This essay aims to discuss the concept of body in the Mozi through the investigation on self-cultivation. First of all, this essay tries to indicate that the body in the Mozi is constructed by‘xing (形, “body”) ─xin (心, “heart”) ─ qi ( 氣, “energy”)’which is in accord with the Pre-Qin thinkers’ understanding to the body. While xing refers to the flesh-bloody part of human being, the concept of xin focuses on the aspect of cognition and is closely related to the concept of shan (善, “goodness”), ai (愛, “love”), zhi (志, “will”) and xing. Despite the concept of qi has not been fully developed in the Mozi, it remains significant in understanding On Dyeing (〈所染〉). Based on this framework on the body, we could assert that the cultivated body which implied in the Mozi is not merely a physical body constituted by flesh and blood, but an integration of mind and body. Through the cultivation (gong-fu 工夫), the physical-mental state of the practitioners will then begin to transform. This essay reveals that the domain of gong-fu should not be restricted in the immanent cultivation of xin-xing ( 心性, “mental disposition”). Regardless of using the approaches of inside-out or outside-in, any practice could change one’s thought and behavior could be regarded as “gong-fu”. Thus, this essay generalizes six kinds of gong-fu from the Mozi, namely qu (去, “removing”), fan-zhi-shen (反之身, “self-reflecting and self-justificating”), li-zhi (立志, “determining”), li-shi (力事, “performing one’s duty”), xue (學, “learning”) and bian (辯, “debating”). This essay concludes that the purpose of self-cultivation on the Mozi is to establish an ideal model of Mohism, so as to promote benefits and eliminate harms for the society. This interpretation of body complies with three dimensions, which are zhi-wu-yu-e-zhi-shen (知無欲惡之身, “the body with intelligence neither desiring nor disliking anything”), li-yong-zhi-shen (力勇之身, “the body with power and bravery”) and jiao-li-zhi-shen (交利之身, “the body with mutual aid”).

In general, people think Annotations to Taijitu or Tongshu (Penetrating the Scripture of Change) were influenced by Zhongyong and Commentary to The Book of Changes. Therefore, the dingjing skill and thought of Zhou Dun-Yi were also considered to be originated from Zhongyong or Commentary to The Book of Changes. However, based on my previous research “Influence of the Guanzi’s Dingjing Thought upon Zhou Dun-Yi’s dingjing Skill: From Perspectives of Thought and Structure of Zhu Dan-Xi’s Triad Melancholy Theory,” it showed that the implementation and discourse system of “with tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance, the world can enjoy benevolence and righteousness” in the Guanzi could certainly correspond to the argument of “one settles himself in moderation, benevolence and justice.” As a result, the concept of moderation in Annotations to Taijitu could interpret from the viewpoint of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance” in Neiye (Internal Work) of the Guanzi and be understood more concisely from another perspective.Therefore, the author first organized the interpretations of Liu Ji-Shan and Mo Zong-San, compared with several viewpoints of Japanese scholars Hiroshi Ogiwara and Takehiko Okada and achieve a possible explanation of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance” in Neiye. On the one hand, the concept could logically cover the argument of Ogiwara who interpreted moderation as “utmost righteousness.” On the other hand, it could satisfy the form of the so-called “no tranquility existing without moderation, benevolence and justice” of Zhuzi in philosophical documents. As in the mode of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance,” we could place the doctrine of emphasizing tranquility of Zhou Dun-Yi in the moderation concept and expand the strength of Zhou Dun-Yi’s theory of self-cultivation through the implementation mode of “inner tranquility and outer respect.” Thus, the concepts of “tranquility in mind” and “without desire” contain ontological significance, and are comparable to the cosmological discussion of Zhou Dun-yi.

