321.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1982 >
Issue: 5
謝格式
試論莊子內篇之有中心思想
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322.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1982 >
Issue: 5
陳文;莓
是於守恆論域語意的 量限模態邏輯的樹法
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323.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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楊志南
龍樹的«中論»用了辯證法嗎?
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324.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1982 >
Issue: 5
安誌格
戴東原苛學之評析
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325.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1982 >
Issue: 5
張永偽
二位先主「闢佛說」合議
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326.
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Issue: 5
哲學茶簡訊
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327.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2015 >
Issue: 50
楊植勝
Chih-Sheng Yang
愛的理性化─黑格爾哲學的理性與基督宗教的博愛
Love Becoming Reason
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本文論證黑格爾哲學的理性概念是基督宗教博愛誡命的理性化。基督宗 教的博愛誡命是《聖經》的「新約」最重要的誡命;它超越卻實現「舊約」 裡的法律。它具有矛盾的特性,尤以「愛仇人」的命令為典型。但是它也因 此把有限的人提升到無限。黑格爾的理性概念在這些方面都與它相同:揚棄 律則,對人類知性表現為矛盾,並且被把握為屬於無限的領域。
This paper argues that the concept of reason in Hegel’s philosophy is the rationalization of the commandment of love in Christianity. The commandment of love is the greatest one in the New Testament of the Bible. Love surpasses but also fulfils the law of the Old Testament. There is contradiction in the commandment, which is most evident in the command ‘love for enemies.’ Nevertheless, only by love is the mortal raised to the divine and the infinite. Hegel’s reason has all of these characteristics: it sublates the law; it appears as something contradictory to human understanding; and it is comprehended as belonging to the infinite.
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328.
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Issue: 50
嚴瑋泓
Wei-Hung Yen
如何理解《六祖壇經》的倫理學型態?
How to Comprehend the Types of Ethical Theories of The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch?
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中國佛教倫理思維的特色,在於將戒律的規範性轉移到對心性的重視,其道德實踐的終極目的乃透過排除遮蔽心性的煩惱與顯露清淨本性等進路而完成的。此種主張以禪宗為最,《六祖壇經》中「心平何勞持戒?行直何用修禪?」、「心地無非,自性戒」等說法,特別顯露了中國佛教倫理思維的特色。本文以《壇經》作為探究以禪宗為基礎的倫理學理路。首先從戒律與心性論的視角思考《壇經》的道德思考屬於哪種類型的倫理學?再者,反思《壇經》獨特的倫理思想型態是否與西方倫理學之理論有對話的可能性?一方面從《壇經》內在倫理型態思考其與德行倫理學的相似性,並論述其是否可能為某種形式的德行倫理學;二方面從禪宗哲學明心見性、解脫成佛之終極目的,思考是否可將《壇經》的倫理型態視為某種形式的結果主義?本文的研究成果顯示,《壇經》的倫理學型態包含了返回自性的理路與從緣起與無常所構築的世界觀所引發的「無所住」視角,據此產生一種認識的超越性而指向涅槃解脫。如是般從「認識」而「解脫」的理路提示著一種自律的倫理學型態,在此種型態中,道德主體藉著實踐智慧自發地出於善、完成善。若從理論的相似性來理解《壇經》的倫理學型態,我們最多只能謹慎地作出如下的結論:若從理論的相似性來看,《壇經》的倫理學型態約略可將其類比於德行倫理學與結果主義,甚至是義務論的主張,但若從其理論的內在理路看來,在理論的相似性之外,還必須從差異性來把握其倫理學型態。
This paper uses The Platform Sutra as the theoretical background for probing the ethics on which Chan Buddhism built its foundations. First of all, I analyze the type of ethics that the content of the The Platform Sutra can be said to display from the perspective of the view on precepts and mind-nature and subsequently offer my opinion on the similarities between virtue ethics and the type of ethics displayed in The Platform Sutra. Next, I give consideration to whether The Platform Sutra can be classified as a type of consequentialism when viewed in terms of the Chan Buddhist notion of instant revelation, along with the ultimate Buddhist aim of liberation from suffering and the attainment of Buddhahood. The outcome of this paper suggests that, The Platform Sutra offers a transcendental cognition aiming at Nirvāna and that its central theme of “non-abiding,” derived from the ethical perspective of this text which in turn is based upon both the theoretical journey of returning to mind-nature and a world view constructed around Dependent Origination and Impermanence. The theoretical journey that starts with “cognition” and culminates in “liberation” prompts an ethical pattern of autonomy, whereas the moral subject spontaneously perfects all virtues through the practical wisdom of proper conduct. When considering the ethics of The Platform Sutra it would be prudent to conclude only the following: when seen purely from the aspect of theoretical similarity, the ethical pattern of The Platform Sutra can be said to be roughly analogous to virtue ethics and consequentialism, and perhaps even to deontology. However, when the intrinsic theory of The Platform Sutra is taken into account, it is evident that apart from theoretical similarity, the view of differentiation still needs to be incorporated into the ethical equation of this text.
