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Issue: 53
廖育正
Yu-Zheng Liao
朱子心性論可以回應道德責任歸屬嗎?
Can Zhu Xi’s Theory of Mind Respond to Moral Responsibility?
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在談論道德責任(moral responsibility)歸屬時,一種常被接受的看法是:某人對某事具有道德責任,若且唯若某人在自由意志下,促使了某事的發生。換句話說,若是人無從避免去做一件道德上應受譴責的事情,則不被歸屬道德責任。而朱熹(1130-1200)以心統性情的義理架構,作為其倫理思想的心性論基礎,這樣的系統究竟能否歸屬道德責任?當代學人對此有許多歧見。他們的意見為何產生衝突?朱子心性論可以回應道德責任歸屬嗎?這是本文意欲探究的重點。本文的結論是:當代學人各條研究進路之糾結,大致可以視為相容論與不相容論之爭的中國式展開;對此大哉問,形上學一日不得解,便一日沒有答案。然而在上述糾結之外,若還有回應問題的空間,或許在於以本體工夫論,兼及體驗論的視野,將心詮釋為性情的突現(emergence),去照應涵養省察、格物致知、克己主敬等思想─進而能將Peter van Inwagen 的話改寫為一種中國式的言說:心性情之間,別有一種神秘的工夫。
A commonly held view concerning moral responsibility is that someone has a moral responsibility for some action if and only if someone makes actions freely. In other words, if someone cannot avoid doing actions to be morally condemned, it is not attributable to moral responsibility. Can Zhu Xi’s theory of mind and ethical thoughts─xin-tong-xing-qing 心統性情─respond to the attribution of moral responsibility? Scholars have different opinions and to what extent their disagreement ranges is the focus of this paper.The conclusion of this paper is that the intertwining of these research approaches can be regarded as philosophical problems of the Chinese style concerning compatibilism and incompatibilism. This problem cannot be solved unless its metaphysical problem is dealt with in the first place. However, in addition to the above solution, perhaps we can see xin 心 as emergence of xing-qing 性情, and imagine a special vision of ontological gong-fu 工夫 and experience, taking care of thoughts like han-yang-xing-cha 涵養省察, ge-wu-zhi-zhi 格物致知, ke-ji-zhu-jing 克己主敬. We then adapt the famous statement of Peter van Inwagen as follows: “there is mysterious gong-fu between xin and xing-qing.”
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Wim De Reu
魏家豪
On Goblet Words:
Coexistence and Writing in the Zhuangzi
論巵言─《莊子》之共存與寫作
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This article attempts to reframe the state of research on the notion of goblet words (zhiyan) in the Zhuangzi. Recent studies predominantly view the notion of zhiyan as referring to peculiar stylistic forms exhibited in the Zhuangzi—forms such as dilemmatic questions and paradoxes. In this article, I question the quick identification of these forms as zhiyan. I argue that zhiyan are essentially definite yet provisional simple-form utterances located on the level of everyday interaction and coexistence. On this level, the peculiar stylistic forms do not play their part. However, such stylistic forms do become indispensable in discussing and recommending zhiyan. It is on this meta-level—for the Zhuangzi, the level of writing—that we find these forms employed. Based on structural similarities, we may stretch the label ‘zhiyan’ to include such forms but should keep in mind that any such extension is secondary to the use of language in coexisting with others.
本文嘗試重塑有關《莊子》巵言之研究。近年來,學界大多將巵言視為《莊子》中特殊文體形式,如兩難問題及悖論。本文對於是否能輕易地將這些形式視為巵言存疑,進而試圖論證巵言基本上是簡單形式的言辭,其特色為明確但暫時性的,作用於日常互動與共存上。於此層面,特殊文體形式可謂無用武之地;然而,於探討並進而提倡巵言之時,特殊文體形式便成為不可或缺的一環。正是於此後設之層次─就《莊子》而言,則是寫作之層次─我們發現特殊文體形式之運用。基於結構上之相似度,我們或能將此等文體稱為「巵言」,但同時不應忘記,其乃從屬於與他者共存時所運用之語言。
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Issue: 53
Hsiu-Lin Ku
古秀鈴
On the Very Idea of a Minimal Proposition
論極小命題
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Can the idea of a minimal proposition be successfully held? I will first formulate what the minimal proposition is in the minimalist’s mind, taking Emma Borg as the representative. What a minimalist seeks for a minimal proposition is the abstract and skeletal core meaning of a sentence, and this faith is founded on the notion of minimal word meaning—an atomic, code-like, conceptual thing. I show that the problem of this notion of minimal proposition lies in the three features, intuitive read-off, invariantness, and truth-evaluability, that Borg ascribes to it. I shall argue, first, that positing a conceptual-like thing as the invariant minimal content of word cannot support the invariantness of the minimal proposition of a sentence, and second, that the skeletal content, as the minimal proposition of a sentence, is a grammatically analyzed product and thus is hardly truth evaluable. According to the analyses, the idea of a minimal proposition with these three features identified by minimalists cannot be maintained.