Scottish philosophy and intellectual history have become the increasingly fashionable fields of academic studies. Alexander Broadie, one of the pioneers and an accomplished scholar of the Scottish Enlightenment, returns to the basic question, namely, “what is Scottish philosophy?”, and presents a comprehensive work on the history of Scottish philosophy. Broadie successfully elucidates the nature and significance of Scottish philosophy both historically and philosophically. He argues that Scottish philosophy must be studied in its historical context, for it is not only a philosophical enterprise but also a persistent tradition which has united the Scottish nation for centuries. The advancements in science, literature, politics, and culture in Scotland would be extremely unlikely, if not impossible, without such an intellectual culture established by thinkers in that tradition. This article is intended as a review of Broadie’s A History of Scottish Philosophy in the background of his shifting academic interests from philosophy to history while he holds the professorship in University of Glasgow. His commitment to Scottish philosophical culture deserves the attention of contemporary historians and philosophers, for his work opens up a space for

Based on the author’s previous research on the dingjing skill in Zhou Dun-Yi’s “a saint settles himself to moderation, benevolence and justice”. This paper attempts to investigate the argumentation and structures of Zhang Zai’s On Moderation. With the evidence of textual analysis and related research, I found that the magnificent philosophical thought of On Moderation certainly has thinking and structures corresponding with Zhou Dun-Yi’s “one settles himself to moderation, benevolence and justice.”The main idea of this paper is that the context of On Moderation in fact has the theses of “moderation”→ “etiquette”→ “four nos”→ “sincerity”→ “implementing benevolence at ease, being fond of benevolence and disliking cruelty.” The argumentation and logic of these theses truly interlinked with the practical logic of Zhou Dun-Yi’s “one settles himself to moderation, benevolence and justice.” Additionally, to take a look at its profound argumentation, the “moderation” concept of Zhang Zai could be restored to the original form of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance.” Furthermore, on the basis of the practical thought, Zhang Zai further skillfully introduced the concept of “benevolence, justice, courtesy, wisdom and sincerity” through Mencius Jinxin. Upon making a thorough investigation, we conclude Zhang Zai’s dedication of deducing the practical structure of “benevolence → justice → sincerity → courtesy → wisdom” from the theses of “sincere belief”→ “being studious”→ “courtesy and wisdom”. We can thus know that Zhang Zai not only responded to the content of the dingjing skill of Zhou Dun-Yi, but also made important academic contributions in elucidating the Confucian Philosophy.

Smith (2003) proposes a dispositional account of alternative possibilities, called New Dispositionalism, to resist Frankfurt’s claim that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities (or the ability to do otherwise). He argues that, in Frankfurt’s case (1969), the agent’s alternative possibility is masked by the intervener, but it is nevertheless a present alternative possibility. Frankfurt’s case, hence, is not a genuine counterexample to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities at all. However, according to Cohen and Handfield (2007), Smith’s account is shown to be untenable for the reason that it does not work for all Frankfurt-type examples unless it is implausibly committed to intrinsic finks. In this paper, I argue that Cohen and Handfield’s criticism is not conclusive since it presupposes the debatable conditional analysis of dispositions.

《莊子•天道》中輪扁斲輪故事，看似旨在說明技藝之不可言傳性；若連結到其他論及技藝與語言之《莊子》篇章來看，如此詮釋誠然有跡可循，而在現代學界也確實傾向以此脈絡來理解或應用輪扁之故事。鑒於《莊子•天道》中，另有其他段落以「書」為題，本文擬從《莊子•天道》整章的脈絡來探討輪扁故事之旨趣。本文將根據輪扁故事中有關書的問題，分別探究：書的功能何在？為何批判書？書中少了什麼？依據《莊子•天道》提供之線索探討上述諸問題時，可以發現輪扁之故事應視為政治論述之一環；換言之，技藝與語言等議題，或許無關於其宏旨。

Mozi’s theory of Jian Ai was reconstructed under the form of western philosophy by many scholars. However, I discover that Mozi used different kinds of argumentations to justify Jian Ai concerning different audience. When facing the opponent, Mozi justified Jian Ai by refuting arguments. And he encouraged supporter’s faith through publicizing the principle of reciprocity. However, the practical spirit of Jian Ai is not elucidated by the principle of refutation and reciprocity. This research tries to figure out the practical spirit of Jian Ai from Mozi. My conclusion is that to practice Jian Ai is the value itself. Regardless of any additional benefit, action of Jian Ai is morality. Moral practice is originated from Jian Ai. Although the realistic benefit is limited by causality the practical spirit of Jian Ai is intact.

