Judith Butler maintains that the universality of the precarity of life confirms the interdependence of lives. Such interdependence makes us fundamentally responsible for the lives of Others. Through the application of Marx’s critique of capitalism as ontological degradation, we ask whether the notions of a life and of lives as Butler outlines them in her recent works are adequate to ground moral understanding and practice, or whether, the manner in which human lives produce and reproduce themselves within the capitalist context (now being globalized) problematizes the revision of the ethical. We therefore expand from her claim that “moral theory has to become social critique if it is to know its object and act upon it” (Butler, 2004).

Current struggles over laws prohibiting and criminalizing the public disclosure of violence in the spaces of animal use in the US have underscored the centrality of exposés to animal activism. This article complicates the activist belief in the power of exposure—“If slaughterhouses had glass walls . . .”—by drawing on the insights of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir concerning the prevalence of bad faith in systems of oppression and exploitation. I describe four forms of bad faith common to these systems, and offer suggestions for exposés of the animal enterprise modeled on Sartre’s and de Beauvoir’s “engaged exposés.”

This paper explores the historical conditions under which the object of humanitarian discourse is conceived and organized. What is problematic about this discourse is not only the alarming reality of humanitarianism’s intertwinement with militarism and political power, but also the calculated arbitrariness of redress that brings into question which norms guide public articulations of victims’ suffering. By questioning how a specific understanding of the other is formed, this paper aims to draw attention to the inconsistencies associated with the problematic relation between witnessing atrocities and the moral responses that this should entail.

Taking the work of Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala, Hermeneutic Communism, as a point of departure, this essay explores the concept of pensiero debole (weak thought) and its application to progressive contemporary Latin American governments, which the authors describe as “communist in spirit.” The essay embraces pensiero debole as a method to disagree with Vattimo and Zabala’s assessment and to contrast the policies of state capitalism carried out by those governments to the praxis of anti-systemic social movements engaged in a reformulation of territorial autonomy consonant with what John Holloway calls Change the World Without Taking Power.

Drone warfare, particularly in the form of targeted killing, has serious legal, moral, and political costs so that a case can be made for an international treaty prohibiting this type of warfare. However, the case would be stronger if it could be shown that killing by drones is inherently immoral. From this angle I explore the moral significance of two features of this technology of killing: the killing is done by remote control with the operators geographically far away from the target zone and the killing is typically the outcome of a long process of surveillance. I argue that remote control killing as such might not be inherently wrong but poses the risks of globalizing conflict and prioritizing troop protection above civilian safety, while the “deadly surveillance” aspect of drone killing makes it most clearly intrinsically wrong.

We are facing a terrifying moment in human history, but also a miraculous moment. At the very time when climate change threatens our species with extinction, we not only know that we face an existential threat, we have the means not only to avert catastrophe, but to provide virtually everybody on our planet with the material means for decent life. This paper asks, and attempts to answer, a series of questions: Why are we not doing what needs to be done? Is there a viable alternative to our current economic order? What then should I do?

Instead of understanding property and rationality individualistically as in capitalism, the ecological crisis makes it imperative that we change the priority to the social/collective point of view. Public goods/commonstock should be the default, and private property should have to be justified. Rationality should be understood not primarily from an individual perspective, but from a social/collective point of view. This does not entail the sacrifice of individual rights and freedom to the collective, but rather the synthesis of the two. Planning and freedom coincide if the planning is democratic, which can only happen in a more egalitarian society.

The paper reflects on the methods democratic systems use for arriving at decisions. The most popular ones are elections where the majority rules and deliberative democracy. I argue that both of these do not measure up to the demands of democracy. Whether we use voting with majority rule or deliberative methods, only a portion of the citizenry is allowed to rule itself; minorities are always excluded. Instead of voting with majority ruler or deliberative methods, I suggest that we employ mediation (ADR) to reach agreement in democratic publics.

Liberation philosophy was born from radical, socialist roots. Yet recent developments by major figures in the tradition, including Enrique Dussel, would appear to position the movement unhelpfully closer to liberalism. The present article argues that this is a misconception, and that Liberation philosophy rather suggests a new ideal for conceptions of political justice, one that also helpfully avoids a number of common objections that dog traditional socialist proposals. The work of John Rawls is used as a dialogical counter point to suggest the relative merits for the new approach Liberation philosophy suggest for socialism.