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329.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2015 >
Issue: 50
陳林
Lin Chen
朱子工夫思想的內在發展理路─以已發未發為視角
Intrinsic Development Clue on Chu Hsi’s Gong-fu Thought
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朱子的工夫思想有著內在的發展理路。在「中和舊說」時期,朱子以體 用思維來處理已發未發問題,認為未發是體,是性;已發是用,是心。與此 心性論相對應,朱子提出了「先察識後涵養」的為學工夫思想。在「中和新 說」時期,朱子則以經驗現象中的時間先後和空間動靜來區分已發未發,把 未發理解為心之「思慮未萌、事物未至」的狀態、已發理解為心之「思慮已 萌、事物交至」的狀態,並認為「性為心之體、情為心之用,心統性情」。 與這種心性論相對應,朱子提出了「未發涵養,已發省察,敬貫通已發未發」 的為學工夫。而在晚年,朱子則以心在應事接物時是否順理而為來區分已發 未發,進而把已發未發融合貫通起來,不再執著已發未發之間的時間先後和 空間動靜的界限。由是,朱子晚年試圖打通涵養主敬工夫與格物窮理工夫,使之融合為一,強調涵養主敬與格物窮理相互滲透、相互發明,其工夫思想 也走向了更圓融之境。
Chu Hsi’s Gong-fu Thought has its intrinsic development clue. During the period of his ‘early doctrine of Mean,’ Chu Hsi dealt with the stirring and not stirring problems by thinking of entity and function; he considered that not stirring was entity and nature, while stirring was function and mind. Corresponding to the theory of mind and nature, Chu Hsi proposed the Studying Gong-fu Thought which means ‘first identifying the source of consciousness then cultivating with Heart.’ During the period of his ‘later doctrine of Mean,’ Chu Hsi made the distinction between the stirring and not stirring through chronological arrangement and motion and still in space in empirical phenomena, through which not stirring was interpreted as the state of ‘thinking no sprout and things without realizing,’ while stirring was interpreted as the state of ‘thinking sprout and things realized.’ He also considered that ‘nature’ was the entity of mind, and Qing was the function of mind, man's spiritual mentality consists of sense and sensibility. Corresponding to such theory of mind and nature, Chu Hsi proposed the Studying Gong-fu Thought which means that ‘self-restrain when not stirring, self-examinate when stirring, and respectfulness exists through stirring and not stirring.’ In his later years, Zhu Hsi made the distinction between the stirring and not stirring through minds responding thing following Li or not, and thus made possible the interaction between the stirring and not stirring. He did not insist on figuring out the boundary of chronological arrangement and motion and still in space between stirring and not stirring. Therefore, Zhu Hsi tried to unite respectfulness and Ge-Wu-Qiong-Li as a whole and emphasized that respectfulness and Ge-Wu-Qiong-Li should be interpenetrative, which makes his Gong-fu Thought be more harmonious.
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330.
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劉作
Zuo Liu
活的黑格爾─評劉創馥教授的《黑格爾新釋》
Living Hegel: Comment on Prof. Chong-Fuk Lau's A New Interpretation of Hegel
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331.