本文透過遊魚之喻以解釋《莊子》哲學。我提出要掌握遊魚之喻的意義，必須要探討魚與水之間的關係。本文共分五節。首先，我就既有的解讀方法，也就是分別論魚與論水的譬喻作一概要說明，並指出此一進路在解釋莊書中「道」的概念上的不足。接著，我提出「承給（承擔、給予）意義」，一個替代「價值／意義」的語辭，來發掘遊魚之喻所隱涵的關鍵：立足之地。在第三節，我循承給意義來進行關於遊魚之喻的解讀。第四節透過「脆弱性」的概念，來解釋我們在成心主導下所失去的一種自然能力。我也透過討論莊書中嬰兒與渾沌這兩個對比形象，來說明脆弱性的導引作用。最後，我總結，莊書提供深具實踐意義的建議，讓人─尤其是身處涵蘊多元價值之現代社會的你我─在所處情境中不懈因應，在任一既定社會脈絡內展開充實的生活，採取具創造性的態度去發掘社會世界中的無限可能性。

The description of the flow of Qi (氣) in Yi Jing (Book Of Changes)’s “Xian Gua” includes emphasizes not only natural creation but also human culture. From the courting and marriage between men and women, develop the everlasting ethics of the relationship between husband and wife, and at the same time implying that even though they are not one in the same, there is a relationship between the relationship between males and females and also reproduction and change in the universe. This is the basic framework that makes up the theory of correspondence. It is worth noting that Xunzi “Talueh” is the first none Chinese writing to put an emphasises on couple’s ethics and in actually this correspondence theory and the Yi Jing “Xian Gua” are complementary.This paper delves Xunzi’s multidirectional approach to correspondence in the writings of Xunzi, such as: “Fei Xiang” (〈非相〉), “Xing E” (〈性惡〉), “Li Lun” (〈禮論〉) and “Tian Lun” (〈天論〉), and also the interaltionship between corresponce and Qi (氣), human nature, emotion (qing 情), man-made (wei 偽), empathy (du 度), participate (can 參), shen-ming (神明) and so on. Forming a dynamic and coherent correspondence theory system consisting of three layers in sequence: First, explain the concrete realization course and practical work of auto-affection; Second, elucidate the common feeling and ethical significance implied in the process of self-induction with others; Third, to tell the real human experience and response to the nature, the universe, and the ultimate reality.

In “Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason” (Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793), Kant points out that personality itself (die Persönlichkeit selbst) always comes along with the idea of a moral law of respect (Achtung) which is intelligence affecting feeling caused only by pure practical. And Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of feeling and Achtung elucidates the ontological relation between moral feeling and personality (Heidegger calls this the essence of the human or subjectivity).This paper discusses Heidegger’s Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik and Die Grundfrage der Phänomenologie, specifically, the phenomenological interpretation of moral feeling and the concept of Achtung. The purpose of this paper is to understand how Heidegger relates Achtung to the essential constitution of being of the human, and thereby to grasp the significance of Achtung for the actual construction of the self.

在面對風險轉換案例的時候，一般人直覺上覺得，這些案例顯示，諸如風險這類的實用因素（pragmatic factors）對我們判斷某個主體是否擁有知識，扮演非常重要的角色。這個觀察似乎會跟智性主義（intellectualism）的主張有所衝突。根據智性主義，當我們判斷某個主體是否擁有知識的的時候，實用因素並不是需要考量的因素。這篇文章發展一個知識判斷理論，可以調和我們對風險轉換案例的直覺判斷跟智性主義的衝突。筆者將論證，實用因素不會直接影響我們的知識判斷，而只會通過影響我們的知性角度（epistemic perspective），間接地影響我們的知識判斷。

The main topic of the paper concerns “research methodologies in Chinese philosophy.” It looks like we are talking about more than one methodology. In this paper, I point out that the researcher’s concern plays an important role in academic judgment. Different researchers’ concerns lead to different stances and methods. And different stances and methods in turn lead to different conclusions. What I coin as “the researcher’s concern” might be provisionally understood as a sort of meta-motivation (something that motivates motives). I suggest that among these different concerns we may seek something common. This something common could then be the basis for a public network, which functions as an integrative mechanism encompassing and addressing those different concerns. This paper argues that “seeking truth” should be the common concern of research. It further argues that with this as the basis, the traditional mode of research, being concerned with the meaning of the text, should be integrated with the present concern with how to practice Chinese philosophy after modernity.

