Search narrowed by:



Narrow search


By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:


Displaying: 1-20 of 26 documents

Show/Hide alternate language

0.272 sec

1. Filosofska Dumka: Volume > 2021 > Issue: 2
До читачів
Editorial

2. Filosofska Dumka: Volume > 2021 > Issue: 3
До читачів
Editorial

3. Filosofska Dumka: Volume > 2021 > Issue: 4
До читачів
Editorial

4. Filosofska Dumka: Volume > 2022 > Issue: 1
До читачів
Editorial

5. Sententiae: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Іван Іващенко, В'ячеслав Циба Ivan Ivashchenko
Переднє слово упорядників
Editors' Foreword

6. Sententiae: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
Сергій Секундант Sergii Secundan
Вольф і еклектицизм: від поняття відкритої системи до систематичного інтелекту
Wolf and Eclecticism: From the Concept of an Open System to Systematic Intelligence

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The paper provides a comparative analysis of the programs of reforms of philosophy developed by Christian Wolff and the members of the Eclecticist school. It reveals the critical foundations of the concepts of the system by both schools and assesses the prospects of their further development. Although Wolff is often inconsistent, he is nevertheless closer to Descartes and Leibniz, and therefore to the Platonic tradition. The Eclecticists, on the other hand, are closer to the Peripatetic tradition, and therefore to empiricism. From the point of view of the history of philosophical methodology, Wolff’s program combines Cartesianism and the German tradition of methodical thinking (J. Jung, E. Weigel and Leibniz), which both were oriented towards mathematics. The Eclecticists, on the other hand, used the dialectical model, which they modernized by introducing the principle of historicism and applying it to the history of philosophy. When the program of the Eclecticists was guided by the critical selection of knowledge by members of the "scientific community" and the concept of an open system, Wolff’s synthesis of knowledge is carried out on the basis of a rigorous method. He puts forward a fundamentally new idea of a universal system based on new normative requirements for the system-forming principle - it must be fundamental, generally valid and immanent in the system of knowledge. Wolff does not reject the critical program of the Eclecticists; he tries to prove that the successful implementation of their program is possible only if there is a basic system of truths and a reliable method. In his treatise On the Difference Between Systematic and Non-systematic Intellect, Wolff laid the foundation of “systematic eclecticism” and “speculative criticism”, which was substantiated in the works by "classics of German idealism", primarily by C. L. Reinhold and Hegel.
7. Sententiae: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Юрґен Штольценберґ Jürgen Stolzenberg
Безумовність «Я»
Unconditionality of the «I»

8. Sententiae: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Іван Іващенко Ivan Ivashchenko
Вступне Слово Упорядника
Editor's Introduction

9. Sententiae: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Дитер Генрих Dieter Henrich
Фіхтеве «Я»
Fichte’s “I”

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The author holds the view that Johann Gottlieb Fichte founded a new approach to the problems of subjectivity and self-consciousness. There are two basic models of the theory of selfconsciousness, namely the reflection theory of self-consciousness and Fichte’s approach. According to the reflection theory (Locke, Leibnitz, Kant) self-consciousness is the result of a reflection i.e., in order to ascribe self to oneself one must await its objectification by a subsequent reflection. This poses a difficulty, however. For what should enable the act of reflection (which according to this model is itself non-conscious) to realize that the first-order state belongs to the same subjectivity as itself? The author claims that Fichte noticed this difficulty and elaborated a theory, which provides an understanding of self-consciousness as selfknowledge that couldn’t be objectified by a reflection.
10. Sententiae: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Конрад Крамер Konrad Cramer
Кантове «Я Мислю» Та Фіхтеве «Я Є»
Kant’s “I Think” and Fichte’s “I am”

