemptive intervener bestows an agent with an ability.
218. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
David Palmer Goetz on the Noncausal Libertarian View of Free Will
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According to the libertarian view of free will, people sometimes act freely, but this freedom is incompatible with causal determinism. Goetz (1997, 1998, 2008) has developed an important and unusual libertarian view of free will. Rather than simply arguing that a person’s free actions cannot be causally determined,Goetz argues that they cannot be caused at all. According to Goetz, in order for a person to act freely, her actions must be uncaused. My aim in this essay is to evaluate Goetz’s “noncausal” libertarian view of free will. In section 1, I outline Goetz’s view. In section 2, I develop two criticisms of his view. In section 3, I develop an improved “positive” account of the noncausal view, which takes Goetz’s metaphysical framework as its point of departure but is not subject to the criticisms that plague his development of this framework. Finally, in section 4, I respond to some objections to my proposed noncausal view.
219. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Johan E. Gustafsson Consequentialism with Wrongness Depending on the Difficulty of Doing Better
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Moral wrongness comes in degrees. On a consequentialist view of ethics, the wrongness of an act should depend, I argue, in part on how much worse the act’s consequences are compared with those of its alternatives and in part on how difficult it is to perform the alternatives with better consequences. I extend act consequentialism to take this into account, and I defend three conditions on consequentialist theories. The first is consequentialist dominance, which says that, if an act has better consequences than some alternative act, then it is not more wrong than the alternative act. The second is consequentialist supervenience, which says that, if two acts have equally good consequences in a situation, then they have the same deontic status in the situation. And the third is consequentialist continuity, which says that, for every act and for any difference in wrongness δ greater than zero, there is an arbitrarily small improvement of the consequences of the act which would, other things being equal, not change the wrongness of that act or any alternative by more than δ. I defend a proposal that satisfies these conditions.
220. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Greg Restall On Priest on Nonmonotonic and Inductive Logic
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Graham Priest defends the use of a nonmonotonic logic, LPm, in his analysis of reasoning in the face of true contradictions, such as those arising from the paradoxes of self-reference. In the course of defending this choice of logic in the face of the criticism that this logic is not truth preserving, Priest argued (2012) that requirement is too much to ask: since LPm is a nonmonotonic logic, it necessarily fails to preserve truth. In this article, I show that this assumption is incorrect, and I explain why nonmonotonic logics can nonetheless be truth preserving. Finally, I diagnose Priest’s error, to explain when nonmonotonic logics do indeed fail to preserve truth.