The aim of this article is to critically explore both the theories of “Confucian actual-possession criteria” and “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” and their views on the moral status of human embryos. “Confucian actual-possession criteria”, as accounts proposed for distinguishing person from non-person, and related ideas of Confucian gradualism and Confucian social personhood are discussed first. Their views on the moral status of human embryos are significant, though controversial, and therefore worthy of in-depth analysis. The article discusses then the claim appealing to “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” to justify the destructive use of human embryos for the sake of the welfare of humankind.I argue in this paper that none of the aforementioned Confucian theories of personhood is derivable from nor compatible with Confucianism. Moreover, the justification of sacrificing embryos based on “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” is not only ungrounded but also untenable from the viewpoint of the basic principle of non-maleficence.

According to Cicero’s De Officiis, the Stoic philosopher Panaetius discusses the notion of proper conduct in terms of the theory of four personae, i.e. rationality,personal characteristics, circumstance and chance, and choice. The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, the content and connotation of the theory will beexplored; secondly, by virtue of the discussion of the theory, the contemporary content-free slogan ‘Be Yourself’ could hopefully be provided with substance.This paper therefore consists mainly of three parts: The first part of this paper explores the four personae respectively, and discusses the problem: WhetherPanaetius’s theory is his own creation or influenced by some other philosophers? The second part deals with the issue: How can the four personae harmoniouslywork together? The third part focuses on the problem: What kind of life will one have, when he can make his four personae harmoniously work together?

The key question which new Confucians in the twentieth century attempted to solve is “Can Confucianism-based Chinese culture adopt Western modernscience?” Their program is Mou Zhongsan’s distinguished “Kei-Chu-Lun,” which claims that modern science must be dialectically developed out of, but not be transplanted to, Confucianism-based Chinese culture. The theory presupposes a doctrine of moral metaphysics, which implies a dichotomy between “the kingdom of a priori morality” and “the kingdom of a posteriori phenomena”. In this paper, I argue that the metaphysical doctrine is incompatible to ontologicalconditions by which modern science could be produced. Therefore, it fails in supporting “Kei-Chu-Lun.” I also argue that Confucianism-based Chinese culturehas no capability to develop Western modern science, although it has produced Chinese traditional science. Finally, I want to point out that the key problemwith which contemporary philosophers in Taiwan should deal is rather “what is Chinese culture when it has been transformed by modern science and technology” than “what is the relationship between modern science and Chinese culture.”

In this article, I attempt to throw some light on the basic structure of self-awareness (jikaku), which is one of the central concepts in the philosophy of Nishida, according to his early essay "Logical Understanding and Mathematical Understanding" published in 1912. Nishida puts forward a theory of logical development of experience which can be considered as the prototype of self-awareness. Here we can see Nishida's incorporation of ideas drawn from Rickert's and Sigwart’s logical thinking, Royce's self-representative system and Dedekind's definition of infinity into his own system of self-awareness. We focus on Nishida’s Rickert-interpretation. It is my view that only an infinite self-representative or a self-mirroring system cannot explain all of the aspects of Nishida's self-awareness for missing the intuition into the whole that inherent in this system. This ultimate whole which absolute free will intuits is the totality of being (on) and non-being (me on). I try to clarify its meaning according to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant’s productive imagination (produktive Einbildungskraft). The article is divided into four sections. After a brief introduction of the theme and method of the article (section one), I try to reconstruct Nishida's argumentations in logical understanding (section two) and mathematical understanding (section three). Finally in the last section (section four), I discuss some insights of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant's productive imagination, and attempt to expound possible horizons opened by Nishida in his discussion of the "Absolute Free Will".

The present study treats political authority as a “command-obedience” relationship. This relationship appears in different “forms,” and each respective form is underpinned by a certain “base.” The author targets the forms and bases of political authority exposed in the chapter “Quanxiu” of Guanzi and finds that morality and law are typical forms of authority. From a more detailed analysis, the legal form is presented in the three distinctive dimensions: legitimate authority, induced authority, and coercive authority. The author further argues that the moral form has a mental base, whereas legal form is based on economy and force.

