Under the influence of Koa-Cheng, the Ko-wu and Chih-chih becomes fundamental concepts to moral theories. Philosophy in Ch'ing Dynasty did not have theories of intellectual knowledge. Knowledge is nothing but for the sake of knowledge rather than for morality. This paper indicates this point by a discussion of thoughts of Wang Fu-chih, Huang Tsun-hsi, Ku Yen-wu, Yen Yüan, Li Kung, Tai Chen, and Chiao-Hsün.

戲廉﹒詹姆士(William James, 1842-1910) 主張實用主義( Pragmatism) 。他會列舉八種對食用主義的通俗誤解， 一一加以駁斥， 然後正面 指出: r食用主義的原創住在於使用兵體的觀看法。」他昕謂的「兵體的觀 看法」其質正是指實用主義者心目中的「經驗」而言。因此，實用主義可以 說是一套「經驗之哲學」。這種特性與當代思潮的主流，像存在哲學、現象學、與維根斯坦學氓，非常相契，因而值侮吾人對它蓋新手以評價。「經驗」概念在實用主義J思想中扮演關鏈角色，因此要想真正欣賞這派 思想，首先必須適切了解這個概念。如所周知，安用主義者與英國經驗論者 雙方對於「經驗」概念的內涵與外延的看法互不相伴。不僅如此，實用主義者， 如皮爾士 (C. S. Peirce) 、詹姆士、與杜威 (John Dewey), 彼此之間的 「經驗」概念亦不盡相同。在進一步探討這個問題之前，本文擬專就詹姆士一人的見解深入評析。對於研究宗教哲學的人而言?詹姆士的例子顯然較為鳴目。這不僅因為 他會寫過「宗教經驗之種種J這本名薯，而且因為他的全部作品的焦點是 「嘗試建立一套在今日科學時代仍然生動有殼的宗教立揚。」從另一方面來 君，經驗若不加上某一範疇一一如美學、倫理學、或宗教一一的限定，貝u只 能用以表現「個別事物的流轉生鐵J ，而不足以展示目的性，更不足以引發 適當的行動。「宗教經驗」一詞不僅指稱某種特臻的經驗，而且暗示了某種 探討宗教的特殊進路，亦即經由經驗來探討宗教。本文擬自以下四方面分析詹姆士「宗教經驗」概念之證成: ~一)由心理學 觀點注意這種經驗的出發點; ，斗由倫理學觀點檢證這種現象的發展過程;臼 由形上學觀點透觀這種經驗的基聽;但)荐自神學觀點評估其效應。本文之作，得益於耶魯大學哲學系更正誼教授(Professor John E. Smith) 在「實用主義及其評論者」一課之啟發與討論， 特此誌謝。

This paper deals with "is-ought" in order to indicate an ambiguity in Hume's ethical theory. Concerning the notion of "is-ought" there are two inconsistent interpretations of it. The one is provided by the emotivists, such as C. L. Stevenson. They contend that t "is" cannot entail "ought". Our moral judgment is an expression of our moral feeling. It does not report a fact. The other interpretation is provided by naturalists and descriptivists. The concept of "ought" can be derived from that of "is". Our moral judgment is a report or a description of our feeling and a fact.These two interpretations both can have its own evidences from the Hume's writings. The ambiguity cannot be clarified by the Humean ethical theory itself.

Unlike the problems of Arche the Pre-socratic philosophers discussed the elenlents of the material world in the rhizomata questions.This article is divided into three main parts. The first part deals with the historical development of the problems of rhizomata proceeding in the order of pluralism, mechanism and teleology. In the second part we investigate the essential contents of rhizomata operating from Empedocles, Democritus and Anaxagoras. The causal principle took place in the transcendental and immanental sophistication, and at the same time the materialistic and the idealistic Weltanschauung have had their origin and their naive forms. Finally, in the third part, the contemporary significance is discussed in the light of Aristotle's metaphysical point of view. The author tries here to raise some questionsabout the foundations of the oppositional atmosphere of the Materialism and the Idealism today, which seems to have their origin from the Pre-socratic period.