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傅皓政
Hao-Cheng Fu
論死亡之剝奪說
On Deprivation Account of Death
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伊比鳩魯在〈給美諾西厄斯的信〉中提到死亡本身其實並沒有什麼,所 以根本無需懼怕,我認為在他的論證中潛藏三個非常重要的預設:(1)快樂 主義;(2)物理主義以及(3)存在要求。表面上看起來,伊比鳩魯的論證 似乎是成立的,由於人死亡之後就沒有任何感覺,也就不會有任何快樂或痛 苦的感受,所以,對死亡者本身而言,他顯然無法評斷死亡這個事件對自己 而言到底是好或不好。然而,沒有實際感覺到某個事件所帶來的痛苦經驗,對某人而言就沒有好或不好的評價嗎?事實不然。我在本篇論文中將試圖透 過剝奪說證明即使某人無法實際感受到某個事件對他而言是快樂或痛苦,該 事件對其本身而言是好或不好仍然是可以評價的,並且透過價值比較理論證成對某人而言,即使他沒有實際感受到該事件帶來的痛苦,我們仍然會同意 該事件對他而言確實造成傷害的論題。因此,伊比鳩魯認為死亡並沒有什麼 的論證並不成立。
In Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus contended that death is nothing to us since it is the deprivation of all sensations. I find that his argument implies at least three assumptions, which are hedonism, physicalism and existence requirement. At first glance, Epicurus’ argument seemed to be acceptable due to one is deprived all his sensations and unable to estimate whether death is good or bad for him when death comes. So, it is concluded that death is nothing to us. However, the question follows: is something really not bad for a person if one has no capacity to acquire the unpleasant experiences? I must say that the answer is ‘No’. In this essay, I will argue that something is bad for the people even they don’t have any unpleasant experience and most of us will agree that he is indeed harmed by the lack of pleasant experiences. Thus, Epicurus’ argument is implausible because the strong version of existence requirement is not justified.
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332.
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2016 >
Issue: 51
洪巳軒
Szu-Hsuan Hung
從《韓非子》「人設之勢」 論政治權力之鞏固
On the Consolidation of Political Power from the “Man-Made Shi” in Hanfeizi
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如果政治權力是一種命令者有意圖的以各種方式促使他人服從其對於 有價值之資源的支配性分配活動,那麼如何建立政治的權力關係就成為最關 鍵的焦點。《韓非子》認為道德性的權力關係在理論上雖然可能卻不可行,是以主張透過法令的制定以作為權力的形式要件。並以賞、罰為政治權力的 實質要件,在以人情好利惡害為理論基礎下,透過權力者於發布命令時所挾 帶的教育、經濟與武力之優勢資源,認定權力對象會選擇放棄抵抗而採取服 從行為,權力關係由是建立。
Political power can be defined as “what the commanders purposefully do, by all means, to acquire public obedience to their allocation of resources.” Hanfeizi claims that a morality-based power relationship is theoretically possible, but not actually feasible. Instead, laws should be the core in a political power relationship. More specifically, by assuming that human beings are benefit-oriented and harm-aversive, commanders should make orders based on their advantages in education, economic status, and military power to punish and reward people. These orders will eventually replace resistance with obedience and construct a political power relationship.
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333.
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Issue: 51
鄧敦民
Duen-Min Deng
自然演繹法系統之比較
A Critical Comparison of Natural Deduction Systems
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自然演繹法(natural deduction)是大多數基礎邏輯課程中所教的證明 系統,然而不同的教科書所採用的自然演繹法系統不盡相同,造成了教學與 學習上的困擾。特別是在量詞推論規則上,我們有兩套完全不同的系統。其 中一個系統(本文稱之為「Gentzen 系統」)使用了一條看起來較為複雜的 「存在個例化規則」(existential instantiation),而另一個系統(本文稱之為 「Copi-Kahane 系統」),則是用了一條看起來較為簡單的存在個例化規則。 雖然目前大部分中文邏輯教科書都採用了「Copi-Kahane 系統」的規則,然 而也有少數中英文基礎邏輯或中階邏輯教科書是採用「Gentzen 系統」。這造 成了教學上的一些問題,例如它也許會造成基礎邏輯與中階邏輯課程銜接上 的一些難度。在本文中,我將從邏輯教學的觀點來比較「Gentzen 系統」與 「Copi-Kahane 系統」的優劣,並對於我們應該採用哪一個系統來教學提出 我的建議。
Natural deduction is the logical system most commonly used in teaching elementary logic. However, different textbooks may adopt different versions of the natural deduction system, which can be quite annoying to many teachers and students of logic. More precisely, with regard to the inference rules for quantifiers, there are two completely different systems of natural deduction. One system (which I shall call the “Gentzen system”) has a rule of “existential instantiation” that looks pretty complicated, whilst the other system (which I shall call the “Copi-Kahane system”) has a much simpler rule for existential instantiation. Although most of the Chinese textbooks for elementary logic use the rules of the Copi-Kahane system, there are still some textbooks for elementary logic or intermediate logic which use the Gentzen system. This leads to some problems especially in teaching logic, as students may find it somehow difficult to learn intermediate logic (which usually use the Gentzen system) if what they learn in elementary logic is the Copi-Kahane system. In this paper, I shall critically compare the Gentzen system with the Copi-Kahane system to judge which one is better for teachingelementary logic.