This paper aims to discuss how Sengzhao, basing on the Buddhist view of “naming of illusory existence”, acquires the insight into the existence of all dharmas and reveals the connotation of ultimate reality. Through this insight, he distinguishes true existence from insubstantial and epistemological existence and opens a thinking path to the “ultimate truth” or “nature of things”. The discussion is based mainly on Sengzhao's works: Treatise of Things Do Not Shift and Commentary to the Vimalakirti Nirdesa-Sutra. The approach focuses on self-reflection and the interpretation of his philosophy. The main conclusions drawn from this research include:(1) The viewpoint taken in Treatise of Things Do Not Shift involving “the nature of things” is a theory which establishes the concept of naming for the insubstantial existence.(2) The theory of “Not Shift” is established on the cognitive framework through which things are distinguished from the phenomena.(3) Although the concept, “Things Do Not Shift” does not imply that it is the ultimate truth, it can be seen as a path of exploring truth.(4) Regardless pro or con towards the views of Sengzhao, one must clearly distinguish the differences between the epistemological and ontological definitions of “Things” in order to discuss the divergent views of “Things Do Not Shift” and to be more convincing.

In Nietzsche’s idea of “God is dead”, man has lost his validity in the origin of value, no longer holds the meaning and truth of constancy and eternity in the world of becoming built on “will to power”, but comprehends the meaning of existence through their relative and temporary validity and value. The present work attempts to seek in Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence a possible comprehension and evaluation toward life other than “God is dead” or traditionalmetaphysics, and to create new values from the new way of understanding in the world of becoming. For this, the hypothesis addressed in the present workis: The doctrine of eternal recurrence is the manner of man’s self-evaluation. Its particularity lies in that, through this manner of evaluation, the meaning ofthe world of becoming is reserved on one hand, and the value of existence is created within nihilism and becoming on the other. This manner is presented inNietzsche’s philosophy as a dynamic development from “nihilism” to “laughing”. Beyond all language and rationality, “laughing” has created a new point ofview setting out from the body, and is the meaning of human as super-human.

This paper, taking ideas from history of philosophy, reflects on Wang, Yang-Ming’s criticisms of Chu, Xi. The reflection indicates that these critical ideas are all derived directly from Wang’s interpretation of Dah Xue (The Great Learning). Taking the perspective that nearly all Wang’s works are based on criticizing Chu’s theory, we can say however that Wang is deeply influenced by Chu. Actually, their difference is not that explicit as seen from the generally held distinction in history of philosophy between Cheng and Chu about Li (principle) school on the one hand and Lu and Wang about Xing (principle) school on the other. In fact, according to Wang’s criticisms which concentratedthe limits of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu, we see clearly that the problem originated from Wang’s confusion of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu with Chu’s personal ability of Kung Fu. Moreover, on the Kung Fu theoretical level, Wang’s criticisms confused Chu’s theory of Kung Fu procedure and ontology with pure Kung Fu theory. Consequently this confusion caused the lost of accuracy. Besides, there were other problems relating to criticism based on different interpretations of Pre-Qing Dynasty texts and various views on deviating editions of Dah Xue. This paper however holds the view that these differences caused by referring to ancient texts can be attributed to their differences concerning their attitudes towards the fundamental philosophical problems. It is on this view that this paper argues that the difference between Wang and Chu can be resolved by elaborating their differing problematics.

The remarkable philosophical innovations revealed in the interpretations of the classics, which has on the one hand contributed to the Sinicization of Buddhism and to the development of Neo-Confucianism, and has provided valuable intellectual sources and theoretical models on the other, are probably the reason why metaphysics in Wei and Jin Dynasties played an important role in Chinese philosophy. The essence of Wang Pi’s philosophy consists in three pairs of concepts, being and non-being, root and branch, and substance and function, by which his philosophical innovation can be illustrated. I try to show Wang Pi’s philosophical innovation in three ways: i. from the concept of Being and Non-Being, a new connotation or logic can be found in the ancient concepts. ii, from the concept of root and branch, the logical sequence of the text can be clarified. iii, from the concept of substance and function, the process of rendering brand-new meaning by employing new conceptual categories as framework (or logic) is demonstrated. This essay attempts to show the philosophical innovation in Wang Pi’s philosophy through these three pairs of concepts.