在專名(proper name) 是某一個象自(object) 的記號這個認定或認 識下，在現代西方哲學中，像(1) Pegasus exists (飛馬存在) ;(2) Pegasus does not exist (飛馬不存在) ,這樣的存在語旬，前者被認為不是一句無意義的話，就是一個分析句，而後 者則被認為是一句自相矛盾的話。羅素以專名不過是喬裝的確定描述詞，而在他的描述詞論中解決上述困 難，而創英 (Quine) 則把 Pegasus 動詞化或述詞化來解決這些困難。本文先批評這些作法的缺熙，並且進-步以相當的中文語句(3)有孫悟空〈有所謂孫悟空) ;(4)沒有孫悟空〈沒有所謂孫悟空) ,為例，提出異於前兩者的所謂命名說話做行 (speech act of calling) 理論，來解決這個問題，並說明這個理論的優病。

This is a study of George Santayana' ethical theory. Santayana never wrote any systematic treatise on moral philosophy, though he claims that it is his chosen subject. In this paper I try to piece together his scattered reflections and remarks on ethical problems, and to present them in a cogent and systemtic form. The paper is divided into four sections. Section one clarifies Santayana's view of the nature and scope of ethics. Section two explains Santayana's ethical naturalism and relativism and recapitulates his arguments against the view that good is absolute and unconditioned. Section three deals with Santayana's theory of reason in morality, of which self-knowledge and harmony are the two essential elements. Section four includes some critical observations. Both Santayana's particular type of ethical relativism and his theory of rational ethics areimportant contributions to the field. 'Yet his moral philosophy contains an equivocation and confusion between 'tis' and ‘ought ', and he fails to provide a satisfactory account of moral obligation.

T'ien-- t'ai School was the excellent school in Chinese Buddhism The T'ien-t'ai School was established by Chih-i. (A.D. 538597) He was a great philosopher. He systenlatized the doctrines of this school.The theory of "Tathāgata inherent evil" (evil immanent in Tathāgata nature) was the special creative theory of Chih-i. This theory also manifested the particular feature of T'ien t'ai School.This paper attempts to deep inquiry study this thought's Origin, Method, Content, Principle, Direction and Practice.Finally, I grasped its real meaning, discovered its eternal valuation, and also attained the wisdom of life.

This artical deals vvith the difference between the philosophies of Cheng brothers, Chen-I and Chen Ho. The difference signifies that the Li-ism, and Hsin-ism , i.e. Chen-Chu school and Lu-Wang school, are derived from those two different philosophies. The author indicates the historical development of those philosophies and the characters the of philosophers. He contends that the difference is critical to the development of history of philosophy in China.

There are three types of Ch'an kung-an that often bewilder Buddhologists; namely, (1) the contradictory, (2) the inexpressible, and (3) mixture of the two. D. T. Suzuki and the scholars influenced by him, for example, E. Fromm, think that these three types of kung-an imply the truth realized by Ch'an masters, the truth which gose beyond daily language and logic. However, as the author points out, there are two traditions in Ch,an School: (1) the "Buddha-nature" tradition based on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, and (2) the prajna tradition based on the Diamond Sūtra. Suzuki and Fromm's interpretation only emphasizes the first tradition and ignores the second one. According to the secondtradition, the contradition and inexpressibility of kung-an may seem to indicate the truth of non-existence --śūnyatā, not necessarily indicating the truly existing "Buddha-nature".

Harmony, unity and communication are the basic requirements for the progress of human culture and happiness. A harmony of human relations can be obtained, if "grammar of humanity" is known and be observed. "Grammar of humanity" is used in an analogical sense in this article, since the universe of human beings has been taken as a linguistic system. Human actions is a kind of language which includes all speechs and signs. Language can become a language, and be learned if and only if there is agrammar. The author contends that there is a grammar of humanity.The grammar can be known and observed. The article deals with the grammar of humanity by five sections.i) Indicating the language-learning-process. One learns language as well as the grammar.ii) On the foundations of the grammar of humanity.iii) The characteristics of the grammar and the conditions of formulization of the grammar.iv) The grammar and praxis.v) Meaning and perfection.The approaches are phenomenological and hermeneutical.

