This study is divided into three main parts, and additionally includes an introduction, conclusion, footnotes and a bibliography.The first section examines the historical development of the social philosophy propounded by the Prech'in Taoists, from Lao-tzu through Chuang-tzu to Liehtzu.The second part deals with the Taoist principle of social living, its problems and solutions.Finally we attempt a critique on the values and the limitations of Taoist social philosophy in the Prech'in period.

宋儒朱熹、以畢生功力，闡釋先秦儒家經典。一方面遠承孔孟之仁義性善 論，以及學庸之格致中誠觀念，另一方面又調和周敦頤太極陰陽之說、張裁 之論氣以及三種學讀中之精萃而集大成，孕育出博大精深的思想，造成理學 在中國哲學史上的巔宰狀態。本文從朱子龐大的倫理禮系中，首先疏理出「心體」的意義及其形上學 的地位，並從源自張載「心統性情」的觀點，分析「心J在道德實踐中的關 鍵性問題，展列出「心」在倫理架構上與「性情」、「理氣J、「太極」之 關係，進而現辨道心天理與人心氣欲之分際。與後來陸主「心性之學」相比 較，可以看出哲學史上「繁」與「約」的爭論，其實是成聖的道德實踐之不同過程。以「天人合一」為終極關心而言，種朱陸五可以視為殊途同歸。

This is the fourth paper in my continuing research on "Tittgenstein's Tractatus. The Tractatus theory of language has mainly two components: the "picture theory" and the"truth-function theory". Elementary propositions is one of the basic concepts essentially connected with these two theories. In this paper I attempt a thorough study of theconcept of elementary propositions.I identify and articulate seven basic features of elementary propositions. In addition to examining the accounts of other researchers on these basic features, I contribute what I call the metaphysical language formulized in the philosophy of the Tractatus, and the coordinate diagram of elementary propositions, to account for elementary propositions.

This paper traces the main philososophic issues and the foundations of Cantorian set theory and the contemporary cumulative hieararchy theory (c. h. t.). From a platonisticview point, we formulate two theories of c.h. t. that is, stage theory and level theory. The latter is characteristically stronger than the former. Axioms of Zermelo Fraenkel set theory, ZF, that can be deduced within two theories, are explained and left as logical exercises. We believe that, for a deep understanding of model-theoretic results inaxiomatic set theory, we must capture fully the philosophy (and the picture) of the cumulative hieararchy.

由於「道J字在論語巾的現達八十餘次之多，故無論採用何種詮釋，其 為一中心概念殆無擬議。一般說來，多數詮釋均不無保守傾向:設非接近蕭 公權「從周」之觀點;則多類的 Fingaretter 大道缺歧」 (Way Without Crossroad) 之意見。兩者問各有其獨到之貢獻， 然亦各有所偏頗。當然 ，孔子思想中「法古」色彩相當濃厚，此在論語一書中之例證可謂比比皆是;然而吾人更應對每一例證之上下文慎思孰慮，照幾兔於斷章取義。易言 之，如果過分強調孔子之「法古」色診，且在欣賞其具有創造性或美學性之 諸般創見上不移熱衷，則其深奧之「微言大義J勢將橫遭漠視。為使此等偏 頗趨於平衡，本文擬對孔子思想中之「道」概念再度廣泛深入探討，俾重行 統整之。

眼界問題一直在西方的宗教哲學中佔有重要地位。歷代哲學家與神學家 的討論幾乎已經窮盡了它在各方面的可能j涵義。然而這個問題均不會得到澈 氓的解決，因為它在本質上是一種「奧秘˩ ，一種與人自身的存在息息相關 的奧秘。在某一意、義上說，人若想充分理解自己，就必讀對原罪問題進行深 度的思考。本文~{存評析泰能特 (F. R. Tennant, 1866-1957) 、校內 (Karl Rahner，1904-84) 、與李絡 (Paul Ricoeur, 1913-) 三人對於 「l反罪˩ 的詮釋， 試鬧了解這個概念的三種主要探索途徑， 亦郎「自然神論的演化說˩、「有神論的反過說˩、「辯證論的象徵說˩ ，進而提出一種 對於人性:本質問題(或者，更好說是奧都)之可能的理解。木文之寫成，應感謝耶魯大學宗教系傅萊教授(Professor Hans Frei) :在「神學的詮釋學」一課中之啟發與討論，以及同窗好友歐瑞根 (Cyril O'Regan) 的切能與批評。現在自己重讀本文， 覺得有些地方值 得進一步深入辨析;泣餾想法或許留待他日以中文;這寫這個題材時再來質行 吧。