本文探討極小命題成立與否的基礎。首先,本文將以Emma Borg 為極小主義之代表,釐清極小主義者所謂的極小命題是種語句本身抽象而結構化的核心意義,並被賦予三種特色:直覺的、不變的、有真假可言的。本文論證具有此三種性質的極小命題是難以成立的。首先針對此主張的基礎─字詞本身的極小內容是一種不可再分、密碼般、概念化的對象─本文論證字詞展現在語句中的意義並非如此不變,因此難以支持極小命題的不變性。其次,本文論證,抽象而結構化的極小命題是邏輯分析後的產物,因此難以有真假值可言。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2017
陳士誠
Shih-Chen Chen
知─行合一之哲學史及其倫理學的先驗說明之探究
A Research on the “Unity of Knowing and Acting” and Its Transcendental Explanation Based on Ethics
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知行合一是陽明學核心之一;探求其哲學史根源,以及其倫理學證成方式,以顯其學之規模,即本文之兩個目的。所謂根源,非泛指心學傳統中分析出一種模糊的觀念性連結,而是在確定文本中藉倫理學詮釋尋得文獻根據,以證此知行合一在經典承傳中之一脈相承處。此相承處即是《孟子.離婁上》中所揭示者:知之,即行之,此表示知行間的分析關係,在其中,知,乃智之實:知仁義,即固守仁義;因而,所謂知,即行其所知之遵守義。陽明謂是非心之知,其文本根據即可溯源至此,非如勞思光謂兩者只在詞源上有關而已。這是本文第一個目的。第二個目的乃是藉倫理學證成此知行合一之說。勞思光視「行」為發動義,把「行」一詞之意涵,從常識,提昇到心學與語言哲學位階,但若謂去證成知行合一在倫理學上的必然性,也即,知行何故非合一不可,這問題還需尋求更根本的說明。依本文,這乃基於一相關於使心學所蘊含之倫理學概念成為可能之先驗分析工作,也即,知行合一乃在人之主體同一性中成立,而這同一性則乃是使倫理規範與究責概念成為可能之先在性條件,從而即揭示知行合一之必然性基礎。在這同一性中,知與行在倫理上的屬己性被證立,從而倫理規範與究責之可能性才能被證成。因為,只有在知與行皆屬我的,我才能承認倫理規範之有效性及其可究責性,從而構成一藉主體之自我關係的形式性論證。
The doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” is one of the core concerns of Wang Yangming’s philosophy. This paper is trying to elucidate Wang’s theory by investigating: 1. The philosophical origin of this doctrine. 2. The justification of its ethical theory. Regarding the investigation of its “origin”, I will show the philosophical inheritance between Wang’s doctrine and classical texts by the support of relevant textual evidence, instead of examining the linkage between different general ideas in the School of mind. The common ground is revealed in Book 4A of Mencius, of which has been stated clearly that to know is to act. The relationship between knowing and acting is analytic. Since knowing is the richest content of wisdom, and genuine knowing is the observance of action, the knowing of benevolence and righteousness is also the observance of such values. Such Mencius’ idea serves not only the lexical origin as suggested by Lao Sze-kwang, but also as the textual ground of Wang’s understanding of the knowing function of the mind of discerning right and wrong. The second purpose of this paper is to justify the doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” by ethical interpretation. Lao emphasizes the significance of activity in the concept of “acting”, and transforms the meaning of “acting” from common sense to the level of school of mind and philosophy of language. Nevertheless, if the ethical necessity of the “unity of knowing and acting” has to be justified, i.e. the reason why knowing necessarily entail acting, a further explanation is needed. In this paper, ideas in School of mind will be explained in terms of ethical concepts in order to achieve a transcendental analysis. The “unity of knowing and acting” is possible in subjective identity, which is the a priori condition to make the concept of an ethical norm and imputation possible. The ethical necessity of the “unity of knowing and acting” can thus be revealed. In the subjective identity, the ethical “ownness” of knowing and acting is justified, and an ethical norm and the possibility of imputation can also be possible. Since knowing and acting belong to one’s own self, the ethical norm and its imputation is then valid. This is a formal argument constituted by the self-relation of one’s subjectivity.