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334.
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韓曉華
Hiu-Wah Hon
論牟宗三對「哲學語言」的理解:
從牟譯《名理論》來看
Mou Zong-san on Philosophical Language
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本文認為牟宗三先生重新翻譯維特根什坦的《名理論》之目的,固然 是吸納與消化萊布尼茲與羅素等的邏輯分析一套之思考於其《認識心之判批》 內,即對邏輯系統作出重新之疏解。然而,牟宗三先生以「分解地說」與「非 分解地說」來重新釐定維氏的「可說」與「不可說」,則表達了他對「哲學 語言」的理解。此「哲學語言」的理解至少具有兩重意義:一是牟宗三先生 所論「哲學」之可能根據;二是牟宗三先生以其獨特的「哲學語言」觀對 經典詮釋方案的可能依據。依此,梳理牟宗三先生的「哲學語言」觀,即具 有能理解牟宗三先生哲學思想的兩大重要工作(哲學思想和哲學詮釋)的 意義。
This paper argues that the purpose of Mou Zong-san’s retranslation of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is to incorporate Leibniz and Russell’s thoughts of logical analysis into his A Critique of the Cognitive Mind. In order to succeed, Mou held the distinction between “discriminating speech” and “undiscriminating speech” to express his view of “philosophical language” which has at least two meanings: First, the “philosophy” that Mou argues is based on this view. Second, Mou’s unique view of “philosophical language” is likely to be a basis of his interpretation of the classics. Therefore, clarifying Mou’s view of “philosophical language” will significantly enable us to understand the two crucial tasks (philosophical thinking and philosophical interpretations) of Mou’s philosophy.
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陳榮華
Wing-Wah Chan
羅逖的脈絡重整與高達美的視域融合
Rorty’s Recontextualization and Gadamer’s Fusion of Horizons
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本文首先指出,無論羅逖(Rorty)的脈絡重整 (recontextualization) 和高達美(Gadamer)的視域融合 (Horizontverschmelzung, fusion of horizons) 都是思考的過程。雖然它們是兩種不同的理論,但都是獲得知識的方式。然後本文要證成,脈絡重整無法得到實有的知識,也無法完成羅逖的啟發哲學 (edifying philosophy) 的理想,這是說,脈絡重整無法突破已有的哲學典範,創立新的哲學典範,以提出創新的哲學知識。但高達美的視域融合卻可以避免脈絡重整的困難,讓人能理解實有,也可突破而得到創新的知識。因此相對而言,高達美的視域融合是較合理的思考理論。
This essay first shows that the concept of recontextualization in Rorty and the fusion of horizons in Gadamer are ways of thinking through which knowledge is obtained. Then, I argue that recontexuationalization, as a way of thinking in Rorty, fails both in the achievement of knowledge about reality and in the establishment of Rorty’s philosophical ideal: edifying philosophy. The argument implies that the concept of recontextualization is not able to create a new paradigm by breaking the imprisonment of our present paradigm. Nevertheless, as Gadamer’s fusion of horizon avoids the theoretical difficulties existing in Rorty’s concept of recontextualization, it leads us to obtain the knowledge about reality by being able to create new knowledge. Therefore, in comparison with Rorty’s recontextualization, Gadamer’s fusion of horizons is a more satisfactory theory of thinking.