有關行動理由的哲學爭辯常聚焦於理由與動機之關連，內在論主張行動 理由與動機事實有必要之聯結，外在論則否認。1980 年，威廉斯發表論文 “Internal and External Reasons”，提出反對外在論的強力論證，引發了倫理 學、行動理論以及理由理論一連串深具影響力的辯論。二十年後，他發表 “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons”（2001），精進他的休謨 理論以回應這些年來其他學者所提出的質詢；更重要的是，他將過去二十多 年來的主要批評歸類為兩種進路：「康德進路」以及「亞理斯多德進路」，並 且對二者提出強烈反對。本文檢視康德進路及亞理斯多德進路近來的可能發 展，其中包括柯思嘉和麥克道爾的哲學論述，以解釋並論證為何威廉斯的最 新論點不足以反駁此二進路。

This paper is one of a series of my articles researching practice ways of “Perfect-teaching” (圓教) in T’ien-t’ai Buddhism. Practicing different ways of Perfect-teaching is the most unsurpassable and wonderful one among all dharma-gates. However, it has been an issue of debate among the academia whether these are suitable for average people to practice or not. Moreover, I realize that in fact, there are several ways to practice Perfect-teaching showing different characteristics. As a result, they have their different positions, are suitable for different people, and can reach different obtainments.In order to fully comprehend the related issues in ways of practice in Perfect-teaching, it is imperative to fully clarify aspects that are not well defined in academia. For example, different ways of practice, possibilities in classification of different ways, and justifications of different ways in Perfect-teaching should all be studied. Main objectives of this research are as follows: all ways of practice in Perfect-teaching will be collected, reasons of different ways of practice as such will be analyzed and classified, and then foundations of various ways in practicing Perfect-teaching will be concluded. Only after these works have been done can one gain a correct whole picture of the practices in Perfect-teaching which is the foundation to sort out different viewpoints of the Perfect-teaching.After analyzing thirty ways of practice in Perfect-teaching taught by Master Zhi-yi (智顗), seven characteristics or circumstances can be identified that make a certain practice under the Perfect-teaching:a. when recitation of the Saddharmapundarika Sutra (妙法蓮華經) is involved or it has been stated clearly in the scripture;b. when it belongs to the unsurpassed Buddha of Perfect-teaching;c. when it corresponds to the principles of the Perfect-teaching;d. when it is defined by the principle of Perfect-teaching;e. practices which are unique to the Perfect-teaching;f. those that are the prerequisites of “Threefold Contemplation in One Single Mind” (一心三觀,) which is the representative way of practice in Perfect-teaching; andg. those that are auxiliary to the “Threefold Contemplation in One Single Mind.”

本論文試圖論證：殊性存有論並不需要將殊性之間的相似關係作為其存 有論的原初設定。論證主要依據所謂的「位元原則」。但這不表示「相似」 是一個沒有意義的概念。本論文建議，在形上學裡，「相似」可以化約到介 於兩個一階內存關係之間的二階內存關係，例如「大於」、「重於」；本論文 並且倡議相似現象應該訴求知識論或心理學的解釋。

This paper focuses on two famous debates concerning “humaneness” between Zhu Xi and the Hu Xiang scholars. Based on the survey of literature, this paper tries to justify, at least partly, what Zhu Xi comprehends about the philosophical position of Hu Xiang School. According to Zhu Xi’s philosophy, “humaneness” specifically labels the complete virtue of mind which exemplifies excellent qualities. On the one hand, Zhu Xi objects to the claim of those Hu Xiang scholars that“humaneness” can be defined as “vivid perception”; on the other hand, he argued that perception is by nature attributed to the intellectual virtue, although the humane person certainly possesses the competence of perception. As a matter of fact, the key point of the two debates between Zhu Xi and the Hu Xiang scholars is how to treat Hsieh Liang-Tso’s interpretation of humaneness.Furthermore, this paper argues that Cheng Hao, Hsieh’s teacher, illustrated distinctively the concept of humaneness in his own analogical or metaphorical way, but Hsieh’s formulation of it is akin to definition of a certain kind. This missed link or the rhetorical nuance is the reason why the Hu Xiang scholars follow Hsieh’s approach to humaneness and Zhu Xi has to argue against their ideas of humaneness.