This paper is a tentative evaluation of yang Kuei-shan's philosophy of principle (li-hsueh) and its historical position in the development of Sung Neo-Confucianism asa whole. It seems (1) to demonstrate that Yang Kuei-shan's thought served as an important bridge between the two cheng Brothers and Chu Hsi, and (2) to explain the actualcontent of Yang's philosophy as a process of sythesis drawing from Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. The approach of the argument, therefore, can be divided in thefollowing four categories:1. Historical: the original source of his philosophy.2. Ontological: the principle of ying and yang, the transformation of material force (ch'i) , and the Way of Heaven (fien) and its mandate.3. Epistemological: the investigation of things in the extension of knowledge, and the principle of one-in-all.4. Ethical: the concept of self-cultivation and the contemplation of equilibrium (chung).In the analysis of Yang's philosophy, this paper also attempts to deal with his sivotal methodology of "directness" (chih) in an effort to explicate his doctrines of loyalty and altruism, the one source of internality and externality, the manifestation of nature through the human mind, and the grasping of principle in the midst of human affairs.

In Husserl's Ideas of 1913, we find that the concept of world is ambiguous, for it is firstly interpreted as a horizon experienced in perception, and secondly as a totality of objects known in terms of theoretical thought on the basis of direct experience. In the Cartesian Meditations of 1929, Husserl still retains these concepts, but suggestsa new idea, genetic phenomenology, which advocates that a philosophical understanding of an object must trace the constitutive history of its meanings which have beendeposited in the process of its constitution. This tracing of the history of its constitution requires that the higher constituted products refer to the lower constitutive primordialexperience as the foundation of that history. In the Crisis. Husserl criticizes his previous "Cartesian way" to phenomenology in which the transcendental epoche is a "nullification of a thing-world", and thus, that will be empty of content for philosophical study after epoche. Now, Husserl suggests an "ontological way" in which the transcendental epoche is a total change of attitude, i.e., it does not "nullify the thing-world", but brackets the higher deposited meanings in order to search for the lowerconstitutive primordial experience that is the foundation of constitution. Husserl finds that the primordial experience is perception, and the world correlated to perception he calls the life-world. Thus the perceptual world has become the foundation of the world known in theoretical thinking. The two ideas, genetic phenomenology and transcendental epoche as a total change of attitude, are the reasons. that the later Husserl came to consider the perceptual world as foundation.

1. An analysis of the concept of tao2. An analysis of the concept of hsing3. An analysis of tao fa shan hsiao, shan ta hsing hsiao4. Critique: a) Tao ta shan hsiao and shan ta hsing hsiao are explicated from different points of view b) The concepts of 'shan and hsing are two aspects of one thing c) It is not true that "tao sheng shan, shan sheng hsing" d) The concept of shan is ambigious: i) Shan as the power of chi sheng ii) Shan as the process of chi sheng

In this paper, I continue my comparative analysis of the Confucian concept Jen and Heideggerian Being. I trace the origins and attempt to reconstruct the essential meaning of Confucian Jen and Heideggerian Being.Then, from the respective of their basic presuppositions, I try to compare these two concepts, identifying and expanding upon points of apparent similarity.Finally, I suggest the possibility of utilizing their complementarity as an aid to expressing more fully their respective ontologies.In conclusion, I explore ways in which this methodology might contribute to the reconstruction of Chinese Philosophy.

This study is divided into three' main parts, and additionally includes an introduction, conclusion and footnotes.The first section examines the historical development of the social philosophy propounded by Lu Chia (ca. 260-170 B. C.), Chia Yi (200-168 B. C.), Tung Chung-shu (179-104 B. C.), Liu An (179-122 B. C.) and Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145-85 B. C.) in the Former Han Dynasty.The second part deals with the essential contents of the social philosophy in the Former Han Period, namely the amalgamation of the Confucianism and the Taoism, furthermore the social principle and the social problems in that time.Finally we attempt critique on the values and the limitations of the social philosophy in the Former Han Dynasty.

