The aim of this paper is to highlight the main features of the philosophy of science that are present in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. At the same time I attempt to point out some obscure proposals within his metascientific theory and (hypothetically) to distinguish certain aspects in which the Aristotelian Model of science has become inapplicable nowadays.

In this paper, some theoretical problems about a relevant conceptualization helpful to understand resistance to scientific and technological change are discussed. An interpretative perspective is developed, and some concepts are elucidated, according to which certain processes become scientific changes because, among other things, but in a fundamental way, they are constituted as changes by members of a community. Certain cognitive processes are typified as “scientific”, “technological” and “scientific-technological”, and the importance of their relationship to processes of exploitation is stressed. It is suggested that resistance to changes increases and becomes more problematic when less exploitation is involved in the changes, i.e. when the processes are closer to what here is called scientific, rather than technological or scientific-technological knowledge. Some exampIes are drawn from the history of science to illustrate these ideas.