Rosenberg (2006) argues for reductionism in biology, and he has a special name for the position he adopts: Darwinian Reductionism (DR). The reason why it is dubbed Darwinian is that natural selection plays a key role in answering questions as to what form reductionism should take and what is the lowest level that biological explanations can be reduced to. Given that most contemporary philosophers of biology are anti-reductionists, Rosenberg begins his argument with a diagnosis of why they have been led to embrace the antireductionism: (1) the inapplicability of Nagelian account of reduction to biological sciences; (2) Mayr’s distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations; and (3) the literal truth of Dobzhansky’s dictum that nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. In this paper, I will critically examine Rosenberg’s DR. I will begin with an analysis of how Rosenberg responds to the anti-reductionists’ considerations, and how he is led step by step to DR. Then I will argue that an internal intension is implicit in DR, for it turns out to be not only Darwinian, but also Nagelian. Such an intension, as I will argue, brings some troubles to DR: (1) DR has difficulties convincing biologists who agree with Mayr that biology, as a discipline, is unique and autonomous. (2) DR is forced to abandon the ideal unification of all physical sciences, based on the Nagelian account of reductionism. In addition, DR has difficulties explaining why the principle of natural selection, among all laws in the physical sciences, turns out to be the only one law in its kind. (3) Ironically and to Rosenberg’s surprise, DR has difficulties rendering the principle of natural selection compatible with the physicalism. The critical examination of DR leads me to the conclusion: if we aim to figure out how explanation and reduction in biology proceed, instead of confining ourselves to the law-based account, which is modeled on the physical sciences, we should pay more attention to how biology is distinct from the physical sciences.

It is said that Hegel’s method is dialectic, while the dialectical method is said to be the form of ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’. This paper argues that both these sayings are legends which lack support from the text. It then studies the text of Phenomenology of Spirit and advocates that what Hegel talks about in his work is the method of phenomenology. It also surveys and criticizes the other interpretations. As for dialectic, this paper proposes in accordance with the text to ascribe it to Hegel’s metaphysics rather than his method.

This paper tries to elucidate what Nietzsche’s view of history and his thesis about the relationship between history and life would be in his essay On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for the Life. It is above all to explain how Nietzsche criticizes the teleology of history and the methodology of historiography in this article: Nietzsche claims that there would be no ultimate destination of human activities and the history itself, and that historical writing could not fulfill the objective standard. In another words, the historical writing which runs after the goal of objectivity would, as purely theoretical knowledge, become an obstacle of human life and action, and would then wither and ossify the human life. Historical knowledge and memory would be, in the sight of Nietzsche, a stone of stumbling to autonomous creativity and practice of human life. By this Nietzsche demonstrates the characteristics of human individual life: Neither can life be eternal and immortal, nor would it even be a substantial being; at the same time, it would not necessarily be rational, moral and just. Life is mortal and is a perpetually changing and unfathomable phenomenon. By analyzing the attitude toward history and historical writing, Nietzsche lays the emphasis that life would have to realize itself and surpass itself by the autonomous determination, action and practice.

At the first glance, Mou Zongsan's and Heidegger’s interpretations of Kant seem to be irrelevant to each other. The former focuses on “intellectual intuition” while the latter on “imagination”. In fact, the nexus between them may be more complicated. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger suggests that the essence of cognition in general is intuition and the receptivity of sensible intuition is the root of human finitude. We can conclude his thought into the following theses: (1) Human beings have only sensible intuition; (2) Human beings are finite. In his Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhewue, Mou translates §16 and §25 of Kantbook and he claims the following theses in contrast to Heidegger: (1) Human beings can have intellectual intuition; (2) Human beings are finite and yet they can be infinite. Mou is determined to go beyond the line delimited by Heidegger. Therefore, Mou thinks that human beings should have “intellectual intuition” and thus they are able to create “thing-in-itself”. In this paper, I try to argue that Mou’s doctrine is not a reformulation of Kant’s philosophy, but an illustration of a relation between “heart-mind” and “thing”: Heart-mind is an ability to bestow value on other things.Despite Mou’s doctrine is not as radical as we may think, we can still consider that he exaggerates the status of human beings. Mou puts his ontology out of time and he regards an infinite noumenon as the ground of his ontology. In Heidegger’s opinion, this is doomed to failure. In Kantbook, Heidegger highlights the concept of imagination in order to show that human beings are both sensible and intellectual. Any concept is worth to be cognized only if it goes through a procedure by imagination─schematized─and then they have spatial-temporal elements. In this sense, there is not a separation between understanding and sensibility, spontaneity and receptivity. All in all, human capacity to reason cannot separated from finitude. Under Heidegger’s challenge, Mou’s radical claim on “infinite heart-mind” seems not possible to stand firm.