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Issue: 52
林宏星
Hong-Xin Lin
朱子論真知及其動機效力
Zhuxi on True Knowledge and It’s Motivational Efficacy
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本文試圖通過對朱子「真知」概念的內容和結構的分析,說明「真知」概念所包含的動機效力,並藉由T. Nagel 的理論,以回應休謨式問題的詰難。對於「知而不能行」之知,朱子認為這種知只是淺知,而真知則必能行。依朱子,一個人在特定情境下對何為最好的知道得越深,他就越可能依其判斷去行動,當一個人之知達到了最高的程度,他便完全會依知而行。這種知(真知)不僅是對所當然之則之知,也是對所以然之理之知,而這種所以然之理原在自家身心上,經由反省體驗而得,因而具有在道德行動中決定如此而不如彼的動機效力
This paper tries to explain the idea of motivational efficacy included in Zhuxi’s concept of “true knowledge” by analyzing the content and structure of this concept, and to face the challenge of the Humean problem through T. Nagel’s theory. For Zhuxi, the knowledge of “knowing without being able to act” (zhi er bu neng xing) is merely knowledge of a shallow kind as the true knowledge will definitely lead to action. In a given situation, the better a man knows what good is, the more likely he acts according to his judgment. When a man’s knowledge reaches the highest degree, he will completely follow it. This kind of knowledge (“true knowledge”) is not only the one that man acts according to what he knows, but also the one that man should do. The latter originates from one’s own mind, and it can be known only through self-reflection by gaining the motivational efficacy determining why a man does this way rather than the other in moral actions.
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林薰香
Shing-Shang Lin
瞬間的永恆─海德格《尼采》與《存有與時間》之研究
The Eternity of the Augenblick
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海德格於《尼采》(1961)以存有理解為基礎接續《存有與時間》對存有和時間的追問,論點則由《存有與時間》存有者的存有、向來屬我性(Jemeinigkeit)的個體性轉向存有者整體(das Seiende im Ganzen)、存有本身,因而出現與前期哲學有所延續卻又不同的關係。透過對尼采永恆輪迴學說與強力意志的詮釋,海德格於《尼采》提出「瞬間的永恆(Ewigkeit des Augenblicks)」。如此意義下的永恆與時間及自身性有關,而且和《存有與時間》的瞬間(Augenblick)概念及自主式的自由具有某種相似性,因此本文以《尼采》為主,並藉助《存有與時間》的相關論述,探討海德格有關瞬間和永恆的概念,以及瞬間、永恆與人的可能關係。
In Nietzsche (1961), Heidegger investigates the questions of being and time based on a common base, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927), referring to the understanding of being. But his theses shifts from the being of beings and the individual of (in each case) mine (Jemeinigkeit) in Being and Time to the beings on the whole and being as such in Nietzsche.In Nietzsche, Heidegger has a new definition of eternity (the “Now” falling back into the Self), and seeks the eternity of the Augenblick (blink) by ways of interpreting Nietzsche’s concepts of Will to Power and Eternal Return. I argue that the new meaning of eternity which relates to time and the self (Selbst, Selbstheit) is similar to the concept of Augenblick (blink) and autonomic freedom (Freiheit der Selbstständigkeit) in Being and Time. So, mainly based on Nietzsche and with the aid of Being and Time, this paper aims to investigate Heidegger’s concepts of Augenblick and eternity as well as their relation with human beings.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2016 >
Issue: 52
魏嘉華
Chia-Hua Wei
倫理的意向性分析─以郎尼根思想為框架
Intentionality Analysis of Ethics
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郎尼根主張倫理意向性分析顯示出倫理行為是動態的。它包括:實在的知識、價值反省、價值判斷、決定與行動。實在的知識是透過認知理論的應用而達成的。再者,人基於對價值的無私渴求,會繼續追問一個更深的問題:「我應該做什麼?」如此人便進入倫理反省的範圍。在倫理反省中,人透過情感而意識到價值。此外,情感對價值的回應發生在情感視野中,情感視野會對價值範圍建構出一個方向,它會特別影響價值詢問、價值反省、深思熟慮、價值判斷、決定與行動。至於價值反省與價值判斷,通常是習慣性的。當人遇到新情境、新的情感和價值判斷的新問題時,人會啟動價值反省和價值判斷的新過程。倫理反省是可以自我修訂。人根據價值判斷,而作出決定與實踐決定。
Lonergan argues that intentionality analysis shows that ethical behavior is dynamic. It includes knowledge of reality, reflection on value, judgment of value, decision and action. Knowledge of reality is achieved through the application of cognitional theory. In addition, based upon the pure desire for value, human beings continue to ask a further question: “What should I do?”. With this question, human beings enter the realm of ethical reflection. In ethical reflection, human beings become conscious of value through feelings. Moreover, feelings in response to value occur in the horizon of feelings. The horizon of feelings constitutes an orientation toward the realm of value. It especially affects inquiry into value, reflection on value, deliberation, judgment of value, decision and action. Reflection on value and judgment of value are usually habitual. When human beings encounter a new situation with new feelings and new questions of judgement of value, human beings start a new process of reflection on value and judgement of value. Ethical reflection can be self-correcting as human beings make decisions and put them into action based upon their judgments of value.