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鄭志忠
Jyh-Jong Jeng
康德對觀念論的駁斥
Kant’s Refutation of Idealism
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在《純粹理性批判》B 版的論證(B274-9)中,康德提出一個有說服力的策略,嚴肅地正面回擊懷疑論者對於外在世界真實性的質疑。他直接攻擊懷疑論者的核心假設。首先,康德以懷疑論者都應該能夠接受的自我知識的構想為起點,然後逐步地揭露它的矛盾性。這使得懷疑論者陷入兩難困境。或者他們必須承認,在他們的假設之下,自我知識是不可能的;或者他們必須放棄那個假設,換句話說,他們不僅必須承認自我知識的直接明證性,同時也必須接受作為它的可能性條件的外部事物存在的直接明證性。本文主張:(1)「駁斥」是有說服力的;(2)「駁斥」與「先驗觀念論」的核心主張是相容的。論文分為三大部分。首先,釐清「駁斥」在先驗哲學中的系統性地位,並藉此闡明「現實性設準」的經驗認知意義;其次,批判地分析「駁斥」的論證結構與理由證成;第三,藉由釐清關鍵術語的歧義,來闡明「駁斥」與先驗觀念論的相容性;最後,總結「駁斥」的策略。
In the demonstration of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (B274-9), Kant brings up a persuasive strategy for seriously refuting skeptics’ position concerning the reality of outer world. He attacks directly the core presupposition of skeptics. First of all, Kant takes as a starting point the conception of self-knowledge that should be accepted by all skeptics. Kant then uncovers step by step the sceptics’ contradiction and he hence puts them in a dilemma. Under the sceptics’ assumption, either they must acknowledge the impossibility of self-knowledge or they must give up that assumption. In other words, not only must skeptics acknowledge the direct veridicality of self-knowledge, but also accept the direct veridicality of the existence of outer things as the condition of the possibility of self-knowledge.This paper argues that (1) the ‘refutation’ is persuasive, and (2) the ‘refutation’ and the core theses of ‘transcendental idealism’ are compatible.This essay contains three parts. The first part is to clarify the systematic status of the ‘refutation’ in transcendental philosophy and, by this clarification, to expound the empirically cognitive significance of the ‘postulate of actuality’; the second part is to critically analyze the structure of demonstration and justification of the ‘refutation’; the third part is to expound the compatibility of ‘refutation’ with ‘transcendental idealism’ by clarifying the ambiguity of key terms. The paper ends with a conclusion summarizing the strategy of the ‘refutation’.
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陳斐婷
Fei-Ting Chen
空氣如何容受顏色?:
亞里斯多德論中介物、光、與視覺
How Does Air Receive Color?
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本文嘗試重建亞里斯多德如何看待中介物空氣容受顏色,給予《靈魂論》第二書第七章418a26-b20 這個段落一個新的詮釋。亞里斯多德分兩個方向進行這項探究。一方面,我論述亞里斯多德嘗試建立一個視覺事件的因果發生序列,顏色是整個視覺事件因果發生序列的動力因起點,使得中介物諸如空氣等透明事物產生變動。而這項變動是一項性質變化。另一方面,透過考察亞里斯多德透過對於光的探究,我指出,處於實現狀態的透明事物,應該理解為展現其與火或此類物體同一的透明本性,是透明事物歷經變動的必要條件。如果上述關於空氣如何容受顏色的解讀是正確的,或許可以為視覺感官如何接受視覺對象的形式(De anima 2.12,414a18-19)提供新的思考方向。
In this paper I reconstruct how Aristotle sees the medium receiving color in De anima 2.7, 418a26-b20 and offer my own interpretation. I argue that Aristotle intends to establish a causal chain for a perception event, which begins with the color of the perceived object as the efficient explanation of the whole causal chain. And color moves the medium, i.e., something transparent such as air, in the manner of alteration. On the other hand, I argue that we should construe the actuality of the transparent thing to be the state of exhibiting the nature of transparency, which air shares with things such as fire. And receiving color in the transparent thing requires the transparent thing to be in actuality. If this line of interpretation is correct, it may reshape the current reading of how the faculty of perception “receives form without matter” (De anima 2.12, 414a18-19).