Most contemporary philosophers believe that things in the world can be exhaustively and exclusively divided into two categories: abstract objects and concrete ones, and a main “problem” about this division is where exactly the line between these two categories should be drawn? Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (2003) argued that every ordinary distinction between these two categories was subject to some serious problems and counterexamples, and they therefore proposed a novel distinction that they believed to be completely unproblematic. This paper argues against their proposal by appealing to the same strategy and criterion that they set up for other proposals. This paper also argues for two other points. First, it argues that the fundamental reason why it is so hard (even impossible) to find “the right” distinction between abstract and concrete objects is that philosophers’ “intuition” about the distinction is nothing but the result of conflation and confusion of several non-equivalent and/or vague distinctions. Second, it argues that the problem of the distinction between abstract and concrete objects is of no philosophical significance; it is, therefore, a pseudo problem that need not be investigated at all.

I will focus upon the arguments of Wang Yang Ming’s theory of “Zhi Hsin He Yi”(知行合一) in this paper. Concerning this issue, scholars have proposed various interpretations, pondering whether “Yi Nian Fa Dong Chu” (一念發動處) is applicable to “Zhi Hsin He Yi.” For instance, Chen Lai accentuates “Chong Hsin” (重行) and argues that “Yi Nian Fa Dong Chu” is not applicable to “Zhi Hang He Yi.” Besides Li Ming Hui suggests that “Yi Nian”(意念) is also an “act” in “Zhi Hsin He Yi” so as to solve the entanglement. Inspired by these researches, I intend to analyze the intricate relationship between “Zhi Hang He Yi” and “Yi Nian.” Furthermore, I will reevaluate whether “Shan Nian”(善念) and “Er Nian”(惡念) can be categorized as an “act” in Wang Yang Ming’s theoretical framework. Finally, I attempt toassimilate the arguments proposed by Chen Lai and Li Ming Hui while returning to the core principle of Wang Yang Ming’s “Zhi Hsin He Yi.”

The concept of oikeiōsis is the characteristic of Stoic ethics. The ontological foundation of the oikeiōsis is based on its pantheistic material monism. Thecosmos is constituted by god (gods), humans and natural world as a complete divine substance. The whole cosmos is controlled and directed by the divinelogos. For the stoics, matter is the only true reality. Man is joined by soul and body as a structured wholistic self. The oikeiōsis is in developing processes.Living in accordance with nature and making all those belong to oneself as one’s own is the first stage of oikeiōsis at the moment of the birth of all the animals,including humans. At this stage animals attain their oikeiōsis by their instincts. At the beginning of its birth, a baby lives in agreement with its nature just as theway animals do. When it grows up, as its reason develops, living in accordance with nature turns out to be living in accordance with reason. The second stage ofoikeiōsis is then to attain summum bonum, leading a virtuous life, since man as rational being is capable of recognizing what his constitution is. Because allmen possess the same reason and belong to the same human family, oikeiōsis by nature has social dimension. At the third stage, a man should take intoaccount of his fellow’s well-being as his own oikeiōsis. A man should love the others as he loves himself.This paper tries to argue why the Stoics’ oikeiōsis concept based on its pantheistic material monism. The reason is its objection to any forms of dualism, especially the Platonic dualism; the dualistic opposition between the immaterial and material worlds, that of the psyche and body, and even that of rational and irrational. The Stoics’ oikeiōsis is not only based on its idea of the wholistic cosmos, but also found on that of the structured wholistic self; i.e. the psychophysical whole and the relations between a human being with itself, with the others, and with the natural world. This kind of wholistic ideas of the cosmos and of humans are what Plato denied.