It is easy for modern academic research to challenge and even reject the traditional views of Buddhism. The denial of certain sutras, and also the rejection of Mahayana Buddhism, are cases in point. Various Pan Jiao (判教, “doctrinal classifications”) are untenable under the inspection of historical and philological study; Wu Shi Jiao Pan in Tiantai Buddhism is an instance. This article attempts to present six points to further explore this. First, I argue that there is certainly a conflict between the orientation of academic research and the practice of faith. Second, in terms of level of knowledge, while the academic approach has the upper hand, it is not the sole valid perspective for understanding Buddhism. Third, the religiosity of Dharma is concerned with facilitating the extradition of different humans. In this sense, the timing in the “five-stage distinction” emphasizes causes and conditions no less than chronological order. Fourth, the traditional view toward Buddhist teachings still has its value, insofar as the logic of belief provides a rational basis for this view. Fifth, Quan (權) and Shi (實) form better evaluative standards and criteria than correctness and objectivity. Finally, this study argues that it is better to hold a pluralistic and open attitude for interpreting Buddhist history. In this way, the five-stage distinction, while a “historical distortion” for an objective scholar, is actually “religious correctness” for the Buddhist practitioner. Even if it is an error, it is a “beautiful error.”

This paper brings to light the two types of subjectivity implied in Zhuangzi’s modes of judgment. A person who has a “Fixed Subject” or fixed sense of self uses chengxin, or a thought pattern developed over time to think. This thought pattern develops over three stages; the subjective self comes to be fixed from this process. Through this analysis, the mode of judgment can be schematized as “chengxin → standardization → value of judgment → self.” From this process the subject has an “established” and “fixed” existence. A person who is an “Empty Subject” uses jingxin or sees things as they actually are. This mode of judgment also undergoes a three-stage formation/development, in which “the other” allows the subject to apprehend reality as it is in itself. The steps in such a judgement are: “jingxin → standard of differentiation → value of judgment → ziran (something in itself).” Under this mode, the self is “empty” or selfless and eternally “flowing”. These two modes present the subjectivity that Zhuangzi rejects and prefers respectively.

The article rethinks the meaning of “Xiaoyao” in Guo Xiang’s philosophy. First, I provide a novel interpretation of Guo Xiang’s Commentary on Zhuangzi. Then, I analyze his Commentary by applying key concepts in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Guo Xiang incorporated Zhuangzi’s philosophy into his own. He believes that every individual can achieve “Xiaoyao,” but only if each person forgets both what is beyond the reach of one’s nature and desires not belonging to oneself. The Sage King does not impose his own ideas on the people, and thus he guides the people to achieve the state of “Xiaoyao.” Guo Xiang’s philosophy, by demonstrating that everyone can achieve “Xiaoyao” in articulating how the abstract reasoning in Zhuangzi has practical application, greatly contributed to the popularity of Taoist Philosophy.

In this paper I discuss Xiangshan’s unity of two minds in order to explore its ethical implications and the roots of its philosophical history. The two minds mean Dao mind and human mind, and the so-called one mind is the unity of the two. And this unity in my paper is regarded as the one-mind’s rise or fall by the interpretation of Tang Junyi（唐君毅）, and as a concept of self to combine two minds in according to Xiangshan’s text, the unity is a self who makes a decision for or against his original mind, thus it is two beginnings of the same mind. In a word, the mind rises when the self’s decision conforms with his original mind, and the same mind falls when his decision violates it. In according to the concept of self the possibility of human’s moral norm and responsibility can be explained. The distinction between the two minds is established by a transcendental analysis of their respective conceptual content, and the point is to reveal the character of original mind. But the concept of original mind doesn’t demonstrate the whole but only a part of moral consciousness, because it doesn’t imply the possibility of evil and thus fails to explain the concept of evildoer and the possible responsibility for his evil. The concept of the self indicates the two beginnings of the human consciousness and as such constitute the whole of moral consciousness: the original mind is mine, and I am also the evildoer, thus the self is nothing but the ultimate subject for the possibility of good and evil. The above analysis is based on the Mencius text quoted by Xiangshan. That is, Xiangshan’s two minds in one, in both its ethical implications and philosophical history, is dependent on his interpretation of Mencius text.