This paper is addressed to the subject of suicide within both Hinayana and Mahayana traditions. The concept, type, and motive of suicide found in the canons of both traditions differ substantially. The relevant Hinayana and Mahayana doctrines are examined to explain their differences.The first section deals with suicide casea in the Agamas and Vinaya and explains why some cases were condoned vvhile others censored. This section also investigates how Abhidharma literature treats the subject of suicide.The second indicates five kinds of motives in Mahayana suicide. Each is justified by its own doctrinal basis. The final section examines the attitude of some Chinese eminent Buddhists toward the controversial problenl of religious suicide.

Emerich Coreth's contribution lies mainly in his employing the act of questioning as the appropriate starting point for metaphysics. To systematically comment on his first chapter of his main work, Metaphysics, this article successively studies the transcendental method he uses, the question as the starting point, and the horizon of Being which the question anticipates. Coreth's transcendental method operates on two movements, namely, transcendental reduction and transcendental deduction. The former means the movement from the 'concent' of the question to its 'act' and then to its tconditions of possibility'. On the other hand, the latter concentrates itself mainly on the movement from the tconditions of possibility' to the essential structure of the 'act' , which is then expressed through certain 'contents'.The question is used as the correct starting point because it is undeniable, most primordial, presupposing nothing, and basing itself on experience without being confined completely on the empirical level.When one pays attention to the act of questioning, one will discover from within the act a dynamic anticipation which surpasses every finite empirical horizon and opens itself to the horizon of Being which transcends everything and encompasses all things.

In this paper, I shall attempt to explicate the development of Confucianism in our Pre-Chin's dynasty. In order to make this paper more clear and comprehensible, I divide it into five steps.In the first step of my historical analysis, I trace the Confucious' thought back to two sources; one is from I Ching 〈易經), the other is from Confucious' knowledge of len Te (仁德) of the Chinese ancient sages and rulers. Besides, I also cite the Book of History (書經) as to confirm the Confucian teachings in Analects (論語).In the second stage of this paper, I deem Tseng-tzu (曾子〉 as a follower of Confucious at his old age. Being the filial, Tseng-tzu seems to be the author of The Great Learning (大學〉 and that of Canon of Filial Piety (;孝經). Historically speaking, thoughts of these two books have made a great influences upon the later Confucianists. The former, especially, had shown an adequate way to penetrate into Jen (仁) ; that is, it had established a regular procedure of cultivation to attain the spiritual state of Jen.In the third stage of the paper, I deal with the thought of Tze-sze (子思); he is the Confucious' grandson and seems to be the author of The Golden Mean ( 中庸). Being a morally metap hysical book, the book anticipates the basic moral theories of Mencius while discussing on those themes of Moral Subject and moral conciousness ······etc.In the fourth stage of my analysis, I deal with the systematic moral theories of Mencius, and take them as a great products of thought of Pre-Chin's Confucianism.Finally, in the fifth stage of the paper, I deem Hsün-tzu 〈茍子) as the last Pre-Chin's Confucianist. Though he had established much of marvellous theories after the death ofMenicus, he had almost gone astray from the originally Confucian scheme which had been concerned about the presupposition and generalization of moral self-consciousness.

Mutai Risaku (1890-1974) is one of the disciples of Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), and founder of the Kyoto School. Appointed as the professor of philosophy in Taiwan Imperial University in 1928, Mutai’s research of Hegel directly influenced Hung Yao-hsün’s notion of “dialectical existence.” Hong did not develop this notion in a clear way, but it actually served as the foundation of his own philosophy. Moreover, this notion is not Hong’s invention, but it is a concept developed in his dialectical ontology, which is a result of his reading and understanding of the philosophy of spirit by Hegel, the existential philosophy by Heidegger, and the reception and transformation of Western philosophy by Nishida Kitaro, Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) and Mutai Risaku. However, Hong’s concept of “dialectical existence” has a special context, namely the context of Taiwan under the colonization of Japan. Different from the Kyoto School itself, Hong’s philosophy is historically significant as the alienation of Western modern philosophy in Taiwan. In this paper, I shall first describe studies of Hegel in the 1930s, and explain the difference between Nishida’s and Mutai’s reading of Hegel. Then I turn to discuss how Mutai’s study of Hegel and “logic of the expressive world” influenced Hong’s concept of “dialectical existence”. Finally, I shall reflect on Hung’s philosophy in the context of the development of philosophy in East Asia.

