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1. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík Vorwort: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
2. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík Slovo úvodem: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
3. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Daniel Heider Leibnizova Disputatio metaphysica De Principio Individui A F. Suárez: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article examines the first fruit of Leibniz´s philosophical endeavour, which is his baccalaureate thesis Disputatio metaphysica de Principio Individui, on thebackground of the comparison with Suárez´s conception of individual unity in his Disputationes Metaphysicae. Despite Suárez´s more differentiated attitude to the issue of individuation in general, the author is convinced that one can find strong parallels between both authors, namely the following: purely ontological treatment of the problem of the principle of individuation; search for a single principle which is common both to material and nonmmaterial substances; nominalist tendency, which is apparent not only in the positive statements of the two authors, but also in their criticisms of rival solutions in general, and theScotist conception in particular. The similarities are not limited only to the principle of individuation or to the problem of individual unity in general but they also extend to the problem of the distinction between essence and existence, the conception of transcendental unity and its relation to ens, or to the problem of reification of hylemorphic components of material substances.
4. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík G. Frege a aristotelská ontologie vztahů: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The doctrine put forth by G. Frege and now almost universally accepted, according to which a predicate expressing a relative notion has to be supplemented by two (or more) subjects, in order for a statement to arise, appears to be a source of certain difficulties. In the paper, the author defends the view that this doctrine goes against our natural understanding of language, and shows that as soon as an attempt to determine the extension of such “relative” predicates is made, a contradiction in the doctrine is laid bare.
5. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Lukáš Novák Problém Abstraktních Pojmů: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
6. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Petr Dvořák K modálnímu ontologickému důkazu: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article deals with various modal versions of the ontological argument from N. Malcolm’s to P. Tichý’s interpretation of Anselm’s second proof. Three key presuppositions of the modal proof are pin-pointed and examined. The principal problem with the proof seems to be the notion of necessary existence attributed to God. More precisely, the question is whether this is not too strong an attribute, for then there would not be a situation, i.e. a possible world, consistently thinkable which precludes the existence of God. However, this seems to be wrong.
7. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
M. J. Loux Nutné a možné: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
8. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík, Joannis Caramuel Lobkowitz Nevyužitý pramen k problematice pronikání karteziánství do českých zemí v 17. století: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
9. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík Tomistická teorie predikace: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
10. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Jiří Polívka Sensus Compositionis a Sensus divisionis v kontextu problému modalit v Ordinatio I, 39 Jana Dunse Scota: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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In Ordinatio I, 39 Scotus distinguishes two ways in which the distinction between sensus compostionis and sensus divisionis can be made: According to the first way the „composition and division“ relates to two different (sensus divisionis) or one and the same (sensus compositionis) instants of time; according to the other the distinction is made between an assertion of compossibility of the contradictory predicates in one and the same instant of time (sensus compositionis) and an assertion of actuality of the one and possibility of the other of the contradictory predicates in one and the very same instant of time (sensus divisionis). The author presents a formal logical analysis of all these various senses of modal propositions and shows how Scotus strictly separated modality from temporality, and contingency from mutability.
11. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Anthony Kenny Tomismus papeže Jana Pavla II. Encyklika Fides et ratio: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
12. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Lukáš Novák Sémantika vlastních jmen a identitní teorie predikace: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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Saul Kripke denies that the reference of a proper name is mediated through a sense (an intension, a concept), and claims that it has to be immediate for „rigidity“ of a proper name to be saved. On the other hand, the version of the Identity Theory of predication according to which predication is characterised as intentional identification of the conceptual content of the predicate with the object represented by the subject-concept requires that there be a concept (sense of the term) at the places both of the subject and of the predicate. This paper is an attempt to propose a conception that purports to maintain the Identity Theory of predication with its demand for proper names to have senses and respond to Kripkean arguments while retaining the rigidity of proper names. Two main theses are defended: 1) Whether a term refers rigidly or non-rigidly does not depend on the nature of the term (i. e. whether it is a name or a description), but on the intention of the speaker/writer. Consequently, both names and descriptions can be used both rigidly and non-rigidly. 2) There is a „minimal sense“ to any proper name which can generaly be described as follows: „the person who has been given the name so-and-so“. The expression „has been given the name“ describes a „relation of reason“, which must be strictly distinguished from the relation of reference of the name, in order to avoid a vicious circle in reference determination, something against which Kripke warned.
13. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Petr Dvořák Tomášova Teorie Predikace ve Světle Obecné Sémantické Teorie (Zkrácená Verze): A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
14. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Michal Chabada Rozumová intuícia podl'a Jána Dunsa Scota – základné prístupy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The problem of the intuition of the individual as such, i. e. of its individuality (the „principle of individuation“) gave rise to many controversies. The problem becomes especially urgent in the light of the Christian revelation, since Christianity in the first place relates to the singular and individual (and therefore contingent), whereas the universal assumes only a secondary rôle. John Duns Scotus deals with this theologico-philosophical problem and sets out to defend intellective intuition of the individual as a whole. He distinguishes three kinds within this type of cognition: perfect intuitive intellective cognition which is possible only in patria, direct but imperfect (i. e. not penetrating the principle of individuation) intuitive intellective cognition which relates to contingent truths and spiritual acts, and, finally, imperfect and indirect intuitive intellective cognition, i. e. acts of recalling the past intuitive cognitions. In these three examples the fundamental Scotus’s arguments are exhibited and the extent to which Scotus transgresses the limits of Aristotelian epistemology is made clear.
15. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Miroslav Hanke Insolubilia Novissima: Analysis of an Anonymous Insolubilia-Treatise with a Working Edition
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Insolubilia novissima is a short anonymous fifteenth-century treatise on semantic paradoxes printed in the Cambridge compendium Libellus sophistarum. Along with a working edition of this treatise, basic information about its content and historical and systematic context is offered. Insolubilia novissima endorses the Swyneshedian contextualist solution to paradoxes based on distinguishing between compositional and contextual meaning of sentences.
16. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter Scientific Knowledge and the Metaphysics of Experience The Debate in Early Modern Aristotelianism
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Early modern commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics contain a lively debate on whether experience is ‘rational’, so that it may count as ‘proto-knowledge’, or whether experience is ‘non-rational’, so that experience must be regarded as a primarily perceptual process. If experience is just a repetitive apprehension of sensory contents, the connection of terms in a scientific proposition can be known without any experiential input, as the ‘non-rational’ Scotists state. ‘Rational’ Thomists believe that all principles of scientific knowledge must rely on experiential data, because experience consists in an apprehension of facts rather than objects. And it is only apprehension of facts that can justify knowledge of principles. In this context, the role of mathematical knowledge is special, because it is self-evident. So Thomists must either show that mathematical principles do rely on experience, or that they do not express knowledge claims.
17. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Mark K. Spencer Transcendental Order in Suárez
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Francisco Suárez’s account of the transcendentals in Disputationes Metaphysicae 3 has been noted by Aertsen, Courtine, Darge, and Sanz for its reductionism; Suárez argues that all proposed transcendentals reduce to unum, verum, and bonum. This scholarship overlooks a key feature of Suárez’s account. In addition to providing his own theory, Suárez also works out a meta-metaphysical framework with which it can be shown how any proposed metaphysical item, including those that do not fit into Suárez’s own theory, relates to Being; he also works out rules for ordering these items. The way in which Suárez orders and reduces items related to Being involves several different kinds of reduction, and is more complex than current interpretations allow. Suárez’s framework and rules providea neutral standard for assessing the truth of any theory of transcendentals; this is shown through examining four accounts of the proposed transcendental aliquid using Suárez’s framework and rules.
18. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Rescher Aristotle’s Precept on Precision
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As Aristotle saw it, the modus operandi of nature is frequently irregular and unruly. And this accords with the structure of the universe, with regularity predominant in the trans-lunar realm and regularity prominent in the cis-lunar. This circumstance opens the way to the different sorts of natural laws: those which are strictly universal and those which function only normally and “for the most part.” And knowing to what extent exactness, regularity, and universality can be expected in different areas of inquiry was, for Aristotle, the very touchstone of scientific wisdom and sophistication.
19. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Vlastimil Vohánka Why Peter van Inwagen Does Not Help in Showing the Logical Possibility of the Trinity
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I conceive the Trinity doctrine as the proposition that there are three persons each of whom is God but just one being (substance) which is God. In two papers by Peter van Inwagen I distinguish three potential candidates for a reason that the Trinity doctrine is logically possible. First, a particular conjunction entailing the Trinity doctrine is formally consistent in relative identity logic. Second, the conjunction is formally consistent in the standard logic. Third, the conjunction shares a form in relative identity logic with another logically possible conjunction. I explain how all these three reasons fail because of the distinction between logical possibility and formal consistency. In contrast to previous critiques, I dispense with epistemological and metaphysical assumptions about absolute and relative identity. Instead, I employ modal distinctions endorsed even by the inspirer of van Inwagen’s relative identity of the Trinity — the pioneering analytic scholastic Peter Geach.
20. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Ondřej Sikora Kant a metafyzika K reakci Stanislava Sousedíka na článek „K pozitivnímu významu Kantovy kritiky metafyziky“