Zhu Xi, remarkably, approved of Cheng Yi’s saying, “it is considered not benevolent （仁, “ren”） if one does not acknowledge justice (義, “yi”) and reason (理, “li”).” The purpose of this paper is to understand their agreement by explicating the deeper meaning of Cheng Yi’s concept of “yi and li” by reflecting on the practical aspects of this concept. Why is it not considered benevolent if one did not acknowledge yi and li？ What sort of yi and li relates to ren? And finally, in their relation to ren, how do yi and li relate to one another to be morally significant?This paper will first interpret the notion of yi in Confucius and Mencius to clarify its relation to ren. Then, on this basis, it will examine the sayings of Cheng Yi’s neo-Confucian comtemporaries, in particular, the arguments of Zhou Dun-Yi, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao, and Cheng Yi’s other teachers and friends. The purpose is to clarify, in the larger context of the development of neo-Confucianism, what Cheng Yi inherited from Pre-Qin thought on ren and yi, and what he transformed and elaborated.After the above preparation, this paper will discuss Cheng Yi’s interpretation of Mencius’ “cultivation of qi （ 氣, “energy” ） and the accumulation of yi” because the peculiarity of Cheng Yi’s theory of the Heaven-Man relationship comes to light in that interpretation. In other words, although Cheng Yi emphasized one principle with many manifestations which influenced the development of Zhu Xi’s doctrine of li and qi, from the perspective of cosmology, Cheng Yi’s framework, like Zhou Dun-Yi and Zhang Zai, also contains the potential of thinking Heaven as benevolent and humans as having the character of yi (i.e. the idea in Guanzi). Section four thus entertains this possibility and explores how Cheng Yi’s concept of “yi and li” can be articulated in terms of actualizing an individual principle of yi on earth with the universal principle of ren in Heaven in the background.The results of this study can address Wei Zheng-Tong’s critique that Cheng Hao’s doctrine of benevolence, in cancelling the subject-object relationship, neglects the practical question of when to sacrifice one’s life for the sake of yi. At the same time, “yi and li” in Cheng Yi crucially supplements and strengthens the understanding of how Cheng Hao’s doctrine of ren is effective as moral practice. This result provides the pivotal link that shows the systematic coherence of the samadhi skills “zhong-zheng（中正, “moderation”）, ren, and yi.”

This article examines three aporias (difficult problems) encountered by Zeng Tian-Zong (1910-2007) in his notion “Knowledge of Ideal of Truth” or “Philosophical Knowledge”, and proposes a possible answer to these problems based on the clues and guarantees he provides. On the reading proposed here, while these problems turn out to not be genuine difficulties, examination of these aporias in his knowledge of the ideal of truth, better elucidates the nature of his “Knowledge of Ideal of Truth” as well as the content and direction of his philosophical system of Aletheiology.

Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s recent work, Kant's Power of Imagination, is a response to the neglect of “the power of imagination” in the Kantian circle. In this 102-page book, Horstmann analyzes passages relevant to imagination in Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment in detail, with the aim of making Kant’s theory of imagination coherent. He argues for the unique contribution of imagination in the context of the constitution of cognitive objects. Horstmann proposes a “two-stage model of constructing cognitive objects” in his examination of the irreplaceable function and special position of imagination in the cognitive process, and from this, he argues that imagination is an independent, self-standing cognitive faculty. Since imagination is an independent cognitive ability, at least in the context of theoretical philosophy and epistemology, Kant scholars have no reason to ignore it.