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
One of the central problems in philosophy after Kant is the meaning and systematic func-tion of self-consciousness. This essay explores the question of how Kant’s concept of self-consciousness and the thinking subject relates to Fichte’s “I”, and what the relevant grounds are possible for Fichte’s view that in his doctrine of “I think” Kant had already “pointed” at the highest principle of the Wissenschaftslehre “I am”. A comparison of Kant’s “I think” with the line of argument of § 1 of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre shows that Fichte follows Kant in the theoretical grounding of self-consciousness in judgmental functions, and in this way Fichte shared a position already presented by Kant that the concept of self-consciousness contains the thought of a groundless subject, spontaneously generating knowledge of its own existence.
11. Sententiae: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Юрґен Штольценберґ Jürgen Stolzenberg
Фіхтеве Положення «Я Є». Арґументативно-Аналітичні Міркування Стосовно § 1 «Засади Всього Вчення Про Науку» (1794/95)
Jürgen Stolzenberg (Halle, Germany) Fichte’s Proposition “I am”

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The paper deals with Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s argument in § 1 of the «Foundations of the Science of Knowledge» (1794). Reconstructing the crucial argument of the § 1 of «Foundations…» step by step, the author shows how Fichte infers the proposition «I am» from the log-ical proposition of identity «A is A». In doing so, the author claims that proposition «I am», which expresses what Fichte calls «Tathandlung», has to be understood as a critical response to Carl Leonhard Reinhold’s methodological program which emphasizes the starting point of philosophy as a «fact of consciousness». Furthermore, the paper shows the difference between Fichte’s argument of the § 1 of «Foundations…» and his first attempt of its application in the «Private Meditations on Elementary Philosophy» (1793/94) which deals with the concept of an intellectual intuition of the «I» and which in turn can be understood as referring to a fact of consciousness. Therefore, Fichte’s argument leading to the proposition «I am» in the § 1 of «Foundations…», is the result of a self-critical revision of his very first conception of the «I».
12. Sententiae: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Штефан Ланґ Stefan Lang
Фіхтева Програма Історії Перформативної Самосвідомості
Fichte’s Program of a History of Performative Self-Consciousness

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
n this paper Fichte’s conception of a theory of consciousness and self-consciousness is ex-amined as it is presented in the «Foundations of Natural Right» (1796/7) and in «Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre» (1797). It is argued that Fichte develops a per-formative interpretation of self-consciousness. The main thesis of the paper is that Fichte provides a performative theoretical program, i.e. the history of performative self-consciousness.
13. Sententiae: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Крістіан Клотц Christian Klotz
Поняття Я У Фіхтевому Розгляді Субстанційності
The Concept of the “I” in Fichte’s Explanation of Substantiality

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
 The paper deals with Fichte’s conception of substantiality formulated in «Foundations of the Science of Knowledge» (1794). The author claims that according to Fichte the self-ascription of an epistemic activity to the subject is possible only if we can think subject as the substance, to which we could ascribe all possible epistemic activities. Furthemore, the author shows the development of the concept of definability (Bestimmbarkeit), which is of the utmost importance for the understanding of Fichte’s concept of substantiality, by Wolff, Kant, and Maimon.
14. Sententiae: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Ігор Немчинов Ihor Nemchynov
Антиномії Свободи, Або Три Спокуси Достоєвського
The Antinomies of the Freedom, or the Three Temptations of Dostoevsky

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this article the main theme of Dostoevsky – the freedom is analyzed. Researchers, who study the legacy of Dostoevsky, try to consider one or another aspect of his work as a more or less constant, complete system. Following the Russian tradition, they seek to record a "positive" Dostoevsky. The author believes that there is no such Dostoevsky. Dostoevsky put "cursed questions" not to get a final answer to them but merely for the process of questioning what actually means "living" them through. The author believes that the antinomy of freedom for Dostoevsky leaves open the problem of choosing between the Boholyudyna and Lyudyno-boh. The content of his works is studying their opposition within the human soul, which lasts throughout life. The process of choice, the arguments in favor of one or the other are more important for Dostoevsky than the final answer.
15. Sententiae: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
Олег Хома Oleg Khoma
Передмова
Foreword

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Introduction to the topic of the issue from the editor-in-chief of the journal "Sententiae"
16. Sententiae: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
Іван Іващенко Ivan Ivashchenko
Асиметричність Тотожності. Міркування Щодо Кантової Трансцендентальної Дедукції
Asymmetry of the identity. Reflections on Kant’s transcendental deduction