It is well known that the Three Dharmas (rūpa-skandha, dharma-dhātu and mana-āyatana) , not only represent the Fiveskandas, Eighteen-dhūtus and Twelve-āyatanas, but also contain the all dharmas, therefore, Asaṅga, the author of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (AS) chose the "Three-dharmas" for the name of the first chapter of his AS.Although there are many quotations and explanations from the texts of the Abhidharma and Vijñānavādin in the AS, they are organized scientifically and explained systematically with the Mahāyāna-theories of Vaipuly (方農) dharma. Especially the two famous Buddhist technical terms "jñeya" (所知) and "vijñeya" (所識) appear not only the texts of Abhidharma and Yogācāra..bhūmi, but also in the second subsection of the "Three dharmas", the first chapter of the AS with sorne special meanings.Therefore, in this paper I compare the theories of these two terms of the AS with other texts, and then explain Some subjects from the viewpoint of the AS as follows: (1) Theposition of the Three dharmas in the AS. (2) The meanings and characteristics of the "jñeya" and "vijñeya". (3) The diffrent meanings between the "jñeya-dharma" and "jñeya-vastu". (4) The relations of the "jñeya-dharma" and thirteen jñānas (十三智). (5) The characteristics and meanings of "vijñeya" (所識).In conclution, it can be said that the Three dharmas. Five dharmas and the Three natures (parikalpita-svabhāva, paratantra-svabhāva and pariniṣpanna-svabhāva) are altogether under the name of "jñeya" of object, or dharma ete., which represents the all dharmas in this world to be known or investigated by us for the purpose to find out the theories of anatman. Especially, the theories of "vijñeya" in the AS are different from the other texts, which show that the special characteristics and activities of ālaya-vijñāna and the other six consciousness, are also to be perceived or recognized by us, and altogether for the purpose to forsake the adherances of the "jānaka" (知者), "paśyaka" (見者) and "draṣṭṛ" (能見者) as the ātman. When we understand the Vijñāvādin's theories of the śunyatā (妻性)， and practice the Bodhisattva's ways, we can not only purify our minds, but also carry out the welfare works for all people and countries; thus the highest purpose of the Vijñāvādin. The PEACE OF THE WORLD, will be accomplished.

奏起悉中文字~J英文的人必定都知道，在這兩個語言中，電是， (Yes) 和聖不 是， (No) 在文法上的使用， 並不完全一樣。在本文中， 我們要顯示在這些 不同的背餒，有一些較深的玄機。那就是，在中文，費是，和電不是，可以免予經 為是分別用來肯定 (affirm) 和否定 (deny) 的，但是在英文，它們只-是用 來當做某種說話的約定或力量一一它們不是像英文字典說的是用來肯定和否 定的。試看下列的電是-不是，問答系絡:問:牽灣在亞洲嗎?答1 :是，它在亞洲。答2 :不，它不在亞洲。設曹 'Q' 為間伺部分， 'P' 為答何部分的質詢電是， 或電不( 是)' ， 而 'A' 為 答何部分，但不合費是，或聖不'。鄭麼，不論在中文互交英文，我們都可把這 種是-不是問答系絡看成有序三<Q， P, A> 。顯然，不論在中文或英文，如果P是用來肯定或否定，在這個有序三中 對之而做7月「定或否定的，必定是Q。我們可以說，在Q中所肯定或否定的是 Q 的對象或內容。假定P 是用或背定和否定的。那麼， 在這兩個話中這發肯 定和否定的結果，都必定是整個A。現在如果P是用來肯定Q的對象p的， 則所得結果應該是A，其中A是p，或A，或A為一致並且、涵蓋P，或者p諂蓋為A所涵蓋者並且A和P一致。而如果P是用來否定的，則所得結果應 該是A，其中A和p相矛盾或者A至少和p反對。我們根據這個判準，顯示在英文中，電 'Yes' 和電 'No' 在許多重要情況中 不是用來肯定和否定的，而在中文中，電是'和電不是，則懿乎都是。

This paper attempts to offer a detailed exposition and a critical analysis of Josiah Royce's absolute idealism. Section one explains Royce's basic jdealistic position. Sections two and three deal respectively with Royce's refutation of realism and his treatment of other conceptions of Being. Section four expounds and clarifies the essential content of Royce's absolute idealism. Section five contains some critical remarks.Royce's theory represents an ingenious effort to integrate the insights and contributions of the past major idealistic philosophers into a systematic whole. His criticisms of realism are pointed and convincing. However, Royce's own idealisnl is not free from solipsistic tendency, and his argument for the absolute knower fails to do justice to ideas and judgments about the future.