Extreme monetary policies successfully prevented the “Great Recession” of 2007–2009 from turning into a global depression. However, they did not address the underlying problems in global capitalism. In recent years prominent “insiders” of global capitalism have proposed reforms designed to remedy these defects. I argue that these proposals are inadequate, due in great part to a failure to acknowledge a profound change in the “deep structure” of capitalism. Technological change, which in the past has contributed so much to the dynamism of capitalism development, no longer does so. The need for extreme monetary policies in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2007–2009, the failure of these policies, and the lack of plausible alternatives to them, are all symptoms of an underlying disease beyond cure. A path towards a democratic form of socialism must be forged for the simple yet compelling reason Rosa Luxemburg articulated: it is a matter of socialism or barbarism.

In this paper I argue that Nancy Fraser’s theory of social reproduction is misleading and that the process of exploitation is more central to women’s oppression than Fraser’s theory suggests. I argue that Fraser’s theory of women’s oppression is continuous with her theory of capitalism and political agency. I critique Fraser’s theory of capitalism at a structural level to clarify some of the ambiguity in her position about the difference between production and reproduction. I then compare Fraser’s view with a structural view of class to make my critique and extend it to her theoretical distinction between status and class.

This paper tackles an old, yet persisting philosophical and cultural imaginary that justifies the political subjugation, marginalization and exclusion of distant others through claims that such people are less advanced and cognitively inferior, and therefore remain at the periphery of moral and political considerations of Western political culture. My premise here is that all knowledge is historically conditioned, and as such serves as a discursive formation that mirrors and sustains specific historical forms of social organization and practices. Thus, by considering the interrelated themes of epistemic and social inclusion (and exclusion) of refugees and migrants from a range of critical philosophical perspectives, I argue that successfully managing the dire humanitarian circumstances involved in admitting and receiving displaced and migrant people requires the inclusion of both the bodies of knowledge and discursive interactions (i.e., epistemic inclusion) and also diverse social and cultural perspectives (i.e., social inclusion).

Socialism from a feminist perspective is not an all or nothing blueprint, but rather a vision of degrees of power/freedom that people in a particular society have in economic, political, social and personal relations. Examples are discussed of societies which are more or less socialist in their class, racial/ethnic, and gender equality, power and freedom. Historical changes in affective economic relations of care, love and affection inform such class, race/ethnic, gender and sexual differences. Three types of transitional strategies are relevant for social movements working toward socialism.

This article seeks to develop a concept I term surveillant citizenship, referring to a historically-emergent civic national and moral discourse that prescribes citizen participation in surveillance, policing, and law enforcement. Drawing on philosophy of race, surveillance studies, critical prison studies, and cultural theory, I argue that the ideological projects attached to the ‘War on Crime’ and the ‘War on Drugs’ sought to choreograph white social life around surveillant citizenship—manufacturing consent to police militarization, prison expansion, and mass incarceration, with consequences relevant to the future of antiracist strategy.

In his essay “Critique of Violence,” Walter Benjamin argued that only certain types of strikes can be considered revolutionary, while others—i.e., most bread and butter, or “political” strikes—tacitly rely on the violent logics of the state. This paper suggests, however, that by reading Benjamin against himself and applying his discussion of “pure means” to those “political” strikes, the extent to which even these basic collective actions represent effective “strategies of resistance” becomes evident. This framework requires an interdisciplinary approach to radical labor studies, combining political theory with history in order to identify and analyze past instances of joyful community-building during strikes. Relying also on a historical case study—the 1926 miners’ lockout in South Wales—and Benjamin’s own writings on the discipline of history, this paper contends that strikes, and the “alternative communities” they encourage workers and their families to build, present enormous revolutionary potential. When theory and history are studied together, and when we pay close attention to the actual tactics of solidarity that make up strike actions, this potential is uncovered.

The colonial process constituted a twofold catastrophe. On the one hand, the genocide and enslavement of racialized bodies, along with the large-scale destruction of their lands was a material, or physical, catastrophe. On the other hand, colonialism led to a reconfiguring of intersubjectivities which constituted a “metaphysical catastrophe” according Puerto Rican philosopher Nelson Maldonado-Torres. This metaphysical catastrophe relegates the racialized subject beneath the zones of being and non-being leading to dehumanization and permanent war. This text intends to illuminate ways in which analectical marronage, as an existential state of Being, resists this twofold catastrophe brought about by the imperial enterprise.