This article shall explicate the theory and praxis of how to live with others under conventional norms in the Zhuangzi. The theoretical aspect is explicated by analyzing the amplitudinal quality of the movements performed by two types of characters─a bodily deformed figure (the ideal person) and a ritually formed figure (his foil). The main difference between the two is the absence of chengxin (成心，the completed heart-mind) in the former and its presence in the latter. A person restricted by chengxin adheres strictly to conventional norms in order to avoid criticism. By contrast, a person not restricted by chengxin deals with these norms in an adaptive and creative manner. Because of this difference, the movements of a person restricted by chengxin have a narrow amplitude, and so they exhibit inflexibility and stubbornness, while the movements of the ideal person have a wide amplitude and therefore manifest flexibility and creativity. The key to self-transformation is, then, to live without the restriction of chengxin, to concretely exhibit such flexibility concerning norms. To approximate such a state, one can adopt the practical strategy of what I call “Dao-embodying posing”. Roughly put, in imitating the wide amplitude manifested in the movements of the ideal person, one gains flexibility in social interaction and creativity in one’s own life.

This paper shall explain and evaluate Gao Panlong’s criticism of Wang Yangming’s philosophy. Compared to his criticism of Wang’s followers, Gao’s criticism of Wang himself is rather mild: much of his objection is to the concept of wushan wu’e. With respect to his own account of gongfu, however, Gao actually incorporates some of Wang’s crucial ideas. Furthermore, he reverts to the Cheng-Zhu position when reflecting on Wang’s understanding of xin. So, through a careful reading of relevant texts, this paper shall specify Gao’s modifications of Zhu’s and Wang’s philosophy respectively and, on that basis, evaluate the coherence of his reconciliation between the two thinkers.

Nietzsche ascribes to Herder’s views on aesthetics and further develops the connection between aesthetics and freedom. He advocates an aesthetic realization of a “human of nature” (Naturmensch) echoing Rousseau’s call for getting “back to nature.” The concept of nature in Nietzsche’s aesthetics leads us towards a non-moralism beyond good and evil, its purpose being to liberate the body from Christian asceticism. Nietzsche celebrates the virtuosity of the Renaissance and takes Goethe’s combination of “noble upbringing” and “bodily dexterity” as an example of aesthetically transforming the “binary opposition of good and evil” into the “non-moralism of good and bad.” Cultivated individuals, like artistic geniuses, are good at mobilizing the multiple forces intrinsic and extrinsic to the body, without excluding the bad; yet, they still recognize the contingency in their destinies. In modernity, which is essentially self-destructive, conflicting forces, capable of destroying life, in effect become the source of innovative lifestyles. Free play is the main form of artistic activity and a sign of life’s vitality. This paper takes the relationship between power, nature and freedom as a lens through which to explore the following questions: Does the power of artistic liberation manifest and reinforce subjectivity or is it actually a process of desubjectification? If artistic activities involve individual liberation, is there any dimension of political freedom involved therein as well? What is the relationship between Nietzsche’s aesthetic ideas and critiques of the Enlightenment?

John Rawls systematically explored and tried to solve the problem of stability; that is, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, how can citizens be motivated so that they will accept and comply with social institutions voluntarily to maintain a just and well-ordered society? In Political Liberalism, Rawls proposed the argument of overlapping consensus. He argued that citizens who affirm different reasonable comprehensive doctrines would agree to “justice as fairness” and use this political conception of justice to regulate major social institutions. Based on this consensus, citizens will voluntarily comply with relevant norms and ensure social stability.This essay shall explore whether the argument of overlapping consensus can successfully solve the problem of stability in a pluralistic society. First, I shall explain the problem of stability with which Rawls was concerned. Second, I shall explain why Rawls gave up the argument for stability in A Theory of Justice and why he proposed the argument of overlapping consensus. Third, I shall analyze how Rawls argued that such a consensus can solve the problem of stability. Fourth, I shall examine and criticize the argument of overlapping consensus. By exploring how this argument fails, I shall point out how any argument appealing to principles of social justice fails to solve the stability problem successfully. Finally, I shall propose a preliminary form of the argument for stability based on moral psychology. This argument is not only compatible with Rawls’s claims but is also theoretically defensible.