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陳湘韻
Hsiang-Yun Chen
主教句型的真正問題
The Real Problem of Bishop Sentences
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描述性理論(或稱E-型理論)是對「驢子代詞」(donkey anaphora)的一種分析(如:伊凡斯(Evans,1977),韓牧(Heim,1990),尼爾(Neale,1990))。此徑路常為人詬病的一點是無法解釋「主教句型」(bishop sentences)。艾勃(Elbourne,2005)提出一套情境語義學(situation semantics)式的描述性理論,並宣稱該理論不僅能解決傳統描述性理論在說明主教句型時的困難,還能解釋另一種新的主教句型。本文旨在質疑艾勃的分析。我指出艾勃的解法不但使用了未受約束的指代詞(unbound anaphora),且其對新的主教句型的說明也並不適切。
Bishop sentences such as “If a bishop meets a bishop, he blesses him” have long been considered problematic for the descriptivist (or E-type) approach of donkey anaphora (e.g. Evans, 1977; Heim, 1990; and Neale, 1990). Elbourne (2005) offers a situational descriptivist analysis that allegedly solves the problem, and furthermore extends its explanatory coverage to bishop sentence with coordinate subjects. However, I throw serious doubts on Elbourne’s analysis. Specifically, I argue that the purported solution is committed to the use of unbound anaphora, and it cannot sustain the claimed empirical adequacy.
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楊德立
Tak-Lap Yeung
評After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900
A Review of After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900
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相比十九世紀後半葉的德國哲學,哲學學者與史家一般更注重前半葉的成就。Frederick Beiser 這本著作,正是針對這種情況而寫。他認為十九世紀後半葉被過度簡化和忽略,其實相對於前半葉,後半葉甚至「更重要和哲學上更有趣」,而通過新的敘事和理論重構,該能賦予其應得的重視。為此,作者鑄造了五條不同的歷史線索,包括新「康德主義的興起」、「物質主義的爭論」、「歷史主義的發展」、「現代邏輯的根源」、「悲觀主義的冒起」,讓讀者以不同角度,重新認識這段歷史。他以發掘失落的傳統為己任,對於志同道合的讀者而言,這書當然對味,然而,若要讓讀者公平、恰當地了解當時的思潮,從另一角度而言,書名引來的期望或未盡相符。作者的學術素養無容置疑,本書豐富的資料和清晰的整理,能讓無論是否熟悉該段哲學史的讀者皆耳目一新。若讀者能自行把當中的細節,放到更大的歷史脈絡看,相信會對此書有更正面的評價、獲益更多。
In contrast with the late 19th century German Philosophy, most historians of philosophy emphasize the achievements of the first half of the century. In After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900, Frederick Beiser stands against this academic current and coins five different narratives, including “the rise of neo-Kantianism”, “the materialism controversy”, “the growth of historicism”, “the root of modern logic”, “the rise of pessimism” to allow readers to reengage with the second half of the 19th century. He takes the responsibility of enlivening the so-called “lost traditions”, and of course, for those readers who have similar taste and interest, this book is their cup of tea. However, if we, by the name of the book, anticipate this work to illustrate a general picture of the “mainstream” philosophical traditions from those times, we may be disappointed. From the academic point of view, this book is certainly well written, with rich references and a comprehensive understanding of the related topics. Through Beiser’s reconstruction of the philosophical controversies, the stiff narratives of the history of philosophy can be softened and refreshed. If the readers themselves are able to incorporate the details provided by the book into the wider historical context and the specific problems in the history of philosophy, the reward can be even bigger.
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Issue: 6
劉福增
維根斯坦《論集》中「實是〈界)˩ 觀念的困題及其解決
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郎昆如
先秦法家社會哲學之研究
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Chang Ko-chuan
張柯圳