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339.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 52
李雨鍾
Yu-Zhong Li
「空」、「氣」之爭及其背後的道德實踐問題─熊十力思想中的儒佛之辯新探
The Confliction between “Emptiness” and “Qi”, along with the Problem of Moral Practice
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熊十力是現代新儒家中極具影響力,也極富爭議性的人物,本文則嘗試透過圍繞在其身上的爭議性話題,進一步探入其背後所關涉到儒佛之爭及道德實踐問題。本文首先對照分析熊氏《新唯識論》(語體文本)中「心-境」結構和宇宙論架構之間的深層關係,進而揭示出其背後所隱含的「空」與「氣」之爭,前者乃是熊氏有取於大乘佛學(尤其是空宗)之處,後者則是熊氏獨尊的儒家(易學)思想系統所牽動的隱藏性線索;本文試圖表明,熊氏對佛家「空」的觀念的吸納,實際上引發了儒學系統中「氣」之坐標的移動與重置,而「氣」及其背後支撐起的實存性體驗又影響了熊氏思想中「空」的形態。藉由「空」與「氣」之間共生而衝突的張力,我們一方面將得以一窺形塑熊氏思想形態的獨特因素,另一方面則可以進一步追問其背後所反映出的,熊氏在儒家「仁心」與佛家「悲心」之間的倫理抉擇,並重新思考此二家在道德實踐問題上各自的利弊得失,由此我們方能真切體會到熊氏由佛轉儒背後的道德關懷與深刻用心,而其中所呈現出的問題結構至今仍值得深思。
Xiong Shili is one of the most influential and controversial philosophers in the modern neo-Confucianism. The paper, starting from the controversial topics haunted Xiong, tries to explore the practical base of morality behind them. Firstly, we compare the “mind-condition” structure and the cosmological structure and by this comparison a conflict hidden behind them is thus revealed as between “emptiness” and “qi”. The former is what Xiong borrows from Mahayana Buddhism, and the latter is derived from the Confucianism tradition that Xiong especially appreciates. As a matter of fact, Xiong’s absorption of the concept of “emptiness” leads to the resetting of the position of “qi” in Confucianism, and the substantial experience supported by “qi” in turn has influences on the formation of “emptiness” in Xiong’s thought. By holding the tension between “emptiness” and “qi”, we can further reveal Xiong’s ethical choice between the “ren” of Confucianism and the “karunā” of Buddhism, by which we are finally able to make tangible the profound moral concerns behind Xiong’s turning from Buddhism to Confucianism.
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340.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2017 >
Issue: 53
黃文宏
Wen-Hong Huang
論洪耀勳「真理論的絕對辯證法」的構想
On Hung Yao-Shun’s Conception of “Absolute Dialectics of Alethiology”
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Hung Yao-Shun (1903-1986), one of the major Taiwanese philosophers in the Japanese ruled period, whose research deserves more attention today. My intention in this paper is twofold: First, to clarify some basic concepts of his “absolute dialectics of alethiological dialectics”, and secondly to indicate some possible developments of his logic. The paper is divided into five sections. After a brief introduction to the leading question of my paper (section one), I focus on his main philosophical work “Being and Truth - A Study of Schalwa Nuzubidse’s Alethiology” published in April 1938 (totally 145 pages). Nuzubidse attempts to explicate the traditional metaphysics as an aletheological realism, aiming at the disclosure of the truth-in-itself. Some of the basic concepts of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and Hung’s interpretation are discussed here (sections two, three, four). Through these discussions, we can see that Hung goes deeply into the core of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and radicalizes his alethiological realism step by step to an “Absolute Dialectics of Alethiology”. Finally, Hung’s critique on Nuzubidse is discussed in the last section (section five). Hung’s project remains an unfinished ideal, which makes some of his creative thoughts still obscure. By explicating his concepts and reinforcing his arguments, some of the possible contributions and new perspectives that Hung provided to philosophy will be expounded in this section.
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