Since women and girls compose more than 50 percent of the world’s population, feminist theology quite rightfully should be considered the most important and influential theological movement in our lifetimes. While it is certainly clear that feminism in religion and theology covers a broad spectrum of perspectives—Protestant and Catholic; conservative, progressive, and radical; female exclusive and male inclusive; straight or queer—feminist theology is not a monolithic theological school without differentiation either implicitly or explicitly. As a response to Lisa Sowle Cahill’s “Catholic Feminists and Traditions: Renewal, Reinvention, and Replacement,” this essay contends that Catholic feminist theology has common emphases with its various analogues but has its own inherent complexity and intrinsic debates that have to be reckoned with in order to guarantee that gender equality and sexual justice are realities in our time.

Thomas Aquinas describes the Christian as homo viator: the "human wayfarer" or pilgrim journeying through this world to the heavenly city. This journey is vulnerable to "worldly sin" or "worldliness": an excessive attachment to wealth, status, honors, prestige, and power. A major cause of apathy to the poor and the underprivileged, worldliness treats our identity as purely this-worldly and therefore shuts the door to eschatological hope through subtle forms of presumption and despair. Drawing upon Aquinas and other sources in the Western theological tradition, this essay argues that Christians should retrieve worldliness as a moral category to better understand threats to hope. As a remedy to worldliness, Elliot proposes hope's beatitude of poverty of spirit, suggesting that it both increases solidarity with the poor and helps one grow in the theological virtue of hope.

Whether modern Protestant thinkers claim a direct inheritance to specific Reformers or not, they stand within a tradition that reveres grace as the preeminent moral standard, often at the expense of considerations of merit or desert. John Milbank and Kathryn Tanner exemplify such stances in their theological visions of economic exchange. I critique their positions by retrieving from John Calvin a more nuanced understanding of his outlook on deservingness, especially as it pertains to economic justice, and then suggest a concept of desert that works concomitantly with grace to overcome the frequent rejection or neglect of the standard in Protestant ethics.

Political and legal theorists sometimes assign attempts to define the purpose of law and government into one of two categories: protectionism indicates that law and government should protect people from the violation of their rights while perfectionism indicates that law and government should also actively promote virtue in the human community. In this essay I draw primarily from the biblical covenant with Noah (Gn 8:21–9:17), supplemented with other biblical and moral-theological considerations. I argue that protectionism, contrary to common assumptions, need not be individualist, subjectivist, or indifferent to the broader well-being of society. Furthermore, and chiefly, I argue that a strong (yet rebuttable) protectionist presumption ought to govern Christian ethical reflection upon the purpose of law and government.

John Howard Yoder's reclamation of Christ's law of love as normative for Christian ethics makes important contributions to the field, but this pacifist legacy is tainted by his sexual violence against women. Prominent "witness" and "feminist" ethicists either defend or condemn Yoder, reflecting retributive approaches to wrongdoing. Restorative justice models—with their emphasis on truth-telling, particularity, and communal responses to violence—illuminate common ground between these often antagonistic groups of ethicists, whose specific resources are needed to "do justice" to Yoder's legacy. Yoder claimed that "Christian identity itself calls for feminist engagement," but he failed to fully develop this claim in his theology or embody it in his life. By collaborating in such a truly feminist pacifist politics, witness and feminist ethicists not only strengthen their own internal projects with respect to the church's mission and the promotion of women's flourishing but also more effectively address sexual violence.

Henri de Lubac's (1896–1991) treatment of the relationship between nature and grace helped the Catholic Church to move beyond the antagonisms that had defined its relationship with the modern nation-state. In critiquing de Lubac, some recent scholarship has presented an interpretation of Aquinas that is remarkably similar to the problems associated with the neo-Scholastic method. These approaches indicate that in order for late modern democratic states to achieve their connatural ends of justice and the common good, they must directly advert to revealed knowledge and Church teaching. This essay proposes an alternative correction to de Lubac that both maintains a distinction between nature and grace and facilitates a capacity for Christians to engage in a nuanced dialogue of affirmation and critique of the human goods sought by late modern political and legal institutions. In the conclusion, this nature-grace distinction is used to analyze the way the US Catholic Bishops have engaged in moral, political, and legal debates over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

The international law regulating resort to armed force, still known by the Latin phrase, the jus ad bellum, forms a principal substantive subfield of international law, along with human rights law, international environmental law, and international economic law. Among theologians, philosophers, and political scientists, just war theory is a major topic of study. Nevertheless, only a minority of scholars and practitioners know both jus ad bellum and just war theory well. Lack of knowledge has led to the erroneous view that the two areas are in conflict. This article responds to this misapprehension, explaining the deep compatibility of international law and just war theory. Today's jus ad bellum, especially the peremptory norm against aggression, is not only the law; it also forms the minimum threshold of a just war under just war theory. In other words, for a war to be morally just, it must at least be lawful. To go to war in violation of the jus ad bellum is both a legal and a moral wrong. Compliance not only fulfills the general moral good of obedience to law; it forms the first step toward fulfilling moral obligations in the grave area of war. This characterization of the relationship between law and morality is seen in the history of the legal prohibition on force and in the actual set of rules that make up the contemporary regime. Comprehensive and persuasive accounts of the jus ad bellum and just war theory consistently reflect this thesis.

This essay invites Christian ethicists to engage in a mutually beneficial conversation with the secular law, particularly the common law. It argues that the common law's feature of narrative accountability provides a natural bridge to Christian ethics. It also points out contact points between the two fields regarding normative concepts of persons, actions, norms, and the common good. Finally, it illustrates the possibilities of a conversation between law and Christian ethics by delving into the leading case on the doctrine of unconscionability, which permits courts to refuse to enforce contracts that shock the conscience.