The Problem of Unity in the Philosophy of Plato
從性質團結問題觀點分析 柏拉圖哲學(中女提要)
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性質間結問題, 體統一性的來源問題, 是陳康先生在「性質團結問 題與本質概念˩ (大陸雜誌,第三卷,第五期,蓋北,民國40年9月,第一 頁至第六頁)一篇論文中提出來的哲學問題,用以說明亞里士多德本質概念 是。與康德範疇說的哲學意義。木艾的目的,即依此問題,探討柏拉閏哲學思想 的發展。柏拉問壯年時期,以費多篇及理想國篇為中心的哲學思想,包含以下八項要點:一、感覺現象變動不已,知識的對象為不變的相,問蘇格拉底普遍定義法的對象,亦間(固體統一性的根源。二、相為現象事物變動的內在目的悶,也是在現象事物變動中,保持不變的本質。三、相兵有自間性。攻象事物之自同性,乃也相所具有之自同性而來。四、相為純粹的單一,閃而試成個體統一性之根據。五、具體的相反君主變,因此位體可接受相反性質而不失其統一性。六、費多黨認為,人類心靈非接合體,因此具有同一性與不變性;理想 國篇卸認為,它可分為現性,欲墜與激情三要素,心靈之統一性乃在於此三 要素之和協。七、認識相的主體能力,為心靈或理性。入、至善之相,為一切知識,存有與本質之最高原理,亦為萬有之最高 目的悶,因而它是一切個體統一性之最高原理。費多篇及理想國篇的相論合有以下五項困難:一、相與個別事物的同名性,造成現實的重登。二、目的論把宇宙萬有解釋成價值領城,相的預設,與目的論的動機相遠。三、個別事物不可能由相導入統一性。四、相論無法解釋個別事物之個別性。五、相之單一性,導致相之自毀。柏拉圖晚竿,以巴曼尼得斯鑄及辯士鴛為中心她隨禱:合,把費多篇及理 想理清主徑:還克個反|生質在!固建中治合的可能性祠定的日以發展,探討筍疇 在個體中結合的可能性問題。在巴曼尼得斯瘖寫三部分中,第三道論證展示:唯有範疇彼;地相互結合 ,範禱告(固邊有泊法合方為可白色。第二道論證及其附論指出,若「一」之詞: 疇與「有」之範疇,綺合,則「一」可與其它一切範疇結合。「一」與「有」 之結合,構或最簡幸自台海疇樁合,連接範疇與個別事物,並過渡到個別事物 。第廿道:侖澄頭去: 「一」 與「其它的J 結合, 為中目反性質在個別現象事物 中結合的可能性條件。辯主講以辟二台為例,解澤巴曼尼得斯篇中個別事物的範疇演繹,並進一 步探討「非有」的意義。滸上篇區別可結合與不可結合的範疇,指出「其它 的」可與一切範疇結合,藉以說明個別事物之個別性的來源。
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352.
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楊政河
論佛教因果法則的邏輯解析
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353.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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楊志南
南禪「頓悟」說的理論基礎一一以「眾生本來是佛一!為中心
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354.
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張永偽
\論宋代幾個重要的「埠。學世家˩
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355.
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Denis Hsin-An Tsai
God and the Problems of Evil in Berkeley
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356.
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Fu Pei-Jung
傳佩學
Some Reflections on the Principles of Individuation and Unification in Neo-Thomism
「對新多瑪斯學派之個體化原理與統合化原理的幾點省察˩
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在日常用語巾,「得˩ 與「類」常被混用。譬如我們自稱為「人幾˩; 但是在給「人類」下定義時,就須將它納入一個更潰的飽問主[動物類˩ ,然 後找出它的特色,即所謂 「;種˩ ;這時人就成為一個「種」了。「種˩ :是 在定義[待所用的抽象名詞。我們日常所見的是個膛,芳草麼,個體 l叫做成呢 ?事質上,這個問題應該是後起的;因為我們所見的萬物先是個艙,像拔、李凹,但是又怎麼知道他們都是「人」呢?換句話說, 「 撞」是如'˩ .成 的?這後兩個問題與前臘時代爭論不休的「 -. 多問題˩ 頗有關聯。本主; 將 以中此 記槃大成的多瑪斯學說昂起點,然後,故討新多瑪斯學派的幾個持法。多瑪斯認為, 料是f f問:泣化˩ 之原理, 形式是「種化」之原理。只料 與˩ 式合成一物之「木質˩ , -本質加上「存在」則為質ff=之物了。質存之物 皆為「存有」之一,因此又能「統合」於存有之下,以構成形上學研究之的 象:就存有;~i衍了:有。所謂「統合化」原理,係拍這最後一個步驟而言。有史新多瑪斯學者,顯然妥了存在主義的影響,也強調「存在」的˩位一一雖然這兩方面使用的存在不是同義詞。以英國的馬斯考( E. L. Mascall, 1905一) 為例, 他就傾向於把「存在」同時位做「分殊化˩ )京見 (包含個體化與僵化)與「統合化J原理。這樣一來,難免產生一些間,妞, 像:本質與仔在之間的關係如何?高物之兵向如何得以鑑別?此決學者的法質是「類比」、「判斷」與「分受」這三個觀念。本文將 針對個體化與統合化原泣分別討論這三個概念。全文結論「約為˩ 以下五點: 付「木,民˩ :是分殊化原理;其中包含的價料與形式,分別足個體化原理 與種化原理。這是維持多瑪斯的原先主張。
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357.
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林義正
論孔子思想的落本格式
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358.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 6
哲學系簡訊
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359.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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陳俊輝
孔子的「仁」與海德格的「存有J 初探(上)
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360.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 6
黃誌梅
清代哲學中人性論的探究
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