Displaying: 1-20 of 120 documents

0.086 sec

1. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 2
Krzysztof Ziarek Trading in Being: Event, Capital, Art
2. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 2
Adam Buben The Perils of Overcoming “Worldliness” in Kierkegaard and Heidegger
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Kierkegaard’s treatment of death has a great deal in common with Heidegger’s notion of “authentic Being-towards-death.” Most importantly, both thinkers argue that an individual’s death, rather than simply annihilating an individual’s life, meaningfully impacts this life while it is still being lived. Heidegger, like Kierkegaard before him, provides an anti-Epicurean account in which life and death are co-present. Despite this kinship, there have been numerous efforts from both the Kierkegaardian camp and from Heidegger himself to distinguish sharply the one from the other. While Heidegger makes several somewhat condescending comments about Kierkegaard’s endeavors, many Kierkegaardians are wary of associating him too closely with Heidegger (and his ample baggage). After a brief description of their largely shared philosophy of death, I would like to consider what I take to be the most significant complaint from each side and suggest a more nuanced understanding of their relationship.
3. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 2
Will McNeill From Destruktion to the History of Being
4. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 2
David Nowell-Smith The Art of Fugue: Heidegger on Rhythm
5. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 2
Texts of Heidegger cited and their abbreviations
6. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 2
François Raffoul The Event of Space: Andrew J. Mitchell, Heidegger Among the Sculptors
7. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 3
Jesús Adrián Escudero Heidegger on Discourse and Idle Talk: The Role of Aristotelian Rhetoric
8. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 3
David Nowell-Smith Sounding/Silence
9. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 3
Sophie-Jan Arrien Faith’s Knowledge: On Heidegger’s Reading of Saint Paul
10. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 3
Raoni Padui From the Facticity of Dasein to the Facticity of Nature: Naturalism, Animality, and the Ontological Difference
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
There have been two prominent ways of thinking about the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism: the first and more traditional way, in continuity with Husserl’s critique of psychologism, exhibits the incompatibility of phenomenology with all forms of naturalism and positivism; the second and more recent interpretive strategy attempts to naturalize phenomenology and make it consistent with current scientific accounts of consciousness and intentionality. In this paper I argue that despite the fact that Heidegger followed the first path and remained critical of naturalism and positivism throughout his career, there are important moments in the late twenties where his project of a phenomenological ontology is challenged by problems pertaining to naturalism. I show how the question of determining the essence of life and animality as well as the overturning of ontology into metontology offer significant methodological hurdles for Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.
11. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 3
Wayne J. Froman Translating Contributions
12. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 3
Hakhamanesh Zangeneh From Jena to Freiburg, via Asia Minor
13. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 3
Texts of Heidegger cited and abbreviations used
14. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 10
Richard Polt Letter from the Editor
15. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 10
Robert Manning The Later Heidegger and the Later Levinas in the Time of Coronavirus
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This article addresses the many ways the philosophies of the later Heidegger and the later Levinas speak to us in the time of the coronavirus pandemic. I argue that the pause in the world’s busy industrial life provides an ideal opportunity for what Heidegger called meditative thinking. The pandemic is also a time both of extreme bodily vulnerability and of extraordinary ethical responsibility for others, and so causes us to hear Levinas’ extreme language in Otherwise than Being about anarchic ethical responsibility and the self as a hostage in a very different way.
16. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 10
Kevin Aho The Uncanny in the Time of Pandemics: Heideggerian Reflections on the Coronavirus
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of Heidegger’s account of “the uncanny” (das Unheimliche) as it relates to the coronavirus pandemic. It explores how the pandemic has disrupted Dasein’s sense of “homelike” (heimelig) familiarity and how this disruption has undermined our ability to be, that is, to understand or make sense of things. By examining our experience of temporality, lived-space, and intersubjectivity, the paper illuminates different ways in which the pandemic has left us confused and anxious about our self-interpretations and future projects. The paper concludes by showing how the uncanny is not simply something we feel in times of crisis; it is, for Heidegger, who we are. This means the secure feeling of familiarity that we embodied prior to the pandemic was an illusion all along, that we are not and never have been at-home in the world.
17. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 10
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, Thomas Sheehan The Unity in the Transformation of Martin Heidegger’s Thinking
18. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 10
David C. Abergel The Confluence of Authenticity and Inauthenticity in Heidegger’s Being and Time
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I argue that there is a confluence of authenticity and inauthenticity inherent to the structure of average everydayness in Being and Time. I support this reading by recasting Heidegger’s notion of fallenness in Being and Time in terms of its precursor, ruinance, which he introduces in his 1921–22 lecture course, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research (ga 61). In this lecture course, Heidegger explains that ruinance is constituted by a dual movement of relucence and prestruction: the former, an intentional openness to the world; the latter, a securing that conceals that openness. While this dual movement is not expressed explicitly in these terms in Being and Time, I show that it is nevertheless tacitly operative in the structure of falling and that it grounds the duality of average everydayness. I frame this study around the debate on how Dasein can be authentic despite its fallenness, given that fallenness paradoxically renders Dasein essentially inauthentic.
19. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 10
Lawrence Berger Attention as the Way to Being
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I argue that staying with the movement of attention is the way to being. For attention moves in response to the appeal of being, which means that being shows itself in that movement. We are thus always already on the way to being, always already listening to its call. But something else is required, a special effort of attending to one’s own movement, a taking-heed (In-die-Acht-nehmen) that enables being to be made manifest in a more profound manner, which can transform our being in the world and associated ethical and political realities.
20. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 10
George Saad The Greek Sources of Heidegger’s Alētheia as Primordial Truth-Experience
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Heidegger develops his reading of a-lētheia as privative unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) in tandem with his early phenomenological theory of truth. He is not simply reinterpreting a word, but rather reading Greek philosophy as having a primordial understanding of truth which has itself been concealed in interpretation. After shedding medieval and modern presuppositions of truth as correspondence, the existential truth-experience shows itself, no longer left puzzlingly implicit in unsatisfactory conventional readings of Greek philosophy. In Sein und Zeit §44, Heidegger resolves interpretive difficulties in Parmenides through his interpretation of alētheia and philologically grounds this reading in Heraclitus’s description of the unconcealing logos. Although this primordial sense of the word has already been obscured in Plato and Aristotle, the structural gradation of their theories of truth conserves the primordial pre-Socratic sense of truth as the experience of unconcealment.