In the Philosophy of Buddhism, the three concepts of "Skandha" "Āyatana" and "Dhātu" are the fundamental and important concepts.The contents are:The five skandhas (aggregates) include form (matter), perception, conception (idea), volition (will) and conciousness.The twelve ayatana include six sense organs and six sense objects.The eighteen dhātus include six sense organs, six sense objects and six senses.I explained, discussed and illustrated these concepts.Finally, I attained conclusion, that is to say, "Skandha", "Āyatana" and "Dhātu" are no substance (anātma) , no duration (anityā) and no bliss (duḥkhā) except Nirvāṇa.

The present paper attempts to examine Hume's argument of personal identity. The first section points out that personal identity is a specific case of the general problem of identity, which has been one of the perenial problem in philosophy since the ancient Greeks. The problem of personal identity on the other hand has occuppied an important place in philosophical discussions since Locke.The second and third sections deal with Hume's views concerning identity, including unmerical identity, specific identity, identity and diversity, and the relationship of all those identities with personal identity. The fourth section discusses Hume's theory of the self. It explains how Hume criticizes the traditional philosopher's view of the self as a substance. It also examines Hume's position concerning the mind. The fifth section examines another of Hume's arguments of persmal identity. The sixth section points out the three basic assumptions in Hume's arguments. It also offers some brief criticisms of these assumptions.

Hsieh Shang-tsai (謝上蔡)， with Yang Kwei-shan (楊龜山),two of the most distinguished disciples of the Cheng brothers(二程). Hsieh played an important role in the diffusion andtransimission of the ideas of the Cheng brothers. Both HuWu-feng (主胡鑫) and Lu Hsiang-shung (劉鼓山) were deeplyinfluenced by him in their philosophical development. Even ChuHsi in his early years was stimulated and inspired by him. Inthe present paper, I shall, based on my reading of "The sayingsof Shang-tsai", explore the sources, contents, and later expansionsof Hsieh's thought from the standpoint of philosophy andintellectual history. I shall assess his position in the Sung andMing Neoconfucianism, and I shall also discuss Chu Hsi's (朱熹jcriticssin of him.There are five basic points in Hsieh's philosophical thinking:(1) Perception (not sensory perception, but rather moral intuition) is Jen (仁) vitality is Jen.(2) Jen is rooted in human mind. Mind is function (spontaneous manifestation of the heavenly principle). 'True mind' as the true self' is the 'moral self'.(3) The heavenly principle is in my mind. To understand the heavenly principle is to recognize one's own mind. To investigate things and examine principles is to follow always the heavenly principle and discover the authentic mind.(4) The method of cultivating the authentic mind consists of five steps. (a) contemplation, (b) emptying the mind: becoming disinterested and innoceut. (c) sincerity: being constantly altest (常惺惺) and empathitic (spontaneous expression of the authentic mind-free self-awareness of the moral subject), (d) removing arrogance and restraining desires, (e) enjoying righteousness and principles.(5) Discriminatier between Confucianism and Buddhism: the Buddhists do not understand heaven, do not recognize principles, and do not see their own mind.

What does the 電Emptiness' in Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī negate? It negates 'svabhāva'-the intrinsic nature of things. This is a widely held view. However, Nāgārjuna himself in Vigrahavyāvartanī claimed, "I do not negate anything, I only 'make known' that the 'svabhāva' of things does not exist."Nāgārjuna's response was aimed at the Nyāya-one of the six schools in Indian philosophy. The Nyāya school said, "what is negated must be real; therefore, it is self-contradictory to say that the 'Emptiness' negates the 'real' thing." In order to counter this attack, Nagarjuna replied that the 'Emptiness' does not negate anything.

The paper deals with ethics by analyzing the ethical problems, such as "Why should I be moral?" The problem can be solved by seeing the "knot" of the questioner. When one has a difficulty of knowing why human being has to accept moral value, one might ask the question. Then, this question will become nonsensical.Moreover, the "knot" might be:(i) What is the nature of the highest good as the end of moral action? Or,(ii) Is the moral way the best one for us to procure the highest good? Or,(iii) Can we have a ground of moral faith?The problem can be solved or dismissed when the questioner has his answer to the question/ or questions.The last part of the paper indicates that ethics can be constructed as a ("game-theory" by a hermeneutical methodology.Those ethical rules have to be taken as a grammar of the humanities.