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The object of the paper is to consider the potential of Kant’s transcendental argument in re-lation to Ernst Tugendhat’s “symmetry argument”. The point of Tugendhat’s argument is the hypothesis that the relevant epistemic use of the first person singular pronoun in the sentence with the structure like “I know that I φ” (where φ stands for various states of mind) makes sense only when someone else can use this sentence by replacing “I φ” with “he φ”, meaning “me” from the first person perspective. Tugendhat calls this basic principle “veritative sym-metry”. Hence, Tugendhat assumes that self-consciousness can be described in terms of ob-ject-knowledge. At this juncture several problems loom large. For one thing, an immediate consequence of such assumption is reification of self-knowledge due to the demand to assign it to some object (state of mind). Also we cannot explain both a meaningful usage of the first-person pronoun and the link between object knowledge and second level (higher-order) self-knowledge, which we have to reach observing some mental states.
17. Sententiae: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
Віталій Терлецький Vitali Terletsky
Прелімінарії До Поняття Онтології В Критичній Філософії Канта
Preliminary to Concept of the Ontology in Kant’s Critical Philosophy

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Basing on Kant’s vast oeuvre, which includes not only published works, but also corre-spondence, lectures and handwritten heritage, the paper explains the meaning of the concept “ontology” in relation to the evolution of the philosopher’s thoughts. An analysis of Kant’s relevant word-usage shows that in the period of criticism he is inclined to adapt traditional metaphysica generalis in the frame of a new project of transcendental philosophy. However, at the same time, certain ways and contexts of usage of the ontological vocabulary remain inher-ited from the German metaphysical school, which is especially evident in the concept of «on-tological proof».
18. Sententiae: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Олексій Панич Oleksiy Panych
Філософія Вчинку Бахтіна В Контексті Антиметафізичних Проектів Пізньомодерної Європейської Філософії
Bakhtin’s philosophy of act in the context of anti-metaphysical projects in late-modern European philosophy

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Mikhail Bakhtin’s philosophy of act is considered as an anti-metaphysical project, which arises in the course of self-refuting development of his original metaphysics. Bakhtin’s version of self-refuting transformation of initial metaphysics into further anti-metaphysics is explored in a wider context of similar projects in European philosophy of late 18 – late 19 centuries (Reid, Engels, Marx, Nietzsche). Bakhtin appears to be close to Marx in his gradual shift from “direct” metaphysics to “transformed forms” of philosophizing that grasp the original subject of their initial “first philosophy” at a more concrete level via tools of some “particular” science (political economy for Marx, “aesthetics of verbal creation” for Bakhtin). At the same time, Bakhtin’s “aesthetics of verbal creation” proves to be actually a kind of “meta-philology” somewhat close to the “philosophical philology” of early Nietzsche.
19. Sententiae: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Олександр Юдін Alexander Yudin
«Перша» Філософія І Естетика Михайла Бахтіна: Спроба Подолання Трансцендентального Підходу У Філософській Думці
Mikhail Bakhtin’s “First” Philosophy and Aesthetics as an Attempt to Overcoming the Transcendental Approach in Philosophical Thought

abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The article analyses M. M. Bakhtin’s early works “Art and Responsibility” and “Toward a Philosophy of Act” which show that the philosophical way of Russian thinker was essentially parallel to the path of Western philosophy from Heidegger to post-structuralism and at the same time was an original attempt to overcome the transcendental approach in philosophy and aesthetics. Bakhtin worked out his original “first” philosophy of being or moral philosophy as polemically opposed to the Western philosophy of mind and especially to Kant’s philosophy. But it was not free from certain transcendental moments connected with the orientation on the phenomenological method which later caused Bakhtin’s evolvution towards hermeneutical philosophy of language and culture.
20. Filosofska Dumka: Volume > 2021 > Issue: 1
Vitaliy Nechiporenko Vitaliy Nechiporenko
До читачів
Editorial